Germany’s Fragile Leadership Role in European Air Defence

Capabilities and the gap

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, efforts to build a better air defence system in Germany had made little progress. They failed due to years of austerity measures and a lack of will to prioritise and invest in this area. Armaments cooperation in the development of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and the Tactical Air Defence System (TLVS – Taktisches Luft­verteidigungssystems) based on it were ter­minated without procurement agreements. The main reason was the exorbitant cost.

Despite the aforementioned deficits, the Bundeswehr has various capabilities when it comes to air defence. The Air Force pro­tects German and, to some extent, Euro­pean airspace around the clock, the Navy has three air defence frigates, and extensive work is currently being undertaken to pro­tect against small and medium-sized drones. In air defence, a distinction is made be­tween several interception layers: the close and intermediate ranges (up to 6 km) as well as the medium and upper interception layers (up to and above 35 km, respectively). In addition, a differentiation can be made between the ranges below and above 100 km.

For the close and intermediate ranges, the Bundeswehr currently still relies on the Ozelot system, which is supposed to ensure protection against unmanned aerial sys­tems and helicopters when its own troops are on the move. But Ozelot is outdated and is not available in sufficient quantities to provide adequate protection of German forces during land-based operations in the event of war. Its successor is to be the Close Air Defence System, which is currently going through the Bundeswehr’s procure­ment process.

The MANTIS Air Defence System can protect military and civilian facilities from rocket, artillery, and mortar fire. But it takes time to set up and is costly to deploy. Since only two systems are available, only two objects can be protected at the same time. Protecting mobile operations is not possible.

The US Patriot system is used for ranges of up to 100 km, as it has a reach of around 70 km. Technically, it is state-of-the-art, but the Bundeswehr only has 12 of the former 36 squadrons, one of which is to be deliv­ered to Ukraine. In 1990, anti-aircraft mis­sile units comprised 10,970 service posts; today there are only about 2,300. This means that the German contribution to the com­mon air defence of Europe within NATO has been greatly reduced. German capabilities could only protect an area roughly the size of the city of Berlin.

At present, Germany has partly outdated and too few systems to guarantee sufficient protection. In addition, the capability gap at particularly high altitudes must be closed quickly. To this end, Germany intends to pro­cure the Arrow 3 system, which is manu­­factured in Israel. It has promising per­for­mance parameters, appears to be reli­able, and is ready for deployment.

Various air defence systems are currently in use in Europe’s armies. The IRIS-T SLM (Infra-Red Imaging System-Tail/Surface Launched Medium Range) system, devel­oped and produced in Germany, covers short to medium ranges. Germany recently delivered several of these to Ukraine. There are different guided missiles for IRIS-T, namely the variants SLS for short ranges and SLM for medium ranges. For long ranges, the SLX variant is to be developed.

Poland has ordered the British Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM) system, in which Italy would also be interested. CAMM has comparable characteristics to IRIS-T SLS.

As far as long ranges above 35 km are concerned, six other European allies besides Germany use the Patriot system. In a Euro­pean armaments cooperation, France and Italy developed the SAMP/T system (Sol-Air Moyenne Portée/Terrestre, i.e., medium-range surface-to-air missile system) with the Aster missile. SAMP/T has similar parameters to the Patriot system and is currently being further developed into SAMP/T NG (New Generation). This is to be equipped with more modern technology: a new Aster missile, a new multifunction AESA radar (Active Electronically Scanned Array), new software for the C2 module (guidance and control), and a new, improved launcher for the missiles. It is expected to be operational by 2025.

In the area of ballistic missile defence, that is, very long ranges over 100 km, the United States operates the Aegis Ashore sys­tem in Romania and, from 2023, in Poland as part of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) mission. The systems are directed against new threats from the Near and Middle East, especially Iran. In addition to the Aegis system, originally developed for the US Navy, the United States deploys the ground-to-air system THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). However, this system has not been procured by any European country.

Since 2019, some European Union (EU) member states have been developing the Twister project (Timely Warning and Inter­ception with Space-based Theater Surveillance) under French leadership as part of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The aim is to create a European multi-purpose defence system with space-based surveillance – targeting emerging threats including hypersonic missiles – that is to be operational by 2030.

Effective air defence

Air defence must be thought of holistically. It is technically very demanding because there are many interconnecting factors. In order to minimise dangers, the entire pro­cess must therefore be perfectly linked, from the reconnaissance of a threat with radar or satellites via a C2 structure to the combat units. This process must be efficient and fast, because in missile defence some­times only minutes pass between the launch and the target being reached. The Russian Iskander missiles stationed in Kaliningrad are just one example. It would only take them a few minutes to reach Berlin.

Integrated air defence means that all military dimensions are taken into account: land, air, sea, cyberspace, and space. Dif­fer­ent systems are deployed: fighter jets, unmanned systems, ground systems, air defence frigates, IT systems, and satellites. All these systems are set up in such a way as to create mutually overlapping layers and domains. This is to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to overcome the defences. In order to be able to react im­mediately to a threat, air defence must be prepared around the clock to repel enemy aircraft, drones, or missiles at vary­ing ranges and altitudes.

These capabilities are intended to thwart successful attacks by the enemy and not allow them to overwhelm the defence sys­tems – neither technically nor through saturation, that is, quantitative superiority. Complete security cannot be achieved any­way, because no system in the world can guarantee 100 per cent protection. Tech­nical failures can occur in the overall chain of action just as much as human error.

Utilising the potential of the ESSI

Germany has long been striving to close the missile defence capability gap through co­operation. This was first formulated in 2014 in the Framework Nations Concept (FNC), the aim of which is to promote voluntary cooperation between European nations – not just EU or NATO members – in order to “develop military capabilities jointly and multinationally”. To this end, the three framework nations – Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy – provide all support services such as logistics, command facil­ities, and concepts for various projects so that smaller nations can obtain military capabilities at low cost. It is striking that, with the exception of the framework nation the United Kingdom, all ESSI participants have already been integrated into the FNC, which is led by Germany. However, this has not yet been implemented, so there is still room for improvement.

This need is now to be met by the Euro­pean Sky Shield Initiative, which is at a critical juncture. On the one hand, Ger­many could involve other European part­ners and present an overall concept for Euro­pean air defence so that capabilities are bundled and deployed in the best pos­sible way. On the other hand, it is conceiv­able that the ESSI could become a pure procurement organisation. This option, however, would be a sign of Germany’s failure as a leading nation in European air defence. Instead, Germany should actively develop its desired leadership role. In con­crete terms, this would mean increasing the interoperability of the different systems through good IT and software solutions, sensibly coordinating the expansion of capabilities, and advancing and effectively integrating the planned system developments within the framework of PESCO. But if Germany does not play this role, the ESSI will only serve to save money. This would be a small step forward, but not a breakthrough in the sense of a common Euro­pean air defence. It would help to a small extent to make more of the same kinds of systems available in Europe, but the goal of integrated European air defence (IELV – integrierte europäische Luftverteidigung), as envisaged by the then defence minister, would not be achieved. However, the ad­vantages of coordinated air defence at all levels would be immense. The interconnec­tion of all radar systems would produce extremely helpful situational awareness. Having more information that is trans­mitted more quickly also leads to better decisions.

A Europe that is united on air defence could conduct targeted and effective arma­ments research, and thus further strengthen European independence from non-Euro­pean armaments in the future. Promising developments such as Twister and IRIS-T SLM / SLS / SLX are good examples of Euro­pean solutions. What is important here is that the European systems have equivalent or better performance characteristics and are not favoured merely due to lobbying and political preferences.

Moreover, the establishment of an IELV would have a political signalling effect. In this way, Europe would be demonstrating its will to protect itself more effectively.

Conflict potential at five levels

An initiative such as the ESSI generates challenges at the political, strategic, mili­tary, industrial, and economic levels. How­ever, as these challenges do not seem to have been analysed in detail, difficulties or un­answered questions emerge at all five levels.

Outlook

For the ESSI to be a success, the German government should promptly present an implementable concept for European air defence and credibly clarify how it intends to realise this politically. First, a comprehensive critical inventory of European capa­bilities should be drawn up. Maximum effort is needed to close the capability gap described above. In order to better integrate new and old systems, intelligent software solutions – in consultation with industry – are a practical first approach. It would also be conceivable for the Bundeswehr to have its own software development laboratory, which would work closely with engineers from industry.

As coordinator of the ESSI, Germany must set a good example in financing Europe’s air defence. With around €5 bil­lion being allocated from the €100 billion German special fund, a first step has been taken in this direction. In addition, funds from the regular defence budget will need to be consistently channelled into research and development, the technical improvement of existing systems, as well as new acquisitions. The latter will also incur high costs for operation, exercises, and maintenance. This has not yet been taken into account in the Bundeswehr’s financial plan­ning. The Bundeswehr will also have to create more posts for air defence, because only with well-trained personnel can these am­bi­tious plans be implemented in a sus­tainable manner in the long term. It would also be helpful to define the political and strategic framework of the initiative more clearly.

To convince partners of the economic added value of the ESSI, Germany will have to add a comprehensive cost model to its concept for European air defence. Here, inflation, price increases for defence equip­ment of around 5 per cent per year, and other factors must be realistically included.

Finally, the actual military performance of the new capabilities and operations must be demonstrated. These could be tested with­in the framework of an annual NATO certification exercise. The most important thing here is to be critical of oneself, not to accept shortcomings or coordination prob­lems, and to work with complete dedication towards improving one’s own capabilities.

The overall equation to be solved is that the capability gap must be closed as quickly as possible without weakening or even jeopardising European development pro­grammes; the balance between political, strategic, industrial, military, and economic requirements must be carefully balanced. Moreover, the participation of France and Italy is indispensable for the success of the initiative. The lack of agreement between Berlin and Paris has caused intense irri­ta­tion in France and contributed to the post­ponement of the Franco-German Ministerial Council at short notice. This is only the latest example of a lack of involvement between the respective partners. President Emmanuel Macron’s push for a European Political Community was seen in Berlin as going it alone. Paris, in turn, directed the same accusation at the German government because of the ESSI and the gas and elec­tricity price caps. This pattern should be rectified as soon as possible in order to com­ply with the commitment made in the 2019 Aachen Treaty to “consult each other with a view to establishing common positions on all important decisions affecting their com­mon interests and to act jointly whenever possible”. Beyond these Franco-German disagreements due to the high-handed approaches on both sides, there are fun­da­mental concerns in Paris and Rome that Germany should take to heart. A compromise must be found that takes into account both Germany’s core interests, that is, the rapid implementation of the ESSI, and those of France and Italy, namely European sovereignty and the preservation of the stra­tegic balance. The first step by Germany towards such a compromise could be to involve European industry more closely in the ESSI and to reaffirm at the highest political level the ambition to successfully complete the Twister project.