North Korea’s fait accompli

North Korea’s changing nuclear posture

In parallel with the further development of its military capabilities, North Korea has also taken steps to modify its nuclear doc­trine. Ever since North Korea’s first nuclear test, documents, legislation, and individual statements from the regime suggested that the primary mission of its nuclear weapons program was to deter war and secure regime stability. Its nuclear weapons were consequently described as “purely defensive.” Despite early claims that it would never use nuclear weapons first – a stance that was also legislatively codified with the 2013 “Law on Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State” – subsequent statements have undermined this claim. While earlier statements and documents hinted at the possibility that North Korea reserved the right to employ a tactical use of nuclear weapons if provoked, this was made more explicit in April 2022 when Kim Jong Un openly pointed to a “second mis­sion” for North Korea’s nuclear weapons. In a speech celebrating the 90^th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revo­lutionary Army, Kim Jong Un not only pledged to strengthen North Korea’s nuclear weapons program “in terms of both quality and scale,” but also suggested that its use was not limited to the prevention of war.

On September 8, 2022, North Korea’s parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly, promulgated a new law “on the state policy of the nuclear forces.” Among other things, the law explains the overall pur­pose, importance, and role of nuclear weap­ons in North Korea’s defence strategy and sets out the conditions under which the country would use them. While certain assurances, for instance regarding non-proliferation, are repeated, two aspects of the new doctrine are particularly significant.

First, the new law emphasises the possibility of first use, including a pre-emptive strike, in North Korea’s nuclear strategy. While the 2013 law provided that nuclear weapons could be used to repel an invasion or attack by a hostile nuclear state and to retaliate accordingly, the new law goes beyond this stipulation. It now permits pre-emptive nuclear strikes if an imminent attack with weapons of mass destruction or an attack against “strategic objectives” of the country, including its leadership, are detected.

Second, the law elaborates on the delegation of authority with respect to commanding the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently to undermine the effectiveness of South Korea’s “kill chain strategy,” a preemptive strategy to take out the North Korean lead­er(ship) and key military centers if Pyong­yang plans to attack South Korea, the law does emphasise that Kim Jong Un would have “all decision-making authority with respect to nuclear weapons.” However, in the event of an attack on North Korea’s command and control centre, “a nuclear strike would be carried out automatically and immediately.”

On the one hand, these developments indicate that North Korea is adjusting its policy in the face of a changing strategic environment, and on the other, it also speaks to Pyongyang’s self-perceived nor­malisation and consolidation of its posi­tion as a nuclear weapons state.

Implications of the changing geopolitical context

North Korea’s missile program advancements and the changes to its nuclear posture take place in a rapidly changing regional and global context which Pyongyang is obviously trying to exploit in its favour. The increasing tension between the US and China as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine provide the DPRK with new room for manoeuvre, which, in turn, will likely further lessen the probability that North Korea will engage in negotiations with the international community on its nuclear weapons program. In fact, the shift­ing geopolitical context in Northeast Asia appears to be buttressing Kim’s survival strategy for the time being. This was arguably most visible on May 26, 2022, when Russia and China, for the first time since the 2006 inception of the sanctions regime on the DPRK, vetoed a US-led draft to impose new UNSC sanctions on North Korea following its renewed ballistic missile launches.

North Korea’s relationship with Russia in particular appears to be gaining momen­tum as a consequence of the latter’s increas­ing isolation. Pyongyang first provided tangible support to Russia over Ukraine in March 2022, when North Korea was one of just five nations that opposed a UN General Assembly motion condemning the invasion. On July 14, 2022, North Korea officially rec­ognised two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, the People’s Republic of Donetsk and the People’s Republic of Luhansk, as independent states, making it one of the earliest and only countries aside from Russia to formally recognise the entities. North Korean foreign minister Choe Son Hui expressed her country’s intention to develop “state-to-state relations” with the two republics. Moscow, in return, labelled North Korea “a very important strategic partner for Russia,” signalling that North Korean workers could play a crucial role in rebuilding the Donbas region. However, neither Pyongyang nor Moscow have made any public or official statements about send­ing, or being prepared to send, any North Korean troops or “volunteer” units to fight alongside the Russians. In early September 2022, US intelligence reports sug­gested that Russia is buying millions of artillery shells and rockets from North Korea.

In parallel to providing support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has also provided rhetorical support to China’s stance on Taiwan. In early August 2022, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokes­person denounced speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, accusing Washington of “impudent interference […] in internal affairs” and “intentional political and military provo­cations.” While describing Taiwan as “an inseparable part of China,” the spokesperson also signalled support for Beijing’s stark warnings to the US over Pelosi’s visit, stat­ing that “it is the due right of a sovereign state to take counter measures against the moves of the outside forces openly inter­fering in its internal affairs.”

For North Korea, the rivalry between China and the US, as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine, provides it with greater Chinese and Russian political support and a noticeable widening of its room for manoeuvre. Conversely, for Russia and China, North Korea’s strategic value has also dramatically increased.

Uncomfortable truths

North Korea’s transition to a de facto nu­clear state is a fait accompli that has changed the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Recognising this new reality does not mean legitimising North Korea’s status as a nu­clear power or abandoning the (long-term) goal of denuclearising North Korea. Rather, it is a matter of using military and diplo­matic means in an expedient and purposeful manner in accordance with this new reality and the subsequent altered conditions. This, however, requires that the inter­national community acknowledge some unwelcome and uncomfortable political truths in light of this new reality.

First, the international community has a limited ability to contain Pyongyang’s plans to build up its military. North Korea has proven willing to pay an extremely high po­litical and economic price, withstand politi­cal and economic pressures from both its adversaries and its most important political and economic “partners” (i.e. China), and ultimately link its survival and security strategy to the possession of nuclear weap­ons.

Against this backdrop, it must be recognised that, second, all previous attempts by the international community to divert North Korea to a path of denuclearisation have failed. Neither diplomacy nor political and economic pressure have led to the desired goal of a complete, verifiable, and irreversible destruction of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Therefore, third, it must be acknowledged that North Korea will not give up its nu­clear weapons for the time being. This is both reflected in its official rhetoric and informal statements, and its actions. Since the collapse of the February 2019 Hanoi Summit with former US President Donald J. Trump and a subsequent working-level meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, in October that year, North Korea has been reluctant to return to the negotiating table. Kim Jong Un’s bet on being able to negotiate with the US didn’t pay off and, since then, Pyong­yang has gone all-in on expanding its nuclear and missile programs. A comprehensive five-year defence modernisation plan, first announced in January 2021 and in which tactical nuclear weapons devel­opment also plays a critical role, is being implemented unabated. In early September 2022, Kim Jong Un expressed defiance about the prospect of ever disarming, in­dicating that North Korean denuclearisation would only occur when nuclear weapons were eliminated worldwide.

Against this backdrop it is hardly sur­prising that all recent US and individual EU member states’ proposals to DPRK offi­cials to re-engage in denuclearisation nego­tiations have been rejected by the North Korean side. As North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons and is currently not will­ing to abandon them, it is to be assumed that any dialogue format and approach that is aimed at or focused on a complete, veri­fiable, and irreversible denuclearisation is currently doomed to fail. This, in turn, raises the question of what options remain for the states involved and what aspects of the current strategy for dealing with North Korea need to be adjusted in light of the new status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

(Limited) options for the international community

There is no doubt that the current situation is extremely complicated and that the inter­national community’s options for action are limited. However, in view of the con­tinually worsening military and security threats emanating from North Korea, simply ignoring the challenge is not a realistic option. Rather, current strategy needs to be adapted to the changed realities on the Korean Peninsula.

Final thoughts

“The time for dialogue on denuclearisation is over.” This is how a North Korean official recently put it in Europe during an infor­mal exchange. Indeed, the likelihood of resuming denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea is extremely low at the moment. This reality is clearly discernible when observing not only North Korea’s unabated implementation of a military rearmament program but also its efforts to (re-)position itself within the competition among great powers and the changing geo­political constellations of Northeast Asia. Whether the international community wants to admit it or not, North Korea is a de facto nuclear power and has made the strategic decision to fully link its survival strategy to the possession of nuclear weap­ons. Therefore, a modified approach to North Korea must consider the changed status quo on the Korean Peninsula. This does not mean legitimising North Korea’s nuclear program, nor does it mean aban­doning the long-term goal of its denuclearisation. Rather, it means using the military and diplomatic means of the states involved in a more targeted and purposeful way, based on a sober assessment of the actual political reality on the Korean Peninsula. Militarily, this means targeted deterrence measures against a de facto nuclear state. Diplomatically, the short- to medium-term focus should be shifted to specific challenges just below the threshold of denuclearisation.

European actors can play an important role in communicating this strategic re­adjust­ment toward North Korea and pro­vide the necessary channels for dialogue at the informal and official levels. They can also play an important role in communicating this strategy to China. Even if such a step might be politically controversial and its success all but guaranteed, progress on the North Korea issue is hardly conceivable so long as the international community con­tinues to proceed on the basis of un­founded expectations and assumptions. This includes the delusion that North Korea can somehow be persuaded or forced to abandon its nuclear weapons.