Syria: Too Fragile to Ignore

Post-war Realities

Figure 1 – Syria, Area of control (as of 04 February 2019)

The future of Syria will no longer be decided on the battlefield, nor in UN-led political negotiations in Geneva. The new UN Special Envoy for Syria may be able to form a Constitutional Committee with representatives from the government and the political opposition as well as legal experts and societal leaders who are un­controversial enough for Turkey, Russia, and Iran to agree upon. It is very unlikely, however, that the Assad government would allow the adoption of any constitutional text that could seriously limit the powers of the president and the security apparatus.

The post-war reality of Syria will nonetheless only partly resemble Syria before the war. Absent unforeseen events, Assad will remain in power even after the next presidential elections, now logged for 2021. He will be ruling a devastated country, however: Syria’s economy is down to roughly 50 percent of its pre-war performance. More than a quarter of the Syrian population have become refugees abroad; another quar­ter or so have been internally displaced. Syria’s social fabric has been severely dis­rupted, as many of the better educated have been driven into exile, and war profiteers have been able to acquire property and posi­tions. The government is not eager to have the bulk of the refugee population come home. Parts of the former rebel-held areas find themselves under de facto occu­pation by the security apparatus, with no guarantees for returnees or for those who have stayed during and after rebel rule. It is rather unlikely that local or external actors will be held accountable for war crimes and the up to 500,000 Syrian war deaths.

Russia and Iran

Given its dependence on Russia and Iran, the Syrian government has also de facto lost much of its sovereignty. Moscow has become the most – and Iran the second most – important powerbroker in Syria. Both will likely maintain a military pres­ence and military bases as well as a strong level of influence inside the political and security apparatus. Although they have been able to manage their differences quite successfully, their strategies for post-war Syria are not congruent: Iran sees Syria as a forward base for what Iranian strategists call their deterrence posture against Israel. To consolidate its influence, Iran seems intent to ingrain itself more deeply into the military-political-ideological and economic fabric of Syria. Russia, in contrast, is neither interested in such a form of Iranian hegemo­ny in Syria, nor in further regional esca­lation. Moscow aims at reconstituting a stable, closely allied, and internationally accepted government in Damascus. For that purpose, Russia is pursuing an ambitious agenda that includes ongoing military stabi­lization efforts, the constitutional process, military reform, local reconciliations, the return of refugees, economic reconstruction, and the prevention of a major Israeli-Iranian military confrontation in Syria. This is more than Russia can shoulder itself, and it is more than it can do with its own pre­domi­nantly military means. Moscow has therefore been asking for support from Europe and the rest of the world, particularly to finance the country’s reconstruction.

European Choices

The impending military withdrawal of the United States from Syria will also reduce Washington’s diplomatic influence over Syria-related developments. This increases the need for Europe to develop a common policy on how to deal with Syrian realities. Even before the US made the decision to leave, it was the right thing for Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the presidents of Russia and Turkey, thereby making an effort to at least avoid further international polarization over Syria. It remains to be seen whether such a format can lead to a modicum of international coordination. It is certainly important to make the attempt. The EU states and Russia do not share the same interests in Syria: Whether to support the stabilization of authoritarianism or instead seek some form of transformation toward better, more in­clusive governance at least, is not only an ideological question. It denotes both dif­ferent attitudes with regard to stability, human security, and change, as well as different time perspectives – more short-term or more long-term ones. But much of what Russia is trying to achieve in Syria today, after its victory, is not incompatible with European interests – certainly if com­pared with the Iranian agenda.

The EU and its members may not like the military outcome, but they recognize it. They are no longer demanding a transitional government or a power-sharing arrangement in Damascus. They are right to sup­port the efforts of the UN and UN aid agencies. This cannot replace a European strategy for Syria, however, which after all is a fragile state in Europe’s neighborhood. Essentially, Europe will have to decide whether to leave international responsibility for Syria to the Astana group – Russia, Iran, and Turkey – or to engage.

There are no ideal options with regard to reconstruction – but reconstruction is the one significant lever Europe has. The EU, along with international financial institutions and wealthy Arab states, cannot sim­ply provide the financial means for a Rus­sian, Iranian, and Syrian-government led reconstruction effort. Europe does not want to support a repressive regime that, after all, is responsible for the vast majority of the war dead and most of the destruction. Nor should it help to further enrich war profi­teers and regime cronies who have already come up with grandiose plans to “develop” and change the demography of devastated former rebel-held neighborhoods.

At the same time, Europe needs to realize that the Syrian people, particularly in war-damaged towns and suburbs, are in dire need of support. These populations have been harmed in multiple ways, not only through physical destruction. Many of their youth are in exile, imprisoned, or dead. They have mostly lost the support of Western and Arab donors who had sup­ported social infrastructure and services in these areas as long as they were under op­position control. The government does not prioritize support for these people but treats them as defeated enemies. A lack of recon­struction would not only leave former oppo­si­tion-held areas in unacceptable humanitarian conditions but indeed create the breed­­ing ground for a resurrected IS or “IS 2.0.”

Rights, Protection, Access: A Focused Approach toward Reconstruction

Europe should communicate to Russia, and thus to the Syrian government, that it is pre­pared to contribute toward the recon­struction in Syria in a conditioned approach based on three elements: rights, protection, and access. Or, more concretely, based on a modicum of rule of law and civil rights, including the rights of returnees and refugees to their property and freedom; protection of the most vulnerable, such as displaced persons, children, detainees, or those who have been vanquished in the war; as well as access for international organizations, NGOs, and diplomats to the people and areas in need. The more pro­gress there is with regard to these elements, the more support that could be made avail­able. Support would principally go to the most needy areas in Syria: the towns and neighborhoods most seriously damaged, such as Aleppo, Homs, and the Damascus suburbs, but also Raqqa, which has been left heavily destroyed after the US-led cam­paign to oust the IS from the city.

Support should not be channeled through government ministries but through inter­national NGOs and UN agencies, which, in turn, will work with municipalities and local NGOs, employ local people, and there­by also be able to monitor progress and make sure that disbursements actually reach people and places in need. This will lead to a slower disbursement of funds and to more small-scale projects – including low-income housing, schools, and medical infrastructure – than a process led by the government or by private developers who enjoy presidential or government patronage. But it is likely to be more effective. Neither the Syrian government nor Iran will welcome such an approach. Russia, however, which actually is demanding Euro­pean reconstruction support for Syria, would understand, and probably even appreciate it.

Does this mean ignoring the Syrian gov­ern­ment? No. As the regime seems to be there to stay, European states need official and unofficial channels of communication with it. Diplomatic relations are not a re­ward for good behavior. Most EU states and the EU itself have not cut diplomatic ties but rather reduced or withdrawn their personnel. They should now find a com­mon line on how to reestablish political contacts with Damascus, but avoid a rush toward full normalization as long as no serious domestic reconciliation and no implementation of the core elements out­lined above are in sight. A diplomatic pres­ence, however, even at lower levels, can improve access, allow for a realistic assess­ment of the situation and may, at times, help to solve humanitarian or other prob­lems. And it would demonstrate to the people in Syria that the international com­mu­nity is not indifferent to what happens in their country.