Macron, the Yellow Vests and the National Debate

The Government’s Response

President Macron rapidly came under pres­sure: despite the violent excesses that over­shadowed the demonstrations, initially over 70 percent of the French population sup­ported the protesters’ demands.

The Debate: A Smart Move

Against this background, Macron’s “grand débat national” is his only promising way out of the crisis. Since mid-January, citizens of the country have been invited to express their opinions and ideas on the following topics online and in organised debates: ecological change; taxes and government spending; democracy, participation, rep­re­sentation and coexistence; and state struc­tures and public services. The discussions ended in mid-March, and the President plans to present their results in April 2019.

This debate is proving to be a clever move for three reasons: first, it allows Presi­dent Macron to use the French mayors to his advantage. They organised over 60 per­cent of the debates. And yet almost all of them belong to the opposition, meaning the conservative, communist or socialist parties, or are non-partisan. Relationship between the president and local politicians have been frosty. Since 2014, 750 mayors have resigned – more than ever before. More than 50 percent do not intend to run again in the local elections in 2020. In France, mayors have a dual role: on the one hand, they are representatives of the state and, on the other, they are directly elected representatives of their community. They feel abandoned by the state in coping with everyday problems and increasingly see their competences curtailed. For example, they complain about the closure of police and fire stations, schools and post offices. In July 2018 they refused the president’s invitation to a national conference on rural areas, and in September 1,200 mayors re­minded him that they were above all com­mitted to the well-being of their voters. Macron has now granted them this role again, while at the same time making them executive bodies of his policy.

Second, the debate helped to divide the yellow vests movement: they do not have a homogenous attitude towards it. According to surveys, about 40 percent of the French population wants to take part in the debate. Repeatedly, yellow vests also found their way to events of the “grand national debate”. They are broadly in agreement with the issues raised by President Macron. In late January 2019, other yellow vests launched a “true debate” (le vrai débat) on France’s future to compete with Macron’s debate. The yellow vests who have been part of the movement from the very start, on the other hand, are arguing about whether the use of police force during yellow-vest protests may be met with violence. These disputes cost public empathy. While in November 2018 71 percent of the population still agreed with the demands and actions of the yellow vests, in March 2019 54 percent did so. Sim­ultaneously, part of the movement is politi­cising – some are making initial attempts to draw up a list for the European elections in May.

This is Macron’s third advantage. A yel­low vest list would deprive both Marine Le Pen’s far-wing Rassemblement National (RN) and the left-wing populist La France Insou­mise (FI) of votes. It could therefore make a decisive contribution to Macron winning the EP election. Long before the yellow vests protests began, Marine Le Pen styled this election as a vote on the president’s policy to date. While Macron’s La République en Marche (LaREM) party is still looking for a prominent top candidate and suitable topics for its European election programme, Le Pen has been ready for the election cam­paign since mid-January 2019. However, the “grand national debate” prevents it from being heard. President Macron has thus also seized control of a key issue from his fiercest adversary: citizens’ participation in political debate.

Reform after Revolt?

The “grand national debate” should thus help Emmanuel Macron to emerge vic­to­rious from the biggest protests since the student revolts of 1968. None of his politi­cal opponents has yet been able to capi­talise on the popular dissatisfaction. Never­theless, the remainder of Macron’s term in office is unlikely to be any calmer, espe­cially since his announcement that he will resume his reform agenda as of May 2019. He plans to reform unemployment insur­ance and reduce the number of people employed in the public sector. His success depends on two factors. First, he needs to explain his economic and social reform agenda better: why is it necessary, and what are its goals? When will all those affected by the reforms today benefit from them? Young people in France in particular are asking themselves these questions. They are the ones Macron must win over. So far, he has not succeeded: 67 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds currently distrust him. Second, Macron must permanently shift the impres­sion that the actions of the political class bypass society. This will only happen if political decision-making processes are decentralised once again. If he is not able to herd the population behind him in the long term, the younger generation in particular will probably return to the streets and sooner or later be driven towards the extreme left or right. The current economic slowdown provides an unpropitious framework for the reform programme – though the yel­low vests protests have not impressed the country’s economy. Yet improved economic performance (and thus also the changes in unemployment) depends on growth mo­men­tum within and outside the eurozone.

The political success of the French president is in Germany’s strategic interest. There is no alternative to Macron in terms of the structural reforms required. However, the possibilities for support from Berlin are limited: France is debating its internal con­stitution. Moreover, Berlin and Paris remain undecided about their economic cooperation in and for Europe. The 15 priority projects agreed by both sides for implementing the Aachen Treaty of January 2019 only men­tion new technologies, the digital economy, and the deepening of the internal market in financial services.