German Central Asia Policy after the “Zeitenwende”

Central Asia’s Geopolitical Baseline

Maximizing strategic autonomy has always been a priority foreign policy goal for the Central Asian states. This has become even more important with Russia’s war against Ukraine. China’s enormous economic in­fluence, in turn, has strengthened endeavours to diversify foreign relations in Central Asia. If the Central Asian states want to gain weight and be heard in the emerging multipolar world order, they must strength­en their technological, industrial and geopolitical independence. This does not necessarily imply decoupling from Russia and China, but rather spreading risk through the addition (not substitution) of partners.

In fact, both powers will remain the key partners of the Central Asian states for the foreseeable future. The region remains closely intertwined with Russia, both eco­nomically and politically. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are integrated into regional organizations dominated by Moscow: the Eurasian Economic Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan). Central Asia has become even more important for Russia economically and politically since the latter’s economic relations with the West have collapsed. This can be seen, for exam­ple, in the fact that President Putin chose Uzbekistan as the destination of his third state visit – after China and Belarus – following his inauguration in May 2024. At the same time, Moscow has effective means of exerting pressure on Central Asia. These relate to the transport links between Ka­zakhstan and Europe, which run through Russia, as well as Russia’s importance as a labour market for Central Asian guest work­ers. Furthermore, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular depend on Russian gas supplies to meet growing domestic demand and fulfil export obligations to China. In addition, Russia will build the first nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan.

To balance Moscow’s influence, the states in the region have been open to coop­eration with China since the late 1990s. On the one hand, the People’s Republic is con­cerned with security and stability on its Western border (especially in the province of Xinjiang), and on the other hand with opening up sales markets and securing energy imports as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s trade volume with the Central Asian states increased by 27 per cent between 2022 and 2023. The People’s Republic is now the most important trading partner for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Un­like Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, these two countries have at least managed to balance out their dependence on China to some extent through economic relations with other countries. The People’s Republic is particularly attractive as a part­ner for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, not least because it has been investing in the development of infrastructure and the ex­ploration of fossil fuels while also supplementing this with renewable energy proj­ects since 2018.

The ongoing economic dependencies on Russia, the growing dominance of Chinese companies and the increasing use of Chi­nese technology and expertise also bind the Central Asian states politically. Against this backdrop, their relations with Germany (and the EU) are intended to gain more eco­nomic and political negotiating power vis-à-vis their large neighbours. However, rela­tions with other players present in the region, above all Türkiye, Iran and the Gulf States, as well as India and South Korea, also fulfil the same function. For the Cen­tral Asian states, maintaining dialogue with a broad spectrum of partners is not just a means to the end of economic diversification. Rather, they are concerned with pre­serving the “multipolar” diversity of the region and avoiding the risks of a bipolar bloc formation. However, this also means that Central Asia is not seeking a privileged relationship with Germany and the EU. With this in mind, German and European efforts to win the support of regional states for Western sanctions against Russia must be measured against the realities on the ground.

This complex initial situation must be taken into account when implementing the announced regional partnership. This means first and foremost focusing on those areas of action that are just as important for Central Asia as they are for Germany. These include geoeconomic diversification – particularly in green energies and indus­tries, critical raw materials and transport routes – and combating climate change. Here, too, it is important to identify inter­ests that do not coincide, to recognize real­ities and to balance expectations.

Combating Climate Change

Efforts to combat global climate change and achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement are an important area of cooperation be­tween Germany, the EU and Central Asia. Within the framework of international commitments and European plans, Ger­many is striving to play a pioneering role here – both in Europe and worldwide – and is developing an ambitious foreign climate policy. The effects of climate change are already dramatic in Central Asia. According to the World Bank, the region will be increasingly exposed to droughts and flooding, with serious eco­nomic and social consequences. As else­where, climate change will exacerbate existing economic and environmental problems, especially the availability of water, which affects the entire region.

All Central Asian countries are signatories to the Paris Agreement and have an­nounced decarbonization targets. They have also been promoting renewable ener­gies since 2018. Most countries in the region have launched at least some kind of green economy strategy or programme to increase the efficiency of resource use and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Against this backdrop, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in particular have been stepping up their efforts to fulfil their national commitments for several years. Germany is already in­volving Central Asia in global climate poli­cy at bilateral and multilateral level – through initiatives such as “Green Central Asia” or the raw materials partnership with Kazakhstan and (prospectively) also with Uzbekistan.

However, it is important to bear in mind that the fight against energy poverty and for access to energy is crucial in the region. Hence, for the time being, Central Asian decision-makers will prioritize security of supply, the preservation of their own ex­port-oriented and commodities-based eco­nomic model and the diversification and expansion of their own industries over strict climate targets and ambitious plans to reduce emissions.

(Geo)economic Diversification

Germany and Central Asia share a fundamental interest in economic and geoeconomic diversification to promote geopolitical autonomy and combat climate change. However, there are also divergent objectives and practical challenges in this field that need to be addressed for Germany and the EU to realize the potential for cooperation.

Opportunities for cooperation are particularly pronounced in green energy and industry. Germany and the EU are dependent on the import of green electricity and green hydrogen in the medium to long term. Central Asia, on the other hand, has significant resources of wind and solar energy. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in par­ticular are planning to systematically expand the share of renewable energies. Cooperation with Germany, including on hydrogen, is already taking place in bilat­eral partnerships. Decarbonization remains a declared goal and a necessity for the Central Asian states. However, a transition to clean energy in the region is only real­istic in the long term. The share of renew­able energies in the regional energy mix is still extremely low. The top priority in Cen­tral Asia is securing fossil energy supplies so that export obligations and rising domestic demand can be met. Renewable energies are being included in the energy mix primarily to strengthen energy secu­rity, acquire technology and industries and open up further export markets and sectors.

However, renewable energy expansion requires the expansion, reactivation and stability of the transregional power grid CAPS (Central Asian Power System), as well as the resolution of water conflicts. The CAPS infrastructure is not only outdated, but also insufficiently developed and net­worked. Access to water is very unevenly distributed in the region, and resource management is inadequate.

Regarding critical raw materials, Central Asia has significant reserves of strategic minerals such as manganese, titanium, copper, cobalt and lithium. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular have enormous potential here. Both countries are striving to optimize their marketing and profitable cooperation and are interested in expanding local vertical integration and refinement.

Germany and the EU already have a raw materials partnership with Kazakhstan, and Brussels has agreed to a corresponding memorandum of understanding with Uz­bekistan. However, there are hurdles to greater German and European involvement in the sector, such as the structural weak­nesses of the German and European mining industry and the strong presence of other external players in Central Asian mining. The same is true for new green industrial products such as solar panels, wind tur­bines, electrolysers and batteries for electric cars. They harbour great potential for co­operation, but China and other players (such as the Gulf States) are also strongly represented in these products in the region.

In the transport sector, the Middle Cor­ridor between Central Asia, China and the EU, which runs across the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, has become particularly important for transporting (industrial) goods, fossil energy resources and, in the long term, green energy to Europe. EU ini­tiatives such as Global Gateway, the agree­ment between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan to expand the Middle Corridor and the agreement between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to export green electricity are showing initial political success. However, the corridor is under­developed in terms of infrastructure and is still dysfunctional in terms of logistics and tariffs. Under current conditions, an in­crease in transcontinental and regional transport volumes – for container trans­port, green energy and hydrogen (products) – would overload it. This was evident in 2023, when an increase merely in transcontinental container traffic led to a decline in freight transit due to logistical and infra­structural bottlenecks. Interest asymmetries are also becoming apparent: Germany would like to bypass Russia and Iran if new transport routes are opened up, while Cen­tral Asia aims to expand diverse routes in all directions. Interest in the Middle Cor­ridor also varies greatly within Central Asia. It is particularly important for Kazakhstan, whereas Uzbekistan is more focused on developing corridors to Afghanistan and China.

Whether and to what extent it is possible to transform overlapping interests in the individual sectors into cooperation that benefits all parties involved depends on the respective strategic priorities of the relevant players. More than that, the political dy­namics in the region itself play a decisive role. Intra-regional co-operation is particularly important in this context.

Dynamics of Regional Co‑operation

Inter-state cooperation in Central Asia was long overshadowed by Russia’s hegemonic policy, which still occupies a special posi­tion in the former Soviet hinterland. How­ever, the fact that intra-regional cooperation was not institutionalized more strongly was also due to the conflict-ridden relations between the Central Asian states. This changed when the new Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016. The development of regional relations gained speed. Russia’s attack on Ukraine accelerated the momentum. In July 2022, the five Central Asian presidents met in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, where they adopted a road­map for regional cooperation. Since then, there has been an intensification of meet­ings and consultations as well as attempts at institutionalization. In September 2023, for example, a Coordination Council was established when the five states held a summit in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe.

The main impetus for closer cooperation comes from the regional heavyweights Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which up­graded their bilateral relations in December 2022 through an alliance agreement. On Uzbekistan’s initiative, the notorious bor­der conflicts with Tajikistan were largely resolved and the delimitation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was finalized.

However, despite all the progress made, numerous obstacles continue to hinder regional cooperation. These include the very unequal economic development and resource endowments of the five countries, still unresolved border conflicts between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, conflicting inter­ests in water utilization, ongoing connectivity problems and trade barriers due to dif­ferent customs systems. These factors stand in the way of the development of regional value chains and their global integration, particularly in the key sectors of energy, water and transport.

Overall, the internal cooperation processes present an ambivalent picture. An independent regional identity has not yet emerged, but the five governments are aware that increased cooperation within Central Asia is also a prerequisite for acting with a higher profile externally. The fact that they are striving for the latter can be seen in their endeavours to appear together in external relations, for example in 5+1 formats and at global conferences.

Recommendations for Action for Germany’s Central Asia Policy

Both Germany and Central Asian countries can benefit from a strategic regional part­nership. In particular, the fight against climate change and (geo)economic diversi­fication in key sectors such as (green) ener­gies, industries and technologies, transport and critical raw materials offer ideal areas of action to further develop bilateral rela­tions and strengthen intra-regional cooper­ation.

It is important to recognize that the region forms a historical area of connection and competition between Asia, continental Eurasia, the Middle East and Europe, but is increasingly subject to the geoeconomic and geopolitical pull of Greater Asia. For German-Central Asian cooperation, this means setting realistic goals and refraining from excessive expectations. Two factors will continue to determine the course of Central Asian leaders in the future: the in­fluence of Russia and China and the author­itarian nature of the political systems in the five countries. When selecting partners and projects, it is therefore important to exam­ine the context in which the respective engagement takes place. Who are the rele­vant stakeholders, and what interests are they pursuing? Who makes the decisions? Where do potential conflicts exist, and what is their impact on project design?

Secondly, cooperation should be guided by a strategic outlook. This requires stam­ina, realism and patience. Germany’s and Europe’s scope for a sustainable impact in Central Asia is limited, not only because of the geographical distance, but also because political and financial resources on the EU side are reaching their limits. In addition, there is a multitude of actors in Central Asia who influence political decisions. A long-term deepening of relations requires acceptance of the geopolitical reality of Central Asia and the regional priorities. Against this background, the four areas of action outlined in the joint declaration on a regional partnership must be further devel­oped conceptually.