A New Balance Of Power at the 29th World Climate Conference

Trump’s election: No deal-breaker (yet)

Historically, the role of the United States in international climate policy has been ambivalent at best. At COP29, however, the Biden administration maintained its con­structive stance of recent years. At COP27 (2022), Washington relinquished its long-standing resistance to the discussion of loss and damage. And in 2024 it made its first significant contribution to international climate finance (US$11 billion) – although this is small in light of its historical respon­sibility. Washington’s diplomatic weight was crucial for the agreement on the first Global Stocktake in Dubai 2023. At home, the Biden administration has created a robust plan for greenhouse gas reduction with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which should at least ensure the continued expansion of renewable energy under the Trump administration.

Despite their growing rivalry, climate policy remained a key area of cooperation between the United States and China (apart from a brief interruption in 2022). Agree­ments between them created the basis for important successes in negotiations, such as the renewable energy targets at COP28 and progress in dealing with non-CO₂ green­house gases like methane. During COP29, their informal understanding on the donor base served as a baseline for agreement on the NCQG. As well as softening their bilateral relationship as a whole, climate cooperation thus also protected the COP-process from becoming another arena of the US-China conflict.

China in the lead?

China has built up a dominant position in green technologies and supply chains over the past decade, while its historical emis­sions have just surpassed the EU’s for the first time. The likelihood of Washington withdrawing from the Paris Agreement presents China with an opportunity to translate its industrial prowess into a narra­tive leadership role in multilateral climate negotiations. At COP29 China expressed a general willingness to shoulder more responsibility and repeatedly emphasised its commitment to multilateralism.

This new openness was most apparent in relation to the NCQG. For the first time, China did not characterise its renewable energy investments in developing countries (US$24.5 billion since 2016) as South-South cooperation, but explicitly used UN termi­nology that characterises such investments as part of international climate finance. In doing so, China was signalling that it would become part of the donor base, albeit on a voluntary basis and as a developing coun­try. Later, China also supported the compro­mise that will allow developing countries’ contributions to multilateral development banks to count towards the NCQG – the very point to which India objected during the turbulent end of the conference. China also coordinated constructively with the EU’s negotiating team, led by EU Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra, on the NCQG and managed to prevent major emerging econo­mies from blocking it – with the exception of India.

Nevertheless, China’s commitment should not be overstated. At no point was China prepared to have its status as a developing country questioned and make more than voluntary contributions based on funds that would have flowed anyway. In the negotiations on mitigation China showed considerably less willingness or ability to exert decisive influence on ob­structive actors within the G77. Looking ahead, the key question is the extent to which China’s actions were a transient response to the expected US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and a subsequent political decision to publicly support multi­lateralism, or whether it indicates a long-term shift. China’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) will provide a first indi­cation.

Diplomatic support for the European Green Deal

In order to mitigate diplomatic tensions over measures such as the CBAM, the EU should make more strategic use of foreign policy instruments such as the Global Gate­way Initiative and the announced Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs). Although the EU managed to block an agenda item on “unilateral trade measures” in Baku, a much more vigorous push should be anticipated at COP30, which will be held under a Brazilian Presidency and likely without US support.

Taking the lead on implementation

The EU can consolidate its leadership role by consistently implementing its own climate targets. To this end, it should formulate an ambitious emissions reductions target for 2040 and present its nationally determined contribution (NDC) as soon as politically possibly. At present, all indications suggest that this will not occur before the second half of 2025, on account of internal matters such as the Polish presidential election in May. That will be too late to influence the inter­national process. Nonetheless, COP29 might have created an opportunity for the EU to coordinate its submission with China, in order to inject momentum into the falter­ing NDC process. This should give the EU a new incentive to search for ways to com­municate at least the target elements of its NDC prior to official submission, despite the difficult internal politics. The United Kingdom could serve as an example, after becoming the first industrialised country to announce the outline of its NDC (at COP29).

Demanding climate responsibility from China

If China wants to play a constructive leader­ship role in international climate politics, it needs the EU as a partner in the camp of the industrialised countries. In return, the EU should demand consistently demand climate responsibility from China. This in­cludes clear expectations regarding ambi­tious national climate plans. In preparation for future COPs and to support UN-based multilateralism as a whole, the EU should aim to fulfil – as far as possible – the stabilising function formerly played by US-China climate cooperation. The 5+1 format – which brings together the European and Chinese climate envoys and met for the first time in 2024 – could be expanded to play a leading role in the climate dialogue with China.

Beyond climate diplomacy, deeper EU-China cooperation on climate issues would involve identifying common interests and recognising and addressing potential con­flicts at an early stage, especially in the areas of technology and geopolitics. This could also prevent China’s alliance with countries of the Global South against EU climate measures such as the CBAM from gaining further influence. Another promis­ing field of cooperation is methane reduc­tion, in particular within the framework of the Global Methane Pledge (GMP).

Internally, the EU faces the challenge of reconciling China’s potential willingness to engage on climate cooperation with the diverging interests and attitudes of EU member states towards China and the grow­ing anti-Chinese rhetoric. The EU will need to embed climate cooperation in the broader context of EU-China relations. Instead of isolating climate issues, a holistic strategy is needed that links climate diplo­macy with trade, green technology and security, and seeks a balance between co­operation and competition.

Advancing climate finance

To sustain the UN climate process despite difficult geopolitical conditions, support for and cooperation with SIDS and LDCs is essential. The success of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T and the fulfilment of finan­cial promises will determine whether these countries continue to support the multi­lateral process and whether progress will be made on mitigation. The EU has an impor­tant role to play in sustaining the ongoing reforms of the international financial archi­tecture and work on innovative sources of finance. Multilateral development banks in particular must be shielded from the effects of Donald Trump’s election.

To this end, the EU should increase its diplomatic presence outside the formal negotiations. Progressive North-South coali­tions are still possible: at COP29, the United Kingdom, Kenya, Brazil, Colombia and Chile (re-)emerged as constructive partners. The EU should work with these countries in order to find ways to advance multilateral negotiations despite geopolitical crises.

Embed COPs in broader multilateralism

The process and outcome of COP29 pro­voked unusually fierce criticism. Baku showed that the COP process may no longer be isolated from geopolitical turmoil.

Cooperation within the UNFCCC is con­strained by the demands of universal parti­cipation and consensus, and smaller club formats are often discussed as a more prom­ising alternative. However, such hopes are regularly disappointed by the political realities – as demonstrated by the experi­ence with the climate club founded by Germany, which has been downgraded to a platform for industrial decarbonisation.

Although the G20 brings together all the major emitters, its Rio summit – which was held concomitantly with the COP – produced no more ambitious results than those achieved in Baku, despite a committed Brazilian Presidency. For the coming years, the constellation of actors in the G20 offers little prospect of change: with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Argentina all led by fossil fuel–friendly governments there are fewer opportunities for progressive coalitions than in the UNFCCC. Nevertheless, Brazil’s scheduling of the G20 summit for 18 and 19 November 2024 – at the beginning of the second week of the COP29 negotiations – could serve as a model. Forward-looking planning of presidencies and dates can create syner­gies between multilateral forums. That would create a shrewd opportunity to embed the climate conferences within geopolitical discussions instead of isolating them with little prospect of success.