Unpacking Turkey’s Security Footprint in Africa

Security Component: Strategies and Patterns

Turkey’s increasing domestic material capacities and its search for new security partners has intersected with African coun­tries’ pursuit of diversification in their secu­rity policies. Many African states are keen to take advantage of Turkey’s experience in counterinsurgency, the modernisation of its security sectors, and the developments in its defence industry. Tellingly, the number of African embassies in Ankara rose from 10 in 2008 to 37 in 2021, and many of the African ambassadors appointed in Turkey are active or retired generals. Turkey’s ef­forts in general show four patterns in terms of strategies that Ankara has adopted.

The most significant and striking among these efforts is the increase in Turkey’s arms exports to African states. While Africa provides a market for Turkish-made wea­pon­ry such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), armoured vehicles, electro-optical sensor systems, surveillance systems, mine clearance vehicles, and rifles, Turkish defence companies offer competitive prices for their military hardware with a no-strings-attached policy. According to figures from the Turkish Exporters Assembly, Tur­key’s defence and aerospace exports to Africa reached $460.6 million in 2021, com­pared to $82.981 million the previous year. This more than five-fold increase in the course of one year shows the growing inter­est of African countries and the high poten­tial of this market.

Secondly, there has also been an increase in Turkey’s systematic efforts to sign differ­ent types of security-related cooperation agreements with African countries. For example, Turkey has security personnel training agreements with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Tunisia. Some of these agreements have also permitted Turkey to open training facilities, such as those in Libya and Soma­lia. Training programmes target different units of the security apparatus, including the military, gendarmerie, coast guards, and police forces.

Yet, Turkey’s security agreements extend beyond training programmes. They also include an increasing number of security cooperation agreements, which are more comprehensive in scope, such as military framework agreements that cover training, technical, and scientific cooperation. In total, 30 African states have signed different types of security-related agreements with Turkey. The largest number of agreements, 21 in total, were ratified in 2017 (with Benin, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti (1-2), Gabon, Gam­bia (1-2), Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast (1-2), Kenya, Libya, Mali (1-2), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda), fol­lowed by 16 agreements in 2018 (The Republic of Congo, Djibouti (1-2), Ghana, Madagascar, Niger (1-2), Nigeria, Rwanda (1‑2-3), Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania (1-2), Tunisia). These agreements provide a frame­work for military and security cooperation at different levels among different stake­holders. The main Turkish state institutions involved in these agreements are the Minis­try of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior (which includes the police, gendarmerie, and the coast guard forces), and the Presi­dency of Defence Industries (SSB). Such a multiplicity of actors creates numerous channels for dialogue with their counterparts in Africa.

As a third layer, Turkey also engages in defence diplomacy with African states. In 2014, the Barbaros Turkish Naval Task Group, which is comprised of two frigates, a corvette, and a replenishment ship, trav­elled throughout the African continent, visiting 25 ports in 24 African countries; 19 of these were first-time visits. This mission both participated in joint training exercises in South Africa and supported anti-piracy activities in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and adjacent regions. It also manifests the extent to which Turkey has interconnected different strategies such as defence diplomacy, the promotion of its defence industry, and military training. The 2014 mission was accompanied by the Under­secretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) and defence industry companies along­side the Turkish Cooperation and Co­ordination Agency (TİKA) as well as other institutions. Introduced during the port visits were the TCG HEYBELİADA corvette, within the scope of the Patrol and Antisubmarine Warfare Ship (MiLGEM) Project, built by the Turkish Naval Forces; the Ship Integrated Combat Management System (GENESIS), developed by the Naval Forces Command; and the SSM. Later, to ensure the continuity of relations, the Multination­al Maritime Security Centre of Excellence, based in Aksaz, provided capacity-building training to African states, along­side other distant countries, on maritime security.

Lastly, Turkey has also increased its par­ticipation in international peacekeeping missions in Africa. In the post–Cold War era, Turkey was eager to participate in inter­national military operations and, as a result of its intense efforts, took over the command of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1993–94. This was the only international military mission in Africa in which Turkey participated during the 1990s. At that time, Turkey’s proactive participation in inter­national crisis management operations was a strategy to guarantee its role in Western security structures, mainly concentrating on the Balkans. In the 2000s, Turkey started to contribute more to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN, and other joint security governance efforts in Africa. Since then, Turkey has contributed to similar multilateral efforts in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia.

The Drivers behind Ankara’s Security Engagement in Africa

Diverging Paths in Africa between Turkey and the EU

Even though Africa is a region where both Turkey and the EU are increasingly striving to develop effective policies, mechanisms, and relations, they have minimal inter­action with each other. Perhaps more im­por­tantly, they follow diverging – in some cases even conflicting – paths when estab­lishing relations concerning security in Afri­can countries. This has various reasons.

Firstly, the stalemate in the membership process negatively affects foreign policy and security cooperation. When there was a chance for Turkey to become an EU mem­ber state, both sides were more eager to cooper­ate in different areas to boost the accession process. Ankara used Turkey’s EU candidacy as a foreign policy resource while engaging with Middle Eastern and African countries. At the same time, in order to do that, it aligned its foreign policies with the EU to fur­ther accelerate the accession pro­cess.

For instance, Turkey was among the contributors to two missions of the EU in Congo – EUFOR RD Congo and EUPOL Kin­shasa – between 2006 and 2007. Meh­met Vecdi Gönül, the Minister of Defence at the time, defined this cooperation in his speech at the Turkish Assembly in 2006 as a posi­tive contribution to the EU’s collective secu­rity efforts, which thus would help Turkey’s membership bid.

In addition, Turkey’s level of alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu­rity Policy (CFSP) declarations was consistently high throughout this period, showing Turkey’s political will to harmonise its for­eign policy with that of the EU.

The EU, on the other hand, as reflected in European Commission progress reports, appreciated Turkey’s increasing role as a stabilising power in neighbouring regions and its contribution to collective crisis management efforts. The high degree of con­vergence from the previous era was apparent in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa. Turkey’s policy back then generally pivoted on soft power and was in line with the EU’s foreign policy approach.

For example, when the EU decided to implement the Euro-Mediterranean Part­ner­ship in 1995 while aiming to create a free trade zone between Mediterranean coun­tries of the Union and five North African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt), Turkey also sped up its eco­nomic engagement with these countries. In the first half of the 2000s, the EU’s Neigh­bourhood Policy was as influential as Tur­key’s long-standing political initiatives in the free trade agreements signed with Tuni­sia and Morocco in 2004 and which entered into force in 2005 and 2006, respectively.

As the accession process began to stall, the security and foreign policy harmony of Turkey and the EU began to abate. As of 2010, Turkey’s degree of alignment with the EU’s CFSP priorities and actions began to decline. The number of confrontational policies in Africa have increased, as seen, for example, in Libya. Today, out of 18 mis­sions and operations currently deployed under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) across the world, 11 are being conducted in Africa, and Turkey has contributed to none of these missions.

As the accession process entered a stalemate, the disagreements between Turkey and the EU over the framework for security cooperation resurfaced. Cooperation on security and peace is in general ad hoc. While Turkey has been contributing to the EU’s CSDP missions on the basis of the frame­work participation agreement that it signed with the EU in 2006, it is also demanding to participate in the decision-making procedures of the CSDP. The EU is, however, determined to restrict the decision-making process exclusively to the member states.

One outcome of this is that Turkey and the EU are carrying out their security en­gagements with African countries without cooperating or consulting with one an­other. Somalia is a good example of this lack of engagement. Both Turkey and the EU have been delivering tactical training support to the Somali National Army with­out any effective coordination between them. Turkey provides more comprehensive training packages with direct links to effec­tive operational units in the field as well as military equipment options as compared to the EU. This also undermines the EU’s overall impact.

In addition to the changing nature of EU-Turkey relations and, as a result, the resur­facing disagreements between the two, Tur­key and the EU have different perceptions of – and reactions to – the emerging environ­ment of complex multipolarity in the continent. While the US is downgrading its posture in the region, African states are increasingly partnering with regional states such as the Gulf States and Turkey as well as global powers, including Russia and China, among others. These new actors pro­vide options and viable alternatives to Brus­sels and other European capitals. In the eyes of African decision-makers, this geo­political transformation provides more space for ne­gotiations and manoeuvring, and relatedly, an opportunity to exercise more agency and the increased possibility of asserting their own interests and prior­ities.

For Turkey, the emerging multipolarity in Africa is an opportunity to develop “stra­tegic and long-term” relations based on “mutual interest, trust, and partnership” with African countries by positioning itself as a security partner.

In contrast, for the EU and its members, this new dynamic presents challenges. For one, the changing reality on the ground is perceived to further contribute towards destabilisation in Africa, and consequently, to aggravate insecurity at the EU’s borders and undermine the EU’s ability to formulate and implement common action as a response to crises and conflicts. Turkey’s increasing involvement in the multipolar competitions in Africa – especially those with the UAE in several military conflicts, such as in Libya and Somalia – strengthen this perception. Moreover, the laissez faire approach of China, Russia, and Turkey to African states contradicts the EU’s heavy emphasis on conditionality.

Last, but not least, the conflicting interests of the member states vis-à-vis Turkey in Africa further accentuate the challenges for the EU. France, for example, increasingly perceives Turkey as a geopolitical rival in Africa and a destabilising actor that is spoil­ing France’s economic and geopolitical in­ter­ests, especially in West and North Africa.

Recommendations

Nevertheless, the EU’s and Turkey’s Africa policies in the continent are not necessarily irreconcilable. Both Turkey and the EU are eager to develop and deepen their relations with states in Africa and face comparable challenges, despite them perceiving the trans­formations in the continent differently.

Firstly, they are both being challenged by rivals offering competitive solutions to African counterparts’ security and eco­nomic quests. Secondly, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area indicate that African states aim to increase their ability to act collectively in order to manage their international partnerships. The recent summits between African states and China, Turkey, and the EU show that security will play an impor­tant role in future relations. Furthermore, an undoing of the new multipolar dynamics in Africa seems to be unlikely. Even Rus­sia’s invasion of Ukraine has not manifested in an “epochal turn” in Africa, as in the rest of the Global South.

Against this backdrop, the EU and Germany should factor these dynamics into their approaches when engaging with Africa. These common challenges also re­quire re­thinking frameworks and partners, includ­ing Turkey, which could help the EU and Germany to strengthen its partnership with African states on security issues.

If both Turkey and the EU can overcome their disagreements and agree upon co­opera­tion and coordination as a matter of common strategic interest, there will be a greater possibility of producing policies that better meet the security expectations of Afri­can countries. Such a direction would also be in line with the EU and the member states’ commitment to implementing the new strategy on multilateralism and build­ing new alliances with third countries based on this strategy.

The EU should address the divergence with Turkey regarding Africa, especially on security and defence issues, with a more structured foreign policy dialogue. In prac­tice, the continuation of this existing diver­gence means that Turkey will continue to pursue its geopolitical agenda on its terms. In Africa, this direction will translate into a wider discrepancy between active forms of security engagement by Turkey and the EU with African states on the ground.

The challenge here is not only to overcome the EU’s reluctance to collaborate with Turkey, but also to establish a multi­lateral framework with partners in a much more strategic way in Africa. This does not mean, however, advocating an ad hoc sce­nario of transactional, interest-based co­operation that differs from case to case. In such a scenario, cooperation out of neces­sity in some theatres without a strategic compass will keep the relationship away from the brink in the short term, but it cannot prevent Turkey-EU relations from moving in a more conflictual direction.

Hence, the EU should consider a formal partnership with Turkey under the CSDP as a non-EU NATO member. This can aid the EU in developing the defence capabilities and effectiveness of CSDP missions in Africa, as well as in converging the defence and for­eign policies of the EU and Turkey in Africa.