The Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia

Opposition to the European proposal

Both sides have agreed on the text of the pro­posal, but not on the annex with the so-called implementation map, which could become a serious point of contention. The map should define which issues will be dealt with first. Serbia, for example, wants to start with the establishment of the A/CSM, but Kosovo does not. Therefore, there is still resistance in both Belgrade and Pristina to the adoption of the new pro­posal, which has not been initialled yet.

President Vučić sparked a heated debate in the Serbian parliament in January 2023 after warning that Serbia could become po­litically isolated from the EU and face eco­nomic destruction if the proposal was not accepted. He then announced new elec­tions that would also serve to legitimise the poten­tial agreement – a strategy that would absolve Vučić of responsibility for accept­ing the proposal.

Prime Minister Kurti, in turn, declared that Kosovo had no interest in implement­ing the A/CSM because it could endanger Kosovo’s sovereignty, promote Greater Serbia politics and destabilise the country. Moreover, in line with his policy of reci­procity, Kurti demanded that Serbia first establish a similar association of Albanian-majority municipalities in the Presevo Valley and maintained that the rights of Kosovo Serbs were in any case protected by Kosovo’s multi-ethnic institutional frame­work.

In other words, both sides are looking for ways to avoid accepting the agreement. Why should Vučić accept an agreement that would solve the Kosovo problem when it is an unpopular choice in Serbia and would not win him political support? Nor can the EU offer Serbia quick accession in exchange for a solution to the Kosovo issue, which would be quite attractive to Vučić. The accession process is linked to reforms in democracy and the rule of law, which the incumbent regime in Serbia does not want, as it bases its power on patronage, corruption and control of the media.

At the same time, Kosovo sees the EU as an unreliable partner. After all, five EU member states have not recognised Kosovo (Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Cyprus), which calls into question its pros­pects for potential EU membership. The EU’s treatment of Kosovo as a status-neutral partner contradicts Kosovo’s aspirations for recognition of its statehood, and thus touches on issues of its identity.

All of this limits the EU’s potential for action and credibility in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. This is also reflected in Kosovo’s often greater reliance on the United States as a mediation partner.

Reasons for rapid implementation

As it stands, all other options for solving the dispute have been exhausted and rejected, such as the often-criticised idea of a territorial swap between northern Kosovo and the Presevo Valley, an issue that domi­nated the dialogue in 2018. That is why all parties should focus on the latest proposal. The time is ripe for a solution that would confront Serbia with the reality of an in­dependent Kosovo. The Brussels Agreement has already laid good groundwork for this. Since 2013, Serbia has recognised Kosovo’s authority throughout the territory of its former province. In this respect, recognising Kosovo as de facto independent would not be a big leap.

In order not to have to wait another ten years for a solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute – which was exactly the scenario of the Brussels Agreement – the EU would need to put pressure on both sides right now so that they do not find more excuses to avoid implementing previous agreements and adopting the new proposal.

Vučić’s announcement of new elections as a means to legitimise the adoption of the agreement should be viewed with scep­ticism. New elections would only serve to buy time. In the parliamentary and presi­dential elections in April 2022, Vučić and his Progressive Party (SNS) won a clear majority. This should have already given them the necessary legitimacy. Moreover, the European proposal is a political agree­ment that does not require a referendum, as it would not violate Serbia’s constitution. Similarly, the Constitutional Court in Serbia also stated that the Brussels Agree­ment of April 2013 was a political, not a legal agreement.

At the same time, Kosovo’s arguments for not implementing the A/CSM should be viewed critically. Kurti often emphasises that Kosovo’s Constitutional Court has ruled that the establishment of the A/CSM is unconstitutional. In doing so, he ignores the fact that the Constitutional Court explicitly recommended that the A/CSM be established in line with the 2013 Brus­sels Agreement. Only the 2015 agreement, which spells out the main principles and elements of the A/CSM, was found not to be entirely in line with the Constitution. Kurti’s government prides itself on uphold­ing the principles of the rule of law. It would be contradicting itself if it did not follow the recommendations of the highest court in the country. How a statute of the A/CSM that is in accordance with the recommen­dations of the Constitutional Court can be devised has recently been demonstrated by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Hence, there is a way, but Kurti has shown no political will to do so.

In addition, there are two other impor­tant reasons why the A/CSM should be estab­lished. The first is the need to reinte­grate the Serb community in the north of the country, which collectively left Kosovo’s institutions at the end of 2022. One of the main reasons for their boycott policy is Kurti’s refusal to establish the A/CSM, which enjoys great popularity among the Serb com­munity in Kosovo. The second reason is that by establishing the A/CSM, Kosovo would strengthen its statehood, not weaken it, as Kurti has often suggested previously. Even the “NEWBORN” monument, which is redesigned every year on Kosovo’s Inde­pendence Day on 17 February, displayed the letters “NO NEW BR” (for “no new broken republic”) this year to draw atten­tion to the danger of the destabilisation of Kosovo that is associated with the estab­lish­ment of the A/CSM. But Kosovo is already a “broken republic”. The north can­not be treated like any other part of Kosovo. By Serbs leaving the institutions, Kosovo’s sov­er­eignty in the north has effectively been weakened. Kurti is trying to integrate the Serbs in the north with unilateral meas­ures (such as increasing the police presence in the north or declaring that Serbian regis­tra­tion plates for towns in Kosovo are illegal), but such measures will always fail. The in­tegration of Serbs in Kosovo overall stands or falls with the north. This was evident in the north Kosovo crisis from 2011 to 2013, which ended with the Brus­sels Agreement, and it also holds true for the recent crisis from 2022 to 2023, in the context of the nego­tiations on the new agreement.

In order to be able to integrate the north and create an “unbroken” republic, the Kosovo government must demonstrate good­will to initiate an honest dialogue with the Kosovo Serbs. To this end, Kurti’s gov­ern­ment could also take advantage of the dis­appointment of the northern Kosovo Serbs with the results of the recent crisis and the ensuing policies administered by Belgrade. A relatively strong civil society sector exists in the north, and there are people who do not blindly follow Belgrade’s policies. Kurti’s generalising claim that the north is con­trolled and inhabited by crimi­nals and extremists is not conducive to a con­struc­tive dialogue with the local population.

What the EU can do

Given all of the above, the question remains how the EU can persuade Belgrade and Pris­tina to ratify and subsequently im­plement the new agreement. Even if there is no pros­pect of EU accession in the short term that could ensure the implementation of the agreement, this goal could be achieved by other means.

In return for concluding the agreement, the EU can, for example, support Kosovo in becoming a member of international orga­ni­sations such as the Council of Europe, there­by strengthening Kosovo’s statehood. In addition, the EU Commission, as well as other EU countries engaged in the dialogue, such as Germany and France, should make parallel efforts to ensure that the five EU states that do not recognise Kosovo normal­ise their relations with the country. This would increase the EU’s credibility in the eyes of Kosovo’s government.

The adoption of the new agreement would also promote regional cooperation throughout the Western Balkans, which would particularly benefit Serbia, the strongest economy in the region. The new proposal would be a building block for the Common Regional Market (CRM), which could move the countries forward economically. So far, the CRM has not been fully implemented because Serbia and Kosovo do not recognise each other. The so-called four freedoms (free movement of goods, capital, services and people) cannot be guaranteed in the region as long as one country denies the existence of the other. This has mani­fold negative consequences: from the rec­ognition of professional qualifications to elec­tricity supply. Even without full EU mem­ber­ship, both countries could achieve economic benefits through regional co­opera­tion and gradual integration into the EU single market. In the short term, it would be important for the EU to fund eco­nomically profitable cross-border projects that promote cooperation between organi­sations from Serbia and Kosovo.

In addition, the EU can provide more economic support (through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance [IPA III]) to the two countries, on the one hand for projects that have high social relevance, and on the other hand for those that contribute to the reconciliation of both groups. One example would be the “Mirëdita, dobar dan!” festival, which brings together artists, human rights and peace activists as well as opinion makers from Kosovo and Serbia, offering a platform for cooperation and peaceful dialogue. Reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo can only be achieved through deeper social changes. This will be easier when Belgrade and Pristina have formalised their relations and are not blocking and antagonising each other on a daily basis. The new agreement would be a good first step on the long road to reconciliation.

Crucial for Serbia’s acceptance of the proposal is the establishment of the A/CSM, which is why it should also be explicitly mentioned as one of the first points in the implementation map as the annex to the treaty. For the EU, on the other hand, it is crucial that both sides commit to the implementation of the individual points of the new agreement. To this end, the EU could set up implementation and monitoring mechanisms based on a realistic time­frame. Accordingly, not only the above-mentioned economic benefits resulting from implementation should be defined, but also those measures that would be taken if the agreed points are not implemented within the set deadline. For exam­ple, the annex could state which investments or aid Kosovo can expect in which period of time – if it were to spell out the statute of the A/CSM as soon as possible – and which measures it could face if it does not do so, for example the continued block­ing of Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe. It is important to set medium-term goals: If only one major goal were to be set at the end of the long process – EU membership – this would lose traction over the years.

An independent, yet to be established EU-financed monitoring commission should accompany the implementation process to report to the EU the progress on the ground. The commission should be multi-ethnic and composed of, for example, members of local civil society and legal experts. Monitoring and implementation mechanisms would subject all sides in­volved in the dialogue to more rigorous accountability and communicate clear expec­tations of them. This should be one of the “lessons learnt” from the poor imple­mentation of the Brussels Agreement, which lacked such mechanisms and still has not been fully implemented ten years after its adoption.

Ultimately, the European proposal should serve as a kind of prelude to the full nor­malisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. It therefore has the character of a transitional instrument rather than a final agreement, which could possibly be reached in ten or twenty years, before Ser­bia or even both countries are on the verge of EU membership or integration into the EU single market. As long as Serbia and Kosovo have opposing views on Kosovo’s status, their relations will not normalise in a sustainable way. Overcoming the domi­nant view in Serbia that Kosovo is part of its territory – a view that is identity-building – will take time and gradual change. This has to be accompanied by tangible socio-eco­nomic improvements for people in Serbia. According to polls, economic and political progress is more important to a majority in Serbia than preserving Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo.

Last but not least, the new agreement would minimise China’s and Russia’s vec­tors of influence on Serbia’s politics. Both states have so far used the Kosovo issue as a gateway to influence local politics. Con­versely, Serbia also uses China’s and Rus­sia’s support in the UN Security Council to pursue its politics of de-recognition of Kosovo or prevent Kosovo from joining international organisations. An agreement could reduce the level of Serbia’s foreign policy cooperation with Russia and China, which would of course be more realistic if Serbia also recognised Kosovo de jure. If Serbia were to solve its “Kosovo problem”, it would no longer be dependent on the sup­port of these states in the UN Security Council.

Conclusion

The fact that all 27 EU states endorsed the European proposal in the conclusions of the European Council on 9 February 2023 gives it the necessary political weight. The supporters also include the five EU member states that have not recognised Kosovo. Adopt­ing the proposal would also strengthen Germany’s role as one of the most impor­tant foreign policy and economic partners of the entire Western Balkans and create new confidence in the EU accession process. If an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo based on the Franco-German proposal were to be reached, it would also be proof of the seriousness of Germany’s commitment to stabilising the Balkans and would also strengthen the Berlin-Paris tandem in EU foreign and enlargement policy. Last but not least, it would be a much-needed sign to the Balkans that the EU is once more com­mitted to the enlargement process after years of stagnation.

As a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, enlargement has again become an important instrument of EU policy. It is in this context that the new-old proposal of normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina resurfaced. The United States, too, has already explicitly sup­ported it and is mediating in the dia­logue. The key partners in the West are therefore behind the proposal. The ball is now in the court of the two Balkan coun­tries, which should do their best not to miss this unique oppor­tunity.