The German-Brazilian Partnership for a Socially Just and Ecological Transformation

Promoting effective North-South cooperation

Germany and the European Union are looking for reliable partners in a situation of growing tensions between the Global North and the Global South. The fear that Germany and the EU intend to continue with extractivist partnership models focussing exclusively on securing raw materials at the expense of local economic development – and thus cementing global exploitation and inequality – is widespread.

Many countries in the Global South criticised the EU for its selective solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic, when Europe hoarded vaccine supplies and re­fused to relax patent rules. They also take a dim view of Europe’s failure to address their unsustainable debt burdens while channelling enormous financial support to Ukraine. Double standards further exacer­bate the geopolitical polarisation. The most relevant current example cited by the Glob­al South is Germany’s continuing military support for Israel despite evidence of vio­lations of international humanitarian law by the Israeli armed forces in the Gaza Strip. The Global North’s persistent failure to fulfil its financial commitments – such as the promise to raise US$100 billion annually for climate finance – has gravely eroded the Global South’s confidence in global climate cooperation and multilateral processes.

Reducing North-South tensions is just as essential for global climate action as it is for Germany’s search for reliable partners. In the sense of Germany’s value-led and interest-based foreign policy, the normative and strategic motivations are practically identi­cal. Effective cooperation between governments in the Global North and South that are both willing and able to act should be a key objective of any strategic partnership concept – alongside progress on de­carbonisation, strengthening security and competi­tiveness, and reducing regional and sectoral dependencies. COP28 in Dubai in November 2023 demonstrated the effec­tiveness of North-South coalitions, as a broad alliance of more than 130 developing and developed countries achieved an agree­ment – for the first time– to “transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner”.

Brazil is a partner of choice for Germany and the EU

Brazil is an important actor with the potential to reduce North-South tensions. Although their respective approaches may vary in certain respects, Brazil has been a partner of choice for Germany and the EU for global climate cooperation and defend­ing multilateral rules and principles since President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva returned to office in January 2023. In the G4 (togeth­er with India and Japan) German and Brazil work for reform of the UN Security Council, offering mutual support for each other’s efforts to obtain a permanent seat. Both take a critical view of the escalating con­frontation between the United States and China, which they fear could endanger multilateral cooperation. Although China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, its biggest infrastructure investor and an important market for Brazilian products such as soy­beans, iron ore, crude oil and beef, it is unlikely that Brazil will take sides in the Sino-American rivalry, because its prime foreign policy objective is autonomy and equidistance between the major powers. Brazil sees itself as a bridge: a representative of the South and partner of the North.

President Lula wants Brazil to play a larger role in shaping international politics. His inaugural speech named the fight against climate change as a top priority, alongside fighting poverty and hunger and reforming global governance structures. Reindustrialising Brazil through investment in green technologies is another core goal.

Brazil as an important player in international climate policy

Lula launched a diplomatic offensive to establish Brazil – which is the world’s seventh-largest greenhouse gas emitter and the largest in Latin America and the Caribbean – as a forerunner of global climate action and a leader of the Global South. He has introduced concrete meas­ures to correct the regressive climate policy of his predecessor Jair Bolsonaro between 2019 and 2023. For instance, he has re­stored Brazil’s greenhouse gas reduction targets – which Bolsonaro had reduced – from 37 to 48 percent by 2025 and 50 to 53 percent by 2030 (all in comparison to 2005). This would achieve the absolute level of emissions originally proposed in Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). The annual rate of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon region – which had increased strongly under Bolsonaro – fell by 62.2 percent in 2023. But at the same time deforestation in the Cerrado increased by almost 68 percent; in 2023 the rate was higher there than in the Amazon for the first time in five years. Lula has said he will end deforestation by 2030. In order to tackle deforestation, he has revived the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation, which had held no summit for four­teen years.

With abundant sources for the production of biofuel and clean energy, Brazil has the potential to become an increasingly competitive actor in the green growth sec­tors. It currently has one of the world’s highest proportions of renewable energy and one of the cleanest electricity systems. In 2023 93.1 percent of Brazil’s electricity came from renewable sources. Hydro power continued to dominate installed capacity (with 58 percent in 2023), but the rate of growth in solar and onshore wind capacity is forecast to more than double by 2028, in comparison to the last five years. Brazil possesses ideal geographical and climatic conditions for green hydrogen and is well placed to become one of the most competitive producers.

Brazil will play a central role in shaping global climate cooperation in the coming five years, hosting COP30 in Belém in 2025, as well as chairing the G20 in 2024 and BRICS in 2025. Brazil has been engaged in the UNFCCC process since early 2024 as a member of the COP presidencies troika, alongside the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan. In the context of its climate diplomacy in international forums Brazil is a strong proponent of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR).

The implementation of Lula’s ambitious plans will face great challenges. The coun­try’s deep socio-economic problems include growing social inequality, massive food price inflation, growing debt, tight budget­ary constraints, and a complex domestic political situation. The Brazilian economy remains highly dependent on emissions-intensive industries like agriculture, mining, and oil and gas, which are traditionally politically well-connected. The influential farming lobby demands a relaxation of environmental regulations, bringing it into conflict with environmental NGOs and indigenous communities.

In order to avoid permanent push-back, Lula is forced to make concessions to the emissions-intensive industries. Conservative parties, which possess a majority in the National Congress and are closely connected with the farming sector, restrict the president's political leeway. They regard climate and environmental protection primarily as foreign interference. Furthermore, Lula’s heterogeneous governing coalition includes right-of-centre parties that obstruct his plans and complicate decision-making, as evidenced in particular by recurring conflicts between the energy and environment ministers.

At the same time, Lula is pushing ahead with oil exploration despite opposition from within his own government. Current plans for the Amazon Basin could make Brazil one of the world’s five largest oil pro­ducers by 2030. It also intends to increase its gas and coal production. This year Brazil joined OPEC+ as an observer.

Perspectives for the transformation partnership

While Germany has praised Brazil for decades as a partner on an equal footing with whom it shares values and interests, the two governments currently exhibit an especially strong desire to cooperate more closely and overcome differences. During intergovernmental consultations at the end of 2023, Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Presi­dent Lula announced a Partnership for a Socially Just and Ecological Transformation to complement the existing Strategic Partnership. It forms the framework for German-Brazilian cooperation in the relevant policy areas. Concrete measures aim to further deepen the bilateral relationship and place cooperation on a new footing. The Partnership will focus on issues including tackling climate change, preserving the Amazon rain forest, promoting sustainable agriculture and food systems, expanding renewable energies, decarbonising industry, and creating local value chains. The priorities also encompass combatting poverty and hunger, on the basis that ecological and social challenges are closely interconnected and must be tackled together. One of the core elements of the Partnership is a high-level strategic dialogue on climate action and ambition, which is to take place three or four times before COP30.

In the interests of a fully integrated approach, all existing bilateral formats in relevant policy areas (such as the German-Brazilian Energy Partnership) will contribute to the new transformation partnership. Unlike previous partnerships with other countries, it pursues a clear strategic vision. It is specifically designed to encourage cooperation beyond project-related tech­nical and financial support and to allow resources to be bundled and effectively coordinated.

Partnerships supplement multilateral governance processes and represent an important instrument for achieving climate goals. Cooperation in a bilateral framework can build trust and assist the formation of coalitions in the climate negotiations. Con­versely, close and constructive cooperation in multilateral processes can have positive effects on bilateral relations – and support Germany’s search for reliable partners.

Key issues in the run-up to COP30

Brazil’s aspiration to play a bridging func­tion and its role as host of COP30 make it a key climate partner for Germany. Four areas are especially relevant in advance of the conference in Belém: interpreting the Global Stocktake; the next round of NDCs; climate finance and expanding the donor base; and reform of global governance.

Priorities of the transformation partnership

Germany’s and Brazil’s approaches may diverge on issues such as the European Union’s environmental standards (which are sometimes perceived as protectionist), the use of biofuels, and the preferred means for producing hydrogen. There are also con­ceptual differences, above all concerning the implications of current and histori­cal emissions for the respective responsibilities of states. Nevertheless, both coun­tries exhibit great willingness to cooperate more closely. Altogether they share a broad con­sensus around the necessity of ambitious climate policy and the shape of the corre­sponding strategic priorities. They both see themselves as mediators, with an important role to play in strengthening confidence in the climate negotiations and promoting effective cooperation between governments from North and South.

Germany and Brazil should use their political dialogue in the framework of the transforma­tion partnership to anticipate where ten­sions might crop up and to address the emerging differences constructively in advance of COP29 and COP30. Overcoming (or at least lessening) bilateral conceptual differences could form the basis for a broader coalition. In order to lay the ground­work for appropriately incorporating the findings of the GST into the next round of NDCs, Germany and Brazil should devel­op a deeper shared understanding of the core elements of the GST, including their bind­ing nature. The voices of civil society, aca­demia and business need to be integrated in this process. In the track 1.5 dialogue, Germany and Brazil could develop convinc­ing and less polarising narratives showing the need for additional funding and new ambitious NDCs for all parties. Such narra­tives would need to be based more strongly on a collective will to raise ambition and work towards a shared understanding be­tween developed and developing countries.

In the run-up to COP30, NDC diplomacy should be one of the top priorities of the transformation partnership. At this year’s Petersberg Climate Dialogue German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called for a broad multi-stakeholder alliance to support the NDCs. Such a coalition could represent an important instrument for promoting a whole of society approach and in particular ensuring that the international financial institutions are involved. Germany and Brazil should further concretise the proposed alliance and its activities, and link their efforts to existing support structures such as the NDC partnership. Coordinated diplo­matic moves would lend greater weight to German and Brazilian efforts to encourage potential forerunners to submit ambitious NDCs at COP29 and create political momen­tum for the national contributions. Germa­ny and Brazil should build bridges to other formats such as the G7 and G20 presidencies in order to promote a holistic NDC pro­cess. Brazil and the EU should also set an example by submitting their NDCs early and ensuring they are compatible with the 1.5 degree path. This would lend Germany’s, the EU’s and Brazil’s climate diplo­macy additional legitimacy vis-à-vis other countries and increase the pressure on other major emitters such as China in advance of COP30. With political majorities for ambitious climate policy under pressure following the June 2024 European elec­tions, it is all the more important for the German government to press for the EU to rapidly adopt an ambitious NDC.

Brazil, which is placed 19th in the ranking of states providing funds for climate protection measures in the developing countries, and Germany, as a dependable donor to international climate funding, should work together to ensure that exist­ing South-South cooperation is more systematically documented. Emerging economies like Brazil and India have provided considerable voluntary financial support for developing countries via multilateral development banks (MDBs) and climate funds as well as bilateral climate funding. But this is often ignored in dis­cussions about expanding the circle of climate finance donors. Such transfers go largely unreported because the developing countries are not obliged to do so – and many fear that voluntary reporting could lead to demands for deeper emissions reductions. Systematically recording with assurances that this would not lead to additional obligations could strengthen mutual trust in the NCQG negotiations and increase the willingness of traditional donor countries to provide additional funding.

First of all, however, the developed coun­tries are responsible for making up the shortfall in the US$100 billion promise and committing significantly higher contributions for the future. Only if the rich coun­tries can be relied upon to keep their promises will willing developing countries be able to find domestic political backing for their own contributions to climate funding. The German government must ensure that it keeps its promise to provide at least €6 billion in climate finance annu­ally by 2025 despite budget constraints and announced cuts in development funding.

The Partnership for a Socially Just and Ecological Transformation offers an oppor­tunity to draw together global agendas like global governance reform with action to combat climate change, and foster political dialogue on these issues. Germany should take criticism of the existing international order seriously and lend more active support to the efforts of Brazil and other countries of the Global South. That will automatically mean renouncing certain privileges. If Germany was willing to contemplate innovative ideas like a global wealth tax and lead the way with corresponding measures, that could encourage Brazil to give at least passive support to German calls to expand the circle of climate finance donors, in particular to including China. Linking transformation processes can strengthen the Global South’s trust in the multilateral climate process and lay the groundwork for more ambitious climate targets and robust partnerships.