South Korea’s Ever-Closer Relations with NATO

NATO’s motives

From NATO’s perspective, the global chal­lenges posed by China, Russia and other authoritarian countries require cooperation with partners across the globe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, what is seen by NATO as Beijing’s support for Moscow, and North Korea’s military support to Russia are seen as major demonstrations of this threat as well as an expression of the increasingly overlapping security dynamics in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Starting with the London Declaration issued in 2019, NATO has publicly described China as a “challenge”. This characterisation became ‘for­mal policy’ in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, issued during the Madrid Summit. The Strategic Concept also highlighted the “deepening strategic partnership” between China and Russia as a threat to NATO. In October 2024, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte described the deepening mili­tary cooperation between Russia and North Korea as a threat to both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security, stating that the deployment of North Korean troops is: a significant escalation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ongoing involvement in Russia's illegal war, yet another breach of UN Security Council resolutions, and a dangerous expansion of Russia’s war. It is against this background that NATO pushed for participation of NATO’s IP4 partners in the last three sum­mits.

The Moon Jae-in administration: NATO cooperation under a Peace-First approach

The liberal Moon Jae-in administration, which took office in 2017, adopted a for­eign policy that aimed to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula through inter-Korean dialogue and engagement with North Korea, as well as by engaging directly with the U.S. and China. For Moon, engage­ment with NATO thus had to be balanced with his administration’s efforts to main­tain dialogue with Pyongyang, framed as complementary to peacebuilding efforts, rather than focusing on traditional defence and deterrence issues. While cooperation on issues such as non-proliferation or inter­operability continued, the Moon adminis­tra­tion particularly strengthened functional cooperation on topics such as science and technology, as well as defence against chemi­cal, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents and cybersecurity in particu­lar. To that end, the Moon administration launched the process for South Korea to join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in 2019. Since 2021, the ROK has participated in NATO’s annual cyber defence exercise Locked Shields, contributed to the “Malware Infor­mation Sharing Platform” (MISP), and co­operated on “emerging and disruptive tech­nologies.” As South Korea-NATO relations are also political, in late 2020 South Korea joined the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting for the first time, after which South Korea has participated regularly.

At the same time, however, the Moon administration was careful to avoid any direct military alignment with NATO that could provoke North Korea. NATO’s em­phasis on non-traditional security threats thus aligned with Moon’s goals of strengthening South Korea’s security without intensifying the threat of military conflict with North Korea. While Moon’s administration sought to reduce military tensions with North Korea, it also recognised the im­portance of diversifying its foreign rela­tions. This entailed reinforcing ties with key allies, particularly the U.S., and strengthening cooperation with the EU and its mem­ber states, as well as Southeast Asian coun­tries and India in the context of the New Southern Policy.

Overall, the approach of the Moon ad­ministration aimed at balancing South Korea’s security interests with its broader peace strategy, positioning the country as a responsible global actor committed to up­holding international peace and security – without directly confronting North Korea, China, or Russia.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administra­tion: NATO cooperation in the context of a more assertive foreign policy

The conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which assumed power in 2022, repre­sented a shift in South Korea’s foreign policy toward a more assertive stance on defence and regional security issues. Al­ready during his election campaign, Yoon’s foreign policy team described its major for­eign policy strategy in terms of transforming South Korea into a Global Pivotal State, representing a shift away from the previous Moon Jae-in government’s heavy focus on inter-Korea relations to a foreign policy strategy “embracing greater roles and re­spon­sibilities for resolving regional and global challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond,” as noted by former Foreign Minister Park Jin. Although the Moon gov­ern­ment sought to expand ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and India through the New Southern Policy, its focus on inter-Korea relations was criticised by the Yoon administration as limiting South Korea’s broader regional and global agenda. The resulting policy reflected a more proactive approach to countering North Korea’s mili­tary threats, as well as a desire to counterbalance the growing influence of China and Russia in East Asia. In contrast to Moon’s emphasis on diplomacy with North Korea, Yoon has been more focused on strengthening South Korea’s deterrence capabilities and aligning South Korea more closely with NATO’s collective defence framework. For example, in February 2023, the ROK and NATO held a first round of military staff-to-staff talks in Seoul, during which they com­mitted to holding annual military talks and establishing a military-to-military consultative body. In July 2024, NATO and the ROK signed an agreement on mutual recognition for military airworthiness certification, marking NATO’s first such deal with an Asian country. In October 2024, Korea par­ticipated in the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting for the first time. As such, the Yoon administration has supported greater NATO involvement in the Indo-Pacific region and has also been more vocal in its support for NATO’s stance on global secu­rity issues, including its condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Compared to the Moon administration, this signalled a more open shift towards an explicit align­ment with Western security interests.

As the Yoon administration has sought to position South Korea as a more active participant in global security affairs, South Korea’s cooperation with NATO was seen as a means to bolster the country’s influence on the world stage and contribute to peace­keeping, counterterrorism, and global sta­bility efforts. Yoon has emphasised South Korea’s commitment to the liberal inter­national order and its role in countering authoritarianism, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the challenges posed by China and Russia. Much more so than the Moon administration, the Yoon government attached a greater impor­tance to ROK-NATO ties, reflecting the belief that this relationship can serve to boost the ROK’s security and defence. In this respect, powerful actors and institutions, such as the Ministry of National Defence, consider NATO to be a crucial partner to confront the challenges posed by North Korea and other authoritarian countries. Yoon’s administration has also placed greater em­phasis on countering the influence of China and Russia in the region. China’s growing military assertiveness and Russia’s actions in Ukraine have led Yoon to seek closer ties with NATO as a means of balancing these regional powers. By cooperating with NATO, Yoon seeks to ensure that South Korea is better positioned to defend its interests and promote regional stability. This approach contrasts with Moon’s more neutral stance toward China and Russia, reflecting a shift toward a more overt alignment with Western powers.

Against this background, cooperation with NATO has become a top priority for the Yoon Suk-yeol government, which has repeatedly highlighted the importance of ROK-NATO cooperation, including in the Indo-Pacific strategy published in December 2022. The ROK opened an embassy to NATO, while Yoon Suk-yeol attended all three NATO summits during his time in office. Moreover, the Yoon administration prior­itised the signing of the renewed ITPP signed at the Vilnius NATO summit in July 2023, which upgraded and marked a sub­stantial departure from the dialogue-centred 2012 IPCP. While the IPCP mainly presented principles for and areas of cooperation, with­out detailed action plans and timelines, the ITPP covers comprehensive and concrete plans for cooperation over a four-year period (2023–2026). ITPPs therefore repre­sent a stronger and more accountable com­mitment by both NATO and its partner countries to practical cooperation and the implementation of the cooperation objec­tives.

The ITPP reflects an evolving security land­scape and need for deeper collaboration on both traditional defence and emerg­ing global challenges. Specifically, the ITPP lists 11 areas of cooperation and contains tangible steps to be taken by both sides to implement cooperation in each area, with clear timelines up until 2026. It even indi­cates which departments of the South Korean government and of NATO are in­volved in the specific cooperation activities. As such, even in the case of a change of government in South Korea, the 2023–2026 South Korea-NATO ITPP will most likely remain the basis for interaction for the next two years, yet it is possible that a new administration will set different prior­ities within that institutional framework.

The importance of the European market for South Korea’s burgeoning defence industry

One of the major explanatory factors for South Korea’s increasingly close relations with NATO during the presidencies of Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol was the shared objective of strengthening the domestic defence industry and the country’s role as a major arms exporter. Closer cooperation with NATO member states was a crucial aspect of this strategy – and a shared ob­jec­tive of both the Moon and Yoon adminis­tration.

Under the Moon administration, South Korea’s defence budget increased annually by an average of 7 per cent each year. Ac­cord­ing to data from the Stockholm Inter­national Peace Research Institute, the value of South Korea’s military exports has more than tripled from $1.2 billion (2011–2015) to $3.8 billion (2016–2020) before sky­rocketing to $38 billion (2021–2023). In 2023, South Korea’s defence industry, domestically known as “K-Bangsan,” ranked second globally behind the U.S. in terms of the number of major arms export contracts, at 2,972 units compared to the U.S.’s 5,631 units. Already during the presidency of the Moon administration, South Korea exhib­ited the fastest growth among the world’s top 25 arms exporters, increasing by over 176.8 per cent between 2017 and 2021.

With the outbreak of Russia’s war against Ukraine, South Korea emerged as an even more attractive arms supplier to Euro­pean countries, such as Poland or Estonia, which supplied weapons to Ukraine and are in need of replenishing their weapons stock­piles with modern weaponry. In July 2022, South Korea signed a $12.4 billion arms agreement – the country’s largest deal ever – with Poland, which included sales of 980 tanks, 648 K9 howitzers, and 48 FA-50 fighter jets. In November 2022, Norway ordered additional self-propelled K9 howitzers and K10 ammunition supply vehicles from a South Korean defence com­pany, Hanwha Defense. President Yoon used his participation at the NATO summits to push ahead defence deals with NATO member states. For instance, at his first NATO summit in June 2022, President Yoon said in a meeting with Polish Presi­dent Andrzej Duda that he expects ongoing defence cooperation discussions between the two countries to make substantial pro­gress. Shortly after the summit concluded, South Korea signed its arms export contract with Poland. At the same time, South Korea agreed to strengthen defence cooperation with Australia at a summit with the Aus­tralian prime minister and successfully exported $2.4 billion worth of AS21 Red­back infantry fighting vehicles to Australia in August 2023. At his second NATO sum­mit in 2023, President Yoon met with Ro­manian President Klaus Werner Iohannis. The two countries announced shortly there­after that they would seek to enhance ties and expand defence cooperation. By July 2024, South Korea had signed a $920 mil­lion deal to export K9 howitzers to Roma­nia. The two countries are also in talks over a potential $14 billion deal for K2 tanks, Redback infantry fighting vehicles, and Cheongung-II SAM missiles.

Institutionalisation of functional cooperation

Both the Moon and Yoon administrations sought to institutionalise South Korea’s co­operation with NATO in particular areas and/or on specific topics. For instance, the Moon administration focused its engagement with NATO primarily on the participation in NATO’s CCDCOE and the alli­ances’ counterterrorism initiatives. While South Korea joined the CCDCOE during Yoon’s term in office, the issue was initially pushed forward by the Moon administra­tion in 2019 when it initiated the process by submitting its application to join the CCDCOE. According to an official of the former Moon administration, South Korea wanted to get access to NATO’s intelligence, expertise, and capabilities in the area of cybersecurity to better protect itself against attacks originating from North Korea, China, and Russia. This view was shared to the author by an advisor to President Yoon, who pointed to South Korea’s cooperation with NATO through the CCDCOE as a “cru­cial element in the ROK’s global network of cyber defence.”

For the Yoon administration, this co­opera­tion with NATO through the CCDCOE took on an additional importance as Chi­nese and Russian noncompliance with enforcement of the UN Security Council’s proliferation sanctions against North Korea grew. It is noteworthy that cybersecurity cooperation is considered an important measure to cut off a crucial element in the financing of Pyongyang’s weapons pro­gram. According to White House U.S. deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology, Anne Neuberger, nearly half of North Korea’s missile pro­gram has been funded by illegal cyber activ­ities. Building on an extension of the U.S.-ROK alliance into cyberspace and the estab­lishment of a Strategic Cybersecurity Co­operation Framework to jointly deter and combat cybercrime by North Korea, the Yoon administration also viewed cybersecurity cooperation with NATO and its member states as an important addition to South Korea’s ongoing efforts to curb North Korea’s illicit revenue generation and weapons program development.

The diversification of foreign relations

The first as well as the prospects from Trump’s second presidency, Chinese sanc­tions against the ROK in the context of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense issue in 2017, and an increasing U.S.-China con­flict has also helped draw South Korea and NATO closer – both under the Moon and Yoon presidencies. After all, the objective of diversifying foreign (economic and security) relations was at the heart of both the Moon administration’s New Southern Policy and the Yoon administrations “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.” As such, NATO and its member states emerged as important cooperation part­ners. While the Yoon administration sought strategic clarity by placing the alli­ance with the U.S. at the centre of the coun­try’s foreign and security policy, the repeated attendance of President Yoon at three con­secutive NATO summits demonstrates South Korea’s desire to strengthen comprehensive cooperation with NATO allies out­side of the Indo-Pacific region in face of what is often described as the New Cold War era. As such, Yoon’s attendance at the previous NATO summits was designed prin­cipally to bolster South Korea’s position as a key contributor to global defence leader­ship in the democratic world in the face of a rising tide of authoritarianism represented by China and Russia.

Ensuring the implementation of the ITPP

With the ITPP, NATO and the ROK have agreed on a resolute and comprehensive agenda for cooperation in the coming years. However, ensuring implementation of the ITPP requires not only consensus about its validity and utility by NATO and the ROK, but also within South Korea. Against this backdrop, it is essential that cooperation with NATO is generally supported by both political camps in South Korea. While the Yoon government has upgraded Seoul’s ties with NATO to an unprecedented level, all previous administrations in Seoul – liberal and conservative – have successively en­hanced ties with the alliance since the inception of relations in 2005. The major difference is that liberal governments tend to focus more on non-traditional security issues as well as diplomacy rather than deepening military cooperation and ties. In a country that is known for its deep-seated political division, this is a development that should not be underestimated. Overall, the growing consensus among South Korean foreign policy and security elites regarding cooperation with NATO stems from multi­ple factors, most notably the shared per­ception that:

• North Korea poses a continuously in­creasing security challenge,

• functional cooperation with NATO brings tangible benefits, and

• cooperation with a diversified set of part­ners is required in an era of “polycrises.”

Against this background, it is highly likely that cooperation between the ROK and NATO will continue to develop in case of a change in government in Seoul. None­theless, NATO and its member states should continue to underscore the importance of this cooperation to both political camps in Seoul and ensure that discussions on the implementation of the ITPP are reconvened as soon as possible.

Prioritisation of cooperation areas

As the ITPP presents a wide-ranging agenda for cooperation, it is important to prioritise cooperation areas that will not only create tangible wins for both sides, but that will be supported by both political camps in Seoul. This will help maintain the momentum of bilateral cooperation, especially in times of domestic political turmoil and a likely change of government in South Korea. Against the background of the above discussion, cybersecurity and cooperation in the defence industry seem particularly promising. Given that the two sides already cooperate in these areas, it will be easier to implement practical cooperation activities. Indeed, defence industrial cooperation was an important topic during the NATO-IP4 talks in Vilnius, and ROK arm sales and industrial cooperation with Poland, in par­ticular, underscore Seoul’s positive con­tribution to European security. Moreover, when Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea joined the NATO defence ministers’ meetings in mid-October 2024, they agreed to bolster joint efforts to boost cyber defences, defence production and innovation, counter information manipu­lation, and harness technology, including artificial intelligence. This prioritisation of particular cooperation areas will help ensure long-term stability in ROK-NATO relations.