New Political Parties and the Reconfigu­ration of Turkey’s Political Landscape

Potential of the New Parties

In Turkish politics, splinter parties usually fail to attract significant numbers of voters. Several senior figures from across the politi­cal spectrum have formed new parties with much fanfare, but they have failed to attract voters. One exception, however, is the AKP, which was formed as a splinter party from the Milli Görüs tradition in 2001 and came to office within a year of its found­ing. Arguably, the circumstances for the AKP victory were quite exceptional and hard to replicate. The AKP’s success was the result of a series of economic and gov­ernance crises that discredited all the major political parties.

One reason both DEVA and the GP were recently formed is due to increased aware­ness that Turkey is currently going through a similar governance problem, with the potential to worsen. Amidst a deteriorating economic crisis, the Syria foreign policy disaster, the huge influx of refugees, and heightened social tensions, Erdoğan’s approval rates are falling. Moreover, un­decided voters now constitute one of the largest voting blocs. Disagreements of Babacan and Davutoğlu with Erdoğan go back years, and the current formation of the new parties is closely linked to this crisis. Thus, the fate of both parties will be determined more by the performance of Erdoğan than by their own actions.

Political Baggage of the Leaders

As senior members of past AKP govern­ments, both leaders’ records will have an impact on their future. Compared to Davutoğlu, Babacan has two considerable advantages. Davutoğlu was the mastermind of Turkey’s increased involvement in the Middle East. Thus, he is largely associated with the ill-planned Syrian quagmire – 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey is a daily reminder of that failed policy. The issue is becoming a major source of public dis­con­tent, as shown in the AKP’s electoral defeat in last year’s municipal elections.

In contrast, Babacan is remembered as the steward of a successful economic pro­gram, a legacy that becomes ever more pre­cious in the current economic crisis, which he argues is due to deviation from his poli­cies. Among the array of opposition politi­cians, Babacan has the most credibility regarding governance issues.

Babacan’s second advantage over Davu­toğlu is his popularity among Kurdish voters. The AKP’s slide into ethnic Turkish nationalism and the adaptation of a secu­rity-oriented paradigm toward the Kurdish question started during Davutoğlu’s term as PM. Davutoğlu is also associated with the cycle of violence and state repression in Kurdish cities that followed the AKP’s elec­toral defeat on June 7, 2015. In contrast, Babacan was sidelined during that process and might therefore still appeal to Kurdish voters. In fact, discontented Kurdish voters of the AKP are expected to constitute the largest voting bloc and the backbone of DEVA during this phase.

Ideologue vs. Technocrat

Other factors distinguishing Babacan and Davutoğlu are their style of politics and their ideological leanings. Davutoğlu, a former academic, is more ideologically oriented than Babacan. In Davutoğlu’s worldview, Islam and conservative values con­stitute the core values. In contrast, Babacan, though he personally follows a conservative lifestyle, has a less ideological approach to politics. He has a technocratic touch and emphasizes his expertise on econo­my management as being his greatest asset as a politician. Babacan tries to con­nect with voters by focusing on the rule of law, good governance, and bread and butter issues.

These different attitudes also shape their criticisms of the AKP. Whereas Babacan criticizes the authoritarian, conspiratorial, and anti-Western turn that the AKP has taken, Davutoğlu makes a moral critique and focuses on individual corruption and increased nepotism. In a direct extension, Davutoğlu’s criticism of the AKP and Erdo­ğan is more personal. He openly criticizes Erdoğan and his immediate family, where­as Babacan shies away from such direct critiques, aiming to avoid the wrath of the government. Arguably, Davutoğlu’s per­sonal criticisms irritate Erdoğan and have prompt him to take punitive measures against Davutoğlu and his movement. The most striking example was the confiscation of the Foundation of Sciences and Arts and the Şehir University of Istanbul, lifetime achievement of Davutoğlu. These actions, in turn, increase Davutoğlu’s visibility and stature.

Babacan’s emphasis on technocratic expertise is also visible on the list of the party’s founders. There are several key bureaucrats, such as İbrahim Çanakcı, former Undersecretary of Treasury, and Birol Aydemir, former Head of the Turkish Statistical Institute. However, DEVA fell short of drawing political heavyweights. Even among former AKP dissidents, the party includes only a handful, and not the most important ones. Whereas Babacan aims to present himself as a team player, Davutoğlu’s style of politics is at the other end of the spectrum. Throughout his term as the MFA and PM, Davutoğlu performed a one man show, as no one else was signifi­cantly visible. As a prominent academic with a clear-cut worldview, Davutoğlu is known to be an overconfident person who does not listen to advice or different view­points, as he rarely doubts his own wisdom. Throughout his tenure as the MFA, he worked with a smaller than usual team of advisors, often former students of his.

Given all these features, one can say that Davutoğlu’s style of politics greatly resem­bles Erdoğan’s. He is self-centered, plays on conservative values and identity-based issues, and his style is confrontational and at times polarizing. In contrast, Babacan presents himself as an antidote to Erdoğan and the confrontational style of politics that has become his trademark. Thus, Babacan can appeal to the segments of society that are wary of Erdoğan’s fervent and polariz­ing politics. However, this also implies that Babacan would not have the rousing, elec­trifying effect on the masses that Erdoğan has – and to an extent Davutoğlu. With his non-confrontational style and his decision to avoid the cultural polarizations that domi­nate political life, Babacan will have difficulty mobilizing people. This is already evident, as Davutoğlu was able to form his party earlier and, so far, has managed to create an impression of a better organized and more energized movement.

Impact of the Presidential System

If the ideological clarity of Davutoğlu has given him a head start compared to Baba­can, the new presidential system strengthens the hand of Babacan. Its logic pushes political parties to form alliances. The more ideological outlook of Davutoğlu might create an impediment for the GP in forming alliances with the secular parties. In con­trast, DEVA is more centrist, thus more prone to form alliances. Here, DEVA seems to have made a conscious decision to not limit its voter base to AKP voters. Although both parties – along with other opposition parties – are arguing for a return to the parliamentary system, they initially need to win in the presidential system. Defeating Erdoğan would require a combination of opposition votes and split votes that Baba­can can take from the AKP. Thus, even though he does not rank among the most popular politicians in the country, in a two-person race with Erdoğan, Babacan’s poten­tial is higher than most opposition figures. Still, this requires that Ali Babacan – or the presidential candidate supported by DEVA – reach the second round. This would be impossible by solely relying on segments of the AKP base, and DEVA must also simultaneously appeal to the opposition bloc. Given that the CHP has a solid voter constituency of roughly 25 percent, DEVA either needs to attract voters from that base or manage to create an alliance or some sort of deal with the CHP. In either case, this demands ideological flexibility.

The party is clearly formed to meet that flexibility. Yet, it is walking a tightrope, as DEVA needs to find a balance that would make it attractive to both the AKP and the opposition bloc. This difficulty forces Babacan to focus on the economy and good governance and avoid divisive identity politics. He is presenting himself and his party as the new political center, and DEVA is aiming to be a catch-all party, integrating actors from different ideological leanings. This was realized in the 1980s by the Mother­land Party (ANAP) of Turgut Özal as well as in the 2000s by the AKP.

Conclusions and Challenges Ahead

Of the two challengers, Babacan has greater potential in the long run. Rather than di­rect­ly confronting Erdoğan and trying to undermine him, Babacan will wait for Erdo­ğan to undermine and discredit himself leading up to the next presidential elec­tions, scheduled for 2023. By avoiding confrontations and portraying himself as the political center, he aims to emerge as a consensus name in a post-Erdoğan Turkey. Moreover, the impact of the coronavirus crisis could mean that he may not need to wait too long, as the current crisis is push­ing the already dire economy to its limits. Although Erdoğan seems to have received an initial boost of support following the outbreak of the disease, this is more of a global pattern and it is uncertain as to how long this will last.

If Babacan overcomes his short-term challenges in mobilizing people without resorting to cultural polarizations, he could be an important player in a post-Erdoğan Turkey. This is good news for Europe. Baba­can’s emphasis on teamwork and institutions will bring stability to the rollercoaster style in current Turkish foreign policy. More­over, whereas Davutoğlu’s foreign policy line would likely follow Erdoğan’s anti-Western approach, a government that Babacan rules or has a significant role in will likely bring Turkey back to its more Western-oriented politics in the inter­national arena, which would contribute to the restoration of the rule of law and human rights at home.