A Redefinition of “Spitzenkandidaten”

The Limits of the Political Commission

The next Commission must now seek a new political foundation in the EP. Under Juncker’s leadership, it had seen itself as a “highly political” Commission that would not only administer EU policy, but also shape it actively along clear – and even controversial – political lines. Juncker wanted to set himself apart from his pre­decessor, José Manuel Barroso, whose Com­mission leadership was regarded as tech­nocratic and subordinate to the member states in the European Council.

In practice, the claim of a political Com­mission was based on two pillars: The first was the political legitimacy of Commission President Juncker himself. In 2014, the holder of this office was elected for the first time by the European Parliament, following the proposal of the heads of state and gov­ern­ment in the European Council. In accord­ance with the “Spitzenkandidaten” princi­ple (top/lead candidates principle), Juncker was able to assert himself as an official can­didate for the EPP. From then on, the Presi­dent of the Commission referred to the dual legitimacy of the national governments and the EP. In practice, however, the authority that could have been derived from this legiti­macy was limited. In the European Coun­cil, the governments of the large mem­ber states continue to set the tone. The Presi­dent of the Commission has only limited influence on its seminal decisions. In the EP, although there was a very close exchange between the leadership of the two major parties and the Commission at the beginning of the parliamentary term, a co­operation comparable to one between a national government and its parliamentary base with a coordinated programme did not emerge.

The second pillar that the “political” Com­mission was based on was the claim to set its own priorities and to take decisions according to political – not purely tech­nocratic – criteria. It is in this area that the contradictions of the European Commission have become most apparent. The self-image of acting as a political body is difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the EU Treaty, according to which the Commission is to act not only as the engine of integration, but also as the guardian of the trea­ties. In some policy areas – such as com­petition policy, the protection of the rule of law, budgetary control in the euro area, and infringement proceedings – it should act as a neutral arbitrator and decide on the basis of technocratic rather than political criteria. Even if the relevant departments of the Commission are internally protected from political influence, its credibility as a neutral body is diminished if the Commission’s leadership sees itself as a political actor.

Two examples from the previous legis­lative period make this contradiction par­ticularly clear. Over the past five years, the protection of the rule of law within the Union has become one of the Commission’s most important and controversial tasks. Where­as the EPP-led Commission relatively quickly instituted rule of law proceedings against Poland, it was much more hesitant towards Hungary – whose governing party, Fidesz, (still) belongs to the EPP. Both the Polish and Hungarian governments have ac­cused the responsible EU Commissioner – Frans Timmermans, a leading head of the Party of European Socialists (PES) – of being politically motivated. Irrespective of how individual rule of law procedures are assessed, the modalities that accom­panied them have shown that the Com­mission cannot credibly act as a neutral authority here.

A similar problem can be seen in the con­trol of national economic and budge­tary policies, in particular those of the euro states. In the wake of the European debt crisis, the competences of the European Commission in monitoring the budgets of the member states have been extended even further. Here, too, the EU Commission should decide on the basis of technical cri­teria. The different ways of dealing with the respective budget deficits of France (led by President Emmanuel Macron) and Italy (gov­erned by a coalition of the EU-sceptical Five Star Movement and Lega) have made it clear that political considerations also flow into the assessment of member states’ budgets.

More Cohesion, Clearer Priorities

The Juncker Commission was more suc­cess­ful in rationalising European legislation. Juncker wanted to significantly reduce the number of new legislative initiatives with the aim of leading an EU that concentrates on the essentials and sets clear priorities, adopting the unofficial motto of being “big on big things, small on small things”.

To this end, Juncker has fundamentally transformed the way the Commission works. The President is free to determine the internal organisation and composition of the Commission. At the beginning of the parliamentary term, Juncker introduced a hierarchy within the Commission and formed clusters. With 28 commissioners, the College of the EU Commission is larger than most national governments’ cabinets. However, a reduction in the size of the Com­mission has so far repeatedly been blocked, especially by the smaller EU states; it would be legally possible without a treaty amendment, but it would require the ap­proval of all member states. Instead, to improve the functioning of the Commission, Juncker has equipped the Vice-Presi­dents with their own leadership competen­cies within the Commission and arranged them into seven clusters. For example, the High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, co­ordinates the foreign- and security policy–related work of the Commission members responsible for the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, Trade Policy, Development Policy, and Humanitarian Aid. As a result, the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy between the Common For­eign and Security Policy and the areas managed by the Commission has increased significantly.

Secondly, the Commission has identified 10 political priorities for its activities under Juncker. Only those initiatives were put on the Commission’s agenda that fell within one of the 10 priorities and were previously recommended by the responsible Vice-Presi­dent, turning them into gatekeepers on the Commission’s blossoming legislative pro­posals.

In practice, the Juncker Commission has largely achieved its objective of economising and prioritising the Commission’s activ­ities. First of all, it has significantly reduced the number of legislative proposals. Where­as the EU adopted, according to EUR-Lex, well over 250 legislative acts (directives and regulations) per year on average before 2009, the average number during the Juncker Commission’s term of office was 130 per year. The reduction was so drastic that, at the beginning of the legislative period, some MEPs complained about a lack of legislative initiatives on the part of the EU Commission. As of June 2019, a total of 517 EU directives and regulations were adopted by the Council and the EP during the five years of the Juncker Commission. In comparison, during the second term of Juncker’s predecessor, Barroso (2010–2014), the figure was 716, almost 40 per cent higher.

Although the announced reduction in legislative output has certainly taken place, the balance is more mixed with regard to its policy aims achieved. The adoption of Euro­pean directives and regulations is the sole responsibility of the Parliament and the Coun­cil. It is true that the Commission, according to its own figures, has actually presented 94 per cent of the initiatives that it has envisaged within its 10 priorities. How­ever, only two-thirds of the dossiers were approved by EU legislators.

No Strong Agenda-setter

The discrepancy is particularly marked in the legislative projects to which the Com­mission has assigned a high political priority. Traditionally, the Commission’s monopoly of initiative is also intended to act as a “engine of integration” and to advance the Union on fundamental issues such as the development of the internal market and the introduction of the euro. In the complex institutional structure of the Union, the Commission can – and could – never dictate EU policy alone, but is de­pendent on winning the support of the majority of the EP and, above all, of the member states in the Council for its political projects by proposing clever and workable compromises.

A successful example of this is the han­dling of the Brexit process by the Juncker Commission. With the early nomination of Michel Barnier as negotiator in the Article 50 process, the EU Commission has not only taken over the direct talks with the United Kingdom. Above all, Barnier and his working group have recorded and processed the political interests of the member states with regard to Brexit through numerous vis­its to all 27 capitals and regular ex­changes in the EU bodies, thus making a decisive contribution towards the EU-27 adopting a uniform position in this process. Although the negotiating mandate has been set by the heads of state and government in the European Council, the Commission has provided substantial input and conducted the negotiations. This political leadership has also given the EU Commission the full confidence of the national governments in the Brexit negotiations.

The situation is different with the EU Com­mission’s major political initiatives. In his annual “State of the Union” speeches to the European Parliament, Juncker focussed mostly on three of his ten priorities: Point one was “jobs, growth and investment”. Juncker was able to win the support of the Parliament and the Council for the Euro­pean Fund for Strategic Investments early on, which to date has mobilised 73 billion euros in funding for investments, with a volume of almost 400 billion euros in the EU. In the field of trade policy, the Juncker Commission has also negotiated extensive new free trade agreements for the EU, inter alia with Canada and Japan.

However, in the second project – the further development of the euro area – the Commission has widely missed its targets. At the end of 2017, the Commission pre­sented its “Roadmap for the deepening of Europe’s economic and monetary union”. Key proposals included the establishment of a European Monetary Fund; the transfer of the Fiscal Compact into EU law, which, under international law, is not part of the EU Treaty; a special budget for the euro area within the EU budget; and the ap­point­ment of a European Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance. These proposals have been met with direct, massive rejection in several eurozone states. At the end of its term of office, the Juncker Commission has not yet achieved any of these goals. Nego­tiations on a – much more limited – “Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness” in the eurozone have progressed the furthest. This, however, is mainly due to the impetus given by Ger­many and France in this matter.

The third area to which Juncker gave priority was the asylum and migration policy. In the course of the last legislative period, this issue was elevated to the Com­mission’s most important issue. As early as 2016, the Commission presented two major legislative packages to reform the Common European Asylum System. Despite intensive negotiations, however, it has not succeeded in obtaining the approval of the Council, in particular for its flagship projects in this policy area, such as the reform of the Dublin regime.

The lack of progress in all of these highly political areas can, of course, be attributed only partly to the Commission. In its “Stra­tegic Agenda” for 2014 to 2019, the Euro­pean Council has also declared as priorities the issues of competitiveness and reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as EU asylum and migration policy. The reasons for the lack of agreement are to a large extent beyond the control of the Commission and found in the increasing tensions between the member states. Even in a series of summit meetings, the heads of state and government were only able to make modest progress on asylum and migra­tion policy and eurozone reform.

Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the Commission have become apparent in these highly political issues. Firstly, it lacks its own political power base. In parliamentary systems, national governments can rely on their government factions or coalitions as a foundation for power. Despite the “Spitzen­kandidaten” principle, however, the Juncker Commission could not rely on continual sup­port from the European Parliament. There was no coalition agreement with thematic objectives. At the same time, however, the Commission’s rapprochement with the EP has fuelled the member states’ concerns that they might lose control of this impor­tant EU institution – a development that has also damaged the confidence of national governments in the Commission.

Moreover, the Commission has been un­able to become an honest broker between the member states in the Council and be­tween the Council and the Parliament in highly controversial areas. The right of ini­tiative gives the Commission the opportu­nity to predetermine the debate at an early stage in the EU’s legislative processes. Ideal­ly, this right could be used to shape EU inte­gration through the careful exploration of preferences and subsequently tailored com­promise proposals. The Commission has suc­ceeded in this with the Brexit pro­cess. On migration policy and EMU reform, on the other hand, it first raised high expec­ta­tions and then put forward ideas that were far from capable of generating a consensus.