Post-2023 Election Scenarios in Turkey

Will the elections be free and fair?

Although the opposition bloc has risen in opinion polls, many analysts are worried that Erdoğan may actively manipulate or contest the results on election night. Despite Turkey having a long record of hold­ing reasonably free and fair elections since its transition to a multiparty democ­racy in 1950, centralisation of power at Erdoğan’s hands, particularly since the failed coup in 2016, has tilted the playing field against the opposition parties. Inter­national observers have already documented electoral irregularities in previous elections that placed the ruling bloc at an advantage over its rivals. In cases where the government lost the election despite such favour­able conditions, it relied on partisan deci­sions of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) to reverse the electoral outcomes, as was the case in the repeat of the 2019 Istan­bul mayoral race after the pro-government candidate’s surprising defeat.

Due to heavy government control over the bureaucracy, judiciary, and the media, the opposition parties will face a skewed playing field against Erdoğan. In such cases, a smooth transfer of power is hardly guar­anteed. For Erdoğan, resorting to outright electoral manipulation, which can be easily detected by opposition parties and outside observers, would be a risky, though not unfeasible, strategy. In contrast to authori­tarian states such as Venezuela, Russia, and Iran, Turkey lacks sizeable reserves of natu­ral commodities, whose windfall would help Erdoğan weather a post-election storm. Electoral fraud would risk further excluding Turkey from Western markets and deepen­ing the economic downturn, which would hit Erdoğan’s base severely. Turkey is already confronted with a major currency and debt crisis that was exacerbated by the COVID pandemic. Nominal GDP fell to $815 billion in 2021, from its peak of $958 billion in 2013. The economic down­turn has limited the regime’s ability to finance social assis­tance programmes for the urban poor – its voter base – and funnel resources to its busi­ness allies.

Prospects of electoral fraud

Electoral fraud might – and can – occur in Turkey, where the opposition camp in­cludes a diverse mix of political actors rang­ing from moderate Islamists and secular parties to Turkish and Kurdish nationalists. Should the opposition leaders decide to contest the election results, they can appeal to a sizeable portion of the society with strong mobilisational capacity. Some fear that, in response to opposition protests, Erdoğan could mobilise his own base, as he had done against the putchist forces during the coup attempt in 2016. Should Erdoğan adopt this strategy, the ruling bloc could tap into groups that are affiliated with the regime. The AKP has millions of party mem­bers across the country and enjoys strong ties with other popular groups, such as the Ottoman Hearths and a military contractor company (SADAT) established by retired conservative officers. SADAT, which is accused of training paramilitary groups in Libya and Syria, could be used against opposition protestors.

Erdoğan has recently taken steps to diversify Turkey’s diplomatic portfolio and improve relations with both Russia and China. The new international environment created by Russia’s attack on Ukraine has pronounced Turkey’s geopolitical impor­tance. Using this opportunity, Erdoğan has increased his cooperation with the Putin government without severing ties to the West. Putin could offer Erdoğan a discount on Russian gas and divert some funds to Turkey to evade international sanctions, which would economically strengthen the authoritarian regime in Turkey. Although the two countries have divergent interests in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars as well as the Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh con­flicts, Putin would still prefer Erdoğan over the uncertainty of a victory by the oppo­sition. This has led to some analysts openly questioning whether Putin will offer Erdo­ğan crucial financial support in the lead-up to the election.

It is not certain that Erdoğan enjoys the full support of the security apparatus, whose unquestioned loyalty would be vital to put down popular protests in the after­math of the election. The police forces, whose ranks have expanded dramatically over the past decade, are seen as a partisan body and are tightly controlled by the Minis­ter of Interior, Süleyman Soylu. Faced with allegations of close ties to organised crime groups, Soylu has a strong incentive to oppose a government turnover, which could pave the way for his prosecution. Mean­while, the military’s compliance in the event of a massive crackdown is not guaranteed. While post-coup purges have brought the armed forces under tighter civilian control, the Turkish military, as a conscription force, may refrain from clash­ing directly with citizens. Any public con­frontation involving the armed forces would highlight the importance of the positioning of the Minister of Defence and former Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar, who has retained his autonomy under the current regime.

Post-election scenarios

There are several scenarios for the post-election period. Due to the current eco­nomic downturn, there is a good chance that the ruling bloc will lose its parliamentary majority. Even some pro-government analysts have begun to openly admit the possibility that Erdoğan may win the presi­dency but face a parliament dominated by opposition parties. Under the current presidential system, the president does not need parliamentary approval to form a cabinet and could govern the country with­out strong checks from the legislature. Should Erdoğan win the presidency, he could co-opt MPs from conservative parties that are currently part of the opposition bloc to hinder the effective functioning of the parliament. Under a continued Erdoğan presidency, the two splinter parties that broke off from the AKP would run the risk of keeping their cadres intact. In the event of an opposition victory in the presidential elections, some MPs from the AKP and the MHP may likewise decide to switch sides. Under both scenarios, the parliamentary arith­metic is expected to change in the post-election period depending on who wins the presidency.

The composition of the parliament is difficult to predict based on opinion polls. The ruling People’s Alliance and the oppo­sition-led Nation Alliance are locked in a fierce electoral competition. In a close elec­tion, the number of seats allocated to these alliances would be determined by the deci­sion of alliance parties to prepare joint lists under the two main parties in the alliance – namely the CHP and İyiP – or contest the elections on their own. Another factor that will influence the parliamentary composition is the presence of other alliances that can offer viable alternatives. The pro-Kurd­ish HDP is currently locked in negotiations to establish a third alliance with several minor far-left parties such as the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP). The HDP, which gained 11.7 per cent of the vote share in the 2018 parliamentary elections, is maintaining its electoral support, according to most opin­ion polls. With the help of this leftist alliance, the HDP could thus emerge as the key party that holds the balance among the two large blocs in a hung parliament. Also, against the backdrop of rising anti-refugee sentiment, the far-right populist Victory Party (ZP) would spoil the opposition vote if it attracts support of opposition voters but fails to muster the 7 per cent necessary to cross the parliamentary threshold.

A more worrisome scenario for Erdoğan would be to lose the presidency to a candi­date endorsed by the Nation Alliance. If current opinion polls are to be trusted, Erdo­ğan is expected to lose against all three of the opposition’s potential joint candidates, namely CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıç­daroğlu, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavaş. Losing the presidency would be a huge blow for Erdoğan, who would be deprived of access to public resources to run the AKP machine. Given his frail health and advanced age, Erdoğan might not be able to muster the strength to lead his party in opposition for long. Although his party has commanded strong electoral support, even at the height of the economic crisis, its future after Erdoğan is uncertain. The ruling party has recently become a personalistic movement with very weak institutions. Although pre­dic­tions of its demise are premature, the AKP would have a difficult time keeping its base intact in opposition.

Challenges for a post-Erdoğan government

If Erdoğan is defeated in the upcoming elec­tions, his successor will face a set of severe challenges. The opposition bloc has cam­paigned on a democratisation platform that envisions a speedy return to the parliamentary system and the restoration of the rule of law. Although the details have not yet been fully formulated, the six parties have pledged to transfer the extensive powers of the presidency to the parliament. Whoever is picked as their joint candidate will be ex­pected to sign this pledge and refrain from fully exercising his or her powers, if elected.

The EU’s task ahead in a post‑Erdoğan era

The outcome of the upcoming elections will have immense importance for the future of EU-Turkey relations. In the event of an oppo­sition victory against Erdoğan, the new government will surely reset EU-Turkey rela­tions and improve Turkey’s ties with its Western allies. The new government will refrain from provoking crises with EU mem­ber states and seek to restart accession talks. In turn, the EU could play a constructive role during this transition process. Most importantly, the EU should closely monitor developments on elec­tion night to document any electoral irregularities. Should Erdoğan refuse to step down that night despite losing, strong diplomatic pressure should be exerted on Turkey by EU member states to ensure a smooth transfer of power. Accordingly, the OSCE should send Turkey a large team of election observers to raise the costs for Erdoğan if he engages in electoral fraud.

Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Turkey’s geostrategic importance has become more pronounced. With its sizeable population, Turkey could become an eco­nomic powerhouse in its region and gen­erate vast trade and investment opportunities for the EU. In many issue areas, such as trade, security, migration, and climate action, the two sides could find mutual benefits. But an improvement in bilateral relations would require goodwill on both sides. Should the opposition defeat Erdo­ğan, the new government will need politi­cal and financial support from its Western allies to undertake the colossal task of resolving the economic crisis as well as the refugee problem and restoring parliamen­tary democracy. Accordingly, the EU might improve trade volumes with Turkey by modernising the Customs Union, cultivating stronger cultural and education ties, and starting a political dialogue with various stakeholders, including municipal governments and civil society. Talks on visa liberalisation can be speeded up to increase people-to-people contacts between Turkey and the EU. Currently, Turkish citizens are being put through a humiliatingly long visa application process that costs substantial sums of money and time. And yet, rejection rates on visa applications from Turkey have increased substantially in recent months.

As Turkey’s accession process came to a halt, EU policymakers developed a rather transactional relationship with the Erdoğan administration on key policy issues, such as the 2016 EU-Turkey deal. In a post-Erdoğan era, the EU would need to make a special effort to place bilateral relations with Tur­key within a rules-based, institutional frame­work. An important cornerstone of this engagement would be the revitalisation of Turkey’s EU relations along with an update of the Customs Union agreement and/or the Association Agreement, namely the Ankara Treaty. The two sides could intensify their cooperation on matters of climate change, irregular migration, and trade. Turkey’s Customs Union Agreement, which went into effect in late 1995, needs to be modernised to address the require­ments of a digitalised economy.

The opposition’s rise to power would result in substantial improvements in certain areas of foreign policy. But the EU should also not make the mistake of assum­ing that the new government will automati­cally capitulate on Cyprus, the Eastern Medi­terranean dispute, or the refugee ques­tion. Relations between Tur­key, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus are plagued by serious disagreements over maritime boundaries and the status of Cyprus. The new government could surely reduce tensions in the region. But this reconciliation would prob­ably not produce a quick diplomatic break­through in any of these substantive areas. Therefore, the EU should encourage Turkey and Greece to hold diplomatic talks while focussing on concrete policy areas for deepen­ing cooperation in the short run.