FOCAC 2024: Moving Away from Large Infrastructure Deals towards Normative Power of China
Megatrends spotlight 38, 16.09.2024The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027) outlines concrete targets for China–Africa relations. What are the latest trends shaping this partnership, and how might they impact Europe’s cooperation with Africa?
African leaders applaud Chinese President Xi Jinping, center, after his speech at the opening ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Thursday, Sept. 5, 2024.
© picture alliance / ASSOCIATED PRESS | Greg Baker
In early September 2024, dozens of African heads of state and government and other high-level representatives gathered in Beijing for the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). It was the largest diplomatic event hosted by China since the reopening of the country in January 2023, following the Covid-19 pandemic, and took place amid growing geopolitical rivalry between Beijing and the West. The event attracted more African leaders than the UN General Assembly, and garnered significant attention both in Africa and globally.
We argue that the FOCAC emphasized two recent trends in China–Africa relations. In terms of economic cooperation and financing, FOCAC shifted away from large-scale infrastructure deals towards “small yet beautiful” projects, thereby responding to international criticism on debt sustainability, and reflecting China’s own economic slowdown. In addition, FOCAC displayed how China is increasingly positioning itself as a normative and discourse power in Africa, emphasizing its own modernization experiences as a potential role model for African countries, and presenting a discourse on China–African relations and on China as a global power as an alternative to the Western approach to development assistance.
African governments have become more assertive in promoting their interests within the FOCAC framework, and openly criticize, for instance, the trade imbalance. Overall, however, African representatives very much welcome China’s cooperation approach. Whereas in Europe, China is now frequently described as a strategic rival and competitor (in addition to being a cooperation partner), this more critical perspective is clearly not shared among African governments.
Infrastructure finance is back on the agenda, but at a much lower level compared to that available in the 2010s. Despite recent debates on debt sustainability in African countries and economic slowdown in China, Xi Jinping announced that China will provide USD 50.7 billion of financial support over the next three years. About USD 30 billion will be provided as credit, about USD10 billion as development assistance and another USD 10 billion in investment by Chinese companies in Africa.
One could argue that announcing sizable finance packages is in line with previous FOCAC summits. In 2015 and 2018, USD 60 billion was pledged for each subsequent three-year period. The recently announced package is both smaller and spread more broadly across credit, investment and development assistance. Not least in light of the economic slowdown in China, the era of continuously increasing finance packages has clearly come to an end.
More importantly, China is adjusting the type and sectors of the projects funded. With the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China for several years prioritized large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya or the Addis–Djibouti Railway in Ethiopia. More recently, and at least partly in response to growing criticism of the BRI, China has been promoting the so-called “small yet beautiful” approach: smaller and more targeted projects that are both economically viable and make a positive contribution to the environment and to social development.
The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027) announced that China will deliver 1,000 such “small yet beautiful” projects to improve people’s livelihoods over the next three years. Existing examples of such projects are the “Luban Workshop”, which focuses on vocational education and the training of professionals and technicians. Another is the promotion of Juncao technology, which focuses on developing sustainable solutions, such as the cultivation of edible and medicinal mushrooms and the planting of a high-yield, drought-resistant grass suitable for feeding livestock.
It will be interesting to follow the implementation of these projects, as smaller projects require proportionally more bureaucratic effort than larger ones. African countries that are focused on reducing debt and moving away from large infrastructure projects may welcome this new approach, while those still reliant on substantial loans to address the infrastructure gap may view the shift with frustration, as smaller projects could restrict access to the financial resources and large-scale infrastructure needed for accelerated growth.
The main focus of FOCAC was to promote China’s experience of modernization as a potential role model for African countries. “Modernization” appeared as a keyword in various sections across the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan as well as in Xi’s FOCAC speech. Modernization is acknowledged as a universal goal and “a common pursuit of countries around the world”. Yet, the overall FOCAC discourse highlights China’s unique approach to modernization and its potential to serve as an alternative model for Africa.
The Action Plan outlines various sectors in which China will share its modernization experiences with Africa. This includes cooperation on anti-corruption policies, agriculture, technology transfers, poverty reduction and rural development. In addition, China also announces that it will share its “governance experiences”. This term refers to Xi Jinping’s thoughts on governance and China’s path to modernization. While these terms remain deliberately vague, they clearly suggest that China is now much more proactively seeking to engage as a norm-setter and role model for African countries.
Various types of elite networks and exchanges will help to share China’s approach to modernization, including party-to-party cooperation, media engagement and various training programmes. The related announcements in the FOCAC action plan are not empty statements, but are likely to be implemented, as various Chinese actors in charge of elite network building have consistently been competing for influence and visibility.
Promoting Xi Jinping’s concept of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind,” this year’s FOCAC stressed a “shared future” between China and Africa. Xi also underscored the significance of the “shared past”, expressing the view that the Western approach to Africa “has inflicted immense sufferings on developing countries”. Compared to previous speeches, he was more explicit in positioning China’s approach to cooperation with Africa as an alternative to that of the West.
The latest FOCAC plan resonates with the national development priorities of many African countries, focusing on industrialization, agriculture, security, trade, investment, employment and poverty alleviation. The FOCAC agenda situates China–Africa cooperation within the broader context of South–South cooperation. The FOCAC plan rejects ideology-based bloc confrontations and calls for reforms in global governance systems to better represent the interests of countries of the Global South. China’s emphasis on its “shared past” and “shared future” with Africa highlights its goal to position itself as the primary partner for Africa and promote its discursive power in the region.
To achieve a “shared future”, China announced multiple commitments to strengthening its networks with African politicians, business elites, scholars, journalists, artists and civil society actors. These initiatives have the potential to translate into China’s normative and discursive power, as African decision-makers are increasingly socialized with Chinese norms and experiences. Some of China’s previous initiatives in building elite networks to shape discourses and perceptions has already yielded positve results.
For instance, at this year’s FOCAC, many African leaders, politicians, and business elites publicly debunked the “debt-trap diplomacy” narrative and applauded China’s development model to both Chinese and international audiences. While debt relief has been a pressing issue for many African countries over the years, China has largely refrained from providing the extensive debt relief that many nations have sought, focusing instead on the overseas deployment of capital. At this year’s FOCAC, China urged developed countries and international financial institutions to “fulfil their responsibilities” in helping African countries alleviate their debt burdens and achieve sustainable development.
While Xi Jinping explicitly criticized the idea of bloc confrontation, his speech and the overall narrative at FOCAC clearly positioned China as an alternative partner to the West – one that is not only addressing one of the key priorities of most African countries – economic development – but is also providing lessons based on its own process of modernization. Compared to earlier years, when China’s engagement in Africa primarily focused on aid, development finance, investment and access to natural resources, its current involvement emphasizes experience sharing. In addition, Xi Jinping also expressed a strong interest in promoting his political ideology and thoughts to African leaders. Western actors, in turn, have themselves contributed to conceiving different types of external partnerships with Africa as a geopolitical and geostrategic competition, for instance by presenting major initiatives such as the EU’s Global Gateway as an alternative to China’s BRI.
Moving forward, Chinese as well as European actors should take steps not to further fuel the geostrategic competition. Whereas different cooperation approaches allow African actors to pick and choose what fits best with their interests, geostrategic competition pushes them to take sides, and prevents any type of cooperation among China, the EU and African partners. For instance, given African countries’ limited access to debt relief, which has already led to the kind of social unrest seen recently in Kenya, China and Europe must collaborate to address these pressing challenges. In light of major development challenges across the continent, a confrontational approach is not a sustainable option.
Dr Hangwei Li is an Associate at Megatrends Afrika and a Senior Researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Dr Christine Hackenesch is a Project Lead at Megatrends Afrika and a Senior Researcher at IDOS.
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