Civil War in Myanmar

Little Chance for Negotiations

Against this background, it seems highly unrealistic that constructive negotiations can be initiated between the military government and the opposition in the near future. Both sides operate according to a zero-sum logic, thus perceiving the conflict as an existential dispute about the future of the country. This leaves little room for understanding or compromise. There is also a lack of political incentives to compromise on either side. The generals are unwilling to abandon power after a military coup that brought months of unrest and hundreds of deaths. This is also true for the rank-and-file soldiers and police officers, who would have to fear extensive reprisals if civilian rule were to be restored. Additionally, many of their families are housed in military bases; the generals use them as bargaining chips to deter potential deserters. Thus, the junta is still counting on the loyalty of its rank and file. A split of the armed forces between hardliners and reformers would only be conceivable if the power of the generals around Min Aung Hlaing were to erode. However, such a scenario does not seem very likely at present.

On the other hand, the CRPH leadership, with hundreds of its supporters having been killed, has no incentive to make a compromise either. The majority of the opposition – which, unlike in previous protests, is broadly anchored in society and includes students and monks as well as, among others, administrative staff, doctors, and trade unionists – accepts neither the coup nor would it accept any future govern­ment in which the military is involved. Members of the counter-government have repeatedly stated in public that they are currently ruling out negotiations with the military leadership. Moreover, the closing of ranks with the ethnic minorities under the unity government increases the pres­sure on the CRPH to be tough on the Tatmadaw. In the view of many minority representatives, this is precisely what the NLD, which forms the core of the CRPH, failed to do during Aung San Suu Kyi’s first term in office. Instead the NLD entered a fragile truce with the military. Minority rights, they argue, were sold out by Aung San Suu Kyi in favour of a power-sharing arrangement with the Tatmadaw. As a result, the peace process, the expansion of autonomy rights, and plans for a new feder­alism made little progress between 2015 and 2020. Hence, if the CRPH were to agree to any compromise with the Tatmadaw, representatives of the ethnic minorities in the NUG would most likely interpret it as another sell-out of their rights and interests.

Escalation of Violence

The initial calculus of the coup plotters seemed to be to take power with minimal use of force by arresting the NLD leadership, banning protests, censoring the media, and shutting down the internet. This was to be followed by a transition to a “disciplined democracy” that would have culminated in an election victory in 2022 for the military-backed parties, most notably the Union Solidarity and Development Party. Such calculus certainly did not work out. Within days after the coup, there were mass pro­tests in many cities, which were violently put down by the security forces. Recently, democracy activists fought back with home­made weapons. In the country’s largest city, Yangon, but also in other cities, bombs were detonated in front of police stations and administrative buildings: 21 members of the security forces were killed according to state media. Moreover, the coup com­pletely destroyed the already fragile peace process with the EAOs. Back in February, the military attacked posts of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), one of the 10 EAOs that had signed the ceasefire agreement in 2015. The RCSS then declared that the Tatmadaw had broken the agree­ment. The Karen National Union (KNU), which, as one of the largest ethnic rebel groups, was also part of the agreement, also declared it null and void as a result of the coup. In recent weeks, the Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the KNU, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have attacked military posts, killing about 30 soldiers. In early May 2021, KIA fighters even claimed to have shot down an air force attack helicopter. The KIA was never party to the ceasefire agreement.

The military responded to the attacks by bombing several villages in areas controlled by EAOs. Thousands of civilians fled. There are also increasing reports that new armed groups are emerging. In response to the coup, for example, the Chinland Defense Force was formed, which claims to have killed dozens of military personnel. In addi­tion, established EAOs have announced that they will cooperate with the unity government and other eth­nic military asso­ciations in the fight against the military. This ap­plies, for example, to the recently strengthened Brotherhood Alliance, which consists of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. There are even reports of increased efforts to forge a coali­tion of ethnic militias against the junta and to lead them together against the army.

It would be a nightmare scenario for the military if the newly formed politi­cal alli­ance of the CRPH and the ethnic minority parties were to be extended to include a broad military alliance of EAOs. Such a political and military alliance, which would transcend ethnic boundaries and include the ousted government, would be a first in Myanmar’s recent history. To be sure, it is still a pipe dream at present. On the one hand, this is because some of the EAOs have fought the military as well as each other in the past. On the other hand, the Tatmadaw have always managed to con­clude bilateral pacts with certain EAOs as part of a “divide and conquer” strategy. This has prevented the formation of any over­arching alliance of the major ethnic rebel groups. For exam­ple, the mili­tary has tied the largest of these groups, the United Wa State Army, to itself through extensive autonomy rights and a bilateral ceasefire. Accordingly, the leader­ship of the organisation, which is externally supported by China, has so far not voiced any criticism of the coup.

It therefore appears unlikely that the Tatmadaw could suffer a military defeat by the EAOs anytime soon. This is not to say, however, that the links between the demo­cratic opposition and at least some militari­ly strong EAOs will not have any consequences. Quite the contrary, it seems plau­sible to assume that it will not only lead to an escalation of violence in the border regions, but also gradually affect the central areas of Myanmar. The extent and duration of the violence is likely to depend heavily on how durable the alliance between the ousted NLD government and the ethnic minorities will be.

What is more, a further escalation of violence is likely to exacerbate the down­ward political and economic trends in Myan­mar. The country is already on the brink of economic collapse. According to UN estimates, more than half of the popu­lation will be living in poverty by 2022. Politically, the country is currently largely ungovernable for the junta. Demon­stra­tions, strikes, and civil disobedience have left, among other sectors, education, public health, and parts of Myanmar’s industry dysfunctional, making it increasingly diffi­cult for the military leadership to provide key public services and keep the economy going.

ASEAN as a Mediator

With a continuing standoff in Myanmar and the UN Security Council stopping short of condemning the coup as well as any fur­ther action due to opposition from Rus­sia and China, there have been increasing calls at home and abroad for weeks for the Asso­ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take on a mediating role. Some member states of the organisation had criticised the coup in an unusually direct manner. Many of the ASEAN countries fear that the crisis in Myanmar could have far-reaching nega­tive consequences for re­gional stability.

A first ASEAN meeting on the situation in Myanmar, which took place in Jakarta at the end of April, was publicly lauded a success by the participants. The result of the summit was a “five-point consensus”, which, in accordance with the ASEAN un­animity principle, was also agreed to by junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. It stipulated an end to violence, dialogue between all parties to the conflict, facilitation of the consensus by an ASEAN special envoy, humanitarian aid to be provided by ASEAN, and a visit to Myanmar by an ASEAN dele­gation, including a special ambassador. However, neither a condemnation of the coup was given, nor sanctions imposed. The CRPH and human rights organisations offered the criticism that, by inviting Min Aung Hlaing to the meeting, ASEAN had effectively given legitimacy to the junta on the international stage. Representatives of the CRPH were not invited. To make mat­ters worse, just days after the summit, the junta declared that it would have to estab­lish “stability” in Myanmar before the five-point consensus could be implemented. The generals thus showed how little they are interested in mediation at­tempts, even if these are procured by neigh­bouring states.

It is therefore unlikely that external actors will be able to significantly influence the Tatmadaw’s strategic calculus or behav­iour on the ground. Even if existing sanc­tions were to be tightened by, for example, the United States and the European Union (EU), this is unlikely to change. For one thing, not all of Myanmar’s neighbouring states support meddling in what they per­ceive to be Myanmar’s internal affairs. For another, the military has learnt since the 1980s to maintain its power grip in the face of international sanctions. In 2021, the military leadership around General Min Aung Hlaing seems determined to turn the country back into a military dictatorship by force. A further escalation of violence seems inevitable. Further displacements and a humanitarian crisis would be just some of the direct consequences. Germany and the EU would therefore be well-advised to prepare for such scenarios now.