Germany, the EU and Global Britain: So Near, Yet So Far

Self-promotion As a Global Leader

Then-Prime Minister Theresa May had already launched the narrative of Global Britain to frame post-Brexit British foreign policy (SWP-Comment 24/2018). Her suc­cessor, Boris Johnson, wants to assert the UK as an independent global leader after Brexit.

With the Integrated Review, the Johnson government concretised its idea of Global Britain in March 2021. It builds upon four main aspects: 1) a more active use of part­nerships and alliances, 2) the UK’s role as a “global champion of free and fair trade”, 3) an independent foreign policy that inte­grates research and development, development cooperation, and “soft power”, 4) a security and defence policy with global reach.

The level of ambition of Global Britain is (rhetorically) high: The UK sees itself as a “game changer nation”, “an even stronger force for good in the world”, and a “science and tech superpower”. After leaving the EU, it wants to take independent decisions on international issues – for example, as a pioneer against climate change – and also be an agenda setter, such as when it im­posed swift sanctions against Belarus in the summer of 2020.

Rejection of the EU As a Foreign Policy Partner and Actor

So far, the British government has rejected foreign and security policy cooperation with the EU. Although cooperation with individual EU states, particularly France and Germany, has been largely successfully decoupled from Brexit, cooperation with the EU as an institution has suffered sig­nificantly. In January 2020, Prime Minister Johnson signed the (legally non-binding) political declaration on future EU-UK rela­tions together with the withdrawal agree­ment. Among other things, it stated the goal of a close “security partnership”. This was to include regular exchanges in for­eign, security, and defence policy; coordination on sanctions; and the participation of the UK in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations.

Nothing of this remained in the negotiation of the future 2020 relationship. A few days after signing the political declaration, the British government published its nego­tiating mandate, in which it no longer en­visaged institutionalised cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy. The word “defence” and references to cooperation in this area were missing. Subsequently, although a supplementary agreement on the exchange of confidential information was attached to the TCA, co­operation in foreign and security policy is entirely missing. There are no plans for an exchange on these issues in the EU-UK institutions created by the TCA, such as the EU-UK Partnership Council. Although US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently attended the EU Council of Foreign Minis­ters as a guest, London rejects this form of cooperation.

In the Integrated Review, London also omits the EU as a partner in foreign and secu­rity policy; it is mentioned only as a partner in climate policy. Moreover, the FCDO has denied the EU ambassador in London diplomatic recognition, arguing that this would set a precedent for other inter­national organisations. This is not very convincing, especially since not only do all the other third countries with EU delegations (140 of them) recognise their ambas­sa­dors, but the UK also worked with the EEAS until it left the EU. In his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2021, Boris Johnson outlined a “Global Britain” that advocates the strengthening of the West and the multilateral world order, but in which the EU does not feature in foreign and security policy.

The outlook for defence policy is similarly bleak. The EU offered the UK to participate in CSDP operations or projects of the Per­manent Structured Cooperation under the regular conditions of third countries. Even the US is now seeking the latter. The British government, however, has rejected all pos­sibilities.

Possible Formats

As a consequence, cooperation between the UK and EU countries in foreign and security policy currently takes place primarily in flex­ible formats. These can be used by Ger­many and others in their mutual interest of keeping London within the European framework on international issues, of pre­venting external attempts at division, and at the same time maintaining links to the EU. The following formats are the most promising.

The currently much-discussed E3 format of France, the UK, and Germany originated in 2003 during the negotiations on the nu­clear agreement held with Iran, but it had lost visibility thereafter. Since 2016, its im­portance has increased: It is seen as a way to ensure foreign policy coordination between the three big European countries despite Brexit, to give impetus to the weak CFSP, and to coordinate the difficult inter­actions with former US President Donald Trump. Meetings became more frequent, the range of topics broadened (beyond EU issues: from the South China Sea to the poisoning of former agent Sergei Skripal), defence ministers also met, and partners were involved. The E3 format allows Lon­don to be linked to EU decisions without an institutional agreement and to coordi­nate positions (beyond EU issues) and joint action.

However, non-involved EU states fear an exclusive and non-transparent format that threatens to undermine European unity, fails to take into account the interests of other states, or even dictates decisions as a directorate. To counter these fears, the nuclear negotiations with Iran were linked to the EU through the strong role of the High Representative, but he has been mis­sing in the most recent revitalisation. It is also important to prevent London from labelling a successful E3 as a failure of EU foreign policy and from fuelling the rejec­tion to work directly with the EU.

In terms of results and acceptance, an issue-specific temporary extension of the E3 seems to be the most promising approach: E3+X. When debating the Eastern neighbour­hood, Poland could participate, for exam­ple. For EU-NATO cooperation, E3 + NATO Secretary General + EU High Repre­sentative would make sense. Berlin and Paris should also push to associate the High Representative in order to strengthen the EU’s legitimacy. He could represent the interests of the EU and act as a “watchdog” for the positions of the other EU states.

The Quad – in this case Germany, France, the UK, plus the US – has worked well in the past at the level of the political directors to ensure information exchange and coordination. Since US Secretary of State Blinken took office, the four foreign ministers have also met several times in a Quad formation, for example on Iran, Myan­mar, and China.

As with the E3, the challenge for the Quad is that other EU states are criticising their lack of participation, most notably Italy, Poland, and Spain. They rightly point out that on certain issues, they can bring as much or more influence or expertise to bear as the E3, for example with regard to the Southern neighbourhood. The US has long avoided the term “Quad” for fear of such complaints. London’s focus on the E3 and Quad seems to point to a British under­standing of politics that relies on the US and large states instead of looking for relevant actors on an issue-by-issue basis. Berlin should not adopt this interpretation. Rather, it should insist on a temporary, issue-specific expansion of the Quad, as in the case of the E3, therefore ensuring the inclusion of the interests of the partners and the EU.

At the global level, the G7 is another flexible format for coordinating foreign and security policy. London is using the format for that function during its 2021 G7 presi­dency, an approach that the new adminis­tration in Washington eventually supported. The advantage here is that the EU is already a G7 member, and the High Representative was also involved in the G7 Foreign Minis­ters’ Declarations. After the UK, Germany will take over the G7 presidency in 2022 and could continue to use the format for foreign and security policy.

NATO remains the central military policy forum for European and transatlan­tic coordination. It is in the mutual interest of Germany and the UK to keep Britain as a strong and reliable partner in the Alliance. From a German perspective, EU defence initiatives support NATO obligations and increase Europe’s capacity to act. NATO-EU cooperation should thus be used to link the UK with EU defence. However, attempts to undermine EU defence initiatives or to play off the EU and NATO against each other must be prevented.

In parallel, Germany should strive for bilateral coordination with London where it suits its own interests and strengthen it through regular exchanges. For example, bilateral and minilateral talks with the UK could be used to flank EU decisions on sanc­tions. London has sought closer bilateral relations since the Brexit referendum, not least because it assumed that Berlin can significantly influence EU negotiations (and EU policies in general). Germany, on the other hand, has made a point of prioritising cooperation with the EU-27 and preventing the impression that bilateral cooperation could undermine EU cooperation. The Ger­man government wanted to avoid weakening the EU, straining the deteriorated rela­tions with the UK any further, and being taken in by a British narrative that presents a false dichotomy between a toxic EU and positive bilateral relations.

Now that Brexit has been completed, Ger­many should be more open towards intensifying bilateral cooperation with London, including signing the long-planned joint declaration on foreign and security policy. Particularly in this realm, the EU’s decision-making autonomy is hardly at risk. Rather, both Germany and the EU have an interest in coordinating with London, as long as this takes place in addition to EU coordination, and not instead of it.

Ad hoc coordination with the EU: Finally, Germany should work to ensure that all flexible possibilities for EU-UK co­ordi­nation are explored, despite the diffi­cult relationship between the EU and the UK. A model here could be, of all things, the increasing coordination with the US. Just like the visits of the US president and the Secretary of State to the European Coun­cil and the Council of Foreign Minis­ters, the British foreign minister could be invited for consultations on dealing with Russia or on how to proceed in the Indo-Pacific. Such ad hoc formats could grad­ually restore trust and underline the ben­efits of mutual coordination on specific issues without restricting EU decision-making autonomy or British sovereignty.

Conflicting Goals in View of Future Cooperation

Linking the UK in EU foreign, security, and defence policy cooperation presents Ger­many in particular with several dilemmas. Two interests have become contradictory due to Brexit and must now be balanced: On the one hand, the UK remains an im­portant partner with whom Germany shares many interests, values, and challenges; on the other hand, Britain’s ideo­logically driven fundamental rejection of foreign and security policy cooperation with the EU is currently complicating co­ordination immensely. As long as the British government fundamentally rejects cooperation with the EU, partners such as Germany and France will be forced to choose between coordination in the EU and bilateral or multilateral cooperation with the UK. In view of the hardened positions, these conflicting goals will almost certainly not be solved in the short term.

In the medium term, therefore, “adhocism” and cooperation in smaller formats (such as the E3) will dominate. Informal contacts between the UK and the EU – as well as between the UK and individual EU states – will have to suffice, as will issue-based co­ordination in the case of common interests, such as on sanctions. However, the difficult EU-UK relationship also limits bilateral co­operation, because the more the EU-UK con­flict escalates – for example on North­ern Ireland or vaccine distribution – the more difficult it will be for Germany and other EU states, such as Ireland, to maintain nor­mal relations with London. At the same time, successful cooperation in the medium term (for instance in the E3 or bilaterally) can create reliable working relationships, (re-)build trust, and produce positive results, thus establishing the foundation for long-term institutionalised cooperation. Ger­many should encourage all other EU states and lead by example so that they mutually inform each other about bilateral cooperation with the UK to prevent them from being played off one another by London.

Thematically, there is significant agree­ment between the EU as a whole, Germany, and the UK on most of the foreign policy dossiers. Cooperation is possible and desir­able, for example on COP26, Iran, and Russia. In a few areas, however, the poten­tial for conflict is high, especially with regard to trade policy, regulatory issues, and pandemic-related topics (vaccines). These issues, however, threaten to dominate the current strained relationship, as the present conflict over the Northern Ireland Protocol shows.

The long-term goal should be a normalisation and institutionalisation of EU-UK rela­tions. However, this would require greater openness on the part of the EU, a change in London’s political position, a more suc­cess­ful EU foreign policy that makes the Union a more attractive partner, or a change in the international security situation that requires increased cooperation. The super-election year of 2024, in which the US, the UK, and the EU will vote and potentially reposition themselves, could pave the way for a qualitatively new EU-UK relationship.

Until then, Germany should focus on ensuring close coordination with London through regular exchanges in bilateral and minilateral formats as well as NATO, but it should place these at the service of strength­ening the EU’s foreign and security policy. Any attempts by London to use smaller formats against the EU or play EU states off each other – thus weakening or disparag­ing the Union – must be resisted. Medium-term cooperation, therefore, explicitly in­cludes a management of expectations that cooperation with London risks being diffi­cult for the foreseeable future.