Shadows over the European Elections

EU-sceptical Factions and Parliamentarians

The largest of these three is the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. It currently has 73 members from 19 EU member states. In addition to its liberal economic orientation, the ECR originally followed a moderately EU-sceptical model. Accordingly, the majority of its members supported the membership of their coun­tries in the EU, but they called for returning to a focus on the internal market and inter­governmental decision-making procedures. Since 2016 at the latest, however, the UK Conservatives, who have dominated the ECR, have been advocating for Brexit. At the same time, the group has expanded to include MEPs who are more sceptical about the EU. These include the Sweden Democrats, who are in favour of an EU exit ref­er­endum. However, the course of the Brexit negotiations have made it clear that Brexit also threatens the future of the ECR: With the Conservatives leaving the EP, the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party remains the only large party within the ECR.

Even more uncertain is the future of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group, the second smallest group in the EP, with 42 MEPs. It was formed after the 2014 elections and has no common elec­toral manifest. From the outset, it has been a mere alliance of convenience be­tween the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Italian Five Star Movement. The lowest common denominator has been the populist, EU-critical stance and the interest in parliamentary resources for political groups. With Brexit (most likely) happening at the end of March 2019, the 19 UKIP MEPs will exit the EP. This means that the EFDD would no longer be able to claim parliamentary group status, at least before the Euro­pean elections in 2019, because a necessary criterion – namely bringing to­gether at least 25 MEPs – would no longer be fulfilled. In any case, the second pillar of the EFDD – the 14 MEPs of the Five Star Movement – is acting more like an inde­pendent group than as a part of the EFDD, most recently since trying to join the Al­liance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in 2017. In Italy, the party has – at least rhetorically – softened its EU-critical stance. The smaller parties in the EFDD should therefore reorient themselves after the European elections, at the latest.

The ENF group has 35 MEPs, almost half of them from the French National Rally (Rassemblement National, formerly Front National). It is the smallest and youngest group in the EP. Its member parties are characterised by their strict rejection of the EU as a whole and also their right-wing populist to right-wing extremist positions. The ENF is the only one of the three groups in the EU-critical spectrum that is not sig­nificantly affected by Brexit. Several repre­sentatives of the parties in the ENF, such as former ENF MEP and current Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, want to transform the ENF into a movement of EU-critical parties after the European elections.

Finally, there are still 23 non-attached MEPs in the European Parliament, most of whom can be counted towards the EU-sceptical spectrum. These include parliamentarians from the National Democratic Party of Germany and the Hungarian Jobbik party, which have been judged to be so ex­treme by their colleagues that, so far, none of the EU-sceptic groups have wanted to admit them. The future of the AfD in the EP is also in question – it can hope for a double-digit number of MEPs in view of its poll results and the many German par­lia­mentarians. In 2014, the AfD started with seven MEPs as part of the more moderate ECR group. After several internal party splits and exclusion from the ECR, only one AfD member is formally still represented in the EP and sits in the EFDD parliamentary group. A connection to the ENF is also being discussed in the party.

Orbán and the Future of the EPP

But the ambitions for a collective movement are not limited to the existing EU-sceptical factions: Salvini, among others, has invited Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to join an EU-sceptical rally­ing group. Orbán’s Fidesz party has been a member of the EPP since Hungary joined the EU. The EPP sees itself as a pro-Euro­pean party that advocates values such as the rule of law, democracy, and the strength­ening of civil society. Orbán, on the other hand, is pursuing his goal of an “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and has already had the freedom of the press and the activ­ities of foreign non-governmental organi­sations restricted. Orbán is increasingly sceptical about European integration in its current form and criticises the fact that it is interfering too deeply with national sover­eignty. The AfD has declared both Salvini and Orbán, amongst others, as their “natu­ral allies in Europe”. In terms of policies, there are overlaps between Orbáns Fidesz with EU-sceptical, right-wing popu­list par­ties, especially in migration policy, but also with the growing levels of rejection of the current path of European integration.

Until 2018, the EPP leadership had opted for dialogue and rejected EU legal proceedings against Hungary. In September 2018, however, the majority of EPP MEPs voted in favour of initiating such proceedings against Hungary under Article 7 of the TEU, whereas the EU-sceptical groups ECR, EFDD, and ENF voted largely in favour of Fidesz. The EPP leadership and Fidesz stressed after the vote that the party would neither leave the EPP nor be excluded. However, Orbán publicly toyed with the idea of cooperating with national conservative forces. He under­pinned this idea during a meeting with the Lega Nord leader, Salvini, at which time they announced a joint “anti-migration front” and positioned themselves in the same ideological camp. In doing so, they clearly distinguished themselves from Presi­dent Macron. The latter, in turn, attacked the EPP and stressed that one party could not be the political home of Angela Merkel and Viktor Orbán at the same time.

Three Scenarios

It remains open whether, and in which con­stellation, the parties of the EU-sceptical spectrum will cooperate in the next Par­liament. So far, as shown, they have been divid­ed into three smaller groups and a num­ber of non-attached MEPs, who by them­selves have less influence than a larger group. For substantive reasons, there is little likelihood that cooperation will con­tinue to be enforceable in the future. The votes in the course of the last parliamentary term reveal that only the ECR has achieved the status of a group being capable of acting with group discipline.

There are also substantial differences between the EU-sceptical parties. This ap­plies, above all, to three of their core politi­cal issues. First, the parties have quite dif­fer­ent stances towards the EU. The spec­trum still ranges from moderate EU scep­tics, who reject the depth of integration but want to retain the Union as such, to fun­damental EU opponents, whose declared goal is to abolish the Union, or at least lead their country out of it. Secondly, the issue of migration is a matter of disagreement. Northern and Central European populists, for example, reject the distribution of refu­gees, whereas Southern Europeans demand solidarity from their EU partners. Thirdly and finally, a “national international” suf­fers from the fact that the emphasis on national identity and sovereignty contra­dicts European cooperation.

Yet, for reasons of power politics, there is a significant incentive for right-wing popu­lists and EU-critical parties to symbolically underpin their strength after the European elections with a joint parliamentary group that is as large as possible. At the same time, this would give them even more op­por­tunities to demand speaking rights in – and resources from – the EP.

Three possible scenarios for the future development of the right-wing populist and EU-sceptical spectrum after the 2019 elec­tions can be formulated from this mixed situation. Scenario A – a continuation of the status quo with the three fragmented factions – can almost be ruled out. The EFDD, in particular, has been nothing more than an alliance of convenience since it was founded and, during the course of the legis­lative period, it has lost what few ties it had that bound it together. Without UKIP as the main pillar, the remaining parties will tend to turn to other political groups. The Five Star Movement from Italy will play a key role. As the second pillar alongside UKIP, it has already distanced itself in the current legislative period from the EFDD and partly from earlier anti-EU/euro rhetoric. In 2019 it could again increase the number of its MEPs and become one of the largest nation­al parties in the EP.

In scenario B, the EU-sceptical camp would concentrate on two factions along the axis of EU scepticism. Accordingly, the EFDD would disappear, the ECR would take on the rather moderate EU-sceptical, eco­nomically liberal parties, and the ENF would assemble the fundamentally EU-sceptical, globalisation-critical parties within its ranks. In scenarios B and C, we have also included the projection that Macron’s LREM will cooperate with the ALDE, and Mélenchon’s LFI with the Euro­pean Left (GUE/NGL).

According to current forecasts, some 46 EFDD seats would have to be reallocated. This would affect the AfD and the Five Star Movement, in particular. Currently, it seems most plausible that the AfD will join the ENF. The Five Star Movement, on the other hand, has recently weakened its EU‑sceptical position and announced the found­ing of a new group after the 2019 elections. However, it is still completely unclear whether – and with which part­ners – this can succeed. If this does not suc­ceed, the Five Star Movement would probably opt for no faction rather than forming a faction with Salvini in the ENF or strongly value-conservative parties such as the Polish PiS in the ECR. In scenarios B and C, it is therefore still assigned to the inde­pendents.

The ENF should fulfil the necessary condition of having 25 MEPs from at least seven member states. With parties such as the AfD, the French Rassemblement National, the FPÖ, and the PVV now firmly anchored in the national political system, the ENF would have a much more stable composition than before. However, a balance of power and common political goals would have to be found in such a group that is composed of strong parties from Italy, Austria, France, and Germany. This could be a great challenge for the parties, as some of them are dominated by individuals (Italy and France), or shaped by discussions about the political orientation, such as the AfD in Germany.

Without the Conservatives from the UK, the ECR would have to reconstitute itself and would, in the future, be more strongly influenced by Central and Eastern European national conservatives. But the group could continue to play its hybrid role, co­operating with the EPP and ALDE on eco­nomic issues, but adopting a more oppo­sitional stance on issues of European policy and conservative values.

For both groups, there would also be the potential for enlargement in the group of non-attached MEPs and new or as-of-yet unattached parties. Beyond the announcement of the results, it therefore remains interesting to observe which camp could form the larger group in this scenario, the ECR or the ENF. In view of the current fore­casts and the diversity of right-wing parties, scenario B seems to be the most plausible one at the moment.

Finally, in scenario C, the parties involved would – according to Salvini’s or Bannon’s declared goal – be able to form an EU-critical collective group uniting all parties of the EU-sceptical spectrum. According to Salvini’s vision, this should not only include the parties of the ECR, the EFDD, and the ENF, but also win the sup­port of the right wing of the EPP, above all that of Viktor Orbán.

In numerical terms, such a collective move­ment would certainly have the poten­tial to become the largest, or second largest, group in the EP. For this to happen, how­ever, the serious political differences between these parties would have to be bridged. A taboo break would also be necessary with regard to cooperation between the previous right wing of the EPP, the ECR, and the tough opponents of the EU. Although this scenario cannot be completely ruled out, it is more likely that the ENF will become stronger and gradually try to poach parties from the ECR or EPP. It will also be inter­esting to see whether parties considered to be clearly right-wing extremists will be in­vited to become members of a collective faction.