Normalisation and Realignment in the Middle East

Transactional Agreements

The recent normalisations comprise prime examples of transactional agreements. The Trump administration played a crucial mediating role in their conclusion, placing Sudan under massive pressure and offering the UAE and Morocco additional incentives to sweeten the deal. After all, for all actors involved, interests, not the settlement of conflict, took centre stage. Apart from the convergence of the threat perceptions of Israel and the Arab states, it was the per­sonal motives of Trump and Netanyahu, who were both in the middle of election campaigns, and specific national interests that played the most prominent roles.

US President Trump sought to distinguish himself as a peacemaker in the Middle East, especially after his so-called “deal of the century” to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained unsuccessful after being put forward in January 2020. He also in­tended to mobilise regional support for his maximum pressure campaign against Iran and to strengthen the US economy through arms deals.

Israel prioritised closing the ranks against Iran, while also seeking to establish a new paradigm in which the Palestinian leader­ship would no longer have veto power over Israel’s regional relations. In addition, Israel sought to broaden its economic rela­tions and expand its presence in the Horn of Africa. The US’s arms deliveries to Arab states were offset by its commitments to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

The UAE was primarily interested in accessing modern weapons systems and establishing a long-term bond with the US through extensive arms cooperation. The Trump administration promised the UAE 50 F35 fighter jets and 18 reaper drones for their normalisation with Israel. In mid-January 2021, it also designated the UAE and Bahrain as major US security partners. In addition, the UAE was interested in improving its reputation following its con­troversial involvement in the Yemen war. Further, Abu Dhabi sought to diversify its economy and develop the country into a technology hub. The agreement between Israel and Bahrain, on the other hand, was not so much the result of specific Bahraini interests as it was a signal of Saudi support for closer cooperation between Bahrain and Israel, seeing that Manama has hardly any independent decision-making capacity vis-à-vis Riyadh.

Sudan, under de facto President Abdelfattah al-Burhan, had motives for the agree­ment that actually bore no relation to Israel at all. Rather, Washington had made Sudan’s removal from its terror list and immunisation against lawsuits brought by terror victims conditional upon Khartoum’s normalisation of relations with Israel. This was crucial for the leadership in Khartoum, because it not only paved the way for the receipt of US developmental aid, but also helped Sudan rid itself of the tarnished im­age that had been left behind by the Bashir regime, thereby allowing it to regain access to international loans.

Morocco was incentivised by US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and the promise that negotiations on a settlement of the conflict there would take place on the basis of Morocco’s auton­o­my plan. As a result, not only the US, but also the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan opened consulates in Western Sahara. In addition, the US promised to supply Morocco with drones and other precision weapons, as well as extensive aid and investment.

Problematic Side Effects

As a result of the agreement between Israel and the UAE, a large number of cooperative ventures have since been agreed upon, not only at the state level, but also between private and civil society actors. Thus, for the first time, a “warm peace” is emerging; already, Israel’s relations with the UAE have clearly outpaced those with Egypt and Jordan. Israel’s existence is not only being recognised as a reality, the country is also increasingly accepted as a partner and a part of the region.

However, this shift should not be confused with progress towards a settlement of the conflicts between Israel and its neigh­bours. In the context of the agreements, Israel did commit to the Gulf States and the US not to carry out the formal annexation of parts of the West Bank that it had an­nounced in May 2020. However, the Abraham Accords make reference to the Trump plan, thus legitimising the Israeli right’s claim to parts of the West Bank as well as permanent, overarching Israeli control over Israel and the occupied Pales­tinian territories. They make no mention of a Palestinian state or concrete steps to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In this vein, the Arab “normalisers” can­not be expected to exert significant pressure on Israel to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Israel’s bilateral conflicts with Syria and Lebanon. On the contrary, the UAE is even falling behind European posi­tions on the matter, for example by failing to differentiate between Israel proper and Israeli settlements in occupied or annexed territories. Emirati companies have even concluded agreements with companies active in Israeli settlements. While Morocco criticises Israel’s actions, including those that endanger the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, it is unlikely to use its political capital to actively counter Israel’s occupation and annexation policies.

The Trump administration’s stance, the Israeli-Moroccan agreement and the growing recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara have also led to both a hardening of Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara issue and to increasing tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Algiers feels threatened by the (potential) expansion of Israeli-Moroccan cooperation and sees itself as even more isolated in the region, especially due to its support for the Polisario.

Beyond these direct effects, three factors in particular are likely to exacerbate con­flict in the region. First, the Trump admin­istration undermined principles of inter­national law – above all the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force – and this is made abundantly clear in its prom­ises to Israel and Morocco. The second fac­tor is the intensification of Tehran’s threat perception as it fears “strategic encirclement”. The US’s commitments to deliver arms could thus trigger a new arms race in the region and prompt Iran to work to secure its strategic depth by expanding its network of (violent) non-state actors. Third, Israel’s intelligence and IT cooperation with authoritarian states in the region threatens to further restrict the scope of action of opposition and civil society actors in these states rather than promoting more inclusive political systems. As recent reports about the Israeli NSO Group’s spyware “Pegasus” confirm, the UAE’s leadership features as one of the malware’s clients, employing it for the surveillance of journalists, human rights activists, and even members of the Emirates’ royal families.

Authoritarian Consolidation

Nothing has changed with regard to the reasoning behind Syria’s original exclusion from the Arab League, namely its massive human rights violations and alleged war crimes. Nonetheless, Arab states now assess the situation differently in light of various developments, including the military defeat of the Syrian opposition, the increased in­fluence of non-Arab powers in Syria, and the devastating regional destabilisation emanating from the Syrian conflict and the Covid-19 pandemic. This shifting perception was also contributed to by the realisa­tion that, at least since Russia’s intervention in 2015, the US and the EU, despite their initial mobilisation against the Assad regime, were no longer seeking regime change in Damascus. As a result, the Arab Gulf States in particular favoured a rever­sion to authoritarian consolidation across the region, including in Syria.

The UAE justified its rapprochement with Damascus in December 2018 by highlighting the necessity to push back the influence of Iran and Turkey in Syria and to strengthen the Sunni Arab presence there. Both Iran and Turkey militarily intervened indirectly and directly on different sides in the con­flict early on. Initiated by Russia in 2017, the Astana Process saw Tehran and Ankara assume official roles in the management of the Syrian conflict. Since then, their pres­ence, or that of the militias they support, has been consolidated in various parts of the country. Indeed, Turkey has even administratively incorporated enclaves in northern Syria. For Abu Dhabi, the prospect of profiting from investment opportunities in the reconstruction of the war-torn coun­try also plays a role. Before 2011, the UAE was the second largest Arab investor in Syria after Saudi Arabia, primarily in the real estate and transportation sectors. Since 2018, Abu Dhabi has been showing increased interest in investing in luxury projects such as Marota City.

For Syria’s neighbours, it is above all economic interests that compel them to open up to Damascus. Jordan and Lebanon, which have been severely impacted and destabilised by the civil war in Syria, seek to revive cross-border trade and profit by way of Syrian reconstruction. The Jordanian leadership also fears the transnational mobilisation of jihadist groups and is there­fore interested in stabilising Syria and deep­ening its security cooperation with Damas­cus. Further, the interest in a swift repatria­tion of the more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees hosted by Jordan and Lebanon plays a central role in their respective rap­prochements with the country.

The decisive obstacles for the Arab leaders’ reengagement with Damascus are therefore political pressure from Washington and Brussels, and US sanctions. Besides the punitive measures levied against Presi­dent Assad and his extended entourage, the US sanction regime includes sectoral sanc­tions that may also be applied to third country nationals who cooperate with Syria’s financial institutions, oil and natu­ral gas industries, and construction com­panies.

Assad’s Rehabilitation

By gradually normalising their relations with Syria, Arab countries confer renewed regional legitimacy on the Assad regime. Behavioural changes in terms of respect for human rights, rule of law, inclusion and good governance, let alone a political tran­sition and a power-sharing arrangement as envisaged in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 of 2015, are no longer part of the discussion when it comes to Syria’s return to the Arab League. As a result, the Syrian population will continue to suffer massive repression. The majority of displaced Syr­ians residing in neighbouring countries will likely be forced to return home in the medium-term, even if neither their safety nor livelihoods are guaranteed.

Limiting Iran’s influence in Syria and expelling Tehran-backed militias has now become the Arab Gulf States’ most pressing priority. Yet, President Assad depends on these militias to maintain his claim to power. Should the Arab states in fact try to reduce Iran’s footprint in Syria, this would probably lead to a renewed flare-up of armed conflict in areas controlled by the regime, thus making the stabilisation of Syria even more difficult.

Arab normalisation of relations with Damascus goes hand in hand with a de facto recognition of Russia as the new dominant foreign power in the Middle East, which means a further weakening of West­ern influence. Last but not least, the reha­bilitation of Assad fits into the pattern of authoritarian restoration that can be ob­served in many other parts of the region. Assad’s staying power and the regime’s self-presentation as a secular bulwark against religious extremism are not only seen as constitutive of a model to be emulated by some rulers in the region, but they have also increasingly made an impression internationally.

Syria’s return to the Arab League could thus also serve as a springboard for the country’s leadership to reintegrate into the world community without any changes in behaviour or reform. In any case, the international rehabilitation of the Assad regime is incrementally progressing. This dynamic undermines the UN-led Geneva process, in which the parties to the conflict are negotiating a political settlement. Yet, that route is largely deadlocked anyway, and offers little prospect of success in view of the military balance of power and the Astana Process.

Motives for Closing Ranks

There were three main reasons for this dé­tente. First, the lifting of the boycott, which was primarily initiated by Saudi Arabia, represented a concession to the new US administration. The Saudi royal family sought to improve its reputation and bilat­eral relations vis-à-vis the US in this way. During his presidential campaign, Joe Biden had already announced that he would with­draw all support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen and fundamentally reassess rela­tions with the Gulf monarchy. This also came against the backdrop of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, which was presumably ordered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Second, by lifting the embargo, the quar­tet intended to integrate Qatar more strong­ly into its “Sunni-Arab alliance” and thus pull it away from the sphere of Iranian and Turkish influence. As the Biden administration sought to return to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran, the quartet feared a strengthening of Tehran which (in their eyes) necessitated defensive action. The heightened threat perception of Iran in the four capitals combined with the realisation that Doha was (inevitably) co­operating more closely with Ankara and Tehran due to the boycott, contributed to the quartet’s willingness to overlook Doha’s deviating foreign policy in favour of closing the ranks.

Third, although less significant, the lifting of the boycott offered the prospect of economic recovery. March 2020’s drop in oil prices on the international market as well as the decline in global demand for oil due to the Covid-19 pandemic, resulted in significant losses for the Gulf States. The end of the embargo allowed for the revital­isation of cross-border trade, mutual invest­ment and open air travel. The fact that the boycott forced Qatar to diversify its econo­my has ironically made it a more attractive business partner for the other Gulf States. This also provides an opportunity for the deeper integration of their economies.

Limited Reconciliation

Still, the persistence of ideological divergences and conflicts of interest is likely to continue to cause tension among the GCC states as well as between Qatar and Egypt. Despite reconciliation, the GCC is still far from being an effective regional organisation, let alone a defensive alliance.