Belarus: Sovereignty under Threat

Diminishing control

In November 2021, 28 out of the original 31 planned roadmaps were signed by Lukashenka and Putin. These plans aim to create a far-reaching alignment in economic and financial policy. Nevertheless, there are no plans to build supranational struc­tures or to introduce a common currency. As the roadmaps were to have been imple­mented by December 31, 2023, it seems that the Kremlin has postponed the more ambitious goals until later. This is at least indicated by a document from the Presi­dential Administration of Russia leaked in February 2023, according to which Moscow is planning a discreet takeover of Belarus by 2030.

To what extent the Belarusian side was able to fend off the roadmaps’ further-reaching Russian demands is difficult to determine due to the opaque negotiation process. In any case, the documents only partially reflect the “national economic interests” as defined by Lukashenka. Bela­rus must largely adapt its legislation to Russia’s. In doing so, Lukashenka risks losing control of the country’s economy, which is practically a planned economy. In order to delay liberal economic reforms, he has therefore proven to be willing to make major concessions in other areas, in­cluding security policy and military co-operation.

Lukashenka’s strategy of geopoliticization

From the very beginning, Lukashenka viewed the political crisis in Belarus in a geopolitical context, starting with his conviction that the protests against the country’s elections were being controlled by the West. If the West were able to topple the regime in Belarus, then Russia would be the next target. By crushing local oppo­sition, Lukashenka was, in his view, also contributing to Russia’s stability and thus hoping for Putin to reciprocate.

At the same time, in the summer of 2021, Lukashenka put pressure on the EU with a wave of refugees at the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. This artificial migration crisis was an unsuccessful at-tempt to make Brussels repeal the sanctions it had imposed against Belarus without having to respond to EU’s political demands. In July 2021, Belarus closed its border to Ukraine, claiming it was trying to prevent weapons intended to be used to overthrow the government from being smuggled in. Around the same time, Russia began de­ploying its troops to the Ukrainian border and demanded security guarantees from the USA and NATO at the end of the year. For Lukashenka, these steps fit in seamlessly with the general threatening position adopted towards the West and also served the security of his own regime.

In September 2021, Belarus and Russia carried out the “Zapad” (West) military manoeuvre, which takes place every four years. Exercises included the military’s defence against Western attempts to over­throw the government and the deployment of joint attack groups in urban areas. The latter were obviously in preparation for the subsequent invasion of Ukraine, especially as Zapad 2021 was the largest exercise of its kind to date.

The manoeuvre also marked the start of operations of the joint Air Force and Air Defence Forces training and combat centre in Grodno, Belarus, that Lukashenka had agreed to set up in March 2021. Shortly before the Russian attack began, the new military doctrine of the Union State came into effect, which Putin and Lukashenka had already announced in November 2021. It declares the West to be the main enemy and its stipulations include an increase in the number of joint troop exercises and the expansion of joint military infrastructure.

The turning point: The start of the war

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine was preceded by a further joint manoeuvre in February 2022, which allowed the pres­ence of more than 30,000 Russian soldiers and their military equipment in Belarus. Lukashenka’s approval of this exercise turned his country into a co-aggressor. Whereas in the past, he had always cat­egorically rejected the possibility that an attack on this neighbouring country could be mounted from Belarus. However, his political relations to Kyiv had become markedly worse since Volodymyr Zelenskyy refused to recognize the results of the Bela­rusian presidential elections.

It remains unclear when Lukashenka was informed about the aggression planned or whether he thought up to the end he was merely involved in creating a threatening situation. His own remarks were contra­dictory. On the one hand, he publicly stated that he was only informed of Putin’s plans shortly before the beginning of the war and denied having any responsibility for the Russian invasion. On the other, he accused Ukraine of having prepared to attack Bela­rus, thereby forcing Russia to intervene. Moreover, Western sanctions left Belarus with no alternative. In this way, Luka­shenka legitimized the Russian invasion and his own support of it.

The fundamental constant in his appearances was his assurance that Belarus would not involve its own soldiers in the war. Here, he was taking into particular account the attitude of the Belarusian people, the majority of whom opposed the invasion. Lukashenka had to fear that direct involve­ment in the war would reignite the pain­stakingly suppressed conflicts in the coun­try. Accordingly, he always presented the lack of Belarusian troop involvement as his personal achievement – also to avoid giving the impression that he had completely surrendered the country’s sovereignty to Russia. However, independent military experts understood that the Kremlin never intended on having any active involvement from the Belarusian armed forces, as they had no international combat experience whatsoever. Instead, by serving as a logis­tical base for Russian troops, Belarus is fulfilling the precise role that Putin had intended for it.

On the international stage, Lukashenka has unreservedly supported the Russian position. In March 2022, Belarus was one of five countries to vote against the resolution from the UN General Assembly condemning the war of aggression. All of the other countries in the Eurasian Economic Union either abstained or were not present for the vote. With that said, Belarus could no longer claim for itself the neutral role of mediator as it had in the war in eastern Ukraine that began in 2014. After three meetings that took place in the Belarusian border region at the end of February and beginning of March 2022, negotiations to end the combat relocated to Istanbul and/or online formats, before being broken off in May of that year.

Readjusting relations

Belarusian-Russian contacts intensified extensively in the first year of the war. There were ten direct meetings between the heads of state. Lukashenka became increas­ingly self-confident. Moreover, in December 2022, Putin travelled to Minsk again for the first time in three years. There are several reasons for this shift in relations. First, this was due to the fact that Lukashenka suc­cessfully furthered the restructuring of the political system in Belarus after the consti­tutional referendum on February 27, 2022. He was therefore convinced that he once again had the domestic situation fully under control and would be able to run in the 2025 presidential elections without any opposition from the Kremlin. Second, the Western sanctions imposed after the invasion created a new balance between Putin and Lukashenka as the war progressed. For now, both leaders had become international pariahs.

The economic sanctions imposed were different in each country, so that Belarus was able to partially satisfy Russian demand for goods they had previously imported from the West. In addition, Belarus pro­duced military equipment (including opto­electronic sensors and chassis used for missile vehicles) that was not being made in Russia. This increased the Russian need for cooperation with and support from Belarus.

Closing ranks and setting boundaries

The continuing war has paradoxically strengthened the position of the regime in Minsk towards Moscow, as Lukashenka is Putin’s only reliable ally. However, Belarus has only gained tactical advantages, which will likely be lost with the end of the Russian aggression. Even under the condi­tions of the war, the implementation of the 28 Union programs is progressing. As announced by the Russians in November 2023, 90 percent of them have already been completed. However, it is almost impossible to say how many of the roadmaps have actually been fully implemented at this time.

Moscow’s pressure on Lukashenka is likely to further increase regardless of whether Russian succeeds or fails in the war in Ukraine. In either scenario his supplying of military services would lose relevance; in the second scenario, Putin would likely view the integration of Belarus as compensation for his failure. For this reason, it is of upmost importance for Lukashenka to take part in international negotiations to end the war. The Kremlin appears to be seeking to prevent exactly this by further deepening the rifts between Minsk and Kyiv. For example, it is forcing its ally to strengthen its contacts to the self-proclaimed People’s Republics in the Donbas and to participate in war crimes such as the deportation of Ukrainian children.

Despite the significant dependencies, it would be wrong to view Lukashenka merely as Putin’s minion. Rather, he is acting in his own interests in accepting the close ties to Moscow as they help to keep him in power. Additionally, both heads of state share an anti-liberal and anti-Western worldview, although Lukashenka’s is rooted more in Soviet traditions while Putin’s Russia has an imperialistic-nationalistic orientation.

Regarding domestic policy, Minsk is striving to prevent being completely co­opted into the Russian information space. To this end, Lukashenka’s regime is pur­suing a Soviet-style national history policy, including the theory of genocide of the Belarusian people. The plan to create a joint Belarusian-Russian media holding has not yet been implemented. Although Russian war narratives dominate the information space in Belarus, the country’s population has so far proven to be surprisingly resilient overall.

The multifaceted lateral communication between Belarusian and Russian players deserves special attention. On the one hand, Lukashenka personally cultivates intense contacts to Russian governors, hoping in this way to be able to remain in power even under a possible successor to Putin. On the other, he is obviously con­cerned that he could lose influence among members of his coterie due to their co­operation with Russia. This is indicated by the fact that per a presidential decree from October 10, 2023, Lukashenka placed the national security organizations including the KGB secret service directly under his sole control, whereas they had previously answered to the government and the Secu­rity Council.

Strategic conclusions

In a resolution adopted on November 7, 2023, the German Bundestag called on the German federal government to work to preserve the national sovereignty of Bela­rus. Corresponding appeals are also coming from the country’s democratic opposition and in other statements from European politicians. However, the central question remains which approaches and instruments European and German policymakers have at their disposal to strengthen Belarus independence and counteract its gradual annexation by Russia. Overall, Western influence is limited. However, based on the actual circumstances in the country and the results of Western Belarus policy in recent years, the following points can be made.

Belarus is not a protectorate of Russia. Even if the country has continued to deep­en its ties to Russia under Lukashenka’s rule, the West should not dismiss Belarus and treat it as a protectorate of Russia. Rather, the West should try to define its own relationship to Belarus and not view it as a feature of its relations to Russia.

Sanctions are not game changers. Western sanctions have hit the Lukashenka regime hard, yet have still not made it re­spond to Western demands. Many members of the Belarusian state apparatus are coming to terms with the loss of their Euro­pean foothold in foreign policy. They speculate that the importance of the West will in any case diminish in the emerging multipolar world order. In their view, this would balance out the imperial claims of the Kremlin. Therefore, the EU must not rely exclusively on sanctions.

(Informal) talks with the regime must not be taboo. Providing comprehensive support to the country’s democratic opposition and civil society is a necessary, but not a suffi­cient prerequisite for Belarus being able to develop freely and independently in the future. The further actions of the Luka­shen­ka regime depend on whether the country’s progressive loss of sovereignty becomes irreversible. Therefore, selective talks with representatives of the regime should not be ruled out, so that it is pos­sible to convey messages and receive more information. The Belarusian elite is less monolithic in its attitudes than it appears from the outside. European prospects for the future should be communicated not just to the Belarusian population, but also to those in power who are not repressive hardliners. This applies even more as the Lukashenka regime will be faced with the question of its succession plan sooner or later.

Borders must remain open. Crucial social exchange can only be maintained as long as the borders remain open and visas issued not only for humanitarian purposes, but also for tourism and business trips. There­fore, the EU has every interest in ensuring that there is no further escalation in the relations between Belarus and Poland or the Baltic states. A poker game with the stakes of closing the borders against migrant flows is also not in the West’s interests. It is therefore particularly important to coordi­nate with Poland and the Baltic states as closely as possible. The change in government in Warsaw offers new opportunities here that should be used.

Consider the opportunities of conditionality. The Lukashenka regime fears that its position with regard to Moscow will be significantly weakened if there are nego­tiations to end the war in Ukraine and a restructuring of the European security order without Minsk’s involvement. In this case, the West could consider if the Bela­rusian leadership would be open to condi­tionality logic, which it had always rejected in the past. This would mean that Minsk fulfil Western demands for the release of all political prisoners and, in exchange, specif­ic sanctions would be lifted. In any case, for the foreseeable future, the West will remain confronted with the problem that the goal of preserving Belarusian statehood is being undermined by isolationist strategies that are effectively driving the country into Moscow’s arms. The yardstick of Western policy should be to what extent it succeeds in ending the inhumane repressive prac­tices in Belarus, securing the release of poli­tical prisoners and expanding the scope for change in the country.