Germany’s New Government and Its Foreign Policy on Turkey: Lines of Conflict and Areas of Cooperation

EU-Turkey cooperation on migration in German election manifestos

Despite the key importance of the “refugee deal”, neither the CDU/CSU, the SPD nor FDP mention it in their election manifestos.

As far as migration via Turkey is concerned, many of the goals that the CDU/CSU explicitly mention in their election mani­festo are already largely being achieved through the refugee cooperation with Ankara: for example, the wish to prevent “illegal migration”, “to keep the number of people fleeing to Germany and Europe [...] permanently low” and to “open up life prospects for refugees in their home coun­tries or nearby”.

The SPD’s election manifesto says, “We will defend the 1951 Refugee Convention”. It then goes on to say, “Pushbacks are a blatant violation of international law”. It also recommends setting up “legal migra­tion routes”. The latter is part of the exist­ing agreement with Turkey. Large-scale push­backs, i.e. the rejection of refugees, occurred at the end of February/beginning of March 2020 at the Turkish-Greek border. The Turkish President had large numbers of refugees transported to the border in a con­certed action and the Turkish police accom­panied refugees to Greek territory. At the time, EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, justified the rejection of the refugees by the Greek authorities by saying its actions were protecting the EU’s external border. That Turkey failed at the time to sneak large numbers of refugees into Greece paradoxically ensured that its cooperation with the EU on migration matters still continues today.

The FDP election manifesto says, “[...] the basic right to asylum for politically perse­cuted people [is] inviolable”. It goes on to say, “It must be possible to get to Europe safely – without having to take a life-threaten­ing journey and risk falling into the hands of human traffickers.” At the same time, it also calls for effective protec­tion for the EU’s external border. The FDP, too, makes no reference to the agreement with Turkey, even though it allows a num­ber of the goals mentioned in its election manifesto to be achieved. The silence of Germany’s political parties on the refugee agreement with Turkey is all the more aston­ishing given that is has obviously served as a blueprint for a number of cooperation agreements between the EU and/or its mem­bers and North African countries.

The Green party’s election manifesto, on the other hand, goes into the EU’s agree­ment with Turkey in some detail. It says, “The current EU-Turkey deal undermines [...] international asylum law, has failed and must be abandoned”. The Green party wants to “expand financial and logistical support for first arrival and transit coun­tries such as Turkey [...]”, but European cooperation with third countries “should not be aimed at preventing people seeking refuge”. They are calling for a new agree­ment in which European financial support for Turkey is only linked to looking after and integrating refugees properly. The EU must also “set binding quotas for resettling vulnerable refugees to the EU”.

Two trends have become apparent. On one side of the fence are the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD. In the manifestos of the CDU/CSU and FDP, they explicitly call for limiting irregu­lar migration and in 2016 the SPD helped initiate the refugee agreement with Turkey and is jointly responsible for it. How­ever, none of these parties have com­mented on the cooperation – probably due to Turkey’s negative image in German society. On the other side of the fence, there are the Greens, who have rejected the cur­rent agreement with Ankara for legal and humanitarian reasons and do not want an agreement whose aim is to limit irregular migration. Instead, they are in favour of increasing the intake of refugees. It is highly likely that the future government coalition will include parties from both sides of this fence and so this issue will need urgent clarification.

The current dynamic on the refugee question

NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and concerns about another massive rise in the number of refugees have set alarm bells ringing in Ankara, Athens, Brussels and Berlin. In Turkey, people’s tolerance of the government’s refugee policy is fast evapo­rating, especially given the country is still in the midst of a long-running economic crisis. The opposition has seized this oppor­tunity to put the government under pres­sure on the refugee question. In polls, seven out of ten eligible voters are in favour of closing the borders to refugees and well over half of those surveyed and more than a third of those who normally vote for the ruling AKP said that letting in more refugees would drive them away from Erdoğan’s party.

The EU approach, which has always been criticised in Turkey as an “externalisation of the refugee question”, of leaving refugees primarily in the neighbouring states of con­flict areas and helping these countries, is now also seen as the only possible solution in Turkey. The Turkish President and his Foreign Minister are calling on the EU and the international community to support Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, the primary host countries of Afghan refugees, and show willingness to provide financial sup­port to these countries as well. The Greek Prime Minister and a summit of EU countries border­ing the Mediterranean (EuroMed9), which he convened, has made similar state­ments. Even EU member states that have so far given migrants refuge are categorically refusing to continue doing so on a larger scale and point out that they have already taken in many refugees.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government is pushing hard for the EU to continue and even increase the amount of aid it provides. The EU is about to officially announce the next tranches. The new federal government is unlikely to be able to buck this trend. At the European level, it will have to continue cooperating with Turkey on the refugee issue and be faced with the additional task of winning over the electorate.

NATO partner Turkey in the parties’ election manifestos

The FDP’s manifesto says, “As a NATO mem­ber, Turkey is and will remain an indispensable partner, which is why we are working hard to reduce heightened security tensions in the alliance”. The addendum, “There will be a Turkey after President Erdoğan”, makes it clear where they believe the problems for the current security tensions lie. The CDU/CSU focuses on normative expectations on Turkey, “NATO is a community of values. Its members must commit them­selves to upholding human rights and the rule of law.” Reading between the lines, they express doubts about Ankara’s reli­ability as a partner, “As a NATO partner, Turkey must make its contribution to col­lective security and meet its obligation to hold consultations on security policy.”

The SPD’s manifesto does not explicitly mention Turkey in connection with NATO, but calls for the “outlawing of autonomous, lethal weapons systems” in order to “coun­teract the temporal and spatial delimitation of military violence [...]”. The use of drones in Azerbaijan and Libya is cited as an example of a delimitation of military force; armed Turkish drones were used in both countries and those in Libya even carried out autonomous killings. The SPD is also announcing a “restrictive arms export policy” and wants to “coordinate a tight­ening of EU arms export agreements with our European partners [...]”.

The Greens are calling for “no German weapons in war zones and dictatorships”. It also states in their manifesto, “For Germany, we will introduce legislation to control arms exports [and] the right to bring a class action if the new laws are broken [...].” As with the SPD’s manifesto, these measures will directly affect Turkey because as well as arms exports to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it is largely contracts with Turkey that keep arms exports on the agenda in Germany. Like the SPD, the Greens are calling for autonomous weapons systems to be banned internationally. The Greens have even gone one step further by announcing that they will “address Turkey’s illegal military offen­sive in Northern Syria at NATO level”.

There is a long list of reasons why Germany’s political parties are dissatisfied with Turkey’s behaviour in the alliance. It ranges from the dismantling of democracy and authori­tarianism to military interventions in neighbouring countries and cooperating with Russia on defence policy, NATO’s greatest challenge in Europe.

Turkey’s strategic calculus

The Turkish government knows how con­troversial its policies are in the alliance and in the West in general. In order to prove that it is still an indispensable partner, Ankara has underlined its diplomatic sup­port for Kiev in recent months. Much to Russia’s annoyance, Turkey is selling armed drones to Poland and Ukraine. Ankara also re­sponded to Washington’s proposals for Tur­key to protect and control Kabul airport – which could not be done due to resistance from the Taliban.

In order to reduce its dependence on military technology, in particular from US, German and French suppliers, Turkey has diversified its arms imports considerably. Ankara also now sources weapons from Russia, China, South Korea and Ukraine. Not least due to sanctions, the US is cur­rently only just Turkey’s largest arms sup­plier; Ankara’s imports from Italy and Spain are almost as high.

It was the arms embargo imposed by the US in response to Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 that prompted Turkey to develop its own defence industry. Today, around 60 percent of civil aviation and military equipment comes from domestic production. Turkey has enjoyed inter­national success as a producer of armed drones which have been decisive in a num­ber of military encounters, particularly in Libya and Azerbaijan. Since 2015, the Turk­ish defence industry has made a significant contribution to its country’s exports, but suffered a severe setback in 2020 due to US sanctions. Against this background, Ger­man restrictions on arms exports to Turkey will only be effective if they are coordinated at the European and transatlantic levels.

What next for Germany and Turkey?

The new federal government will face two big questions. Firstly, how can Ankara be persuaded to cooperate with Brussels and Berlin and consider the interests of the EU and its member states if there is no pros­pect of deepening economic relations, visa-free travel or diplomatic consultations? And secondly, how will Germany and Europe strike a balance between the desired part­ner­ship with Ankara, on the one hand, and European normative expectations and the necessary restrictions on Turkey’s foreign policy activities, on the other?

It is therefore on the coalition partners that form Germany’s new government to first clarify their positions on Ankara’s expectations. They should then recognise that the EU’s current strategy is unlikely to work and therefore needs improving because it is extremely unlikely that the EU will actually make taking any action on areas as diverse as cooperation on migration, economic policy, issuing visas, arms export policy and diplomatic consultations solely dependent on Ankara no longer fur­ther escalating the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. The interests of member states in these areas are too varied for them to be able to find a common position vis-à-vis Turkey within the framework of these negotiations. Ankara will therefore con­tinue to test the EU’s pain thresholds on these matters.

At the same time, Turkey cannot rely on the current supposition that cooperative behaviour really will be rewarded. It is there­fore necessary to define criteria for each individual policy area. Brussels must show Ankara its red lines, but also commit itself to complying with Turkey’s calls, once Turkey has delivered on its promises. For example, starting negotiations to deepen the customs union should only be made dependent on the removal of trade barriers put up by Turkey in recent years which have hampered the current customs union. Cooperation on defence policy, on the other hand, should be tied to de-escalation and Ankara putting more distance between itself and Moscow. And for further coopera­tion on migration, Turkey should be made to comply with the minimum standards for dealing with migrants. Only if the EU formulates clear criteria for Ankara and only if it makes credible commitments to meet Ankara’s demands, will Berlin and Brussels come to an agreement with Ankara that is based on rules and gives both sides something they can rely on.