The State of Consensus in the EU

High consensus also with QMV

In order to overcome these entrenched positions and move the debate forward, it is worth taking a look at the practice: How and with what results are decisions taken with a qualified majority? To this end, the SWP has collected the voting behaviour of national governments in more than 1,300 public votes in the Council in the EU Coun­cil Monitor – from the Treaty of Lisbon en­ter­ing into force up until September 2023.

These votes show an astonishingly high consensus rate among the member states – on average, they achieved a consensus in almost 83 per cent of votes, although major­ity decisions would have been pos­sible. The consensus rate includes those votes with a qualified majority in which there were no votes against, but potentially abstentions. The consensus rate has been surprisingly stable over time. Until Brexit, it was 82 per cent, and since Brexit it has been as high as 85 per cent. If we only look at the votes in which all states voted in favour, that is, in which there were also no abstentions, the figure for the entire obser­vation period is still 64 per cent.

A change in the consensus rate can be spotted when individual policy areas are examined: In the area of finance, for exam­ple, consensus was reached in 85 per cent of votes before Brexit and 93 per cent since Brexit. The consensus rate has also risen in the area of institutional affairs, from 67 to 100 per cent. By contrast, it has fallen from 80 to 70 per cent in the area of justice and home affairs, which includes the CEAS reform (see Figure 1).

On the one hand, the high consensus rate means that at the end of EU negotiations – despite disputes – all member states can usually agree on the negotiated compromise. In addition, national governments are reluctant to outvote larger groups of states, even if numerically a qualified majority has already been reached. Votes in which four or more member states are outvoted there­fore remain a rarity. On the other hand, the high consensus rate also shows that major­ity decisions alone are not a magic solution to all of the EU’s difficulties in terms of its ability to act: Even with QMV, negotiations in the Council can take a long time or even be permanently blocked if the EU states are divided into several large groups.

No structural minorities

A look at which states are outvoted more frequently is also instructive for the debate on the expansion of majority voting. As the explanations for the consensus rate already indicate, one country has long been an out­lier – the UK. It clearly tops the list of the most frequently outvoted countries, both in the period up to its official withdrawal from the EU and in the overall analysis: The UK was outvoted a total of 167 times. This means that the former EU member was outvoted in 16 per cent of the public votes while it was still a member (see Figure 2). In contrast to this stands France, which was only outvoted five times in the entire observation period. This corresponds to significantly less than 1 per cent of votes.

A comparison of voting behaviour before and after Brexit shows that two member states whose governments have repeatedly spoken out against majority decisions now stand out – Hungary and Poland (as well as Bulgaria) are now the most frequently outvoted states. The situation was different before Brexit: Between 2010 and 2020, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands were the second to fourth most frequently out­voted countries after the UK. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, until Brexit, the UK was outvoted almost three times as often as Austria, and almost seven times as often as the tenth-placed Bulgaria. Since Brexit, Hungary, which is now in first place, has been outvoted 2.3 times as often as Austria in fourth place, and just over four times as often as the Czech Republic in tenth place. This means that Hungary is still considerably less often in the minority than the UK was before it left the EU.

Two other things stand out in the voting behaviour of Poland and Hungary after Brexit. Firstly, both are more likely to vote against instead of abstaining, signalling their outright rejection of an EU decision. Secondly, they vote against decisions sig­nifi­cantly more often together; at least until the change of government in Warsaw in De­cember 2023, Warsaw and Budapest were in clear solidarity.

There were no instances found in the data in which all four states of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) were outvoted. This suggests that negotiations continue if all four reject a pro­posal together, but Poland and Hungary stick to their position due to having less of a willingness to reach a consensus and are outvoted in the end if they are the only opposing states. If we look at all votes with at least one vote against in the entire period covered in the EU Council Monitor, there was only one case up to Brexit in which Poland and Hungary were jointly outvoted: a vote on social policy. Since Brexit, the two countries have been outvoted together once each in the policy areas of economy, energy and environment, and three times in justice and home affairs. By way of comparison, in March 2024, Germany and France were out­voted together for the first time ever in a pub­lic vote, in this case on the Platform Work Directive.

A comparison with the members of the Group of Friends on QMV is also interesting: It includes countries such as France and Italy, which were rarely or never outvoted in the public votes, as well as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (as an observer to the Group of Friends), which were outvoted relatively frequently. Count­ing the entire period since 2010, Germany has been outvoted almost as frequently as Poland or Hungary.

Even if Poland and Hungary have recently been outvoted more often than other EU members, a structural minority cannot be recognised. In other words, it is not the case that a country or a group of countries is outvoted with great regularity in a number of different policy areas. At the same time, the change in their voting behaviour after Brexit is striking: Poland never voted in favour when Hungary voted against, and vice versa.

Controversial policy areas

It is not only the number of out-votes that distinguishes Hungary and Poland from the UK, but also the policy areas in which they were outvoted. The UK was most frequently outvoted in the areas of finance (26 per cent) and foreign affairs (18 per cent), but above all institutional issues (46 per cent), which concern the nature and functioning of the EU as a whole. For Poland and Hun­gary, other policy areas take centre stage: The three areas in which they have been outvoted most frequently since Brexit are environment; justice and home affairs; and transport and social policy, respectively. The controversial CEAS reform, which Orbán cites as an argument for his demand to return to unanimity, falls under the area of justice and home affairs.

Overall, the increased rate of Poland and Hungary being outvoted in the area of jus­tice and home affairs after Brexit stands out. Among other things, this includes migration policy, which both countries strongly criticise and politicise. If we look at this policy area as a whole, the consensus rate has only fallen slightly compared to the time before Brexit (from 80 per cent to 70 per cent, see Figure 1). In transport and social policy, it has even risen slightly (to 81 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively), while in environmental policy it has fallen (from 70 per cent to 58 per cent). This makes it clear that Hungary and Poland do not represent a structural minority. Only in the policy area of justice and home affairs have they shown less of a willingness to vote with the majority; this is partly due to their location on the EU’s external border, but also due to the strong politicisation of asylum issues. Nevertheless, it is worth not­ing that unlike the UK, Poland and Hungary are not (yet) expressing any disapproval of the EU’s institutional processes – and there­fore ultimately of the EU as such – with their abstentions and votes against, but are instead pointing to dissent in a clearly defined political field.

A small or more ambitious approach

If the German Federal Government wants to realise its goal of significantly expanding majority decisions, there are at least two strategic questions. The first concerns the trade-off between a “small” and a “more ambitious” approach: The small, short-term approach corresponds to the Group of Friends’ endeavour to introduce QMV in selected individual areas of the CFSP, such as decisions on civil CSDP operations, opin­ions on human rights issues or sanc­tions. The advantage of this would be that major­ity decisions in foreign and security policy could be tested, and the Passerelle clause could be applied for the first time. How­ever, this would also require unanimity, and a great deal of political capital would have to be expended in order to achieve this. In view of the limited expansion, it would ultimately not make the EU sub­stantially more capable of acting.

With the more ambitious, long-term approach, the issue of expanding majority voting would be linked to the enlargement of the EU. As part of a more extensive reform programme, the application area of majority decisions would be expanded along­side broader institutional reforms to prepare for the next enlargement. In this way, a more comprehensive approach could be taken to reform EU decision-making pro­cesses; entire policy areas would switch to majority decisions. This could give the EU a real boost in terms of its ability to act. Linking this to a broader reform agenda for institutions, the budget and individual policy areas would also make it possible to embed the expansion of QMV in a broader reform package to find a balance between all member states. However, this process will be a long one – lasting at least the entire next EU legislative period – and the outcome is uncertain.

Politics can and should pursue both strategies in parallel. Still, it remains true that any move towards more majority deci­sions requires unanimity, and therefore a complex balancing process with all member states. This balance is likely to be easier to achieve through a major reform – also and especially with the aim of comprehensive expansion – than in an isolated one in which only a few “equalisation payments” are possible. Furthermore, more extensive changes to the QMV resolution could be examined in the event of a major reform, for example adjusting the voting rights of small and large states in an enlarged Union.

The second strategic question is about how a balance can be struck between legiti­mate national interests – particularly in policy areas that are important for national sovereignty – and the EU’s ability to act. In addition, the balance between large and small member states plays a role. The key here could be a sovereignty safety net, such as that proposed by the Franco-German expert group on the reform and enlargement of the EU. Such a safety net would allow member states to transfer decision-making processes to the European Council despite QMV if vital national interests are affected. Then a consensus could be reached there at the highest political level.

The Treaty on European Union already includes similar “emergency brakes” or safety nets, for example in the CFSP (Art. 31 para. 2 TEU). Two factors would be decisive for the concrete triggering of the safety net and the final decision-making capacity. Trigger­ing centres on the question of whether a national government could activate such a protection instrument alone, in a group with others or with a control mechanism. A combination of the two would be recom­mendable: Triggering by an individual member state through a kind of peer review by a qualified majority of the Council that accepts vital national interests are affected. This is provided for in Article 31(2) TEU, for example. Such an approach would make it possible for each state to put forward its core interests and simultaneously protect against the misuse of the instrument as a quasi-veto.

The final decision-making capacity is about what happens when the safety net is trig­gered – does the European Council then make the final decision, or is there a dead­line and another way back to majority deci­sions? A safety net, for example in the CFSP, can only protect vital national interests if the European Council becomes the final decision-making authority. If the other member states have recognised such a vital national interest in the Council, then a common political solution that is accept­able to all should also be found at the highest political level in the European Council.

A sovereignty safety net that offers both sufficient protection of vital national inter­ests and creates scope for the EU’s ability to act could be a way out of the long-standing deadlock in the debate on majority deci­sions. It could thus pave the way for a more capable EU – especially in the expectation of an EU 30+.