Rethinking Strategic Sovereignty

Europe’s New Confrontational Security Order

Over the last three decades, the idea of a European security order has degenerated from the hope for a “lasting and just peace order from Vancouver to Vladivostok” (Hans-Dietrich Genscher) to an increasingly antagonistic constellation between the West and Russia under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. This has already manifested itself in the Georgia war, the annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s actions in Syria.

With the Ukraine war, the transition to­wards a confrontational European secu­rity order is becoming apparent. This mani­fests itself not only in Ukraine and the rela­tion­ship between the EU and NATO states and Russia, but also in the EU’s wider neigh­bourhood, such as the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and Mali.

At the same time, the EU and NATO con­tinue to exist as essential pillars of the “old order” and have even gained in importance in the wake of the Ukraine war. In contrast, those institutions that served to integrate Russia into the European order have been seriously damaged, especially the Organi­zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe. The NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Russia Founding Act might be permanently dis­mantled.

This new constellation has direct implications for European strategic sovereignty. Firstly, EU member states as well as Euro­pean NATO partners will have to shoulder considerable costs to decouple themselves from Russia in terms of energy policy, while at the same time containing the Kremlin’s territorial and power ambitions. This leaves less attention and fewer resources for policy areas that are not directly related to this challenge.

Secondly, Putin has made it clear that his focus is not only on Ukraine, but also on a more fundamental reorganisation of Euro­pean security, including the restoration ofRussian supremacy in the “post-Soviet” space, reaching as far as EU and NATO mem­ber states. Closely linked to this is the goal of pushing the US out of Europe politically as well as in terms of security policy. From the perspective of the EU and European NATO states, on the other hand, the Ukraine war is once more underlining the impor­tance of US security commitments.

Thirdly, the EU and NATO will have to clarify how they will adapt their respective enlargement processes under the conditions of a confrontational security order. In the short and medium terms, it is primarily Sweden and Finland debating whether or not to join the alliance (see SWP Comment 24/2022). So far, there is little indication that other non-aligned EU states such as Ire­land, Malta, and Austria are also seriously reconsidering their status.

The question of how to integrate the states in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood into Euro-Atlantic security structures is also becoming much more relevant. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have now applied for EU membership, and geostrategic competition with Russia in the Western Balkans is increasing. Ultimately, the question is how far – also in terms of strategic sovereignty – the borders of Euro-Atlantic security extend and how this security can be guaranteed, especially for those states that have no fore­seeable prospect of NATO membership.

What Strategic Sovereignty Now Means

These fundamental upheavals in Europe make it necessary to redefine the goals of strategic sovereignty. In recent years, the debate on the strategic sovereignty or – depending on the definition – strategic autonomy of Europe has been a focal point in the discourse on European policy. The notion of Europe’s “self-assertion” (“Selbst­behauptung Europas”, Helmut Schmidt) has been a central aspect of the European po­liti­cal discourse since at least the found­ing of the EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, it was only during Donald Trump’s term as US president that the question of strategic autonomy was brought to the fore. Despite – or precisely because of – the high level of security dependence on the US, the advocates of stra­tegic autonomy were primarily con­cerned with Europe’s ability to set its own interests and priorities autonomously from third parties. This concerned not only the US but also the other “great powers” China and Russia (see SWP Research Paper 4/2019). The goal of “more autonomy vis-à-vis the US”, however, resulted in many Central and Eastern European states rejecting the idea. Even if they are supportive of strengthening European (military) capabilities, with a view to Russia they have regarded US security guarantees as existential, long before the start of the Ukraine war.

In consequence, much of the debate about strategic autonomy and/or sovereignty has been driven by disputes over definitions rather than by what steps are necessary to achieve these goals. Looking ahead, it is there­fore important to distinguish between three specific terms and their different levels of ambition.

Capacity to act refers above all to the politi­cal and material preconditions for com­mon European action in foreign, secu­rity, and defence policy. The capacity to act requires political institutions inside or out­side the EU to take binding decisions as quickly as possible. It also requires the appropriate resources to act militarily, eco­nomically, technologically, or politically. However, the goal of having the capacity to act does not, in itself, say anything about the appropriate fora in which Europeans should act to­gether.

Strategic autonomy goes beyond the mere capacity to act because, at its core, it means the ability to set one’s own priorities, make decisions, and implement them (SWP Research Paper 2/2019). Autonomy vis-à-vis the US and its security commitments to Euro­pean NATO members is therefore espe­cially controversial.

Finally, strategic sovereignty is the most ambitious goal. First introduced into the debate by French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne speech in 2017, the political concept of sovereignty implies a common political authority. In democratic states, such authority can only be derived from the people. Even more than strategic autonomy, strategic sovereignty requires a political construct that – beyond the nation-state – only the EU can offer. Al­though the EU is far from being a sovereign state, it is nevertheless a unique political entity that is capable of jointly exercising sovereignty across the full range of state policy.

Strategic sovereignty thus also has the potential to become a central narrative for the deepening of the EU. Since the start of the Ukraine war, the idea of sovereignty has taken on a new meaning. Ensuring security and personal integrity is one of the core tasks of states. Just as in the Covid-19 pan­demic citizens expected the EU to take responsibility for public health (regardless of formal competences), in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they expect the EU to take care of the security of its states as well as its citizens.

Despite this debate, EU Europeans have made little progress towards greater sov­er­eign­ty in concrete and practical terms since Donald Trump’s inauguration as US presi­dent to the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Until the war against Ukraine, defence budgets in most EU and NATO coun­tries had increased only moderately, but for the most part remained far below the NATO-agreed target of 2 per cent of GDP. Although the EU has created institutional procedures in the form of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund, it has so far barely strengthened its military capacity to act. In the economic arena, more tangible progress has been made with regard to protection against economic coercion, technological resilience, and the projection of European economic power outside of the EU (Global Gateway).

Reassessing Relations with Partners and Third Countries

Strategic sovereignty requires cooperation both with close partners who essentially share the EU’s values and goals, but also with those third countries where this is not the case. Dealing with Russia as well as with the economic and security-political consequences of the Ukraine war will be a focus – perhaps even the point of gravity – for European foreign and security policy in the foreseeable future. For the EU, this means that patterns of interaction with, and dependencies on, the world outside the Union are also changing.

Europeans in the EU and NATO will thus have to re-evaluate their partnerships: What are they needed for? What role will like-minded partners play? And to what extent will a new “realism” be required?

Conclusions

The quest for European strategic sovereignty has gained new urgency with the return of a major military conflict to Europe. The transformation towards a confrontational European security order requires a re­think­ing of the goals, frameworks, priorities, and partners with which strategic sovereignty can and should be implemented. German and European policy should draw four con­clusions from this.

First, the EU should change course. Stra­tegic sovereignty, rather than autonomous capacity to act, should come first. In doing so, the EU should focus on the security of its members, with all that that entails. The EU is the political framework for action in which strategic sovereignty could operate to its full extent, for example in areas such as trade policy and sanctions; energy security and reducing dependence on strategic re­sources; digital and technology; and eco­nom­ics and financial policy. This is where the EU can and should play to its strengths.

Second, the Russian war against Ukraine also puts into focus, once again, the EU’s “Achilles’ heel” with regard to strategic sov­ereignty, namely the continued weakness in defence policy. It is very likely that the EU and NATO states will significantly in­crease their individual and collective defence efforts in the years to come. It will also take years before these funds – such as the €100 billion investment in the German armed forces for the next years announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in February – are actually translated into noticeably increased military capabilities. Moreover, it remains to be seen to what extent the new security situation will also increase the necessary political will and coherence within the EU to jointly build up capabilities and also deploy them in the event of a crisis or war. In the medium term, the US and NATO will remain indis­pensable for the defence of the EU and its member states.

Strategic sovereignty in its entirety can therefore only be thought of in Euro-Atlan­tic terms – with the aim of successively strengthening European defence capabilities within the alliance framework. In view of the uncertainties about the long-term orientation of US policy, the EU must pur­sue this goal even more consistently and forcefully.

Unfortunately, the EU’s “Strategic Compass”, adopted in March 2022, does not have the necessary level of ambition for this. It is particularly problematic that the document continues to focus on civilian and military crisis management rather than European defence.

Third, it must be emphasised that strategic sovereignty cannot be achieved through minor reforms at the European level. It is not enough to just push for – the still blocked – majority voting in foreign and security policy or to fine-tune PESCO projects. Rather, European policy and poli­tics need their own “Zeitenwende” in which every effort is made to orient EU policies towards common strategic sovereignty. This can become a unifying narrative for Euro­pean integration that also brings together the interests of its various member states.

The recommendations at the Conference on the Future of Europe also indicate that many EU citizens see the motif of security and self-assertion as a pillar for the EU in the 21st century. For this to happen, how­ever, strategic sovereignty would have to be thought of and implemented together with the economic transformation (Green Deal) and digitalisation as the third major politi­cal project of European policy.

Fourth and finally, the pursuit of strategic sovereignty also requires more German leadership and commitment. The initiatives for strategic sovereignty have so far come pri­marily from France, while Berlin has played more of a wait-and-see role.

As the largest European economic power, Germany has a special leadership responsi­bility. This applies both to the non-military components of strategic sovereignty within the EU framework and to the strengthening of military capabilities in close cooperation with the EU and NATO. Strategic sovereignty – for example by reducing dependencies on energy imports and strategic raw ma­terials – can only be achieved through inter­nal burden-sharing and more budgetary flexibility.

From the perspective of many Central and Eastern European partners, however, the Russian war of aggression also marks the failure of Germany’s foreign policy of “Wandel durch Handel” (i.e., the idea that economic exchange automatically leads to political rapprochement). Germany’s cred­ibility suffered greatly in the run-up to the war. Although Berlin has scrapped Nord Stream 2, disappointments amongst some European allies is growing again over a reluctance to deliver heavy weapons to Ukraine and extend sanctions to Russian oil and gas. If strategic sovereignty is to be suc­cessfully advanced, Berlin – but also Paris – must keep the interests of all member states in mind and protect them jointly at the Euro­pean level.