Shaping the Future of Gaza

Governance

The United States and the EU have stressed that a “revitalised PA” should assume gov­ernance functions in Gaza after the war. In talks between the United States and the PA in January 2024, US representatives detailed that this would first and foremost necessitate a PA cabinet reshuffle, more effectively combating corruption, and train­ing Pales­tinian Security Forces to be deployed in Gaza. PA representatives have stressed the need to secure the regular trans­fer of funds from Israel under the Paris Protocol to pre­vent the financial collapse of the PA. They have also made it clear that they would assume governance functions in Gaza only within the frame of a political process that leads to an end of occupation and Palestin­ian self-determination. Netanyahu has re­jected the idea of the PA assuming gover­nance functions in Gaza after the war and suggested that Israel would rather work with local representatives of its choice, such as clan chiefs and entrepreneurs, drawing on similar (and ultimately failed) arrangements from the past.

Four considerations should guide the European approach towards governance in Gaza: a) those implicated directly or in­directly in the 7 October atrocities must not play a role in future governance; b) in order for a governing body to be able to function, it will need to be accepted by the local pop­u­lation; c) governance should be pro­vided in a way that helps in overcoming the split between Gaza and the West Bank rather than deepening it; and d) for the PA to be able to play a constructive role, it needs to be inclusive, sufficiently financed, thor­oughly reformed, its capacities strengthened, and its legitimacy improved.

A cabinet reshuffle in conjunction with cosmetic reforms and training, as announced in January 2024 by Prime Minister Moham­mad Shtayyeh under US pressure, will not do the trick, as it would not address the underlying causes of the PA’s weaknesses and its sweeping loss of legitimacy among Palestinians. Also, a PA entering Gaza “on an Israeli military tank” – or an assembly of tribal figures picked by Israel (or the international community for that matter) – would not stand a chance of gaining the popular acceptance needed for providing internal order and governance. Rather, it would risk laying the ground for new and potentially violent internal conflicts.

In contrast, a technocratic Palestinian government backed by all factions (similar to the 2014 government) could serve that purpose well – as has been suggested by Palestinians and put forward in the ap­proach taken by Egypt and Qatar, as detailed in the December 2023 Egyptian ceasefire proposal. Hamas has signalled that it is ready to hand over governance to such a body – an acceptance that will be key in an environment in which Hamas (as well as other factions that consider themselves to be part of the “resistance”) is certain to continue to wield political influence and veto power. And while such a suggestion might be in contradiction with Israel’s proclaimed war aims as well as public opinion in Israel, it might be the only way forward to stabilise Gaza.

The EU and its member states should therefore support the endeavours of Egypt and Qatar to overcome the split and achieve a renewed Palestinian commitment to power-sharing in the form of a techno­cratic, non-partisan government. Over­coming the split is also a sine qua non for genuine political reform. In the medium term, and in order to be meaningful, PA reform would need to aim at returning to a political system with checks and balances, and to provide for regular and competitive elections. Corruption will only be successfully restrained in a system where there are independent institutions that control the executive and there is accountability through regular elections.

The EU is well-placed to support such a reform. For example, EUPOL COPPS – the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support – could play a more effec­tive role than it currently does in supporting the rule of law and reform of the judi­ciary. Yet, it is also clear that training will not suffice to achieve structural change. Rather, the EU will have to apply conditionality to its support of the PA in order to press for judicial independence, the rein­statement of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the rule of law.

The EU could also take the lead in supporting a path towards elections. In ad­dition to addressing flaws in the election law that hamper the participation of young and less affluent candidates, and engaging with Israel to ensure that Palestinian Jeru­salemites can cast their ballots, the most important challenge for the EU and its member states is to find a formula that will allow them to continue cooperation with a Palestinian government of national unity that commits to non-violence. By contrast, trying to impose a commitment to a two-state outcome as a condition for participation in Palestinian elections only makes sense once the United States and the EU seriously push for such an outcome, for example by recognising a Palestinian state. Last but not least, the EU can once more provide election assistance and monitoring.

Security

Israel’s war cabinet has made it clear that it reserves the right for the continued security oversight of Gaza and its sea and land borders, including the Philadelphi Corridor between the Strip and Egypt, and that it seeks to keep the prerogative to intervene militarily at any time. The Israeli army has also been working on creating a buffer zone within Gaza along the border fence, as it sees such an uninhabited area as a pre­requisite for returning its own population evacuated from the Gaza border communities. Most likely, Israel would enforce an even harsher closure on the Gaza Strip than the one in place before 7 October. That would seriously affect the provision of drinking water and electricity, imports and exports, the possibility of Gazans working in Israel, and medical transferrals to Israel and the West Bank.

These measures would amount not only to a continuation of the Gaza Strip’s occupation, but also to its deepening. They would imply a permanent displacement of those who used to live in what will become the enlarged buffer zone, increasing the demographic pressure in the already very densely inhabited Strip, as well as leading to a further reduction in available agricultural areas. Fishing, an important sector of Gaza’s economy, could also be further reduced through an even stricter maritime blockade. Overall, a tightened closure would impede reconstruction and stifle any devel­opment, keeping the population dependent on international aid.

It is in­conceivable that such an arrangement would provide security to Israeli citi­zens, even more so if it is perceived as being permanent rather than temporary. Rather, it is certain to fuel hopelessness among Gazans and thus provide fertile ground for re­cruitment by militant groups. Ultimately, diminishing the attractiveness of armed groups backed by Iran or others hinges directly on the prospects for young Pales­tinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and refugee camps. Therefore, an opening of Gaza to the world and a comprehensive political process are key.

Yet, while the EU and the United States have stressed that they do not want to see a “reoccupation” of Gaza and that its territory must not be diminished, they have not sug­gested a convincing alternative to Israel’s approach. In order to be able to take over responsibility for internal order and securi­ty in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Security Forces, which have been proposed to be stationed in the Strip, would have to be trained, financed, and legitimated – that is, accepted by Palestinian factions (and later through elections) – and be deployed in the context of a political framework. But Israel would still not trust them to provide security.

The only force that Israelis might agree upon to provide security – and which would therefore allow it to scale back its own posture – would be an international presence with a robust mandate under the lead of the United States. Yet, such a force has not been – and is very unlikely to be­come – part of US planning, as the United States is aiming at reducing the number of its combat troops in the region rather than increasing it. For Israelis, UN troops or an Arab military presence would not be a trust­worthy alternative, and it is utterly improb­able that they would materialise in the first place. As a result, the security situation in and around Gaza will remain extremely fragile. This will be even more the case in the absence of an agreed cease­fire, a con­crete plan for reconstruction and development for Gaza, and a political arrangement for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution – and against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in the West Bank.

To contribute towards stabilisation in that difficult context, Europeans – to­gether with the United States and Arab states, in particular Qatar and Egypt, which have shown their ability to lean on Gaza’s mili­tants in deals to release hostages and de­liver medications – should push for an end to the war in Gaza that is not premised on achieving unrealistic aims, such as the eradication of Hamas or Israel’s “total victory”, but instead on an agreed ceasefire that com­mits Israel as well as Palestinian militants in addition to establishing a code of con­duct for the period directly after the war.

The EU can also contribute to internal order and border controls through its two civilian missions in Palestine (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah), after their mandates have been adapted. EUPOL COPPS could play a role in training and vetting staff from Gaza who could later take over police and justice functions there. Moving forward, the EU could offer to re-establish a European presence in Rafah (and to estab­lish one at the Allenby Crossing between Israel and Jordan) in a reconfigured border regime, which would allow the free move­ment of persons and goods while preventing the import of weapons. Europeans can also offer appropriate scanners that would allow for the movement of imports/exports without reloading.

Reconstruction

The war will leave Gaza devastated, with large parts of the civilian infrastructure and residential buildings destroyed, the pro­vision of basic services seriously affected, and a dramatic humanitarian situation, including large-scale internal displacement. The challenges will be enormous: Rubble removal, the clearing of unexploded ord­nance, and early recovery measures (in­cluding the provision of temporary hous­ing) will be key in improving the humanitarian situation and preventing the further spread of diseases. The reconstruction of civilian infrastructure and housing will be crucial to avoid permanent displacement and allow for economic development. Mental health support will be essential to deal with the traumas of war, displacement, and famine.

Although the scale of needed aid is difficult to estimate in the midst of ongoing destruction, according to UNCTAD it is already clear that the recovery of Gaza’s economy from the current military opera­tion will necessitate a financial commitment that is much higher than commitments made after any previous war. What is more, already long before 7 October, the UN had warned of the Gaza Strip becoming uninhabitable because of the depletion of drinking water and environmental pollu­tion. As a consequence of the combination of the closure of the Strip, recurring wars and destruction, reduced international aid, as well as the de facto government’s priori­ties (with a focus on armed struggle rather than development), poverty and unemployment levels had already dramatically risen before the war: 80 per cent of Gaza’s population was dependent on humanitarian aid.

Reconstruction would have to systematically address these challenges as well. Therefore, economic rehabilitation should not simply aim at restoring the pre-October 2023 status quo. Rather, the vicious circle of destruction, partial reconstruction, and blockade should be broken, among other means, by measures such as restoring the Gaza International Airport, building a sea­port, and enabling the Palestinian government to develop the natural gas fields off the shore of Gaza.

Israel expects the international community to pick up the tab for recovery and reconstruction in Gaza with the support of some UN agencies, but not UNRWA, which is one of the largest employers in Gaza and crucial for providing services (health, edu­cation) and humanitarian aid. Yet, although the international community has been willing to support the population of Gaza (even if inadequately) with humanitarian aid and will continue to do so, and despite the fact that it will likely engage in early recovery efforts, it is rather unlikely to fund large-scale reconstruction unless there is a concrete political path towards sustainable stabilisation. What is more, under a tightened closure, reconstruction would also be slow and partial. The issue is there­fore closely linked to security and a politi­cal path towards an agreement – on Gaza and beyond.

The EU and its member states should support early recovery and reconstruction. These efforts firstly depend on capable Palestinian and international counterparts. Palestinian counterparts for recovery and reconstruction would have to be approved of locally and be acceptable to the international community as well as be capable of engaging in planning for cooperation with specialised international agencies. In that context, the technical staff of Gaza’s munic­i­palities, that is, the experts for electricity, water, education, etc., should be the main interlocutors for the international community. They are already on the ground and experienced. Also, UNRWA – with its pres­ence on the ground, trained staff, and logis­tical expertise – will be crucial in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

Secondly, it will be paramount to establish the right framework for reconstruction first. Three issues stand out here: For sus­tainable economic development, the free movement of persons and goods is critical. In this context, the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access is worth revisiting and adapting to the current situation, rather than reviving fantasies about arti­ficial islands or other grandiose projects. Second, it will be essential to set up a mech­anism to ensure that construction materials not be diverted for military purposes, while Israel no longer determines which imports and exports are allowed, as has been the case in the frame of the UN-led Gaza Recon­struc­tion Mechanism. Third, there should be an ap­propriate oversight mechanism to ensure that funds are spent according to priorities determined by representative Palestinian bodies rather than individual intermediaries.

Political process

The United States, the EU, and Arab states alike have been stressing the need for a “political horizon” to accompany post-war stabilisation efforts in Gaza. And indeed, progress on security, governance, and re­construction are all closely linked to a polit­ical agreement on Gaza as well as a process that provides for the prospect of Palestinian self-determination and security for Israelis and Palestinians. Also, PA legitimacy de­pends not only on inclusive governance and elections, but first and foremost on the PA being in a position to deliver progress to­wards the end of occupation.

What is more, Gaza cannot be stabilised while the PA is about to collapse and the situation in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) deteriorates. Rather, any politi­cal process will also have to address obsta­cles to Palestinian development (such as access and movement restrictions) and threats to safety (such as settler violence and forced displacement, which have soared in the wake of 7 October) in the West Bank.

Yet, Israel and Palestine are currently not offering the required leaders to move forward. Israel’s Prime Minister has made it clear that there will not be a Palestinian state under his watch, that Israel will main­tain overall control between the River and the Sea, and that he is not ready to stop the settlement project in the West Bank. Even worse, although a change in government in Israel would make a big difference with regard to safeguarding liberal democracy, based on current polling and long-term trends, it would not change much with re­gard to the rejection of Palestinian state­hood. An ever weaker PA has clung to a two-state outcome, but it is hardly in a position to make concessions or implement an agreement. Hamas representatives have professed hardline stances since 7 October, reneging on earlier positions regarding the acceptance of a two-state outcome based on the 1967 lines as “a formula of national consensus”.

Against that backdrop, in January 2024, Josep Borrell suggested a peace conference followed by working groups to draw up the framework for an Israeli-Palestinian arrange­ment. Such a conference – if well-prepared and backed by influential actors committed to seeing through a process aimed at a final settlement – could be an instrument to create the sought political horizon.

Once working groups meet to define a framework for negotiations, they should incorporate lessons learnt from the failure of the Oslo process, such as: the need to clearly define the parameters of the end­game (as detailed in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the July 2014 EU Council Con­clusions on the Middle East Peace Pro­cess); providing for robust mediation that balances rather than reinforces the asym­metry between the parties; putting forward a concrete timeline with benchmarks and a monitoring mechanism; and ending the impunity of all actors for war crimes. They should also spell out incentives in concrete terms and with concrete commitments so as to achieve progress towards conflict settle­ment. For Israel, a strong incentive would be further integration into the region, in particular normalisation with Saudi Arabia, which should go hand in hand with con­crete progress towards ending the occupation. For Palestinians, a strong incentive would be recognition and full UN membership, which would also help to anchor the 1967 lines as the territorial baseline. Israelis and Palestinians should only be brought in once the framework is established.

One thing is clear: If the relevant international actors take their commitments lightly, there is a high risk of break­down and a return to violent conflict. Just repeat­ing the two-state mantra – without show­ing a concrete path of how to get there and linking it to benchmarks as well as in­cen­tives and disincentives – will not suffice.