The Covid-19 Pandemic and Conflict Dynamics in Syria

Pandemic Hits a Country in Crisis

After nine years of (civil) war, Syria is in an extremely poor position to confront the pandemic, putting Syrians at very high risk. The country’s health system as well as the energy, water, and sanitation infrastructure have been largely destroyed in nine years of fighting, in particular in former and cur­rent rebel-held areas. The Syrian Arab Army and Russia’s air force have both deliberately targeted hospitals, clinics, and health work­ers. According to the UN, at the outbreak of the pandemic, only 57 hospitals and clinics were fully operational in Syria. In early March 2020, there were an estimated 325 ICUs with ventilators available throughout the country. These were distributed very unevenly, with some two-thirds in Damas­cus and the provinces of Latakia and Tar­tous, i.e. the regime heartlands, and none in Deir ez-Zor. Even those hospitals and clinics that are operational lack equip­ment, trained personnel, and medicine.

Also, against the backdrop of a severe economic crisis in Syria – exacerbated by the financial crisis in Lebanon – state revenues have been severely reduced, leav­ing few resources for Damascus to upscale health capacities and cushion the impact of preventive measures on the popu­lation, thus further increasing dependency on inter­national humanitarian aid. With an expected drop in the remittances on which many Syrians depend and the impact of lockdown measures, living conditions are set to worsen. Already before the epidemic hit the country, according to the UN, more than 80 per cent of the population was liv­ing below the poverty line, some 11 million Syrians were receiving humanitarian assis­tance, and some 8 million of them were dependent on food aid.

The risk of being affected by Covid-19 is highest for some 6 million internally dis­placed persons (IDPs), around 130,000 de­tainees in regime prisons, and tens of thou­sands of suspected Islamic State (IS) fighters and their families detained by the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in camps and detention facil­ities. Most of these vulnerable groups live in cramped conditions that do not allow for social dis­tancing, they lack access to health services, suffer from catastrophic hygienic condi­tions, and often do not even have access to clean water. A spread of the virus among IDPs, prisoners, and detainees would be next to impossible to contain and lead to large numbers of fatalities.

Conflict Dynamics Impede Confronting Covid-19 Challenges

Rather than the pandemic uniting local, regional, and international actors around a common purpose, conflict dynamics have hampered an effective response to Covid-19. The fragmentation of territorial control in Syria – between Damascus and its backers (Russia, Iran, Iran-backed militias); the Kurdish dominated self-administration and its supporters (mainly a reduced num­ber of US troops); Turkey and allied militias; as well as the Syrian Salvation Government linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an al‑Qaida offshoot of Salafist jihadis – and continued conflict between the players have rendered a joint or coordinated ap­proach to Covid-19 impossible. Also, none of the crucial external actors has changed course so as to allow for an effective tack­ling of the humanitarian needs resulting from the pandemic.

In addition, interventions by international humanitarian actors have been severely hampered by the lack of access to territories outside the control of Damascus. This prob­lem has been compounded by restrictions on mobility imposed by Damascus and de facto authorities to contain the pandemic as well as by the closure of two border cross­ings (al-Ya’rubiya on the border with Iraq, al-Ramtha on the border with Jordan, both formerly used for international cross-border aid to circumvent Damascus) based on Secu­rity Council Resolution 2504 of January 2020. It has also been magnified by inter­national actors such as the WHO relying on Damascus as their main counterpart in addressing the Covid-19 challenge while avoiding to deal with de facto authorities in the north-west and north-east of the coun­try. The problem has been especially stark east of the Euphrates, where the WHO shunned contacts and refrained from aid deliveries until mid-April 2020. What is more, Damascus and Ankara have both used the denial of access to north-east Syria for humanitarian actors and aid deliveries as a means of putting pressure on the Kurd­ish-dominated self-administration to, re­spec­tively, agree to a deal on terms set by Damascus or respect Turkey’s red lines. Turkey has also repeatedly withheld drink­ing water to areas in the north-east. In the same vein, humanitarian access to the Rukban Camp on the Jordanian border has been denied by Damascus (and by Russian troops stationed in the area) to increase the pressure on US-backed rebels in the enclave to surrender. In the wake of the pandemic, Jordan also no longer allows direct cross-border aid deliveries to the camp.

Measures adopted by local actors to con­tain the spread of the virus and prepare for dealing with infections have also been under­mined by conflict dynamics. The government of Syria and de facto authori­ties in other parts of the country have each adopted similar, yet uncoordinated meas­ures to prevent the spread of the pandemic, such as: a partial closure of borders, mob­ility restrictions, curfews, the suspension of non-essential economic activities, the intro­duction of part-time hours for the public sector, and the closure of schools and uni­versities. Two communities that turned out to be hotspots of infections (Manin and al-Sayyada Zainab) have been quarantined to prevent the spread of the virus. Damascus has also granted amnesty to criminals and defectors (although to date no meaningful release of prisoners has been registered) and postponed parliamentary elections that had been scheduled for mid-April. Damascus and the SDF apparently have suspended military recruitment, and the SDF declared a unilateral cease-fire. Yet, border closures and travel restrictions have been undermined by the continued movement of fight­ers, in particular between Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Also, incentives to engage in smuggling activities have increased further against the backdrop of scarcity and enor­mous price hikes, in particular for medicine and food. Last but not least, the so-called IS has tried to exploit a situa­tion – in which it sees its local, regional, and international enemies focused on fight­ing the pandemic – to raise its profile and reinvigorate its networks, leading to an upsurge in attacks across the country as well as mutinies and (attempted) prison outbreaks, in particular from the SDF’s detention facilities.

Covid-19 Impacts the Military Balance of Power

Actors involved in the Syrian conflict have been impacted differently by the pandemic, depending on how much they have been afflicted by Covid-19, the repercussions on available resources (e.g. state revenues), and the manner of involvement in the conflict (e.g. reliance on ground troops vs. air force). The respective impacts have reflected on actors’ military capabilities, and thus on the overall military power balance. In contrast, the pandemic has not had a pacifying effect.

As a case in point, some observers have held that one effect of the pandemic is that a cease-fire in Idlib province has lasted longer than originally expected. Yet, it seems that the relative calm in the area agreed upon is less a direct effect of involved actors adjusting to Covid-19 than an expression of the main parties – in particular, Turkey, HTS, and Damascus and its backers – pre­paring for the next round of fighting so as to defend what each sees as vital inter­ests. The limited ceasefire arrangement agreed upon by Russia and Turkey on 5 March 2020 was to establish a secure corridor along the M4 motorway connecting Latakia on the coast and Aleppo, Syria’s commercial centre. Although it stopped the regime’s offensive aimed at re-conquering the whole of the former de-escalation zone, it did not provide lasting arrangements for any of the points of contention. As was the case with previous Turkish-Russian agree­ments, this one also put the responsibility of separating HTS from moderate Syrian rebels on Tur­key’s shoulders – an impossible task given the grip of HTS over the area and its rejec­tion of the deal. Accordingly, joint Turkish-Russian patrols along the M4 motorway, a central provision of the agreement, have faced local protests and attacks instigated by HTS. At the same time, Turkey has used the lull in fighting to forestall Damascus from re-conquering further territory north of the M4 by increasing the number of its troops there to some 20,000. In the same vein, Turkey has also been try­ing to con­solidate Syrian rebels under one umbrella – the Syrian National Army – and beef up their ranks. Yet, given the fact that Russia controls the airspace in north-west Syria, Turkey’s military build-up there will re­main vulnerable. Finally, yet importantly, the pandemic has prompted Ankara to further tighten its control over the Syrian-Turkish border and to toughen up its meas­ures against refugee inflows.

What is more, the pandemic has had an effect on the military power balance in the country, to the benefit of those (mainly) engaged with air power and to the detri­ment of those engaged with ground forces. In this vein, Covid-19 has led to a redeploy­ment of Russian troops in north-west Syria, reducing their presence among local allies. Yet, Moscow’s primary engagement, i.e. the Russian air force’s sorties in support of Syrian ground troops and allied militias, is hardly being affected by the pandemic. In the same vein, Israel’s military engagement in Syria has not only continued unimpeded by Covid-19, with the Israeli air force con­tin­uing to carry out airstrikes against Ira­nian and Iran-backed militia targets in Syria. Israel has even stepped up these attacks this spring, seizing the opportunity to increase the pressure on Iran and its non-state allies in Syria during a difficult time for the Islamic Republic.

In contrast, Iran – the country hit the hardest by the pandemic in the Middle East – has had to adjust its presence and activities. The pandemic has forced almost all parts of the Iranian government, includ­ing the Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to focus on curbing the crisis inside the country. It has also worsened Iran’s economic difficulties due to lockdown measures and a significant drop in global oil prices, thus compounding the impact of US sanctions. As a result, Iran’s financial resources to support its allies and proxy groups in Syria have been considerably re­stricted. In the Idlib theatre, this has mainly affected the mercenary Afghan and Paki­stani fighters of the Fatemiyoun and Zaine­biyoun brigades, which have seen reduced levels of funding. In addition, the Corona crisis has prompted a significant number of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units forces operating in Syria to return home to help fight the virus out­break, thus affecting Iran’s overall posture in the country.

Crucial Actors Likely to Adapt Priorities and Approaches

In the mid-term (i.e. for the next 2–3 years), the relevant local, regional, and global actors are unlikely to alter their pur­suit of strategic interests in Syria due to Covid-19, as they overwhelmingly perceive them to be vital. Yet, actors might adapt their operational priorities, as well as the strat­egies to pursue them, due to the effects that the pandemic is having on available resources.

Covid-19: Another Intervening Factor in the Syrian Theatre

Concerning mid-term conflict dynamics in Syria, the Corona pandemic is unlikely to become either a turning point, a catalyst propelling the conflict in a clear direction, or an overall determinant. Rather, it will most likely turn out to be one intervening factor among a variety of factors affecting cooperation formats, military strength, power balance, and prospects for stabili­sation.

Cooperation between the guarantors of the Astana process (Russia, Turkey, and Iran), which was launched in January 2017 to jointly resolve the conflict in Syria, is not set to get any easier. In the beginning, the Astana approach of de-escalation zones and reconciliation agreements had proved highly effective in restructuring Syria’s conflict dynamics in a way that benefitted the regime and diminished the opposition, while safeguarding the interests of the Astana-3. However, an agreement on the end­game along the Turkish-Syrian border will be difficult to achieve, and renewed fighting in the province of Idlib will once more increase the risk of direct confron­tations between them.

Although the conflict over Idlib has at times been a hard test for Turkish-Russian relations, mutual accommodation has so far prevailed. Yet, an ever greater level of in­volve­ment by Russia and Turkey on op­posing sides of the civil war in Libya, which started well before the pandemic and has turned Syria into a theatre for the recruitment of mercenaries for the war effort in Libya, is likely to increase the intensity of the confrontation between the two – and reflect negatively on cooperation in the Astana format.

In addition, with regard to the conflict in Idlib, Turkey and Russia have preferred to cut deals bilaterally, without involving Iran. That has raised concerns in Tehran about being sidelined when it comes to decisions on Syria’s future order. Should Tehran fail to keep the Astana framework alive, it might turn to undermining Russian-Turkish agreements on the ground. What is more, unlike in the 2016 battle of Aleppo, in which Russia and Iran fought in unison, the con­flict over Idlib is likely to continue to drive the wedge between Iran and Russia. Despite a likely decrease in Iran’s direct military involvement in Syria in the years to come, Iran’s political rivalry with Turkey will continue, and its relations with Russia will become more strained.

There are at least three more arenas that will continue to bear (or increasingly bear) a high risk of military escalation. This is, first, the north-east, with its high concentration of local, regional, and international troops and militias – an area where, similar to Idlib, interim agreements have frozen the lines of conflict rather than resolved any points of contention. Second, it concerns the antagonism between Israel and the US, on the one hand, and Iran and its allies on the other. An increasingly assertive Israeli posture had already brought the antago­nists to the brink of direct military con­fron­tation in February 2018, and the US and Iran have clashed repeatedly in the Persian Gulf. Third, it applies to endeavours by the IS to profit from the chaos and contested control in many parts of Syria, allowing it to conduct operations as well as regroup and recruit.

Although the Syrian regime will remain set on re-conquering the remaining terri­tory, that process might take longer than envisioned due to increasingly strained resources in Damascus and Tehran. At the same time, a trend of destabilisation in territories nominally under the control of Damascus is likely to continue. Even before the pandemic, protests against bad govern­ance and the lack of services had been on the rise in several parts of the country, including traditional strongholds of the regime. Armed confrontations between remnants of rebel formations and regime forces had escalated in so-called reconciled areas, especially in the southern Deraa province. It is safe to assume that the level of popular unrest will rise in the case of continued lockdown measures that prevent income-generating activities, against the background of a continued decline in remit­tances, and a trend of erosion of state func­tions due to the precarious fiscal situation of Damascus.

A reversal of the destabilisation trend is unlikely to come through agreement in the UN-facilitated constitutional committee or a strong reconstruction drive. Damascus has not shown any interest in political com­promise, and it has neither funds to invest nor has it been successful in repatriating diaspora capital. In addition, already before the economic effects of the Corona pan­demic became a factor, Russia and Iran were not in a position to provide money for a comprehensive, countrywide reconstruc­tion. Other potential supporters have either categorically rejected involvement without seeing progress in conflict resolution or political openings (US), or they have been hesitant to engage (the Arab States of the Persian Gulf), positioned themselves for involvement at a later stage (China), or focussed on areas controlled by them and their local proxies (Turkey). The economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, especially the sharp fall in the price of oil, are further reducing the availability of resources, in particular those of the Arab Gulf States. The pending enactment of comprehensive sec­ondary sanctions on Syria by the US (so-call­ed Caesar sanctions) will further deter inter­national engagement in Syria’s reconstruc­tion.

In this vein, even though the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has stepped up its normalisation with Damascus in the wake of the Corona crisis and pledged support for fighting the virus, it seems that the move was motivated more by an interest to have the regime increase military pressure on the Emirates’ regional rival Turkey through a renewal of military operations in Idlib than an interest to assist in the long-term stabilisation and reconstruction of Syria. The UAE’s main aim seems to be to get Turkey bogged down in the Levant so that Ankara can devote less attention and fewer resources to Libya.

Policy Recommendations

The EU and its member states have little influence on the conflict dynamics in Syria. In the short term, they should prioritise helping fight the pandemic there, rather than treating it through the prism of con­flict dynamics, as other actors do. This im­plies at least two core elements: first, insisting on maintaining – or rather ex­panding – access to humanitarian aid and health support in all areas of Syria, and in this vein preparing a follow-up to Security Council Resolution 2504, which will expire in July 2020, so as to allow for cross-border aid operations. Second, Europe should encourage the cooperation of the WHO and other international bodies with the de facto authorities in the north-east and north-west of the country to fight the pandemic, and, in particular, to address the challenges in detention centres and IDP camps.

Europeans should then focus on diplo­macy and work towards arrangements that make the protection of the civilian popu­lation a priority, as well as promote a nego­tiated conflict settlement that achieves a balance between local, regional, and inter­national interests based on international law. In this context, it would also make sense to interlink the various multilateral processes – the Astana process, the so-called Small Group, and the Geneva pro­cess – more closely. A first meeting be­tween the heads of state and government of Germany, France, Russia, and Turkey in October 2018 marked the start of such an endeavour, but it has lacked follow-up. Europeans should also facilitate talks that would contribute to a modus vivendi between Turkey and the SDF as well as Iran and the US/Israel.