Israel: Half a Year under the Bennett Government

Religion and State

The new coalition is one of the few since 1990 that does not include ultra-Orthodox parties. This offers the opportunity to ad­vance reforms in relations between reli­gious authorities and the state – a policy area that is at the centre of the Israeli cul­ture war and in which the ultra-Orthodox are some of the most important players.

Admittedly, the coalition is also heterogeneous in this respect. The positions of the radical secular finance minister, Avigdor Lieberman, and the Orthodox minister of religious services, Matan Kahana, for exam­ple, are far apart. Nevertheless, they are united by the desire to bring about reforms that the ultra-Orthodox parties have pre­vented.

Already in the first weeks of the govern­ment, Finance Minister Lieberman cut state support for childcare for families in which, as is the case with many ultra-Orthodox, not both parents work. Transport Minister Merav Michaeli wants to make public trans­port possible on Shabbat. Kahana’s reform plans are particularly striking. He has intro­duced legislation that would end ultra-Ortho­dox control over conversion and dietary laws (kashrut). He also wants to in­tro­duce secular subjects in the school sys­tem and military service for the ultra-Orthodox.

Arab Sector

Ra’am’s participation in the government coalition represents a cultural revolt: For the first time in Israeli history, an independ­ent Arab party is part of a coalition. On the one hand, the way to this was paved by Netanyahu, of all people, who wooed Ra’am even before the Bennett-Lapid coali­tion, and thus legitimised cooperation to a certain extent. On the other hand, Ra’am’s success is also due to the pragmatism of its leader, Mansour Abbas, who is trying to avoid the politically contentious issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He believes that political participation is more likely to improve the lives of Israeli Arabs than isolation as a result of irreconcilable posi­tions. Therefore, Ra’am’s slogan is to be “realistic, conservative and influential”. The priority of Israeli Arabs’ concerns over Palestinian interests as a whole was demon­strated in the summer of 2021, when Abbas opposed issuing more work visas to Pales­tinians from the West Bank. This would reduce the chances of employment for Israeli Arabs.

Abbas was given far-reaching concessions for his agenda in the coalition negotiations. In the new state budget, these include the enormous financial allocation for Israel’s Arab citizens. The new five-year plan for their socioeconomic development includes the record sum of the equivalent of about 8.5 billion euros. Some 710 million euros of this is intended for combating crime and violence in Arab localities. In addition, there are agreements on the construction of a new city for Bedouins in the Negev Desert, the recognition of illegal villages in the south, and the electrification of previously unauthorised buildings in Arab cities. Abbas’ successes also include the suspension until the end of 2024 of a law that allows illegal houses to be destroyed.

It is questionable whether he will suc­ceed in channelling the exorbitant sums in a meaningful way. He will also be judged on his ability to curb crime among the Arab population. Abbas also faces opposition with­in the coalition regarding the promises made to Arab Israelis in the coalition agree­ment, such as in the case of electrification.

At the same time, Ra’am continues to maintain a certain distance from the gov­ern­ment: The party does not hold a minis­terial post, and thus does not share govern­ment responsibility. In this way, it hopes to survive politically if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should escalate violently again. Despite all its pragmatism, it cannot escape this. After the violent clashes in May 2021, Abbas admitted on Israeli TV: “Even if you consciously decided to ignore national issues, you will not succeed. Reality is stronger. The conflict still exists.”

The future of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel seems to depend heavily on this ex­periment. If Abbas can noticeably improve the situation of the Israeli Arabs, there is much to suggest that his model has a prom­ising future in Israeli politics. If it fails, prag­matism is also in danger of failing.

Rapprochement with the EU

The progressive distancing of Israel from the EU, evident during the Netanyahu years, seems to have been halted for the time being by the Bennett-Lapid government. For example, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs was closed. There, the accusation that the EU was anti-Semitic and anti-Zion­ist had been turned into a foreign policy tool. At present, the government is not pursuing a policy that exploits the division within the EU member states on Israel and the conflict, as was the case under Netanyahu. Whereas Netanyahu had castigated the EU’s policy towards Israel as “crazy” and de­scribed its attitude towards the settlements as being borderline anti-Semitic, Lapid and Bennett instead emphasise common values. This is being well-received in Europe. Lapid was already a guest at the EU Council of For­eign Ministers in July, and the EU’s Hori­zon 2021–2027 funding programme was signed on 6 December.

Nevertheless, critical points remain. The most recent example is the six Palestinian non-governmental organisations, funded largely by EU countries, that Israel has placed on the terror list. Josep Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, complained that Israel had not provided enough evidence to sufficiently justify their designation as supporters of terror. In this area, tensions between Israel and the EU have become visible.

In a meeting with 16 European diplo­mats, the Israeli director of European Affairs of the Foreign Ministry was widely reported as shouting that they would “piss her off” for their criticism. In addition, a representative survey conducted by the think tank Mitvim in 2021 also shows that the change in policy has not yet reached the Israeli population. According to the sur­vey, 47 per cent of respondents were against the Horizon 2021–2027 funding pro­gramme because it excludes settlements in the West Bank; 46 per cent continue to see the EU as an enemy, only 24 per cent as a friend.

Ambivalent Relationship with the US

The tone towards the US is marked by the fact that both heads of government are cur­rently happy not to have to deal with their respective predecessor. In the first joint meet­ing of Biden and Bennett, both em­phasised the spirit of cooperation. On the Israeli side, there is an effort to improve relations with the Democratic Party instead of focussing exclusively on the Republicans, as was the case under Netanyahu. Never­theless, dealing with the Democrats remains difficult. Within the Democratic Party, demands are growing louder to attach conditions to military aid for Israel. For exam­ple, in September 2021, members of Con­gress critical of Israel ensured that a separate debate and vote was necessary for financial support for the Iron Dome missile defence system.

There are also differences between the US and Israel in various policy areas. These include Washington’s criticism of Israel’s close economic ties to China, its invest­ments in critical infrastructure in Israel, but also Israeli technology exports. Another contentious issue under the Biden adminis­tration is the conflict with the Palestinians: According to the US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, settlement construction has reached a criti­cal stage, so that a two-state solution will soon be impossible. There is a continuing dispute over whether the US consulate in East Jerusalem can be reopened. Moreover, the US – like the EU – is still not con­vinced that the six Palestinian non-govern­mental organisations mentioned above can be rightly classified as supporters of terror. On the other hand, the US has put the Israeli company NSO Group, which distri­butes the spy software Pegasus, on a sanc­tions list because it threatens the rights-based international order. Overall, however, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a sub­ordinate role for the Biden administration.

Another divergence concerns how to deal with Iran and whether the nuclear agree­ment with Tehran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) should be renewed. The US is seeking an agreement that would be significantly smaller – following a policy of “less for less” – in scope than the last one. Israel, on the other hand, is trying to put pressure on the negotiators to break off the talks or reach a much more com­prehensive agreement. Israel warns that a “bad” deal would bring Iran closer to nuclear weaponisation and is calling on the US not to rule out a military option.

At the same time, Israel is preparing for a failure of the negotiations. A military strike on its own is also being discussed. However, it is questionable whether Israel would be able to decisively weaken the Iranian nuclear programme. At present, the military seems to lack the necessary weap­ons technology as well as the necessary preparation. Moreover, those responsible in Israel are aware that a military strike against Iran could mean war. Not only Iran itself, but also Hezbollah and possibly Hamas would attack Israel in this case.

Nevertheless, there is a clear difference compared to the Netanyahu government: Despite criticism of the JCPOA, the current coalition does not seem to be completely closed to a resumption of negotiations (even if this chance has receded into the distance after the last rounds of negotiations). This is also supported by the failure of the Netan­yahu-Trump strategy of maximum pressure, which clearly put Israel in a strategically worse position.

Integration into the Region

Israel’s position in the region has changed significantly since it concluded normalisation agreements with the United Arab Emir­ates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in recent years. These are the first normalisa­tion agreements with Arab states since the peace agreements with Jordan (1994) and Egypt (1979). The reasons for and background to these agreements were not the same everywhere.

What they had in common, however, was that unofficial contacts had already been maintained, that the states hoped that this would lead to better relations with the US, and that the Palestinian question played an increasingly minor role for those in­volv­ed. For the Gulf States, there was also the fact that they, like Israel, felt threatened by Iran.

The new government is using this devel­opment to further consolidate Israel’s posi­tion in the Middle East. In the last seven months, Ministers Bennett, Lapid, and Gantz in particular have travelled frequently to countries in the region. They opened embassies, had their pictures taken with their Arab counterparts, and signed various trade and military agreements. Relations with the UAE are particularly noteworthy. Beyond the already existing diamond trade, the volume of trade has multiplied: The value of Israeli export goods to the UAE rose from the equivalent of around 9.8 to a good 60 million euros between 2019 and August 2021, and that of imports from liter­ally zero to more than 214 million euros. In the course of this development, several economic cooperations were estab­lished, for example in the aviation industry and gas production. As a result of the estab­lish­ment of a new economic forum together with the UAE, the US, and India, Israel is for the first time part of a global geopolitical multilateral format. Israel has also established ties with Morocco at various levels. Foreign Minister Lapid flew to the Moroccan capital, Rabat, in August 2021 to open the Israeli embassy there. Sub­sequently, memoranda of understanding were signed on cooperation in research and development, cybersecurity, culture, and sports. A preliminary highlight of the rela­tion­ship was the visit of Defence Minister Gantz to Morocco at the end of November 2021. During this visit, it was decided to formalise security cooperation, exchange intelligence information, and conduct joint military exercises.

In addition to the new normalisation agree­ments, the government, unlike in Netan­yahu’s time, is trying to improve rela­tions with Jordan and Egypt, which are char­acterised by mistrust. The reason for this is not least the stabilising function that these neighbouring states have for the con­flict with the Palestinians. Prime Minister Bennett’s meeting with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh on 13 September 2021, including a photo oppor­tunity with a prominently placed Israeli flag, was remarkable. It was the first official visit by an Israeli prime minister to Egypt in 11 years. Even more remarkable is the change of political direction in relations with Jordan. These had suffered greatly under Netanyahu, and recently there were even speculations that the former prime minister wanted to strengthen the Jorda­nian opposition against King Abdullah. Prime Minister Bennett paid a secret visit to the Jordanian king as early as July 2021. Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Lapid and Defence Minister Gantz paid an official visit, and even Mansour Abbas, party leader of Ra’am, met with the Jordanian king and took the opportunity to reaffirm his sup­port for the two-state solution.

This new diplomatic offensive is also manifesting itself through cooperation. On 22 November 2021, Israel, Jordan, and the UAE signed an agreement. Under the agree­ment, Israel will buy solar energy from Jordanian power plants built by the Emir­ates. In return, Jordan will buy water from Israeli desalination plants. This is part of the so-called Climate Innovation – a for­eign policy strategy to strengthen regional relations through green technological cooperation.

The fundamentally positive trend towards regional integration, however, has several critical aspects. For example, the new cooperation often centres on the sale of Israeli military and surveillance tech­nology (such as Pegasus) to authoritarian states, which can use this technology against their own populations. In addition, international law is sometimes ignored in relationships brokered by then-US President Donald Trump. This is especially true in the case of Morocco: In exchange for normalisation, the US officially recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the occupied Western Sahara. Moreover, Israeli-Moroccan rela­tions mutually legitimise two occupying powers. Finally, a sometimes intentional, sometimes unintentional consequence of Israel’s regional integration is that the Pales­tinians are increasingly marginalised.