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In the coming legislative period, the Federal Government and the Bundestag will need to redefine the scope of Germany’s responsibility in world politics. The potential for action of German foreign policy cannot be properly assessed without taking into consideration the new international constellations and the required changes.
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Shifts in international power, the loss of influence of Western positions, growing authoritarianism, the weakening of multilateral institutions, urgent global problems such as climate change – all of these challenges call for a realignment of German foreign policy. In doing so, it is important to adequately assess the limits of its capabilities but also the existing room for manoeuvre. This should guide its goals and priorities.
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German foreign policy is faced with increasingly intense competition for international influence and the authority to interpret norms and values. This competition takes different forms in the individual fields of foreign affairs. For this reason, Germany’s presence in international politics can only be influential if the ministries involved pool their efforts and resources.
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More room needs to be made available for forward-looking and medium-term approaches in foreign policy decision-making. In this way, it may be possible to overcome the tendency towards ad hoc decisions and to avoid predominantly reactive patterns of behaviour.
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Germany’s foreign relations must be guided by reliable partnerships and new forms of responsibility-sharing in various policy areas. How conflicting objectives are to be negotiated can only be determined through open and transparent dialogue.
Table of contents
1 Introduction. German Foreign Policy in Transition: Volatile Conditions, New Momentum
1.1 Recognising change and promoting change
1.3 What change? An attempt to determine where we stand
2 Time for Diplomacy: The Model of a New Concert of Powers As a Cue for Germany
2.1 The new concert of powers – a blueprint
2.2 Selective added value for German and European foreign policy
2.3 Impetus for Europe’s strategic autonomy
3 Germany Matters: Berlin Must Take the Lead in Creating a Europe of Global Stature
3.1 The leadership dilemma can be attenuated
3.2 Germany’s interests and EU integration are intertwined
3.3 No hierarchy between values and interests
4 German Global Health Policy. For a More Sustainable Orientation
4.2 A changing international landscape
4.4 Multilateral systemic approaches
4.6 Scientific and political monitoring in Germany
4.7 Coordination within the Federal Government
4.8 Windows of opportunity and setting the course
5 The EU on the Way to a Fiscal Union?
5.2 What has already been achieved?
5.2.1 A possible differentiation between the euro zone and the EU-27
5.2.2 The problem of joint and several liability
5.2.3 Democratic legitimacy of new fiscal instruments
5.3 What issues remain to be resolved?
5.3.1 Is a permanent stabilisation or transfer mechanism possible?
5.3.2 Financing the mechanism through common debt instruments or an EU tax?
5.3.3 What conditionalities and limits should be introduced?
5.4 Tasks for the next Federal Government
6 Advancing the EU Security Union vs Protecting the Community of Law
6.1 The development of the Security Union to date
6.2 Greater need for European crisis management and solidarity
6.3 A deepened Community of Law as a prerequisite for the Security Union
6.4 Mutual trust and the national rule of law
6.5 Priorities and recommendations for Germany
7 The Need for New Concepts to Address Conflicts in Europe’s Broader Southern Neighbourhood
7.1 Policy option 1: Diplomatic ad hoc mechanisms
7.2 Policy option 2: Military coalitions of the willing
7.3 Policy option 3: Universal criminal jurisdiction
8.1 Basic features of the “old” Bundeswehr
8.2 “Key Elements” for the future?
8.4 National command and planning
9 Maritime Choice: Indo-Pacific versus Arctic–North Atlantic Priorities
9.1 The situation in the Arctic and North Atlantic regions
9.2 The Arctic–North Atlantic region from a German perspective
9.3 Consequences for German policy
10 Difficult Relations with Moscow. German Policy towards Russia Must Be More Carefully Calibrated
10.2 Germany’s Russia policy: Partly missing the facts
10.3 Next German government: (Even) more realism needed
11 A Different Kind of “One China” Policy
11.1 A defensively oriented, value-driven foreign economic policy
11.2 Strengthen and expand international cooperation with regard to China
12 Putting Words into Action: Foreign Policy towards Africa and Latin America
12.1 Migration policy in Africa
12.2 LAC in the context of the Covid‑19 vaccine policy
12.3 Policy changes and confidence-building
13 Multilateralism and Partnership in German Foreign and Security Policy
13.3 Conclusions and recommendations for action
14 Foreign Sustainability Policy
14.1 Starting point: The German Sustainable Development Strategy 2021
15 Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Six Practical Proposals
15.1 National foreign policy dialogue platforms
15.2 European early warning networks
15.3 National Security Council in the German Bundestag
15.4 Institutional framework of the Alliance for Multilateralism
15.5 Review conference for the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
15.6 Institutionalised EU capacity-building on Asia
16 Hybrid Threats and the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy
16.1 Resilience and Security Union
16.2 The weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
16.3 The necessary reorganisation of the EEAS as a strategic intelligence unit
16.4 Germany’s contribution to the restructuring of the EEAS
17 Towards an International Policy of Democratic Resilience
17.2 Looking at variants of authoritarianism and autocracies
17.3 From external democracy promotion to an international policy of democratic resilience
18 Thinking Build Back Better on a Global Level: Strengthening Strategies from the Global South
18.1 Understanding regional recovery strategies
18.3 Build Back Better in Africa
18.4 Latin American strategies
18.5 The need for compatible regional strategies
18.5.2 Designing nearshoring fairly: Strengthening local supply chains through EU trade policy
18.5.3 Thinking globally about the energy transition: Implementing measures for a just transition
19 Integrating Climate Ambition and Energy Diplomacy in Foreign Policy
19.1 Climate ambitions and a changing energy sector
19.1.1 A coal phase-out as the prevailing global climate solution
19.1.2 Expansion of renewable energies and the importance of Europe
19.2 External relations in climate and energy: Interfaces, divergences, and partners
19.3 Options for a proactive German diplomacy
20 German and European Asylum and Migration Policy: Why a More Forward‑looking Approach Is Needed
20.1 Problems, challenges, and opportunities
20.2 Conflicting objectives and target-setting
20.3 Elements of a strategically oriented asylum and migration policy
21 Between War and Peace: How to Raise Germany’s Profile in Crisis Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa
21.1 Early prevention instead of wait and see
21.2 Acting at critical junctures
21.3 Considering “atypical” courses of conflict
21.4 Formative change needs leadership
22 Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. Germany’s European and Global Responsibility
22.1 Balancing act between normative non-proliferation policy and nuclear sharing
22.2 The credibility dilemma of nuclear first‑use
22.3 Political stability considerations and conclusions
23 A Club of Democratic Market Economies in Response to China’s Mercantilism?
23.1 Preference for economic autonomy
23.2 Consequences for Germany and the global economy
23.4 New directions in trade policy?
24 Readjusting and Refocusing Germany’s European Policy
24.1 Courage to change shape in European policy despite pressure to adapt
24.2 The EU is not Europe – EU enlargement does not happen on its own
24.3 Strengthening intergovernmental cooperation within the EU‑27
24.4 Reshaping EU relations with EFTA and the United Kingdom
24.5 Dealing with the EU neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Eastern Europe)
25 Rethinking and Redirecting: Germany’s Security Policy Needs Mental and Material Empowerment
25.1 Why German security policy needs to be enhanced
25.2 An 11-point agenda to enhance German security policy
26 The European Security Order in a Geopolitical World
26.1 Dwindling influence in a changed geopolitical environment
26.2 What power politics, with what partners?
26.3 Flexibilisation internally, readjustment externally
27 German Policy Towards the United States: More Self-Confidence and More Independence Needed
27.1 No return to the status quo ante
27.2 More initiative and self-confidence in cooperation
27.3 Cooperation where possible, independence where necessary
27.4 Reduce political, military, and economic dependencies
28 Partners or Rivals? Dealing with Authoritarian Powers
28.1 What makes states partners, what makes them rivals?
29 Don’t Drop the Ball: German Indo‑Pacific Policy
29.1 European coordination and cooperation
29.2 Partners in the Indo-Pacific
Introduction. German Foreign Policy in Transition: Volatile Conditions, New Momentum
Günther Maihold, Stefan Mair, Melanie Müller, Judith Vorrath, and Christian Wagner
The hasty withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan and the rapid takeover by the Taliban in Kabul have placed some fundamental questions about German foreign policy on the agenda with renewed urgency. In what form – and with what goals – should “the West” become involved in such contexts in the future? What degree of responsibility does the German government want to assume? How will Germany prepare itself for military operations abroad in the future? Last but not least, it is also a question of how preventive action can identify escalating crises at an earlier stage and help avoid violent conflicts or tackle them more effectively.
Beyond these currently debated aspects, the developments in Afghanistan and the discussions on the lessons learnt from this international engagement illustrate just how vital questions about global and regional regulatory frameworks are for Germany. The newly elected Federal Government and Bundestag will have to produce quick and far-reaching answers to a large number of future issues.
Frameworks and contexts are never static, but recent changes seem to be more profound and accelerated, not least due to the impacts of the Corona pandemic. In the last decade, volatility has affected many formats of foreign policy action that were previously considered stable. This applies – even after the end of the Trump presidency – to the willingness to act multilaterally, to the commitment to global public goods, as well as to the relationship between preventive action and the recovery from damages resulting from crises and conflicts. It can thus be assumed that the West will lose recognition and that the influence of its values and normative ideas will (further) wane. This affects not only the leading power – the United States (US) – but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, the European Union (EU), and Germany.
Just how far-reaching the resulting shifts at the global level will be is difficult to assess at present. However, Germany must prepare itself for the possibility of considerable upheavals in international politics that will affect both partners and competitors. At the same time, these developments imply the need, but also the opportunity, to create new momentum in the European and international frameworks.
The main coordinates of Germany’s engagement in world politics have to be examined and possibly redefined if the country wishes to position itself for the future. Many international parameters are changing, indicating the need for a new perspective and a reorientation of Germany’s own policies. Under these conditions, the elections of 2021 have ushered in a new phase of German foreign policy, but not only from Berlin’s perspective.1 With the end of the “Merkel era”, international expectations of Germany’s leadership role will also be reordered.
The traditional pillars of German foreign policy are its integration into European affairs and the transatlantic partnership. These basic elements have been subjected to discernible stress tests in recent years, as more populist governments have come to power and domestic political polarisation has increased in many European states as well. In various regions of the world, an erosion of democratic processes and growing authoritarianism – in part transnationally linked – can be observed. At the international level, the strategic, increasingly systemic rivalry between China and the US is undermining multilateral relations. At the same time, new actors seeking regional spheres of influence are emerging in the Global South. Western states can no longer easily assume that they are central players in other world regions or multilateral fora. The EU is confronted with the task of dealing with intensifying rivalries between great and regional powers, therefore it is obliged to define its own strategic position and, in the process, forge alliances with new partners.2 Human rights violations and breaches of international agreements are putting an increased strain on the multilateral system, to which German and European leaders are committed.
These upheavals in the international system are happening in addition to global challenges such as man-made climate change and digitalisation, but also hybrid threats from cyberspace and the growing competition for resources. Transnational migration movements and disruptions in international trade require strategic decisions to be taken within national and European frameworks. With the erosion of old regional orders and the emergence of new actors seeking to establish their own concepts of “order”, the task of regulating conflicts in a sustainable manner is becoming even more complex. Asia’s economic dynamism and the rise of China have set new reference points for foreign policy. Moreover, the Corona pandemic is accelerating many developments – not only because it increases social tensions and inequality within and between regions, but also because it draws political attention away from other issues.
Changes in domestic political preferences and interests can also be observed. Thus, the German elections of 2021 provide an opportunity to set priority issues and meet the challenges of the international environment through an assessment of the current situation while questioning the underlying identity of foreign policy and developing options for action. This is the approach of this collaborative volume, which revolves around the central question: What reorientation and what course should the future German government set in order to shape the central challenges of its foreign relations, exploit existing opportunities, and generate new momentum from internal shifts around the elections?3
The contributions of this volume deal with policy fields, issue areas, and actors for which a change of perspective is necessary or desirable in order to reposition Germany in the international arena as well as in its domestic and foreign policy realm. To start with, the focus is on change in the international environment and the resulting challenges. But it is also about the question of how to classify various topics and fields of action whose priorities have shifted. Finally, the normative debates on German foreign policy positions that follow from new conceptual approaches and party-political preferences are being taken up while their contexts of justification are also evaluated. This process includes, in particular, defining the principles, values, and rules of multilateralism for the future.
Recognising change and promoting change
The following considerations focus on change, which does not necessarily devaluate previous approaches, instruments, and concepts. Rather, the aim is to sharpen the focus on those policy areas where changes and shifts in priorities can add value for Germany in international politics. The growing pressure to act in certain areas has to be considered, but options for shaping policy to create new opportunities pro-actively are equally important. The contributions explore relevant changes, room for manoeuvre, and entry points for German foreign policy. In doing so, the authors at times adopt controversial perspectives – also among themselves. We deliberately avoid comprehensively outlining the problems and look beyond the usual categories of foreign policy issues and points of reference. The focus is on those options where Germany can change its position by taking active steps to utilise existing opportunities or create new ones.
This also requires a review of the country’s own instruments of action, from diplomacy and the Bundeswehr to development cooperation and stabilisation engagement. The organisation of the foreign policy decision-making process, which suffers from the fact that participation formats fray and the competencies of various departments and agencies overlap, is also reviewed. The claim that Germany’s foreign policy should be characterised by consistency in different arenas and vis-à-vis partners that can also act as competitors (keyword: coherence) represents an ongoing challenge. In this respect, converging individual fields of action and achieving compatibility are key for an effective foreign policy presence, not least in international “club governance” formats such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the G7, and the G20.
The focus on a foreign policy “in transition” is not intended to underestimate the importance of continuity and stable guidelines for action. Especially in moments of crisis, demands for a change in course or strategy are part of the standard repertoire of political debates. In this volume, a change in foreign policy behaviour is understood as a change in the realm of possibilities for foreign policy.4 This is associated with the notion of unused or new options for action that can be implemented, provided that the relevant competencies and the necessary sources of power are available. The scope and size of this realm of possibilities are determined by external factors, the country’s own formative power, and the will to use it. In addition, it varies according to subject area and policy field; how it is shaped depends on foreign policy style, which can range from a willingness for pro-active engagement to reactive behaviour and negligence. The very fact that the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy are blurring shifts the content and organisational allocation of foreign policy measures. At the same time, strategic considerations from the field of domestic policy – for example on energy or migration issues – are spilling over into foreign policy positions.
In any case, change should be understood as a gradual process. It refers to a spectrum of possible transitions of German foreign policy, ranging from selective course corrections to a change of track or direction. In other words, it is not always a matter of a fundamental departure from established positions, but in part about other priorities or adjustments that are applied to foreign policy from outside or inside and can be grasped in different dimensions in terms of their scope and depth.
Categories of change
The contributions to this volume are structured along four categories of change that determine foreign policy action and at the same time offer starting points for future course-setting.
Adaptation: Upheavals, geopolitical rivalries, and shifts in power that take place in the international sphere can expand or restrict a country’s scope for action. In any case, this sphere exerts pressure on national actors to adapt. The strength and speed of such changes create new conditions for foreign policy that are often underestimated. This concerns the rise of China as well as the geopolitical ambitions of other states to control strategic resources.
Identity-related change: If the national self-image, the negotiation of domestic political interests and consensus, or social power configurations change, this can influence concepts of foreign policy roles and lead to the repositioning of a country in international politics. This also includes adjustments in the prioritisation of policy areas, new bases of legitimacy for foreign policy action (e.g. through movements such as “Fridays for Future”), and obligations under international agreements (e.g. the United Nations sustainability agenda) – factors, in other words, that have an impact on established orders of preference or patterns of action and that close, or can close, credibility gaps.
Formative change: Foreign policy action can be transformed by a change in the ability and willingness to shape international affairs. If nothing else, routine patterns are then overcome. A new interest in an international presence, the proactive pursuit of opportunities to exert influence, the desire to gain status or avoid losing it – such factors can inspire more active participation in shaping international policy, as can be seen in the cases of South Korea and Turkey and their regional and global ambitions. This can also be reflected in the preference for certain foreign policy patterns, for example in terms of policy style.
Partner-related change: The scope and impact of foreign policy change are strongly conditioned by the selection of partners and support groups. It is true that alliance-building, integration processes, and socialisation effects in international organisations can initiate and deepen convergence processes in intergovernmental behaviour. But such developments are difficult to assess if, for example, China appears to Germany simultaneously as a partner, a competitor, and a rival.5 Similar unpredictability arises in regard to relations with the US. Partner constellations shape the normative and operative articulation of interests and the order of preferences for foreign policy action. They can strengthen or weaken the changes in foreign policy behaviour bilaterally and in a group context as well as specifically in certain policy fields.
These four categories overlap and can be found as part of different configurations in almost all policy fields. The way in which the following contributions are assigned follows the authors’ assessments of which forms of change are paramount in their topic in each case – without, however, neglecting the other dimensions.
What change? An attempt to determine where we stand
With its 28 contributions, this volume covers a broad spectrum of the fields of action that illustrate the wide scope of changes that have been identified or are considered necessary. Within the framework of this assessment of the current situation, medium- and long-term perspectives are identified that can affect the basic approach to foreign policy action or also make visible the short-term necessities for a change in course.6 Understood as a stocktaking, the aim is to question assumptions, analyses, and approaches in relevant areas in order to identify warning signs as well as shifts in the framework for action and to point out the potential for change in German foreign policy going forward.
With this aim in mind, the contributions each derive conclusions and recommendations that set their own subject-related emphases. Nevertheless, some basic principles for Germany’s foreign policy under a new Federal Government can be outlined below:
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The architecture of foreign policy action must be changed in order to better accommodate medium- and long-term perspectives. Particularly in view of fundamental technological dynamics and massive power shifts in the international arena, foreign policy should be positioned more strongly beyond the public’s attention threshold and crisis-driven logics. In this context, it is necessary to view foreign policy as a long-term task, to pursue it with foresight, and to provide the necessary latitude and resources for this kind of understanding of the policy process. This may require a change in foreign policy style.
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Such an arrangement should allow thematic and geographical priorities to be set in view of limited resources for action. It is important to realistically assess one’s own capabilities in day-to-day activities and to avoid the claim of “universal responsibility”. German’s and Europe’s unilateral efforts are less and less successful – even taking a pioneering role does not usually lead to enthusiastic followers. The focus should therefore be on the goal of creating medium-term convergences of interest in certain thematic areas with various partners, thus enabling a new strategic orientation. However, this presupposes that one’s own position is clearly articulated and convincingly represented.
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There needs to be a new pace in German foreign policy in some areas. This means overcoming existing path dependencies, taking a fresh look at relevant groups of actors – such as those from the “Global South”, the “NGO world”, and the growing number of diaspora groups – and freeing foreign policy from its previous restrictiveness, for example an overly limited focus of migration policy. The demands for recognition and the participatory interests of other states must also be taken up outside the European context if lasting partnerships are to be forged. New configurations, such as in Russian-Chinese relations, must be given greater attention. Dealing with major powers is a contested issue in German domestic politics, as it is linked to legitimising interests for the positioning of parties and politicians.
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Germany must clearly decide in which thematic areas and with which partners it wishes to vigorously deploy its political capital. In the interest of greater effectiveness, it is crucial that resources for action are consolidated. Consistent interaction and the pooling of efforts and resources between the various ministries are critical factors.
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Without a reorientation of foreign policy roles, it will not be possible to implement change. The outlined categories for change and the focal points set by the following contributions provide guidance on this. Existing conflicts of goals should be discussed publicly, the costs and benefits of certain decisions made visible, and the corresponding trade-offs made transparent. At the same time, this allows for the balancing of different policy fields and the creation of a broader foundation for the necessary decisions. Such orientation of action is also advisable when dealing with partners.
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Existing framework conditions must always be made clear, such as the requirement for compliance with the goals of the sustainability agenda, which calls for a clear orientation towards a global policy of public goods, and thus sets milestones that form a fundamental guideline for Germany’s international presence. The interlinking of climate protection, energy, technology, and industrial policy is just one example of how the various policy fields must be considered together and integrated into a common concept for action. The importance of the sustainability framework has so far been barely visible in foreign policy; it should be more firmly anchored in political practice.
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The partnerships that are essential to German foreign policy carry with them opportunities but also dependencies. Therefore, comprehensive expectation management, both internally and externally, is imperative. Particularly in the NATO alliance as well as in the European context, this is of central importance. The orientation towards the important Franco-German partnership must not lead to feelings of exclusion among other EU members. “Neighbourhood” will no longer be a regional concept; Germany needs “global” neighbours in various regions of the world if it is to make its contribution towards solving the problems of the future. It will not only be a matter of achieving arrangements for burden-sharing, it will also be of great importance to develop a new set of instruments for sharing responsibility and shaping the future together.
Foreign policy course corrections are not only necessary because domestic power relations are changing; they are indispensable in view of shifts in world politics. In this context, it is important to prioritise what kind of change needs specific reactions, should be shaped, and/or actively promoted. The dimensions outlined in this volume make it clear that change can be encouraged, provoked, and generated in different ways. If German foreign policy is to be well positioned for the future, it must not only deal with this in a deliberate manner, but also create new momentum itself.
Adaptation
Time for Diplomacy: The Model of a New Concert of Powers As a Cue for Germany
Barbara Lippert
US policy advisors Richard N. Haass and Charles Kupchan argue for the creation of a “new concert of powers” as a counter-model to the liberal-democratic multilateralism to which the European Union (EU) and Germany continue to subscribe in international organisations and alliances.1 Because their potential to ensure security and prosperity as well as preserve the world’s natural resources is dwindling, according to the two authors, a global concert of powers “offers the best vehicle for managing a world no longer dominated by the United States and the West”.2 It would be short-sighted to immediately dismiss these considerations as a 19th century perspective. Although Germany should not endorse such a concert politically as an alternative model of order, it could find impetus for the revival of a rules-based international order from the ideas being played out.
The new concert of powers – a blueprint
Disillusioned supporters of multilateralism will share the central premise of the “new concert of powers”: The international order is no longer underpinned by the Pax Americana. The latter is giving way to a multipolar order whose bipolar core consists of the rivals the United States (US) and China. These two – together with the EU, India, Japan, and Russia – are to form the propagated concert. These six powers account for about 70 per cent of global gross domestic product and military spending, and 65 per cent of carbon dioxide emissions.3 In the concert model, they maintain close, informal, and flexible cooperation with the goal and purpose of ensuring stability in terms of the territorial status quo. “The Six” mutually exclude interference in internal affairs and respect any form of government for the sake of political inclusion. The concert sees itself as the control centre of international politics and is in fact superordinate to the United Nations (UN) and groups such as the G7. The corresponding authority and legitimacy are derived from the ability of the Six to find common answers to global challenges. These include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of terrorist networks, concerns about global health, and the impacts of climate change. Top diplomats do the groundwork; they hold the fort at a headquarters, such as in Geneva or Singapore, where a secretariat is installed. Close communication between them, aimed at consensus, is intended to prevent one member from surprising the others with unilateral actions. Where agreement cannot be reached, however, even the concert of powers remains powerless. Its members can even act unilaterally if they see that their vital national interests are being threatened. A member is only expelled if it repeatedly violates the interests of another in an aggressive manner.
Selective added value for German and European foreign policy
The UN Security Council comes closest to the concert of powers in that both are ideologically diverse, as are the five permanent members of the Council. What could be the incentive for the latter – especially Russia, China, and the US – to engage in a superordinate concert? From Washington’s perspective, the format could help contain the aggressively revisionist powers of China and Russia, and especially counter Beijing’s hegemonic claims. Unlike the Congress of Vienna4 in 1815 and the victorious Allies of 1945, however, the new concert of powers cannot establish a post-war European or global order. It must take the international scene as it is – and moreover, as it is to remain – in territorial terms. The concert is also unlikely to give Russia, for instance, a free hand in its neighbourhood. Rather, it would pragmatically seek to prevent military conflict resolution as well as unilateral interventions that would affect the territorial status quo. Early warning and diplomatic defusing would therefore be called for. From Beijing’s and Moscow’s points of view, the rejection of regime-change strategies would appear particularly attractive. Being able to rely on each other would be the core promise of solidarity among the Six.
Membership in the concert of powers would mean an upgraded status for the EU, but it would not necessarily enable it to pursue its foreign policy interests more effectively. In terms of dealing with the Eastern neighbourhood, for example, the model would not offer any discernible advantages. Rather, with the Paris Charter and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU has more tangible levers at its disposal to support its neighbours in their right to freely choose alliances and political orders. Russia, however, regards the former Soviet republics as its exclusive sphere of influence, whereas Ukraine and Georgia are turning politically and economically more towards the West. The EU (like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO) would therefore not have to defer its offers of political association and economic integration as well as military cooperation with post-Soviet countries, but it would have to actively defend them at the level of the concert of powers. The latter would probably pay relatively little attention to the European security order on its own. Issues of nuclear strategic stability would be negotiated directly between the US and Russia and, if possible, China. Through the NATO-Russia Council, the Europeans have a channel for dialogue on matters of security policy that is currently on hold. The EU has postponed the resumption of meetings with Russia at the highest level. But sooner or later it will have to return to these exchanges and coordinate bilaterally with the US on security cooperation with countries in the Eastern Partnership and on a possible enlargement of NATO. The concert of powers would only provide added value if the US and the EU were able to communicate these goals more transparently, and potentially in a more confidence-building manner vis-à-vis Moscow than through previous bilateral channels.
From Germany’s point of view, such a superstructure is not convincing for other reasons as well. For even if the concert of powers could agree on targets and measures in climate policy, for example, it would remain dependent on the established international and regional organisations to translate what has been agreed upon into rules and regulations and on the participating countries to implement them in practice. Not only institutionally, but also in terms of international legal norms and concrete international agreements, the concert would be based on what already exists, without remedying its shortcomings. Ad hoc fora such as the Normandy and Astana formats would therefore continue to be necessary and permissible, especially since the concert would not strive for a strong profile in conflict management, particularly in view of the large number of internal conflicts and internationalised civil wars. Rather, the Six would likely see their task as developing a common understanding of what constitutes politically unacceptable external interventions that must be avoided. Thus, at best, the concert of powers would intervene to de-escalate before a conflict erupts. Yet, it could turn out to be just as dysfunctional and inert as the Security Council is at present, thus reflecting the state of the UN’s collective security system.
The concert of powers would be more similar to the G7 than to the Security Council regarding its expected agenda. However, this is likely to be less progressive in terms of content if China, Russia, and India, for example, merely continue their previous positions in international fora and there is no willingness to invest in public goods. With Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (plus Presidents of the Council and the Commission of the EU), the Europeans already have an excellent platform for shaping international rules and regulations. The German government should work to make the post-Trump G7 more ambitious in setting the pace for international policy and more effective in implementing its agenda. This is more modest than the ambition of a concert of powers acting as a global steering group. However, the G7 should not be reduced to a bulwark of democracy – in the spirit of the Summit for Democracy,5 a D‑10,6 or the New Atlantic Charter7 – and positioned accordingly. For a future German government should not cement blocs; rather, it should also be able to explicitly include in dialogue formats and problem-solving those countries that do not meet the criteria of liberal democracy.
Even if its summits are professionally prepared, the G7 has not gone the way of institutionalisation. In contrast, the concert of powers would create a new super-bureaucracy. As with the G7, however, the key to effectiveness would lie in an informal and personal exchange among leaders and also high-level officials who take time for reflection, consultation, and problem-solving. German foreign policy shares the interest in seeing trust and predictability of action emerge across power-political and ideological divides. This could be an added value of the concert model – especially for issues that require a global accord across major powers.
Impetus for Europe’s strategic autonomy
The EU would be one of six powers playing in the concert. This would be in line with the new role of an EU that wants to “learn the language of power”8 and initiate a geopolitical turn so as not to become a pawn in power games.9 However, the EU is a Union of states that, unlike the five (semi-)presidential or dictatorial systems of government, can only arrive at collective positions through lengthy consultation procedures. According to current logic, the President of the European Council would have to represent the EU in the concert. Of course, Germany, especially after the Merkel era, could decide at the next opportunity in May 2022 in favour of a strong President of the European Council who would not only have a representative effect, but could also seek personal union with the Commission President during the next treaty revision. What remains as an immediate lesson, though, is that the EU has considerable problems in bringing its weight to bear in any format internationally. In addition to extending qualified majority voting to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the German government should advocate for greater continuity and centralisation of the decision-making apparatus. The proposal for an EU Security Council, in which permanent and rotating members would determine foreign policy, is a step in this direction of making the EU more capable of taking decisions.10 At the same time, these innovations should provide institutional incentives for processes of political convergence in the EU.
From the EU’s point of view, the positive side of a concert of powers would be that it would enable (peaceful) coexistence in the systemic conflict between the US and the liberal-democratic West on the one side, and China on the other. Furthermore, a group of six countries could mitigate the emerging G2 structure of world politics and strive for a dynamic modus vivendi. But in its current stature, the EU – like Japan and India, and in the medium term Russia – would only be among the B players in the concert. In this respect, the model is perhaps a beneficial reminder from the realm of realism, more consistently urging the pursuit of the project of strategic autonomy for the EU. The fact that the three empires of the US, China, and Russia – each in their own way – have considerable potential for domestic destabilisation, which threatens to spill over into the international order, is only one more argument for Europe’s self-assertion.
Indeed, the EU could also advocate a progressive agenda of global governance and cooperation in the concert of powers. But that would probably result in not more, but rather less leverage than within the established multilateral organisations. In these, it exerts its influence through cooperation with middle powers and regional organisations, as well as through one permanent and up to three elected seats on the UN Security Council. In addition, the Europeans would have to find greater elasticity, similar to the E3 (France, Germany, Italy) or other flexible formats of the willing, so that internal divergences can be bridged and external assertiveness can be increased. In a reformist context, this could be called a “soft utopia”.11
Outlook
The proposal for a new concert of powers is not least a plea for more and better diplomacy. This should be agile and realistic, focusing on achievable goals and relevant actors. Germany and Europe should use the momentum of the Biden administration to make the different approaches to multilateralism work effectively in the spirit of the rules-based international order from within a strong EU. The concert model provides a future German government with its cue to pursue this agenda while adhering to certain key guidelines: the intensification of dialogue at the highest level between the major global and regional powers in various formats; the strengthening of regional organisations with regard to shaping those policy regimes on which the survival of humankind depends; measures and offers for confidence-building; early warnings to avoid military conflicts as well as their internationalisation and expansion through the interference of external actors. The UN, the EU, and NATO remain fundamental as a framework for action for Germany. However, the German government should give priority to making the G7 more effective and make greater use of the OSCE again for Euro-Atlantic security.
Germany Matters: Berlin Must Take the Lead in Creating a Europe of Global Stature
Eckhard Lübkemeier
Foreign policy is the attempt of a state to influence its external environment so as to create conditions conducive to furthering its interests and values. To do this, a state needs power – defined as the ability to achieve one’s own objectives.1 Interests, values, and power are constitutive of foreign policy. In post-war Germany, politicians, the media, and academics have struggled to embrace this triad in its entirety. The normative consensus has been that foreign policy had to be values-based. However, while in practice national interests have been guiding German foreign policy from the beginning, rhetorically this was rarely acknowledged and instead camouflaged as “responsibility policy”.2
This has changed. In German political and public discourse, national interests are now regarded as a legitimate guiding principle. The term “power”, however, continues to be used hesitantly. The main reason has to do with history: Germany’s thirst for power was a key trigger of the First World War and led Nazi Germany to provoke the Second World War.
In essence, power is a means to an end, which in foreign policy consists of interests and values. The greater the means and the more skilfully they are employed, the greater the chance of asserting one’s own interests and values. This leads to a fourth category relevant to German foreign policy: leadership.
Leadership implies being able and willing to inspire others to contribute to achieving collective goals. Only those who have the requisite power can lead. Exercising leadership is not something that can happen – and does not have to happen – in an exclusively cooperative manner, that is, based on the willing consent of all. Leadership is called for precisely when divergent interests have to be brought towards a common denominator, which may require the robust use of power.
Leadership is essential to enable a group of actors with heterogeneous interests to act together. Still, it has been a term that is shunned by German policymakers.
But whether one likes it or not, Germany is a leading power in the European Union (EU) – nothing less, but also nothing more. Germany cannot be Europe’s hegemon: Its sources of power are insufficient for such a role; Germany is bound by a web of interdependencies to its EU partners, and it is part of an EU construction that curtails national power through supranational competences (trade, competition, currency, borders).3
Nevertheless, within the EU’s power hierarchy, Germany occupies a top position. Such an edge counts because, despite its partially supranational structure, the EU remains a union of nation-states. Accordingly, power differentials carry weight, making Germany an EU heavyweight. This entails a leadership role. Germany cannot be Europe’s sole leader because, unlike the United States (US), it does not have superior power, and the notion of German leadership is historically contaminated. Yet, what it can and must do is to be a co-leader within and for Europe.4
This role should be embraced unabashedly. Germany’s responsibility to provide leadership for the European project is widely accepted, and there is no doubt that exercising it can be a burden. However, leadership also opens up opportunities because the more powerful can influence their environment more than others.
The leadership dilemma can be attenuated
In any case, Germany cannot make itself smaller than it is, nor how others see it. This creates a dilemma: Germany is called upon to lead, but it is supposed to perform this role in a way that suits its partners. However, making everyone happy each and every time is an art no one can master – even more so when it includes Germany. German policy cannot be guided purely by altruism. The country has interests of its own that do not need to coincide with those of its European partners; if the government were to ignore them, it would risk being voted out of office.
Smart leadership can mitigate this dilemma in a way that is compatible with sustaining the cooperation of Germany’s partners. Any such effort has to start with not being oblivious to history. Human memory fades slowly (if at all), and how history is interpreted and instrumentalised by others is beyond Germany’s control. German foreign policy would do well to continue taking this into account.5
Secondly, it is essential not to define one’s own interests in a narrow and selfish manner. Leadership is not based solely on the ability to persuade others to behave in a certain way by employing greater power in a gratifying or sanctioning way. It is easier to lead when those involved trust each other. Hence, it is crucial that leadership be used for the common good. Surely, there will often be disputes about what is in the best interests of all and who should contribute how much. But leading powers need to care for the common good more than others: They possess greater resources, and only with these can they lead on the basis of trust.
Germany has shown wise leadership by agreeing to cushion the pandemic-related economic slump with additional EU funding of €750 billion. To this end, a large amount of EU – that is, jointly funded – debt will be incurred, which is something all German governments had rejected hitherto.
Germany did not abandon its long-standing opposition because it benefits most from the EU. This frequently employed argument in Germany and elsewhere is mistaken. The EU is of immense value, economically and politically, to all member states alike.
The preamble to Germany’s constitution states that EU membership is part of its foreign policy canon (“inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe”), and Germany’s firm integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU has not undermined but, instead, enhanced its sovereignty.
Yet, above all else, what binds the most powerful country in the centre of Europe to the EU are its values and interests.
Germany’s interests and EU integration are intertwined
Germany’s core foreign policy interests are peace, security, welfare, and participation. Peace is a state of affairs among nations in which there is no risk of war because conflicts are settled exclusively and reliably for all involved without the use or threat of force. If such a risk exists, there is a security problem. Therefore, security policy aims at providing protection against threatened or applied violence, if necessary by employing violent means. Welfare is a form of prosperity that is sustainable because it is climate- and resource-friendly. Participation means having a say by being able to influence one’s environment in such a way that it offers favourable conditions for peace, security, and welfare.
Germany’s core interests are linked to European integration. The EU is a community of peace: If it existed in isolation from the rest of the world, EU members could abolish their armed forces because they trust the EU to settle their conflicts without resorting to violence. Strong security as a safeguard against violent aggressors still requires US backing through NATO. But Europe as a whole and European NATO allies will have to lessen their dependence on US protection: Doubts about Washington’s reliability that were fomented by the Trump administration persist. The Biden administration is also calling for more European self-reliance. Fundamentally, European sovereignty will remain precarious unless it is underpinned by defence self-sufficiency.
A high and sustainable level of welfare is closely linked to the EU: The single market becomes even more important in the face of transatlantic disagreements and increased tensions with China; climate and resource protection require a green transformation of the European economy, and only the single market confers sufficient regulatory power to set and enforce competition and tax as well as social and environmental standards.
Europe’s regulatory clout points to participation, which is the fourth element of core national interest. Germany is a heavyweight in Europe, but not in the world. It can only achieve parity with the US and China or with non-state actors such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook together with its European partners. Europe’s collective power offers opportunities for global self-assertion that Germany would not have on its own.
This is not just about self-assertion vis-à-vis other global players or in the midst of an American-Chinese rivalry. A powerful Europe can also act as a “force for good”: promoting just and sustainable development, climate and resource protection, as well as human rights and a rules-based international order.
Only a strong and stable EU can be a global power. This requires that its democratic nature remain intact. Consequently, the next German government should work to stop the erosion of the rule of law in EU member states, including sanctioning persistent violations by resorting to the new conditionality clause agreed for the EU budget and the pandemic recovery funds. The monetary union lacks a fully-fledged banking and capital market union that would allow the euro to become a veritable alternative to the US dollar. As with the euro, the objective should not be autarky but an interdependence that is based on overall parity, that is, a relationship in which dependencies and vulnerabilities are balanced in a way that provides power parity. This implies that 5G networks must be equipped with European technology and that Europe should become autonomous in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum and cloud computing, semiconductors, and batteries. More than elsewhere, Germany will have to bite the bullet regarding security and defence policy. Germany’s advocacy for a European defence union as well as its NATO obligations require an increase in defence spending. Equally important is that political leaders will have to convince a leery German electorate of the continued need for nuclear deterrence and, more generally, a foreign policy fortified by military means.
No hierarchy between values and interests
In foreign policy, too, interests and values do not have to be conflicting precepts. Standing up for values can be smart interest-based policy because violence, disenfranchisement, and injustice can lead to wars and conflicts, cause economic hardship, and result in the depletion of natural resources – with repercussions such as mass migration that can endanger Germany’s security and welfare.
Yet, values and principles can be neither a clear nor a sole guide. The Corona pandemic hits poor countries disproportionately harder than rich ones such as Germany. Is it selfish or legitimate for countries that invented the vaccines to give priority to vaccinating their own people? Climate protection requires the cooperation of China, the world’s largest CO2 emitter. However, both as a market and a global supplier, China has turned itself into a pillar of the world economy, and it has become a global power in geopolitical terms. How far can Beijing’s dictatorial leadership be sanctioned for political repression without risking its willingness to cooperate, which is essential for climate protection, the world economy, and international order? Condemned by Germany, Putin’s Russia is threatening Ukraine and occupying parts of the country. To shore up Ukraine’s defence capabilities, the US has provided military equipment. Since such supplies help deter Moscow, would it not be appropriate for Germany to participate in reinforcing Kiev’s military capabilities? What should or must Germany and Europe do to protect themselves from unchecked migration? To this end, they concluded an agreement with an Erdoğan-led regime that harasses its internal opponents. Migration control may require cooperation with unscrupulous forces in transit and origin regions. In such cases – as Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the German Parliament, has admitted – there is “no morally clean way out”.6
But even if there were, values cannot be the sole compass for foreign policy. Interests count just as much. In foreign policy, the electoral mandate is to advance a country’s core interests of peace, security, and welfare by cooperating with others and, when necessary, asserting them against others. No democratically constituted government can ignore the imperative of national interests. Especially since there is no hierarchy between values and interests. Is peace a value or “merely” an interest? As Federal Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt elevated the cold peace of non-war between the nuclear-armed East-West antagonists to a “fundamental value”.7
Schmidt’s speech offers a paradigmatic discourse on how to deal with conflicting objectives. To this end, he employs the example of the “Polish crisis”, that is, the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 by a communist regime shaken by an independent trade union movement called Solidarność. Schmidt’s government had been accused of not reacting forcefully to the quashing of Solidarność. In response, Schmidt argued that values cannot be the sole guideline of government policy, but that “rational deliberation can lead to very different goals and paths”.8
More than before, Germany – as it is being called upon to play a leading role in Europe – will have to face up to moral dilemmas and trade-offs of interests. It will have to do so keeping in mind the lingering effects of history while also remaining aware that, as a democratic anchor of stability in the centre of Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany has become a trusted European neighbour. Today’s Germany should be confident that it has drawn the right lessons of history, in particular that peace, security, and welfare are collective goods shared with neighbours and partners. That Germany matters is all at once: an obligation, a privilege, and a call to action.
German Global Health Policy. For a More Sustainable Orientation
Susan Bergner and Maike Voss
The Covid-19 pandemic has put Germany’s global health policy to the test. As a major player in this field, the new German government must prove itself in a changed landscape of actors. In times of crisis, it can no longer rely unconditionally on traditional partners such as the United States (US), but at the same time it should build on the achievements made under Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. Germany’s existing instruments and international cooperation mechanisms are not sufficient to cope with future health crises. Global health needs to be prioritised in German foreign policy with strategic foresight. As a contribution to a sustainably shaped health policy, key long-term issues must be addressed and blockades within Germany’s own ranks dismantled.
The Covid-19 pandemic has shown that all areas of life and politics are dependent on the proper functioning of health systems and on evidence-based political decisions. It has also become clear that international cooperation in global health policy to date is not sufficiently prepared for crises of this dimension. Existing instruments such as international health regulations are neither being sufficiently implemented nor complied with. There is also a lack of funding as well as internationally coordinated strategic foresight, which should already be initiated at the Federal Government level. After all, the weaker the coordination for the joint management of a pandemic, the longer the pandemic will last.
Germany’s new indecision
The high level of international recognition that Germany enjoys in the field of global health is largely due to Angela Merkel’s successful agenda-setting. At the same time, Germany and the European Union (EU) face growing competition in this field from China and, in some cases, conflicting interests from its ally the US. But the future German government – with its G7 presidency in 2022 and discussions about a possible European Health Union – has an opportunity to take up Germany’s international responsibility and initiate the necessary changes.
First, however, Germany’s indecisiveness should be recognised and addressed. For example, the German government has been instrumental in strengthening the World Health Organization (WHO) and new instruments for pandemic response. At the same time, however, it is blocking proposals in the World Trade Organization to temporarily waive patents on vaccines and other health goods, threatening to further delay the response to and management of Covid-19. Moreover, such blockades weaken multilateralism – which is an inherent concern of German foreign policy.
A changing international landscape
The EU has become a central channel for German global health policy and should remain so. While cooperation with France, among others, has been strengthened in this framework – as a Franco-German non-paper1 on the WHO reform process shows – the US has proven to be a difficult partner. Although the Biden administration is bringing new momentum to global health, the American claim to leadership is colliding with Europe’s increased commitment. This is exemplified by discussions on a new pandemic treaty – an idea put forward by Chile that is highly supported by EU Council President Charles Michel and WHO Director General Dr Tedros, but which has so far been delayed by Washington and Beijing.
China and the African Union (AU) are other health actors that have expanded their activities in the course of the pandemic. China’s bilateral cooperation, especially on the African continent, is particularly interesting when viewed against the backdrop of geopolitical competition. The AU, in turn, is increasingly focused on achieving more strategic autonomy for Africa, including in its own health economy.
Thus, Germany must balance different roles in the field of global health. The German government finds itself in the position to form alliances as a partner – as with the AU – and represent common interests. But it also aims at setting its own agenda as a counterweight to countries such as China and the US, via the EU.
Future topics
For a more sustainable German global health policy engagement, key issues need to be addressed strategically. One of these is “deep prevention”2 or, thinking even more broadly, “deep transformation”, an approach aimed at comprehensive and equitable preparedness for health crises of all kinds – not just infectious outbreaks. This also includes climate change impacts on health. Critical building blocks for future action are the strengthening of resilient health systems and value-led policies that promote universal health coverage for all people in all places.
Similarly, it is important to consider and expand the financing of global health and new models for health financing in development cooperation in order to create starting points for a robust global health policy. This also serves the purpose of strengthening trust in existing institutions such as WHO.
In the future, greater attention should be paid to the interconnections between global health and other policy issues such as climate, security, and geopolitics. However, Germany currently lacks the proactive inter-ministerial mechanisms that could highlight interlinkages of policy areas and connect global health with national health policies.
Multilateral systemic approaches
There are several options for advancing systemic approaches in the multilateral arena. First, components to strengthen health systems should be added to existing health initiatives and included in new initiatives from the outset. As an international response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the ACT-A (Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator) multi-actor platform emerged, with the purpose of developing and distributing diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics. Later in the process, a pillar for strengthening health systems was also created. The aim here must not be merely to distribute medical goods from the Global North to the Global South and then to the local level; rather, what is needed is a comprehensive and systemic development that includes local institutions which are capable of acting in the health sector and producing medical goods on their own.
Second, the ongoing reform processes in WHO could be used to design a financing instrument for health systems instead of focusing only on the containment of selected infectious diseases. So far, there is no international instrument with robust financing that aims to build strong public health structures in the long term. One of the lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic is that this needs to be improved.
Third, an international pandemic treaty is being discussed within WHO, following the aforementioned initiative of the European Council. It remains to be clarified where the added value for crisis management lies, whether a new legal instrument solves fundamental problems of global health governance, and who benefits in detail from a new treaty. At the same time, a binding international pandemic treaty could also have the potential to create synergies, link actors, and enable regional policies to be coordinated with the global level in health crises. Moreover, it could give WHO a central role in managing future pandemics.
Institutional conditions
Global health starts at home. In order to live up to this motto, the first step should be to implement the sustainable development agenda in Germany’s own health system and to link national and global health policy. In this way, a new “Strategy for Public Health in Germany”3 could have a positive impact on the ability to act and the legitimacy of German global health policy in Europe as well as on the international stage. The second step is to create robust institutional structures for global health in Germany that draw on expertise from the German public health sector.
Germany has been reactive in its national and global health policies in the face of the challenges posed by the pandemic and has only implemented institutional changes peu à peu. At the same time, however, Berlin showed itself as being willing to assume more responsibility for global cooperation and reform processes. This broadened self-perception was reflected above all in the German government’s newly formulated strategy for global health.4
Global health has been institutionally strengthened in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), which established a subdivision for Global Health, Pandemic Prevention and One Health. The Federal Foreign Office is becoming increasingly involved at the interface of global health and geopolitics; it is now increasingly concerned about the impact of health crises on multilateralism. The Federal Ministry of Health, in turn, is establishing a Global Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence5 in Berlin together with WHO.
Although these structural changes are welcome, more coordinated action is needed to enable Germany to prove itself in a changed landscape of actors.
Scientific and political monitoring in Germany
A Federal Government Advisory Council on Global Health would strengthen Germany’s evidence-led policy. Global health could also be given even greater consideration in the revision and implementation of Germany’s sustainability strategy.6 The Subcommittee on Global Health in the German Parliament has become increasingly important during the pandemic. It should therefore be retained in the new legislative period, strengthened in terms of personnel, and expanded in its range of tasks. In this way, the subcommittee could also support the government by using its control function in measuring the progress of the global health strategy7 and assist in their implementation. This requires a more concrete action plan by Germany’s state actors, including a review mechanism for implementing and monitoring the progress of the strategy.
In addition, existing structures can be used. The German Alliance for Global Health Research, which was established in 2020,8 could play a stronger advisory role in the political arena and be requested by the latter. In addition, greater use could be made of scientific expertise from other policy areas. For example, the next report of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) will deal with planetary health, that is, the link between the environment, animal health, and human health.
At the same time, there is a need to expand education and training in order to promote young talents for global health in Germany and internationally. Germany could try to strategically send more personnel to international health organisations and support German scientists in WHO working groups and collaboration centres in Germany.
Coordination within the Federal Government
Finally, the new Federal Government must try to ensure that international processes in this policy field are coordinated more effectively by the ministries and agencies, because the responsibilities for relevant health organisations are fragmented between individual ministries. One remedy could be to expand existing formats, such as departmental exchanges or jour fixe meetings of state secretaries. On the other hand, new structures should be established to ensure intersectoral communication and cooperation, irrespective of the commitment of individual persons. Possible approaches would also be to set up a rotation system for staff between ministries based on the Japanese example, to appoint a Minister of State for Global Health in the Chancellery, or to entrust State Secretaries with inter-ministerial tasks. Inter-ministerial training and simulations can also promote a comprehensive and strategic orientation of global health policy.
Windows of opportunity and setting the course
Germany has the opportunity to contribute towards shaping the processes and structures of global health policy at the European and global levels. This would ensure that the world community is better prepared for health crises in the future and can respond to them in a more coordinated manner while counteracting inequalities. Germany can draw on the important work carried out under Chancellor Merkel, but at the same time it must reduce the degree of indecision in its own policies.
In the short term, the most urgent issue is the equitable distribution of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics worldwide, also in view of the geopolitical implications involved. Germany must acknowledge the criticisms from the Global South that it has touted Covid-19 vaccines as a global public good9 but ultimately failed to share them globally.
In the long term, key challenges need to be addressed. Production capacities for vaccines and medical products must be increased worldwide and distributed in a less centralised manner; in addition, systemic approaches are needed to implement comprehensive pandemic prevention and reduce global inequalities.
At the European level, discussions on a European Health Union are underway. At the same time, the debates on WHO reform processes and a pandemic treaty will remain on the agenda at the international level. This will enable Germany to take advantage of opportunities that arise in the short term in order to set a sustainable long-term course in global health.
The EU on the Way to a Fiscal Union?
Peter Becker
The agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 and on an additional European stimulus budget under the heading “NextGenerationEU” (NGEU) was certainly a milestone in the European response to the Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath. The most important innovation was that it is now possible for the European Union (EU) itself to borrow on the financial markets on an unprecedented scale in order to finance the stimulus budget. These are far-reaching measures that would have been almost impossible, indeed unthinkable, to implement before the pandemic crisis.
This agreement undoubtedly also marked a significant change in German European policy – although the German government had insisted on setting some restrictive key points regarding the form and scope of the stimulus budget as well as its one-off nature. The fiscal package was not to become a permanent fiscal policy instrument of European policy, but was to be a one-time solution and used only to finance the NGEU.
Now, however – irrespective of whether the new instrument have yet to be successfully implemented – a debate has begun on whether the NGEU should be transformed and developed into a permanent European fiscal equalisation system in a European fiscal union. In such a scenario, it would no longer be a question of whether the EU should be allowed to go into common debt, but only of when and under what conditions this debt option could be used.
The response of the next German government will be decisive in determining whether and how the efforts to achieve lasting fiscal stabilisation in the EU are implemented and in which direction the European integration process will develop in the medium term. Berlin will have to broker a compromise solution within the EU. On the one hand, there are the hard-line positions of the austerity-minded and frugal northern Europeans (especially the Netherlands), who are committed to credibly and effectively strengthening fiscal discipline in all member states. On the other hand, there are calls from the southern European crisis and debtor states (especially Italy) for more solidarity and risk-sharing among EU members. However, one point seems to be clear: A return to the status quo ante of the pre-Corona era will not be an option.
What is being discussed?
The EU – not least in response to the debt crisis in the euro zone a decade ago – has created both new crisis and emergency instruments and elements of prevention, which now need to be further expanded and supplemented.
A European crisis fund was created with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in order to be able to step in when individual member states face liquidity problems, and the European Central Bank has widely expanded its monetary policy instruments. Additional and important elements of a comprehensive solution are still in difficult negotiations or implementation processes, such as the European Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. With the programme “Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE)”, the European Union created an instrument to support the member states’ unemployment systems, and thus to cushion the unemployment effects of the pandemic crisis.
What are needed now and currently being discussed under the heading of a European fiscal union are instruments for fiscal stabilisation and balancing the economic cycles in European economies. The aim should be to cushion the pro-cyclical effects of monetary policy without having a permanent redistribution mechanism with large financial resources and without further worsening the debt sustainability of the already heavily indebted member states. In addition, binding conditionalities and limits for such stabilisation instruments are being discussed, as is the question of how they could be given greater democratic legitimacy.
What has already been achieved?
The compromise on the NGEU answered some fundamental questions that had dominated the debates for a decade on a fiscal capacity or a specific budget for the euro zone. The following issues were settled.
1. A possible differentiation between the euro zone and the EU-27
The NGEU as a temporary stimulus budget has been linked to the European budget; financing and disbursement will thus take place within the framework of the EU-27. Therefore, it will no longer be necessary to consider creating separate budgets or financial instruments for the benefit of the euro zone only or outside the European treaties. The new instruments are signs and symbols of European solidarity that should apply to the entire EU and not be limited to the euro zone.
2. The problem of joint and several liability
The debates on the necessity and limits of European solidarity have so far been linked to German fears of “joint and several liability” in connection with euro or Corona bonds. In a negative scenario of default or refusal to pay by individual debtor states, Germany feared that it would have to stand in for their debt instruments. Linking the common debts to the European budget, and thus to the EU, has largely eliminated this concern: The EU uses its own triple-A rating for low-interest debt.1
3. Democratic legitimacy of new fiscal instruments
Transfers between member states, even if they are only of a temporary nature, always have distributive effects and are therefore among the most politically sensitive and conflict-prone issues in the EU. For this same reason they require a high degree of democratic legitimacy. An important preliminary decision on this issue was taken with the procedure for adopting the NGEU: All member states jointly agreed on the new instrument, which was confirmed by the European Parliament with an absolute majority of its members, and likewise by the national parliaments.
This form of democratic legitimacy involving both parliamentary levels will certainly be the yardstick when a decision has to be taken on a further instrument to cushion symmetrical shocks. A decision in which the national parliaments are left out will no longer be possible.
What issues remain to be resolved?
Developing these instruments further, additional preconditions must be created in order to be able to stabilise the EU and the European economies fiscally. Three fundamental questions remain to be clarified.
1. Is a permanent stabilisation or transfer mechanism possible?
It is true that economic convergence is one of the EU’s explicit goals, and it already has instruments of redistribution at its disposal. Nevertheless, there are major reservations about any form of permanent and unconditional redistribution. Experience with Germany’s regional fiscal equalization system (Länderfinanzausgleich) has shown that, even within relatively homogeneous nation-states, such transfer mechanisms are at best grudgingly accepted. In the case of permanent cross-border transfers within the EU, much greater resistance would have to be expected. Unlimited and uncommitted financial transfers are therefore inconceivable in the EU.
In order to avoid harmful redistribution conflicts as far as possible, the decision-making procedure and the trigger criteria should be laid down in advance for a European stabilisation mechanism to be created, that is, independently of the individual case or crisis in question. The procedure and criteria should be transparent and clear enough that they can also be democratically legitimised ex ante. It should be specified in advance as to which indicators (such as an economic slump of several percentage points or rapidly rising unemployment as a result of a natural disaster, pandemic, or global crisis) are to be used by which EU institution (probably the European Commission) and according to which procedure (ideally after consulting the European Parliament and after a unanimous decision by the Council). At the same time, key points for the settlement of Community debt should be defined. This concerns, for example, a separate source of financing for the EU budget that would have to be used for this purpose, or a commitment to a repayment schedule.
2. Financing the mechanism through common debt instruments or an EU tax?
In the event of a symmetric shock – that is if, as during the Corona pandemic, all member states slide into the crisis together – a central stabilisation mechanism can be counterproductive. This is the case if the need for financial support is so great that it cannot be met by the common monetary policy alone. In such a scenario, the receipt of transfers may have a stabilising effect in the case of a member state that is hit harder than average; but in the case of the member state that is only relatively better off and may also be in a severe recession in absolute terms, the transfers may have procyclical, that is, crisis-exacerbating, consequences. Such a mechanism could therefore have a stabilising effect on the one hand, but a destabilising effect on the other.
What is needed hence is a central mechanism with a stabilising effect across economic cycles or crises and compensation over time. The transfer payments should not only take the form of (low-interest) loans, which would further increase the indebtedness of the affected member states and put their debt sustainability to a further test. Instead, non-repayable grants should also be possible in principle. The relationship between loans and grants would have to be renegotiated separately for each individual crisis and for each member state concerned.
However, such a mechanism would require the possibility of central borrowing. This would mean either a facility outside the treaties, as in the case of the ESM, which would be endowed with capital from the member states, or the issue of common debt instruments – the much-discussed Eurobonds – or community debt of the EU, as in the case of the NGEU. The redemption of the common or community debt instruments would then take place through long-term payments by the member states or via the common budget.
An alternative would be to give the EU its own right to tax. In this way, it could generate its own revenues – independently of the transfers from the member states – which could be used to slowly reduce the community debt. In the long term, this source of own resources could be used to finance an EU stabilisation fund for a European economic policy – a kind of European cyclical compensation reserve for a counter-cyclical economic policy of the EU.
3. What conditionalities and limits should be introduced?
If unconditional financial transfers are not conceivable in the EU, the basic conditions for a disbursement of European funds must be agreed in advance in a binding and transparent manner. This applies to, among other things, the transfer volume and a possible time limit on payment flows. It would be possible to set a legal upper limit on the volume, for example, of 0.5 per cent of the member states’ gross national income. Equally necessary would be binding specifications on the tasks and objectives to be served by the payments. European transfers should not be used to pay off old debts; rather, as with the NGEU, they should be used for the benefit of common European goals – in other words, they should create European added value. They should also be linked to the common economic and employment objectives to which all member states have committed themselves within the framework of the European Semester. This would undoubtedly include the implementation of medium- and long-term structural reforms to increase their competitiveness. Such reforms would also limit the volume of European transfers required. Finally, clear ultimate ratio rules should be agreed in advance, that is, stipulations on which cases and under which conditions European solidarity and stabilisation aid may no longer be granted. This would lead to the possibility of a sovereign insolvency mechanism or a European procedure for an orderly debt restructuring.
Tasks for the next Federal Government
The next Federal Government and the parties supporting it must find their own answers and compromises on these issues and then define initial positions. The interests of the new Federal Government should be formulated openly and transparently. It will then be necessary to campaign for corresponding definitions, both in German domestic politics and in the EU, and to seek partners, especially for the conditionalities to be agreed. This is because further deepening of European integration will make it necessary to adapt the European treaties, which will require a consensus in the EU and broad support in German politics. Actual negotiations at the European level should, however, only begin once a comprehensive analysis of the NGEU that has just been created is available. Only then will it be possible to see to what extent the EU can make effective and sustainable use of the new instruments.
Whether this is ultimately referred to as a European fiscal union, an economic union, a stability union, or a stabilising economic instrument may be important for political symbolism and may also be a sign of party-political assertiveness. For the further development of the EU, however, the choice of term is secondary.
Advancing the EU Security Union vs Protecting the Community of Law
Raphael Bossong
The European Union (EU) is ever more important for addressing a broad range of internal security challenges such as border management, the fight against terrorism and crime, cybersecurity, and aspects of civil protection. Although the primary responsibility for internal security remains at the national level, member states rely on close cross-border cooperation and support from the EU level.
Germany in particular – as the largest central European state with the greatest number of internal borders and widely integrated value chains – has an essential interest in maintaining the Schengen zone and safeguarding the internal market. Germany’s exposed position underpins its demand to better control “secondary migration” from countries at the EU’s external borders; likewise Germany’s political leadership and operational contribution are crucial in the field of police cooperation and for the steady expansion of Europol.
In view of the experiences of the last five years, the EU Security Union should be strengthened such that swift and authoritative decisions can be taken, more resources can be mobilised, and reliable solidarity can be provided in crises. One building block for such an improved European capacity to act are genuine EU forces for providing internal security tasks. At the same time, the controversy surrounding the operational deployment of the Frontex border guards highlights that the EU has to improve its mechanisms for safeguarding fundamental rights. It is even more pressing to preserve mutual trust in national criminal justice systems, as some member states have eroded the separation of powers. Consequently, Germany must weigh two things against each other: on the one hand, deepening cooperation on security issues, and on the other, defending the community of law.
The development of the Security Union to date
Until 2015, the EU’s internal security policy was primarily concerned with facilitating the mutual recognition of asylum, migration, and criminal law as well as policing instruments. Today, the focus is placed on addressing technological and societal dynamics that are inadequately regulated or not regulated at all in many member states. Current examples are new legal obligations to delete suspected terrorist content online1 or complex negotiations on how electronic evidence should be collected and shared across borders.2 The EU can add particular value when new security policy issues interact with its core competences in the internal market, for example in the fight against money laundering.
The second pillar of EU internal security cooperation is the exchange and analysis of information. To this end, EU member states and EU internal security agencies operate a large number of joint databases for (border) police purposes as3 well as networks for the horizontal exchange of information. In the next two years,4 comprehensive reforms should be implemented to ensure seamless biometric checks on persons and the networking of all EU data sets.5
Thus, the EU has already made considerable progress towards a “Security Union”. The goal is an increasingly broad and more operationally oriented EU security policy that addresses citizens’ expectations.
Greater need for European crisis management and solidarity
The smouldering refugee crisis and the Corona pandemic have shown, however, that the EU lacks resilience, solidarity, and the capacity to act together. Improvised crisis management measures have repeatedly led to subsequent integration. The most recent example is the stepwise creation of a new Health Union. But the lesson that Europe often only advances through crises is not a historical law. The still missing “European solution” for the distribution of asylum seekers underlines this critical point.
European solidarity should be thought of in a thematically open way, since new kinds of crises can arise at any time. However, the solidarity clause in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)6 has only been used cautiously. According to this clause, “all [...] available means” could be mobilised for mutual assistance in emergencies. So far, the procedure for implementing this clause is the “Integrated EU Mechanism for Political Response to Crises”,7 a political coordination process led by national ambassadors in Brussels. This mechanism has gained considerable substance during the pandemic and has been complemented recently by an expansion of the EU civil protection mechanism.8 Compared to the EU’s financial efforts to deal with the pandemic, however, it is clear that far greater reforms are conceivable and may become necessary.
A fundamental question for the future of the Security Union is the development of independent EU security forces. These could cushion crises, demonstrate Europe’s ability to act, and underpin trust between the member states. The tip of the spear is Frontex, which should recruit 3,000 new EU border guards – with executive powers and weapons – by 2027.9 These new forces should be deployed, among other places, at pressure points of the EU’s external borders. National border guards that are seconded from the member states to the EU will continue to form the clear majority of Frontex forces;10 at the same time, the member state where joint Frontex operations take place always retains ultimate command and legal responsibility on the ground.
Despite these limitations, the recruitment of EU border guards raises fundamental questions. Should the EU eventually take over elements of the state’s monopoly on the use of force? If the new Frontex border guards add substantial value over the coming years, they will serve as a precedent for other EU agencies and areas of responsibility – for example, for Europol, the EU Agency for Asylum, and joint civil protection operations.
A deepened Community of Law as a prerequisite for the Security Union
Such a paradigm shift would move the EU in the direction of genuine statehood. Yet, this long-term development also brings the protection of fundamental rights to the fore. The relationship between freedom and security, which must be constantly negotiated in all liberal democracies, has not yet been fully spelt out at the European level. The credible allegations that Frontex is covering up11 – or may even be involved in – the unlawful pushback of asylum seekers underlines the need for truly effective legal and political control over the emerging EU security executive.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding with the Treaty of Lisbon and clearly points beyond a mere economic community. It commits the EU to a comprehensive liberal understanding of the rule of law. The practical consequences have only become apparent in recent years. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) – with reference to various European fundamental rights, especially data protection – now plays a central role in security issues, sometimes in sharp contrast with the political decisions being made at both the European and national levels.12 The ECJ now plays a central role in adjudicating the proportionality of security issues with regard to various European fundamental rights. Especially in the field of data protection, the court has repeatedly clashed with European as well as national policymakers.
Another crucial step is pending. In the coming years, the ECJ will have to decide highly sensitive cases dealing with operational actions of EU internal security agencies and the direct accountability of the EU for human rights violations.13 This mainly revolves around the treatment of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood. All EU institutions and agencies must comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The member states, for their part, are bound by it within the scope of EU law, and also by the European Convention on Human Rights. Failure to comply with these obligations – for example at the EU’s external borders – cannot be justified by simply referring to emergency situations and the primacy of member states’ competence for national security.
Basically, it needs to be clarified how EU law stands up in exceptional situations. The EU, like its members, must explain more clearly when and to what extent restrictions on fundamental rights are justified and proportionate. Legal responsibility must no longer be blurred between member states and EU actors.
Mutual trust and the national rule of law
Even more pressing is the dispute over the independence of the judiciary in some member states. The ECJ and the EU Commission are criticising national judicial reforms and the erosion of the separation of powers in Poland and Hungary in increasingly harsh tones, while these two countries seem ready to openly reject the primacy of EU law.
Beyond the widespread discussion about restricting EU funding in light of deficits in the rule of law, this dispute has potentially serious implications for European cooperation on internal security and migration matters. National judges in several north-western European states are increasingly making cross-border cooperation in these fields conditional.14 Already since the early 2010s, there have been systematic problems with transferring irregular migrants and asylum seekers to other member states that cannot or will not provide adequate accommodation and humane treatment. The fundamental rejection or disregard of European asylum law in some Central European countries deepens this dilemma.
Meanwhile, disputes over Polish judicial reforms are undermining the European Arrest Warrant – and the related principle of mutual trust between EU member states in their respective national criminal justice systems. So far, the ECJ has ruled that refusing the extradition of a wanted person or a prisoner to another member state can only be justified after a thorough examination of the individual case, for instance if there are reasonable doubts about a fair trial. If the member states drift further apart in terms of the rule of law, such selective reservations could become systemic. Poland and Hungary could be decoupled from cross-border cooperation in other areas of internal security. The recent scandal surrounding the alleged use of the aggressive surveillance software program Pegasus against Hungarian journalists15 can be seen as a serious violation of European fundamental and data protection law.
Priorities and recommendations for Germany
Germany faces contradictory demands: On the one hand, it should strengthen the crisis response capabilities and operational dimensions of the Security Union, and on the other hand, it should preserve the EU legal community and mutual trust in the rule of law. In case of doubt, in order to protect the national constitutional order as well as the existing level of European integration, priority should be given to respecting fundamental rights and the principles of the rule of law.
Nevertheless, Germany should advance the Security Union in some fields. The next political milestone is the French EU presidency in spring 2022, during which a reform of the Schengen regime could be agreed. Strengthened mutual supervisory mechanisms to build trust between the member states, new legal provisions for health-related checks, and improved technical measures for effective border management should allow a return to complete freedom of movement for individuals. Germany should take the first step, if necessary, and lift all remaining internal border controls. Negotiations on the European Migration and Asylum Package16 should be considered as a separate process. Finally, Germany should actively work towards implementing the latest reform of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism – both at the level of Community resources and at the domestic level – to ensure closer European connectivity.
The Need for New Concepts to Address Conflicts in Europe’s Broader Southern Neighbourhood
The current conflicts in Europe’s broader Southern neighbourhood reveal a deep crisis of regional orders amid an emerging multipolarity. Russia and a growing number of regional powers are increasingly willing to intervene in conflict hotspots from Syria to Libya, from the Caucasus to the Horn of Africa and the Central African Republic (CAR). They are responding to the partial retreat of the American hegemon while also actively pushing back on the influence of the United States (US) and Europe. The US and European countries are often drawn into the competitions between regional powers or into local struggles and thereby become conflict actors themselves. In the United Nations (UN) Security Council and at the European Union (EU) level, the new multipolarity has led to decision-making blockages.
Conventional German approaches to conflict management are no longer able to cope with the erosion of the old orders. German participation in UN and EU missions, for example, dates back to a time when the US and Europe still exercised far greater influence in Europe’s broader neighbourhood and the UN Security Council was less polarised. In the new disorder, UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions are increasingly out of the question, and this even applies to fact-finding missions. Where the Security Council continues to deploy such missions, their effectiveness in increasingly complex conflicts is often even more limited than in the past – the UN mission in CAR, for example, hardly ensures the protection of civilians while maintaining problematic relations with Russian private military companies. EU missions are increasingly being designed in a non-political manner due to the conflicting interests of member states and are failing to meet the new, more antagonistic conditions. This applies, for example, to the EU naval mission Operation IRINI, which has not even begun to fulfil its mandate of enforcing the UN arms embargo imposed on Libya.
In conflict mediation, traditional formats that bring together local parties are often no longer appropriate. Russia and regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates play increasingly dominant roles in these conflicts, often covertly and with recourse to mercenaries and local militias. The ineffectiveness of established forums for conflict management has been prompting local parties and regional powers to use ad hoc formats. Although these contain the conflicts, they can also stand in the way of lasting resolutions. For example, the Geneva Syria talks, under the aegis of the UN Special Envoy, have been undermined by the Astana format initiated by Russia (in cooperation with Turkey and Iran). Finally, interventions by regional powers that are not guided by principles of international law, as well as polarisation in the UN Security Council, today place much tighter constraints on international criminal justice than was the case in the 2000s.
Effective conflict transformation in the broader Southern neighbourhood is in Germany’s own interest in order to avert negative repercussions and provide a convincing alternative to the offers of illiberal actors. Mediation, peacekeeping, and ceasefire monitoring can only be ensured by impartial and credible actors. A more consistent approach is also needed to address the issue of impunity of the conflict actors, which is an obstacle to lasting peace. The new challenges of complex conflicts require policy changes. Three approaches to diplomacy, defence, and criminal justice could help promote German interests in this policy area. However, they also entail dilemmas and costs.
Policy option 1: Diplomatic ad hoc mechanisms
With the transition to a multipolar order, the need for diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution is growing. Given the ineffectiveness of established multilateral formats, regional cooperation forums and ad hoc diplomatic mechanisms have been gaining in prominence.
Recent German experience provides insights into the costs and benefits of such mechanisms. In 2020, for example, Germany established the so-called Munich format with France, Jordan, and Egypt, which advocated a two-state solution for Israel/Palestine. Even if this quartet was not the decisive actor, it contributed to pushing Israel to abandon its annexation plans, which were encouraged by the Trump administration. Once those plans were off the table in the autumn of 2020, however, the forum was unable to generate momentum, not least because there was no consensus among the four on how to proceed. In the Libyan conflict, the German government has been supporting UN mediation efforts through the Berlin Process. However, the understandable intention to limit the group of participants to the most important external actors in Libya has led to tensions in Germany’s relations with Greece and Morocco. This is a fundamental problem with ad hoc diplomatic formats. Most importantly, the Berlin Process on Libya shows that such formats depend on the willingness of leading states to invest political capital. In the Berlin Process, Germany counted on states’ commitments to respect the UN arms embargo on Libya and withdraw from the country. Neither Germany nor its partners seriously attempted to apply pressure through public blaming and shaming or sanctions to ensure compliance with these commitments. The result was that, despite the Berlin conferences on Libya, the level of intervention increased and there was no withdrawal.
Cooperation forums can also exacerbate conflicts. In the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, for example, Egypt, Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel, and other Mediterranean countries cooperate on energy policy with the support of the US and the EU, but they de facto exclude Turkey. This has exacerbated the degree of polarisation in the eastern Mediterranean region instead of reducing it.
Ad hoc formats have the advantage that they can act relatively quickly. In this respect, they are well suited for dealing with acute crises. To be successful, however, these formats need clear goals, an inclusive group of participants, and the will of the actors to invest political capital with the aim of enforcing agreements – which also entails costs, such as creating tensions in relations with uncooperative states. Moreover, ad hoc formats can contribute to the erosion of multilateral institutions. They should therefore involve regional organisations such as the African Union or seek the support of the UN General Assembly and/or the Security Council. In this way, they could be gradually embedded in a multilateral framework.
Policy option 2: Military coalitions of the willing
In view of decision-making blockages and disagreements in the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the EU, Germany’s close allies have increasingly turned to coalitions of the willing in recent years. Their goals are diverse: The anti-IS coalition fights the so-called Islamic State (IS) and trains local security forces; the European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz serves to protect civilian shipping; the French-led Takuba mission trains and mentors special forces in the Sahel to fight jihadists. Germany is generally sceptical of coalitions of the willing and, when asked, usually refers allies to a provision in Article 24 of its constitution, according to which foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr are only permissible within the framework of a system of mutual collective security. However, participation in the anti-IS coalition shows that there is political leeway in the interpretation of constitutional norms.
Coalitions of the willing tend to intervene in particularly difficult conflict contexts. This is because missions that are internationally uncontroversial and low-risk are likely to continue within the established multilateral framework. Under current circumstances, coalitions of individual states could also be more effective than UN or EU missions in peacekeeping or peace enforcement. At the same time, the troops involved would be exposed to greater dangers. Coalitions of the willing are also better suited for projecting the power of individual states against competing regional and middle powers. However, they thereby risk contributing to the further decline of the rules-based international order. A minimum requirement for any German participation should therefore be that such interventions are firmly anchored in international law, for example by being based on the principle of the responsibility to protect.
Any German government is likely to consider participating in coalitions of the willing only in exceptional cases. For such missions undoubtedly harbour greater potential for domestic political controversy than the deployment of soldiers in UN and EU missions. But this, in turn, also provides an opportunity for more purposeful action. While the Bundestag usually approves and prolongs missions within the UN and EU frameworks without intensive debate, a more in-depth discussion of the goals and benefits of the mission would be necessary for participation in coalitions of the willing. Such an approach could also enable Germany to exert more influence on objectives, strategies, and the selection of partners. However, because they are exceptional in nature for German policy, coalitions of the willing are ultimately not a sufficient approach for future conflict management.
Policy option 3: Universal criminal jurisdiction
Civil wars in the broader Southern neighbourhood are unlikely to give way to lasting peace if human rights violations and war crimes are not dealt with by the actors involved. There is a need to deter potential criminals, provide victims of violence and their families with a minimum of justice and recognition, and create a basis for societal reconciliation. In most cases, however, transitional justice measures comparable to the truth commissions of South Africa, Peru, and Morocco are unlikely because the dominant parties in a conflict have no interest in coming to terms with the past. In such cases, the international community can contribute to investigation of and accountability for crimes. One feature of internationalised conflicts, however, is that prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) or international special tribunals is often impossible because permanent members of the UN Security Council are involved. Therefore, the only option is for national courts to deal with the situation in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Germany could take a pioneering role in several respects: first, by consistently supporting the prosecution of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity by the ICC wherever it has the mandate; second, by encouraging trials under the principle of universal jurisdiction in national courts (in Germany and other EU member states where this is possible); third, by supporting court-proof documentation of war crimes by civil society and international organisations and by expanding the capacities of its own law enforcement agencies; and fourth, by promoting non-judicial approaches to transitional justice, such as truth commissions or the facilitation of local reconciliation processes, which can also contribute to peaceful coexistence, even in authoritarian contexts.
Such a pioneering role would correspond both to Germany’s interest for lasting stability in its broader neighbourhood and its interest in strengthening a rules-based multilateral order. It would entail a greater emphasis on criminal justice, and thus a reallocation of resources. Criminal prosecutions, especially in complex conflicts, are anything but “low-hanging fruit” that can be readily reaped. Rather, they involve a host of dilemmas. These include the fact that, in the short term, prosecutions can put a strain on cooperation with conflict actors, and that they are usually limited to the crimes of local actors, whereas the crimes of international actors go unpunished.
Germany can only credibly act as a pioneer if it consistently fulfils this role. This implies that criminal prosecutions do not stop with the nationals of friendly states (see, for example, the ICC investigation into suspected war crimes in the Palestinian territories), nor should they be discontinued for reasons of cost or limited to direct perpetrators for reasons of political expediency or due to threats, while those politically responsible are not prosecuted (see, for example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon).
If negative repercussions from conflicts in the broader Southern neighbourhood are to be avoided, Germany must, in its own interest, contribute more effectively than in the past to dealing with these conflicts. To this end, it should adapt its toolbox to increasingly complex challenges. Ad hoc diplomatic mechanisms, military coalitions of the willing, and criminal justice can help make conflict management more effective in the short, medium, and long term – but only if the unintended side effects are taken into account and mitigated from the outset.
The Key Elements Paper on the Bundeswehr of the Future: Necessary Adaptations to Security Policy Challenges
Florian Schöne
Violence and the threat of violence to enforce interests is once again a political reality in Europe. The annexation of Crimea, the Russian military’s deployment near the border with Ukraine, and propaganda videos of new weapons systems provide evidence of this development. In Syria, with Russia’s help, a brutal war is being waged against the population, also with the calculation of using the refugee movement migrating towards Europe to destabilise the European Union.1 Meanwhile, China’s influence is growing far beyond Asia. Russian and Chinese actions are similar, and cooperation between the two countries is becoming closer. Violent extremism is spreading in Africa. Under the impact of these events and trends, Germany is once again focusing more on national and collective defence, but the boundaries with international crisis management are becoming increasingly blurred.
The Federal Republic can hardly solve these problems on its own, but its restraint in threatening the use of force as well as the application of hard power does not appear to be expedient either. When it comes to settling conflicts, German foreign policy still relies too much on the United States (US) in particular. Washington’s focus on Asia makes it necessary for the Europeans to contain the violence in their own neighbourhood and areas of interest – be it Ukraine, Syria, Libya, or Mali. Former US President Donald Trump’s scepticism about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), displayed in word and deed, has shown Europe that US security guarantees should not be taken for granted. Germany must therefore also become more capable of acting militarily and be able to lead the way in military conflict management more independently. This requires integrated armed forces with their own strategic and operational planning at the national level. It is in the interests of the Federal Republic to develop the Bundeswehr along these lines if it wants to strengthen and continue to shape alliances such as NATO and, to some extent, the EU. Conducting its own strategic and operational planning and integrating it into alliance systems strengthens its own position. Largely independent forces should therefore be the goal of adaptation efforts, as they would strengthen the alliances and can also be deployed in ad hoc coalitions.
In May 2021, the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) published a Key Elements paper on this subject.2 This paper takes the first steps in this direction. However, in order to be able to continue on this path, some well-trodden paths will have to be left behind.
Basic features of the “old” Bundeswehr
Since its founding, the Bundeswehr has been in an unusual situation. As militarily necessary as the German armed forces were in the early phases of the Cold War, their creation was controversial and subject to compromise. They were hemmed in – from outside as well as from within.3 Strategic and operational control was ceded to NATO. In short, there was no institutionalised, autonomous strategic thinking in the German armed forces, and it had no strategic means (of deployment) of its own. Even after its reorientation in 2010/2011 and the subsequent focus on crisis management – meaning deployments abroad – the Bundeswehr remained true to this tradition. The operational army was also dependent on the alliance structure. Inter-army cooperation was promoted and enormously improved by the establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling Service (Streitkräftebasis) and the Joint Forces Operations Command (Einsatzführungskommando). However, all of these changes did not translate into a comprehensive national command-and-control capability. The capacities for actual operational action and strategy formation were not significantly expanded; the focus was – and still is – primarily on tactical challenges. Autonomy remained limited.
“Key Elements” for the future?
Conflicts today are cross-dimensional and require flexibility – that is, more autonomy – at the national level without, however, neglecting alliance structures. Conflicts are becoming more complex, more long-term, and more wide-ranging, and therefore they place greater demands on strategic capabilities. Today, the Bundeswehr has to travel great distances to reach a potential theatre of operations, be it Lithuania or Mali. It is by no means certain that a deployment on the eastern flank will take place under NATO Article 5 conditions. The chances of a deployment being accompanied by a declaration of a state of defence in Germany seem even smaller. Opponents such as Russia deliberately exploit legal and social vulnerabilities and keep disputes below the threshold of war. This does not mean, however, that armed conflicts with German participation should remain out of the question.
Dimensions
In 2018, the US Army summarised its concept of “multi-domain warfare” in a doctrine.4 It focuses on overwhelming an (equal) opponent with attacks from all dimensions (land, sea, air, cyber, space), thus limiting the opponent’s ability to act until their will to fight is broken.5 This type of battle management requires forces that can exchange data without delay. An Air Force jet must be able to send coordinates to Army artillery. The jet pilot must know when its own cyber forces have jammed the enemy’s air defences so they can fly into enemy territory. The frigate offshore needs to know when the jet is approaching in order to pause firing. Satellites monitoring the battlefield must be able to provide this and additional information to all forces.
In order to ensure the functionality of this concert, central control of all systems involved in the fight is needed, that is, operational integration. To achieve this, structural measures must be implemented, but the processes must also be practiced. Although this could initially be done on a multinational scale, it would involve considerable effort. The more nations that are involved, the more difficult it becomes; this is in part due to language barriers, especially in emergency or high-pressure situations. The coordination of dimension-specific capabilities is conceivable at the corps level, and with the establishment of so-called Component Commands, such a level is now to be mapped out by the commands of the different branches of the Bundeswehr, according to the Key Elements paper. This measure is suitable for deepening the understanding of the cross-dimensional approach. It will also improve the level of training of personnel, and thus ultimately the performance capacity of alliance structures. However, the envisaged corps structures also ensure a more rapid availability of forces, which can increase national flexibility and accommodate partner forces, including in ad hoc coalitions. They should therefore also be tested in future exercises to prove the usefulness of national planning and capabilities.
National command and planning
The Territorial Command (Territoriales Führungskommando), which the BMVg outlines in its Key Elements paper, will improve the ability to conduct operations within the territory of the Federal Republic by combining the agencies that are currently responsible. Less interfacing and a stronger substructure are a gain not only for Germany’s own security provision – within the framework of so-called administrative assistance – but also for the NATO alliance, which must be able to rely on “hub Germany”, for example in alliance defence. Together with the Joint Forces Operations Command, which is responsible for Germany’s share of missions abroad, the Territorial Command will make it possible to create a clear situational awareness of all missions in and outside of Germany, thus enabling the political leadership to make informed decisions.
The changes in the Ministry of Defence serve to enable “the Federal Minister of Defence to command and control the Bundeswehr in the complex crises of our times”.6 They create the prerequisite for command and control of the armed forces from a single source. They give German foreign and security policy more flexible options and are thus expedient in view of hybrid threats and under the aforementioned legal conditions. Until now, command and control of the armed forces has not been a task of the Ministry of Defence. A joint command-and-control facility for the armed forces that combines a future Territorial Command with the Joint Forces Operations Command outside the ministry and is available to the political leadership as a central command-and-control point would make further interfaces obsolete and avoid the duplication of command cells.
Joint command and control requires joint force planning. This must be designed in such a way that there are not only ensured exchange relationships between weapons systems and units, but also that their capabilities complement each other. Uncoordinated independence of the individual branches of the armed forces could run counter to this goal. In order to prevent this from happening, a top-down approach with common guidelines is indispensable. Such a coordinating body has already been created in the form of the Bundeswehr Office for Defence Planning (Planungsamt der Bundeswehr). This office should be further strengthened, for example by placing the doctrine centre described in the Key Elements paper under its authority, irrespective of where it is located. A doctrine, in the sense of operational-strategic guidelines, links visions of the future (conflict scenarios) with current challenges and is an integral part of force planning. Such a doctrine is therefore suited to bridge the gap between the capability profile and tactical implementation. Such a centre will further strengthen the understanding of doctrine development, which will increase Germany’s weight in alliance processes such as the NATO Defence Planning Process.
Strategic thinking
The ability to think strategically is an essential element for government action. The military provides options to the government, but to do so it must think through strategic processes itself. It is not an easy undertaking to strengthen strategic thinking, as this requires the development of a strategic culture.
Strategic thinking is a prerequisite to “improve strategic coordination”,7 as envisaged in the Key Elements paper. This goal cannot be achieved with accompanying measures alone, such as the establishment of a “Federal Security Advisory Council”8 or the holding of a “security week” in the Bundestag.9 A Federal Security Advisory Council would also depend on the ability of senior officers to assess what is militarily necessary as part of the comprehensive approach as well as what is politically feasible, and to work out the (long-term) consequences and options based on this assessment. Strategic thinking is complex and therefore requires targeted training. Without adept teaching, it is difficult to develop a strategic culture. This way of thinking should be encouraged at the very least among prospective staff officers and subsequently further consolidated and enhanced. The staff officer course and the general staff course would have to be adapted accordingly.
Strategic capability requires internal and external discourse. In order to stimulate this discourse, the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (GIDS) was founded in Hamburg in 2018. Its purpose is, among other things, to make the military perspective accessible to the public. However, there is a lack of internal publication formats that could lower the inhibition threshold for participation, especially of younger soldiers. Both internally and externally, it is up to military superiors to set a good example and initiate discussions. A starting point would be an obligation to provide an opinion paper on military strategy topics every year, from the first rank of general upwards. Secondly, it is up to politicians to encourage this kind of debate and the military’s contribution to it. One step in this direction would be to place the GIDS directly under the Ministry of Defence. This could improve relations and have a positive effect on the acceptance of this think tank.
Conclusion
Those who want to protect themselves or others from violence must have the credible power (the skills and the will) to use counter-violence. The new conflicts are being fought in all dimensions and with all means. These strategic and operational framework conditions require armed forces that are nationally capable of command and control and integrated across all branches of the armed forces, just as they must be capable of international integration.
The Ministry of Defence’s Key Elements paper points in the right direction, but this must now be pursued systematically. The Bundeswehr must go beyond the tactical level in training and planning and become capable of developing military strategies and conducting them operationally; it must also continue to make contributions to the public discourse. End-to-end leadership capability right up to the Ministry of Defence, the establishment of a doctrine centre to develop its own operational guidelines, and the founding of a think tank as a clear sign of the will to engage in military strategy discourse are not – in view of the Bundeswehr’s history – measures that can be taken for granted. All of these steps are suitable for adapting the armed forces to the above-mentioned security policy framework conditions, that is, for enabling them to become more independent and to assume more responsibility. These measures would enable the Bundeswehr to act in concert with like-minded partners and to possibly even lead the way, should alliance structures not be effective. The result would be forces that – not unlike the French and British armed forces – are integrated into alliance structures and yet can be deployed flexibly; forces that would improve Germany’s ad hoc ability to act. The new German government should pursue this path.
Maritime Choice: Indo-Pacific versus Arctic–North Atlantic Priorities
Michael Paul and Göran Swistek
By publishing its “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”, the German government has made it clear that it currently regards this region as the most strategically important area and will henceforth give it priority in foreign policy. The general assessment is that Germany’s security is also at risk in the Indo-Pacific. It is therefore important to protect the international order there. Hence, the German government also intends to contribute military resources to this task. In his first keynote speech at the end of June 2021, the newly assigned Chief of German Navy stressed that his intention is to consolidate the commitment to the region, which started with the deployment of the frigate BAYERN. He also said that he would like to see an intensification of cooperation with the major naval powers in this region, even if this can only be achieved by relieving them of their obligations to provide naval units in the Standing NATO Maritime Groups.
At the same time, however, the alliance is facing a dynamically escalating conflict with Russia in the High North. Never since the end of the Cold War has the relationship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with Moscow been at such a low point. For the alliance, a geographic balancing act in which it pays equal attention to both the Arctic–North Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions would be almost impossible to achieve. In its final report, the group of experts of the “NATO 2030” reflection process recently outlined the increase in Russian military activities in the High North, which can be assessed as aggressive. As a consequence, it recommends that NATO should strengthen its pillar of military deterrence and defence within the North Atlantic and European areas. The final communiqué of the June 2021 NATO Summit is also exceptionally clear about the potential threat posed by Russia. At the same time, however, the heads of governments in the alliance are also addressing China’s increasing advances in the North Atlantic region and hold out the prospect of a stronger engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific. In its 2016 White Paper, the German government already defined the horizon of German security policy as being global. However, due to the risks and threats in the North Atlantic and Eastern European regions, Berlin has placed its security policy focus in recent years on strengthening national and alliance defence capabilities. In view of its limited resources and the existing operational obligations of its armed forces, it is hardly feasible for Germany to operate in both geographical and predominantly maritime zones. The danger here is that essential capabilities would become overstretched and that the duplication of efforts with partners and allies would create open “flanks” elsewhere.
The situation in the Arctic and North Atlantic regions
Since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, which was followed by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in Ukraine, the security situations in Europe and from the North Atlantic to the Arctic have changed. Russia is currently using a broad repertoire of covert and overt means to destabilise the West, ranging from military build-ups and deliberate provocations to interference in the domestic politics and elections of European countries as well as constant attacks in the cyber and information space to advance its interests in Europe and the North Atlantic. As a result of these acts, European countries are in a permanent state of conflict. However, Russia refuses any blame, and these acts of aggression currently remain below the threshold of any physical violence.
Moscow’s policy in the High North and the Arctic is directly linked to its interests in Europe. In geostrategic terms, the European continent appears from the Russian perspective as a peninsular extension of the Eurasian landmass. Europe possesses the mostly freely accessible coastline and ports to the Atlantic, which the Russian Federation lacks. Russia’s access to the Atlantic is via the Baltic Sea or the Arctic, where Moscow has deployed considerable maritime and military capabilities and forces, which are restricted in their freedom of movement, however. From Russia’s point of view, the sea lanes in the Arctic–North Atlantic region are not only essential for supplying its own ports, but also seen as the potential traffic and transport routes of a future maritime Silk Road. In the context of the planned intensification of cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, Russia sees an opportunity to shift geo-strategically from the periphery of Europe and Asia to a trade and economic hub at the centre of Eurasia, thus enhancing its role as a global political actor. Geo-economically, these aspirations manifest themselves in the land and sea crossings of the Silk Road to Central Europe and in Russian oil and gas pipelines to Europe. Strategically, this area, Central Europe, belongs to the immediate sphere of interest of Russian foreign and security policy. It is the landmass that connects the High North and the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, respectively. Moscow’s North Atlantic and Arctic policy is thus – economically and in terms of security policy – also a vehicle for its strategy towards Europe.
The Arctic–North Atlantic region from a German perspective
Germany is not an Arctic state, but its role in the international community and its interests mean that it is heavily involved in issues concerning the Arctic. Geo-strategically, Germany is in a very special position: As part of the Baltic Sea region, it lies at the interfaces with the High North – the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea. Linked to this are vital sea and land lines of communication that either run through or past Germany. The German public views the Arctic and the adjacent subarctic region primarily from ecological, economic, and political perspectives. As a member of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the European Union, and NATO, and as an observer in the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the German government has numerous issues on its agenda that directly or indirectly affect the Arctic. These issues and related interests were bundled in Germany’s “Arctic Policy Guidelines” in August 2019.
As a medium-sized political power, Germany is particularly interested in a reliable international security architecture that contributes to collective crisis management and crisis prevention. As a nation that depends on foreign trade and raw materials, and as a continental middle power and part of the European peninsula, Germany depends heavily on free sea routes. All of these essential framework conditions are being called into question by the growing competition between great powers, which is also curtailing Germany’s room for manoeuvre. Therefore, in accordance with its “Arctic Policy Guidelines”, it is in Germany’s interest “to counter existing geopolitical tensions in the region and to prevent conflicts (of interest) and potential crises in the Arctic”. The Federal Government is committed to maintaining the Arctic as a low-conflict region, utilising it in a peaceful manner, and preserving the freedom of navigation there – after all, almost 60 per cent of German foreign trade by value is carried by sea.
Furthermore, it is the aim of Germany’s Arctic policy to ensure that existing international obligations and norms in the region continue to be respected. At the same time, Berlin is aware of the developing security policy dynamics in the High North. In view of a potential arms race and escalation cycle that may arise there, it is committed to its obligations to NATO. Germany and its Armed Forces must strengthen their military capabilities together with their northern European partners. They must also make substantially greater contributions towards the effectiveness of European diplomacy and the alliance’s defence capabilities in the sub-Arctic region. Any military activities in the region are to be of a defensive nature. Nevertheless, the participation of German Armed Forces in drills and exercises in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions is to indicate an expression of reassurance to the alliance and serve as a signal of deterrence. As far as exercises on land are concerned, reference should be made above all to the participation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, which is predominantly supplied and led by Germany, in the major NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in northern Norway. Soldiers from the Navy’s sea battalion have also occasionally participated in Arctic training with Dutch Marines in preparation for the jointly deployed Amphibious Task Group. The German Navy is also regularly present with its units in exercises in the sub-Arctic region. Whether as part of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, within the framework of bilateral cooperation, especially with Norway, or during other maritime exercises: The subarctic area of the North Atlantic and the northern Baltic Sea is one of the sea areas in which the German Navy routinely operates.
Due to Germany’s dependence on free and open sea lanes, the Armed Forces have “a special responsibility” to protect its own coastal waters as well as adjacent sea areas and international sea lanes, as stated in the “Konzeption der Bundeswehr 2018”. In the case of the Baltic and North Seas, this responsibility is relatively clear. But NATO’s northern flank consists not only of the sea between Denmark and the Baltic, it also extends across the European North Sea into the High North up to the North Pole. Germany and its European partners, like the United States (US), are seeking to enhance the security and resilience of the countries in this area. This requires special military capabilities in the maritime regions of the High North, both above and below the sea, as well as in airspace. The submarines and submarine hunting units also make an important contribution to situational awareness and knowledge about maritime spaces (Maritime Domain Awareness). The US is the largest provider of such capabilities in NATO. However, against the backdrop of Chinese power politics in the Indo-Pacific region, the US is increasingly being called upon to operate beyond Europe and its periphery. Accordingly, many of the US Navy’s specialised capabilities will be prioritised for deployment where confrontation with China can no longer be ruled out. In his remarks on the US defence budget for 2022, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley said that the Arctic may well obtain a significant geostrategic role for the US in the future. But for now, he said, there are other priorities in terms of capabilities and their funding. The escalation dynamic in the Indo-Pacific is seen as more pressing. It is also in Germany’s interest – and in line with the declared policy of the US – if the US has more capacity freed up to face the security challenges there. However, Washington associates this with the expectation that the immediate problems for Europe’s security – also in the High North – can be addressed more autonomously and with more credibility by its allies and partners on the European continent. Beyond command and control roles or coordination tasks, which Germany is keen to assume, this requires a strengthening of military resources, the closing of specific capability gaps, and an increase in military readiness.
Consequences for German policy
In both geographical areas, there are signs of growing cooperation between China and Russia. The basis for this is an overlap or compatibility of interests and goals. Western democracies face the problem that, both in the Arctic and in the Indo-Pacific, overlapping systemic conflicts are accompanied by security policy challenges. Germany is a global player in terms of its economic policy, but a middle power with limited resources and capabilities in terms of foreign and security policy. Since the latter is unlikely to change and the German defence budget is also expected to stagnate or decline in the coming years, it is foreseeable that the German Armed Forces as an instrument of foreign and security policy cannot be deployed simultaneously in these two maritime and geopolitically important spaces.
In view of these premises, Germany would do well to concentrate its military capabilities in the medium term on a security policy approach that is regionally limited. In the Indo-Pacific region, diplomatic and foreign economic instruments are sufficient to assure partners in the region of Germany’s sustained interest. In the North Atlantic and the High North, on the other hand, diplomatic engagement should be intensified. At the same time, security policy and military enablement activities, within the framework of NATO, should be stepped up in order to stabilise this region.
For Germany and Europe, Russia’s actions currently pose the most immediate and direct threat – both in terms of freedom of navigation and the potential for escalation based on Russian behaviour towards Nordic states and the ongoing militarisation of the Arctic–North Atlantic region. At present, Europe and Germany cannot counter these threats alone. For the foreseeable future, it will still require the capabilities and presence of US forces. However, the US is increasingly focusing its activities on the systemic conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. If Germany were to assume more responsibility in the North Atlantic, and thus relieve the Americans there, this would provide the US with the necessary leeway. At the same time, Germany would make a noticeable contribution towards strengthening the deterrence and defence capabilities within NATO and stabilising the security situation in the High North.
Difficult Relations with Moscow. German Policy towards Russia Must Be More Carefully Calibrated
Relations with Russia will continue to be one of the greatest foreign policy challenges for the next Federal Government. They are among the most controversial matters facing the European Union (EU) and are of fundamental importance for European security. They also have an important transatlantic dimension. Because of China’s increasing importance for Russia, these relations are closely linked to the question of the future world order. Germany does not need a fundamentally new Russia policy. However, it needs to take better account of the realities of Russian domestic and foreign policy.
Russian realities
Three trends are shaping the development of Russian politics:
1. The Russian state has steadily grown more authoritarian over the past two decades. The autocratisation of the political system goes hand in hand with the increasingly explicit rejection of liberal democracy and the existing international order. According to official Russian discourse, both are merely underpinnings of a unilateral Western claim to international dominance. Since Beijing also shares this view, Russia and China are increasingly closing ranks in the international arena.
2. Russia sees itself as an international great power and claims a decisive role in shaping regional orders (in its neighbourhood, in the Middle East). This aspiration results from the idea of a multipolar world, in which Russia acts on equal footing with great powers such as the United States (US) and China.
3. Russia is exploiting the weaknesses of Western democracies. Moscow sees this as a justified response to Western interference in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China and Russia share many goals and methods in this area. Western democracies should therefore understand these closely intertwined trends within the context of intensifying systemic competition at the global level.
Autocratisation at home increases Russia’s need to repel Western influence and undermine Western systems. In turn, the geopolitical confrontation with the West also serves to strengthen domestic legitimacy. All three trends are very likely to continue over the next five to ten years. Democratic transition, on the other hand, seems unlikely. Despite growing challenges to its legitimacy, the Russian political system exhibits a relatively high degree of stability. The international context (the increasing influence of China, the weakening of Western democracies) will also be favourable rather than destabilising and enable Russia to remain on its course.
Germany’s Russia policy: Partly missing the facts
The trends described above define the scope for German and EU policy, whose influence on domestic developments in Russia has noticeably shrunk. The confrontation with Moscow in the Eastern neighbourhood is putting a strain on the European security system. At the same time, Russia’s political and military involvement in the Middle East is impacting flight and migration to Germany and the EU. In the global systemic rivalry with China (and Russia), Germany has yet to take a clear position between growing threat perceptions and trade and economic interests.
In recent years, Berlin has adjusted its policy to the changing conditions in the region and embedded it in the European context. Today, the German government attaches more importance to the states in its Eastern neighbourhood than it did in the 2000s. Germany has played an important role in upholding the EU consensus on sanctions against Russia since 2014. In view of the political conflict with Moscow, Berlin has also made it a priority to promote engagement with Russian society.
But at the same time, German policy continues to be guided by assumptions that are increasingly difficult to reconcile with the reality of relations with Russia. For example, there is still a widespread belief that economic integration will, in the long term, bring about positive change in Russia’s economic and political systems, and thus also in its attitude towards Germany and the EU. The same applies to the hope that dialogue could prompt Moscow to adopt more conciliatory positions. For years, neither of these assumptions has corresponded to the self-image of Russia’s political leadership. Such misconceptions can be found at various levels of German politics. The result is national unilateralism, especially where economic interests are at stake. The most prominent example is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Moreover, individual German states and other actors tend to engage in shadow foreign policies vis-à-vis Russia – as for instance with the possible procurement of the Russian Corona vaccine Sputnik V. All of this leads to conflicts with European partners as well as Washington.
Next German government: (Even) more realism needed
The next German government should do more to adapt its Russia policy to reality and abandon outdated assumptions. At the global level, Berlin must factor in the dynamics of Russian-Chinese relations. The relationship between the two countries will continue to evolve, but it will also become more asymmetrical, to Russia’s disadvantage. However, Moscow is unlikely to oppose this – unless there is a reorientation of Russian foreign policy, which in turn would require domestic changes. Instead, Moscow and Beijing will continue to align themselves on issues in which they can weaken the positions of the US and other Western actors. French President Emmanuel Macron launched a diplomatic initiative directed at Moscow in 2019 in the belief that the EU could woo Russia away from its embrace with China. This quickly proved to be an illusion: The Russian political leadership did not trust Macron to take the lead in the EU, especially vis-à-vis Germany. By this point, Moscow had also lost interest in engaging with the EU. With the election of Joe Biden as US president, the opportunity has arisen to reactivate transatlantic relations (among other things) with regard to Russia/ Eastern Europe. The next German government should prioritise transatlantic consolidation when it comes to shaping the EU–US–Russia–China quadrangle. The time window for this will close with the start of the next US presidential election campaign at the end of 2023.
Germany needs to assume more responsibility for European security. Relations with Russia on this issue are extremely tense. In its extended neighbourhood (including the Arctic and the Middle East), Moscow is relying increasingly on military and hybrid means. International arms control regimes are eroding, and mutual trust has reached a low point. In this situation, Western democracies need to shore up their defence capacities and resilience within the frameworks of the EU, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This also includes examining financial flows as well as political and economic linkages to see where they affect political processes in Germany and other EU member states. Only when dealing with a consolidated and resilient counterpart will Moscow take seriously the offers to talk about arms control, conflict prevention, or “de-conflicting”.
Berlin should also review its assumptions about the Eastern neighbourhood. The region has grown extremely diverse. As a result, the EU’s Eastern Partnership, created in 2009, is breaking down into two parts: the implementation of the association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia on the one hand, and relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan on the other. Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka has suspended his country’s participation in the Eastern Partnership. Reform processes in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are the topmost priority. The association agreements have been in place since 2014, but the track records of their implementation are mixed. All three countries are caught in a vicious circle of internal resistance against reforms, regional instability, and meagre offers from the EU. All three insist on joining the EU. Germany, along with some other member states, has so far rejected this option – and the EU is certainly not in a position to engage in new enlargement processes at this time. However, the prosperity and stability of these states are in Germany’s primary interest. Their reform efforts must be supported with all available means. Such steps are of great importance for the EU’s relations with Russia. They underline the EU’s claim of playing a decisive role in the region and contributing to the process of securing reforms in these states. At the same time, Germany and its EU partners must make efficient use of the limited room for manoeuvre available vis-à-vis Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
German reservations about more intensive security cooperation with Ukraine no longer do justice to the sad reality on the ground. In the past two to three years, the structure of the conflict in the Donbas has changed significantly. Large parts of the population in the disputed territories have received Russian passports. This makes a military offensive by Moscow “to protect” these new citizens more likely. The Russian troop deployment along the Ukrainian border in the spring of 2021 exposed the dangerous dynamics of the conflict. Tensions are also growing around the Crimea and in the Sea of Azov. If Berlin is open to discussions about more security support for Kiev, clear conditions can be formulated for when such cooperation can take place. Conflict resolution needs to regain priority in Germany’s policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood.
The new German government would be well advised to stop searching for perpetually new opportunities for “selective engagement” with Russia. All the issues that fall under the fourth of the five guiding principles for the EU’s policy towards Russia have been on the table for a long time. Their number is limited, which has to do with diverging interests, but also with Moscow’s diminishing will to engage. The rejection of all advances made by the EU to cooperate in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic is proof of this. Together with its EU partners, Germany should identify the few issues where engagement with Russia is either inevitable or promises progress due to overlapping interests. The first category includes regional crises and conflicts – especially in the Eastern neighbourhood and the Middle East – arms control, cyber security, and the future of the Arctic. The choice is much more limited in the second category. At present, the fight against climate change is the most obvious issue. To be sure, Moscow’s climate policy has so far remained mainly at the rhetorical level. But as an oil and gas exporter, Russia will be massively affected by the implementation of the European Green Deal. This will open up opportunities for cooperation on the Russian side.
Engagement between societies must remain a priority of Germany’s Russia policy. Autocratisation and the pandemic have drastically shrunk the scope for this. Moscow is increasingly taking repressive action against German organisations. In response, the German side of the Petersburg Dialogue has suspended all activities until further notice. The new German government should critically review this dialogue and the function it can have in the future. It should also support EU steps (even unilateral ones) that would make it easier for Russian citizens to enter the EU.
Such changes must also be reflected in the institutional framework of Germany’s Russia and Eastern Europe policy. The post of Coordinator for Inter-Societal Cooperation with Russia, Central Asia and the Countries of the Eastern Partnership is no longer adequate. The tasks should be reorganised and divided between different positions. The new Federal Government should appoint a Coordinator for the Eastern Partnership, with a focus on the countries in the association agreements. This would give them the weight they deserve. Another coordinator should handle the shrinking opportunities for engagement with Russian society. Both positions should be entrusted to people with political clout and extensive regional expertise. Civil society cooperation with the Central Asian states could be covered by another coordinator or a special ambassador with the Federal Foreign Office.
Costs and benefits
None of the above means that Germany should withdraw from any form of engagement with Moscow. But the next Federal Government must tailor its actions even more closely to the political reality in Russia. Coordination within the EU and with the Western alliance must also be a top priority. This has not always been the case, as the example of Nord Stream 2 shows. Such projects, which inevitably generate their own dynamics and path dependencies, must be avoided in the future. The approach suggested here for Berlin’s future Russia policy might cause further tensions in the short term – although relations already reached an unprecedented low with the Alexei Nawalny case in 2020. In the medium to long term, however, such an approach has the potential to consolidate both the EU and the transatlantic relationship with respect to Russia policy. It could provide Germany and its EU partners with greater bargaining power in numerous disputes with Moscow. Finally, it would close many gaps that Russia could now exploit to further weaken the EU.
Germany and Europe’s China policy has changed course in the past decade. In a strategy paper jointly published on 19 March 2019, the European Commission and the European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy described China not only as a strategic partner, but also as a competitor and systemic rival. However, these multiple classifications have not had the effect of making European policy towards China less arbitrary or less contradictory. The various actors at the European, national, and subnational levels continue to pursue their own agendas, ignoring the spillover effects on other policy areas.
In this already problematic constellation, Germany should avoid the impression that it is behaving ambivalently. A policy is needed that primarily serves its own foreign economic interests and attempts to engage China in meaningful global cooperation, but disregards the dangers that arise from China’s totalitarian governance and expansive power projection: for the multilateral liberal order, for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, for Europe’s self-assertion. Such a China policy from Europe’s economically and politically most important country is becoming increasingly untenable.
The guiding principle should instead be the fundamental insight that the defence of the rules-based, liberal principles of order, the defence of human rights, and Europe’s political self-assertion are more important and higher-ranking goals than the economic returns that can be achieved by doing business with China. Moreover, a China policy is always also a European and alliance policy. If Brussels, Paris, or Washington expect Germany to adopt a clearer – and if necessary a more confrontational – stance towards China in a spirit of solidarity, this expectation is not synonymous with the demand for economic “decoupling” or the start of a new Cold War. Furthermore, concrete measures must be taken to ensure that Europe’s businesses, consumers, citizens, and government institutions are effectively protected against Chinese incursions; and such measures are only realistic in a European context.
Shaping a unified approach Contrary to how things appear on the surface, the chances of a unified approach towards China are not so bad. The opportunistic behaviour of EU member states should not obscure the fact that Europe’s capitals are increasingly united in their assessment of China, not least in light of China’s recent aggressive “wolf warrior diplomacy”, that is, its attempt to influence the policies of others through threatening behaviour. Notwithstanding the country’s undoubtedly fantastic development successes and a still discernible heterogeneity in the state and party leadership, China’s domestic and foreign policies show that it is a one-party regime run according to Leninist methods, which, if necessary, require brutal and resolute enforcement in order for China to retain power and manage its global political rise according to self-defined conditions. The EU member states also agree with the assessment that the Western policy of engaging China has failed. The hope that – in the course of modernisation and wealth creation – China would liberalise internally and integrate peacefully into the rules-based world order has proved to be a misjudgement.
The unity in this assessment should be followed by unity and consistency in action. This can only succeed if Europeans jointly define their position, ideally at the level of the EU heads of state and government. This position can only be based on European values, legal norms, and concepts of order, as well as on the core interests of the continent derived from these – in concrete terms, maintaining a rules-based international order and preserving freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and fair competition in Europe. Therefore, the EU should do three things: first, protect the EU’s internal market and the regulatory sovereignty associated with it; second, guarantee the political autonomy of action of the EU and EU member states, not least in the face of subversive or intimidating measures taken by China; third, defend the rule of law and commitment to common rules at the international level.
If Europe dissociates itself politically from China and puts compliance with international rules and its own strategic autonomy first, this should provide the orientation for its foreign policy – but also for other actors from politics, business, and civil society – and give its China policy the necessary consistency and integrity. Such an accentuated China policy would guide actions and decision-making in the individual areas of diplomacy, security, trade, business, technology, culture, and human rights; it would also be relevant for the state and local levels. This harmony, which encompasses all essential policy fields, can be described as a new “One China” policy1 – a term borrowed from China’s doctrine for the political and territorial unity of the People’s Republic and Taiwan.
The EU’s strategy paper should be supplemented and concretised by such a new “One China” policy. As already mentioned, EU-China relations are characterised by the attributes of partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry. This admittedly renders the bilateral relationship into an elegant triad. However, this “compartmentalisation” fosters the illusion that it would be possible to distinguish between economics and politics, and between comfortable and uncomfortable areas – in cooperation with a China that instrumentalises economic exchanges for its political and military power projection and that disregards rules at home and abroad when it is deemed necessary and useful.2 The priority policy goal associated with the position statement – namely to get China to play by the rules in the future – puts an end to this illusion.
Consequently, the “One China” policy obliges us to react appropriately to violations of international rules, and to take decisive action against China’s attempts at corruption and its exertion of pressure on Europe. It signals to China what Europe’s core interests are. However, it should not be misunderstood as an attempt to take sides in geopolitical terms against China’s rise in world politics, or even to pave the way for a change of system in the country. The starting point of the “One China” policy is China’s violations of the rules. Such a clarification is important for two reasons: Firstly, it makes the China policy compatible for the entire EU; secondly, it counteracts an unwanted escalation – after all, both sides are interested in continuing the dialogue and cooperation, whereby political differences are (or must be) mutually recognised.
China also has an interest in prosperous political, economic, and cultural cooperation with Germany and Europe. It is in Europe’s interest to strengthen the influence of the group of “internationalists” and, if possible, to prevent Chinese policy from hardening further. Reducing global CO2 emissions, combating pandemics, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining security and stability in critical regions of the world are not the only issues that China and the West must work on – and are capable of working on – together constructively. Here it is important to welcome positive signals from China and to promote cooperation.
The “One China” policy makes Germany and Europe’s policy towards China more honest, rational, and predictable. It puts an end to ambivalence. However, decision-makers in politics and business should also be aware of the consequences of such a “One China” policy – the positioning will have its price. China will initially classify Europe’s stance as antagonistic or “insubordinate” and sanction it economically and/or politically. Lasting damage to German market positions – and indirectly to Germany’s political position vis-à-vis China – cannot be ruled out. However, in a global economy based on the division of labour, China always harms itself through sanctions and boycotts; this is why solidarity within the EU is so important. The EU should respond to China’s punitive measures, such as those against Sweden or the Czech Republic, with united reactions. At the same time, this would be an appropriate signal to Beijing that “punitive measures” have consequences. The aim would be to find a circle of like-minded states beyond the EU that would act and react together vis-à-vis China.
A defensively oriented, value-driven foreign economic policy
German and European foreign trade policy towards China has so far focused primarily on offensive economic interests. Successes have been achieved in terms of market access, most recently within the framework of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. However, China is further away than ever from alignment with the Western rules-based market economy system.
In any case, the critical problems from a European perspective no longer lie solely in the Chinese domestic market, but rather in the unfair trading practises of many Chinese actors on international markets and the threats they pose to free market competition and the multilateral trade order. Therefore, although Germany and the EU should continue to pursue the goal of non-discriminatory market access and fair competitive conditions in China proper, their foreign economic policy should be primarily defensive. While China’s economy, unfazed by Western criticism, is transforming towards national economic autonomy and increasingly being controlled by Communist Party cadres, the main concern from a European perspective should be to protect European companies, consumers, and taxpayers from Chinese practices and incursions so as to preserve the EU internal market and the European economic and social model.
A number of demands3 have been made for a defensive foreign economic policy. Various sensible measures have already been implemented or initiated, such as investment screening and the EU’s new “anti-coercion instrument”. However, the policy implementation still needs a strategic compass to fill that void. The principles of reciprocity and value orientation are useful as a compass for a foreign economic policy that takes a defensive stance towards China. For example, Chinese companies should compete for public procurement contracts in the EU under the same conditions as European companies in China. And if goods and services are purchased from China, it must be ensured that their production or provision is sustainable and, above all, that human rights are respected along the supply chains. It is also important to reduce vulnerabilities in the areas of imports, exports, investment, and technology.
Many German companies that are successful in China now will not be able to avoid reducing their dependence on the Chinese sales market and manufacturing locations. To achieve this, the Indo-Pacific region offers attractive alternatives. Here, the EU should be supportive by making active efforts towards dismantling market barriers.
Strengthen and expand international cooperation with regard to China
Europe will not be able to shoulder the task of committing China to the rules of international law, multilateralism, and liberal governance by itself. Europe’s key partners for political coordination and cooperation are the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and like-minded states in the Indo-Pacific region. The transatlantic community of values and security provides a good foundation for political and economic cooperation with regard to China, even though Asia is outside the purview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is important to accompany the systemic and serious approach of the Biden administration in a constructive and cooperative manner or to accentuate it in European terms, for example in the areas of climate, health, and infrastructure development. Since the systemic competition with China will be fought and decided in the field of technology, joint export controls should be expanded, systematized, and above all, better coordinated internationally.
Moreover, the West should strengthen and expand the norms and practices enshrined in international jurisdiction, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the Bretton Woods institutions. When leadership positions are filled in international organisations, Beijing must not be allowed to take the field, as China is increasingly attempting to instrumentalise international organisations in order to legitimise its own national values and interests.
Europe’s China strategy should take account of countries in other regions. The German government’s Indo-Pacific Strategy provides an excellent basis for intensifying political and economic cooperation with countries in that region.4 But the goal being pursued here – namely to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and resilience – should also have appeal elsewhere, leading to more resistance against Beijing’s political and economic pressure. However, words must be followed by deeds. Germany and the EU can present alternative perspectives for countries in other regions through trade and sectoral agreements and offer cooperation in the development of sustainable infrastructure.
The defeatist assessment that the liberal system, democracy, and the market economy cannot survive in competition with China’s authoritarian state capitalism is misplaced.
Putting Words into Action: Foreign Policy towards Africa and Latin America
Denis M. Tull and Claudia Zilla
Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) occupy an ambiguous position in German and European Union (EU) foreign policy. Both are regarded as politically and economically peripheral regions that yield only a weak influence on the international level. While the LAC states have concluded a particularly active period (2000–2014) of regional and global engagement, Africa has been making increased efforts to build and project collective action for the past decade. This difference in ambitions is partly reflected in the respective regions’ loss or gain of relevance on the German and European agendas. Still, Berlin and Brussels find it difficult to articulate interests and goals in their relations with both regions that would justify sustained political attention.
Nevertheless, for years German and European decision-makers – supported by a multitude of initiatives – have been invoking the need for deeper cooperation or even “strategic partnerships” with their “natural allies” (LAC) and the “neighbouring continent” (Africa). However, the rhetorical phrase of “partnership on an equal footing”, which is commonly used by decision-makers, gives an idea of how asymmetrical the relationships with the two regions actually are.
Meanwhile, global power shifts are manifesting themselves in Africa and LAC. Non-Western states have become important partners for both regions in the areas of trade, infrastructure projects, credit, and investment. In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, China added a developmental component to its now strong role in LAC as a trading partner (China accounts for 33.9 per cent of Chile’s total trade, 16.1 per cent of Brazil’s, and 14.3 per cent of Argentina’s)1 and creditor (from 2005 to 2019, China provided infrastructure loans worth $25 billion).2 Since the beginning of the Corona crisis, the People’s Republic has donated medical supplies worth $215 million.3 In Africa, the outlines of a “new race” to pursue strategic interests between ambitious small states (e.g. the United Arab Emirates), emerging middle powers (including Turkey), and global superpowers (China, Russia) are discernible. Currently, 39 African and 13 LAC states are part of Beijing’s “New Silk Road Initiative” (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI).
For both regions, the rise of China – and, more generally, the increasing plurality of actors – initially meant a substantial expansion of their foreign policy options. The relevance and attractiveness of traditional partners and some of their customary policy instruments are fading. For instance, the share of development cooperation funds as a share of external financial flows to Africa fell from 60 per cent in 1990 to 29 per cent in 2018 (LAC: 3.2 per cent).4 However, the notion that Germany and the EU are losing ground everywhere and inexorably is inaccurate. It is up to Berlin and Brussels to decide whether they will maintain their influence. However, it is questionable as to the means with which this should be done. It is a delusion to believe that Europe can compete with China with BRI-like programmes and loans or with “hard power”. Apart from their financial clout, the EU and its member states simply lack the instruments and the domestic backing to act as comprehensively, quickly, and boldly as China’s (para‑)statal organisations.
Influence and credibility, moreover, are not solely dependent on economic potency and hard power currency. No other actor besides Europe has anywhere near the same historical depth and density of relations with Africa and LAC. These “soft power” factors represent a comparative advantage, but one that is becoming increasingly fragile. This is not only due to the activism of international competitors. Contradictions between the rhetoric of partnership and effective action in the context of bilateral, bi-regional, and global challenges as well as foreign policy inconsistencies have shaken the confidence of many states of the Global South in German and European contributions to multilateralism and a more equitable global order. This problem is particularly acute in two policy areas: migration policy and the handling of Covid-19 vaccines.
Migration policy in Africa
Few issues have put more strain on European-African relations than migration. Since 2015, the EU has characterised migratory movements emanating from Africa as the central challenge in dealing with the continent. Stemming this migration became an “integral part” of German and European Africa policy, an objective to which entire policy areas were largely subordinated, as in the case of development policy.5 The building blocks of this policy were the relocation of Europe’s external borders to North Africa and the Sahel and a forced practice of returning illegal migrants to their countries of origin. Given the diverging interests between Africa and the EU in the matter, the latter tried to exploit the asymmetry of relations to impose its migration policies.6 That is to say, in order to meet the rhetorically dressed up “common challenge” of migration, the EU was prepared “to create and apply the necessary leverage, by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools” at its disposal, including development policy conditionalities, market access, and visa restrictions in order to impose its will.7 De facto, “cooperation” with Africa became a question of compliance with European-defined targets, which were to be ensured via negative or positive incentives (aid packages). African preferences, such as more opportunities for regular mobility and migration to Europe and more intra-regional freedom of movement in West Africa (curtailed by EU support for strengthening controls by border police in the region), were hardly taken into account.
Unsurprisingly, the success of this policy has been limited and is probably short-term, as it has been linked to the expectation that African governments would implement policies that hinder the free movement of people in their own societies, thereby endangering their own power. The EU has paid a high price for its partial successes. The focus on migration prevention and the subordination of other goals has weakened its political credibility in Africa overall, not only in the policy areas concerned.8
When it comes to shaping migration policy, the perpetuation of asymmetrical power relations that the EU always claims to want to overcome is put in sharp relief. In the short and medium terms, the Union’s actions are raising doubts about Europe’s suitability as a partner from the perspective of an increasingly self-confident continent. In the long term, migration policy also undermines the influence of the EU, which has so far been sustained through dense political and social networks, values, norms, and expertise.
LAC in the context of the Covid‑19 vaccine policy
LAC is the most pandemic-affected region in the world. With only about eight per cent of the world’s population, it accounts for about 21 per cent of Covid-19 infection cases and 32 per cent of deaths worldwide9 (as of 13 July 2021) – and containment of the coronavirus in the subcontinent is not yet in sight. Amid the emergency, LAC governments are seeking access to vaccines from around the world through participation in Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), that is, the initiative of the World Health Organization (WHO), and through negotiations with manufacturers. But multilateral and bilateral progress has been extremely slow: Only 15 per cent of Latin America’s population has received full vaccination coverage so far.10 Pharmaceutical companies prioritise richer countries in contracts for large shipments; through the COVAX mechanism, only a little more than half of the vaccine doses promised by the end of June 2021 have gone to LAC. While citizens in the Global South rely heavily on Chinese (Sinovac, Sinopharm, CanSino), Russian (Sputnik V), and Indian (Covishield) “second-class vaccines”, official voices in Germany and Europe denounce this as Chinese and Russian “vaccine diplomacy”.
EU member states have agreed on a common vaccine strategy. Based on this, the EU has ordered twice as many vaccine doses as it needs to fully protect its population. Germany and the EU are also participating in the COVAX mechanism, which has shrunk from a global redistribution initiative to a modest aid programme due to initial underfunding and weak bargaining power vis-à-vis vaccine manufacturers. The COVAX initiative has come to rely on those vaccines that wealthy states had previously secured for their own populations or for health diplomacy purposes, some of which are now being made available. Rather than encouraging vaccine development and production in the Global South, COVAX primarily supplies vaccines from the Western world (the first Chinese vaccine was approved as recently as June 2021). In February 2021, WHO listed two versions of Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines from the Republic of Korea and India for emergency use and distributed them through COVAX. But vaccination using these Covid-19 vaccines is not recognised as vaccine protection for entry by some of the EU member states that provide financial support to COVAX. The same is true throughout the EU for those vaccines that are not of European, UK, or US origin.11 While some health professionals point out that only free or compulsory licensing and technology transfer for vaccine production in poorer countries can ensure fair global vaccine access, the German government – in line with the pharmaceutical companies – opposes the release of patents. This posture is being noted in LAC and Africa.
Policy changes and confidence-building
Migration and Covid-19 vaccination policies exemplify global phenomena whose negative aspects particularly affect Africa and LAC. Structural disparities in the world system mean that vulnerabilities to international challenges and the necessary levels of resilience are unevenly distributed across states and regions. In these policy areas, Germany and the EU are missing the opportunity not only to contribute to sustainable problem-solving, but also to breathe life into the rhetoric of “partnership on an equal footing” with Africa and LAC.
Apart from its limited effectiveness, Europe’s migration policy towards Africa results in numerous conflicting goals. Short-term political goals counteract long-term European interests and coherence in and across policy fields. For the sake of both the effectiveness of migration policy and its own credibility, the EU should expand its toolbox to include positive incentives such as mobility partnerships for work and education. In these, African governments could recognise a willingness to compromise and make counter-offers, which would make it easier for them to promote domestically controversial cooperation on migration with Europe to their own populations.
The example of migration policy shows that the EU is less and less able to translate economic asymmetries and donor dominance into power, because pressure leads at best to partial cooperation. In Africa, Europe should not so much use the “language of power” (Ursula von der Leyen), but instead try to use its remaining comparative advantages with “soft power” by underpinning its rhetoric of partnership with concrete offers on issues that are of central concern to Africa. This includes support for the African Continental Free Trade Area. At the global level, it is important to identify common interests in the transformation of multilateral institutions (including the UN Security Council and international financial institutions) in dialogues with African actors. The future legitimacy of these institutions will also depend on Africa no longer being merely an object, but also a subject of international politics.
With regard to the states of the Latin American and Caribbean region, partnership behaviour presupposes first and foremost that Germany and the EU acknowledge the contradictions and inconsistencies that make their own policies towards the region less and less attractive or credible – most recently in the context of the Corona pandemic. They should work bilaterally together with LAC as well as globally to reduce the asymmetries in a sustainable manner. In terms of global vaccine policy, this would mean first of all abandoning their resistance to vaccine patent waivers. In addition, Germany and the EU should promote the establishment of capacities for vaccine production in the developing world and of supra-regional production networks (as undertaken by AstraZeneca). With regard to vaccine distribution, it is necessary to strengthen the COVAX initiative, firstly financially and secondly by refraining from bilateral contracts with vaccine manufacturers and separate deliveries of vaccine doses to specific regions (such as the EU to the Western Balkans). In line with this, no booster doses should be purchased while large parts of the world’s population are still unvaccinated. Germany and the EU should also explore the certification of vaccines from the Global South and allow people with such vaccine protection to enter Europe. Finally, the charitable rhetoric of “donation” should be abandoned and, instead, a narrative of vaccines as “global public goods” should be accompanied by substantial policy changes.
Identity-related Change
Multilateralism and Partnership in German Foreign and Security Policy
Hanns W. Maull
German foreign and security policy consistently relies on multilateralism and essentially derives its identity from it. This is historically consistent and politically unavoidable for a middle power such as Germany. But there is no such thing as “the” multilateralism: Each of the diverse formats and contexts of multilateral diplomacy is embedded in political contexts, on whose normative foundations national and international political orders rest. The challenge for German foreign policy is therefore to advance specific liberal-democratic forms of multilateralism and to contain authoritarian or even neo-totalitarian alternatives. This requires that the particular multilateralism that German foreign and security policy espouses retains international influence. The prerequisite for this are powerful coalitions of states that support each other in sustained partnerships and see this – more persistently than has been the case to date – as an important aspect of their foreign policy identities. Such a normatively well-grounded multilateralist policy must be designed and implemented concentrically, holistically, and strategically. To this end, it is essential to re-conceptualise and firmly anchor such a policy in domestic politics and society.
Multilateralism
Not only Germany, but also many other states claim to pursue a multilateral foreign policy, above all China. After Donald Trump moved into the White House as president and began to base his policy on the principle of “America first”, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented China as the guarantor of an open multilateral world order. However, Chinese foreign policy is based on values that are rather different from those that inform German foreign policy. The Chinese leadership interprets the principles and norms of the international order and the rules and regulations of the United Nations (UN) in its own unique way. Wherever it can, it is increasing its influence in terms of personnel and policies in existing international organisations and is also building new multilateral structures of its own that complement existing institutions but could also serve as alternatives to them. All this illustrates how widely divergent perceptions exist about what multilateralism is and how it should be practised. This cannot be surprising: Multilateral diplomacy is, first of all, simply an instrument to achieve national goals and interests. These, in turn, reflect the different normative foundations in which decision-makers’ actions are rooted.
When speaking of multilateralism, therefore, it is always necessary to clarify what is meant by it. Two aspects are particularly relevant here, namely on the one hand the specific principles and values associated with particular concepts of multilateralism, and on the other the formats in which it takes place. While the specific form of multilateralism usually follows historical and pragmatic – that is, factual – considerations, the different constellations of values that are incorporated into the practice of multilateral foreign policies are of fundamental importance. For the principles and norms to which governments feel committed manifest the respective foreign policy identities as well as (in the double sense of the term) the domestic political constitution of countries. In a White Paper published last May,1 the German government committed itself to a “values-based multilateralism”. By this it means liberal democratic principles and norms as well as a pro-European orientation in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law.
The geopolitical shifts in power over the last two decades and the rise of right-wing populist forces in Western democracies have fuelled arguments about multilateralism in recent years. As a result, the common ground in the international community about multilateralism is now largely limited to the Charter (open to interpretation, as shown) and institutions of the United Nations. This is better than nothing, but the progressive paralysis of the Security Council by the veto powers shows that these commonalities may be too limited to enable effective international cooperation.
Sustainable partnership
The term “partnership”, which Chinese foreign policy in particular cultivates, also implies cooperation on the basis of common ground. In this respect, it tends to obscure the view of possible antagonistic aspects in international relations. In this context, too, questions therefore arise about not only the partners’ definitions of interests, but also the values that shape them. For the definition of a country’s national interests is heavily influenced by the principles and values that the decision-makers hold. Partnerships can therefore be highly diverse, depending on the parties involved and their specific normative orientations.
Another important question in partnership cooperation concerns the way both the costs of and possible gains from cooperation should be shared between the partners. This is a sensitive question, insofar as collective action implies both the opportunity (for the individual) and the problem (for the collective) of free-riding. In other words, partnerships as well as multilateralism require that those involved be willing to contribute their resources and adapt or change themselves in such a way that the desired goals can be achieved. Germany needs this willingness from its partners in order to achieve its goals and assert its interests. Its partners expect and need the same from Germany.
Germany’s most important partners are currently France and the United States, as well as the other member states of two of the prominent multilateral contexts of German foreign and security policy: the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In a different way, however, and on the basis of fundamentally different principles and values, Russia and China should also be considered significant partners for Germany.2 The effectiveness and legitimacy of partnerships and multilateralism depend importantly on whether, and to what extent, it is possible to find domestic political support for common concerns and mobilise resources through internal adjustments. An example of this would be the increase in national defence budgets in order to fulfil the commitments entered into within NATO. This applies to Germany’s partners, but also to Germany itself.
Certainly, multilateralism may achieve some desired results relatively easily. This may be the case, on the one hand, if results can be achieved with a rather low expenditure of resources and internal changes, and, on the other hand, if the costs can be charged to other participants in the cooperation, or to third parties. However, there is much to suggest that, not least because of the ecological limits to growth, the possibilities of shifting the burden of national adaptation onto the international environment – and thus to international relations – have been largely exhausted. It seems instead that, for the sake of the future, a kind of reversal of thrust is necessary, namely from adaptation through externalising its costs to adaptation through internalising them.
Conclusions and recommendations for action
Germany’s future depends crucially on how European and international politics will develop in the coming years. In order to be able to influence the international order in accordance with its principles, values, and interests, Germany needs a normatively firmly anchored, effective multilateralism and, to this end, robust partnerships. One prerequisite for this is public awareness that there is a close link between Germany’s foreign and security policy and its own prospects for the future. Another condition is the collective willingness to undertake greater efforts and invest more resources to advance liberal democratic multilateralism.
The international disputes about which principles, values, and rules should guide multilateralism in the future will intensify further in the coming years. The protagonists here are China and Russia on the one hand, and the United States and the EU and their allies on the other. This tug of war is not only about the future shape of the international order, but also about the future of liberal democracy. The tug of war has already begun; it will almost certainly continue throughout the coming legislative period and probably well beyond.
Multilateralism takes place in many different constellations. The issues to be dealt with in each case often overlap and influence each other – for example, in the relationship between trade and climate policy. Moreover, decisions in the respective contexts are often not only about their specific issues of substance, but also about the principles and values behind them. Multilateral foreign policy can therefore not be pursued in a “compartmentalised” manner, that is, solely oriented towards the respective substantive issues, even if this is unavoidable to a certain extent. The practice of German multilateralism to date has fostered tendencies towards such compartmentalisation, however, in which linkages between the individual policy areas and the normative implications of policies are neglected. The new German government should therefore implement the multilateralism strand of German foreign policy concentrically, and as far as possible holistically, on the basis of an overall strategic concept.
Foreign policy coordination mechanisms should be further developed accordingly at the executive and parliamentary levels. To this end, the strategic orientations of German foreign and security policy should be explicitly formulated, for example in the form of a White Paper, and should be the subject of parliamentary discussions at regular intervals. In addition, the Federal Security Council should be upgraded and expanded in this sense.
The core of a “concentric multilateralism” is its basic normative orientation towards liberal democratic principles and values. Institutionally, these are represented by the European Union, transatlantic relations, and relations with other liberal democracies. It is also part of this core area to uphold and further develop the principles and values mentioned within the Charter of the United Nations. The second circle of concentric multilateralism consists of systematically aligned and coordinated multilateral action in the various formats. The third circle concerns the specific policies in their respective multilateral contexts.
Multilateral foreign and security policy is not only demanding in itself, it also puts a considerable burden on domestic politics. On the one hand, political support is needed at home to provide adequate material resources for foreign, security, and defence policy. On the other hand, politics, the economy, and society must be adequately protected against attempts to influence them from outside and risk precautions must be taken. This, too, requires resources and investment. To provide a yardstick of what may be required: In 1990 a good fifth of the federal budget (21.5 per cent) was spent on foreign relations, in 2021 only just under one-eighth (12 per cent).3
Effective partnerships are the most important prerequisite for an influential German foreign policy. They are made more difficult by the increasingly inward-looking orientation of the politics of foreign policy among Germany’s partners, but also in Germany itself. On the other hand, transnational civil society actors may serve as new partners that can provide important impetus and open up opportunities for effective cooperation.
A successful German foreign policy needs not only substantive impetus, however, but also more domestic support and adaptation. Overall, foreign policy needs to be given more attention and more weight. Initiating and driving forward such a re-orientation is one of the most important political challenges for the coming legislative period. At the same time, Germany needs to encourage and promote similar changes among its partners. This is the only way to close the widening gap between what multilateralism must achieve and what it is currently capable of delivering. It is also the only way to protect the values of liberal democracy and to allow it to survive and flourish, in international politics but also in Europe itself.
Starting point: The German Sustainable Development Strategy 2021
In 2020/2021, the Federal Government updated the “German Sustainable Development Strategy”.1 Inspired by the 2019 Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR, written by an independent group of scientists for the United Nations (UN) Secretary General),2 the strategy identifies six areas of transformation in which five so-called levers are to be applied. One of the levers is “international responsibility and cooperation”.3 This continues the well-established approach that the strategy should not only be implemented in Germany, but also with and through Germany. The levers in the strategy, however, are neither particularly well-developed nor strategically thought through. For example, under the heading of “foreign sustainability policy”, only pre-existing activities have been listed so far. The basis for this is the 2020 departmental report of the Federal Foreign Office “Diplomatie für Nachhaltigkeit” (Diplomacy for Sustainability).4 In this report, the Federal Foreign Office reports on thematic activities such as sustainability dialogues or Germany’s efforts on “climate and security” in the UN Security Council.
In its 2021 Sustainable Development Strategy, the Federal Government announces under the heading “Next steps”: “Germany will continue to make steadfast progress with its activities internationally. It will demonstrate that sustainability is intrinsic to both German foreign policy and multilateral cooperation”.5 The Federal Foreign Office had already asked in its departmental report: “How can we align even more areas of our foreign policy action with the 2030 Agenda? How can we integrate and achieve the long-term goals of the Agenda with ‘classical diplomacy’ [...]?” Answers to these questions “are to be found through a comprehensive and continuous debate in the Federal Foreign Office and in dialogue with the public.”6
Change
In the past, all this rhetoric was rarely taken seriously beyond opening speeches. German politicians tended to reject far-reaching, transformative measures due to concerns about “yellow vest protests” on German streets. Already conceptually this is not convincing because the concept of sustainable development implies that three dimensions are to be considered – social and economic as well as ecological concerns.
Moreover, we are seeing changes in the German public debate. In April 2021, the Citizens’ Assembly on “Germany’s Role in the World” submitted a report to the German Bundestag.7 It states that “Germany should promote sustainability [...] as a global cross-sectional task [...] and place [it] at the centre of its political action”. In doing so, Germany should also “act in the interests of other countries”.8 At the end of March, the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled that the government not only has to improve its national climate protection law, but also intensify its international action on this.9 Increasingly frequent extreme weather events, such as the recent heavy rainfall and flooding in Germany, also reinforce the social pressure that social movements such as “Fridays for Future” have already built up. Taken together, it looks like societal support for more decisive action is growing. In mid-June, the Committee of State Secretaries, with a view to the coming legislative period, stated: “Achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda is a task of highest priority.”10 The next Federal Government should consider the strategy again at an early stage and decide about the next steps in 2022.11
At the international level, UN Secretary-General António Guterres is promoting an “inclusive and networked multilateralism” to advance the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and move closer to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – this is also part of his new report “Our Common Agenda”.12 According to the “White Paper on Multilateralism”, Germany also advocates for a value-based, inclusive, and effective multilateralism. In the Declaration on the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, Germany, together with the other UN member states, proclaimed the 2030 Agenda and the 17 SDGs as the “roadmap” for the next 10 years. To put this roadmap into practice, Germany’s foreign policy would have to take the lever “international responsibility and cooperation” much more seriously and use it more strategically.
Recommendations
The new German government, and the Federal Foreign Office in particular, should assess and approach sustainable development issues more pro-actively, and also strategically, while placing them in a political and geopolitical context.13 Efforts should be focused on positively shaping the ongoing changes in the international order. The Federal Foreign Office could make greater use of its knowledge of the “politics”, both in the countries and regions and in the various multilateral contexts and negotiations, across departmental responsibilities, that is, even when it is not the leading department. Relevant knowledge includes – depending on the theoretical perspective – geopolitical power shifts and sovereignty concerns; interests and interdependencies; values and political narratives; or hegemonic blocs formed by elites in politics, business, the military, and society. Specialists who tend to think in sectoral or technical terms often lack this kind of knowledge. Yet, in multilateral but also plurilateral and bilateral contexts, this kind of expertise is extremely relevant for targeted negotiation strategies.
The consensual adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs by the UN member states is rightly seen in the “White Paper on Multilateralism” as proof that “the international community can agree shared objectives on a global scale, despite its differing interests”.14 This offers an opportunity to shape international cooperation strategically with a view to these common goals. In 2016, the Federal Foreign Office had conducted a “mapping exercise”, via its missions abroad, to find out how governments of other states intend to implement the SDGs. The White Paper falls short on this kind of transfer to the classic arenas of diplomacy. The next German government could initiate a renewed proactive “outreach” to learn where Germany is in demand as an inspirational learning partner – especially in the context of efforts for a “better and greener recovery” after the Covid-19 pandemic. Building on this, the 2030 Agenda could be placed more centrally in the Federal Foreign Office, both conceptually and institutionally, and should guide action in foreign relations, also in more prominent formats.
The results of such a process could then also inspire the further activities of the Alliance for Multilateralism. Its members could develop ideas for multilateral transformation partnerships – in other words, use the Alliance as a “partnership incubator”. In addition, a better interface with the UN needs to be considered so that these initiatives would not remain parallel events but promptly be associated with relevant multilateral processes. Multilateral partnerships, such as the Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative, are an important test for an inclusive and networked multilateralism. Further initiatives should be developed together with – or at least in close consultation with – the UN. As the COVAX example shows,15 a unit would be useful that monitors, makes transparent, and addresses in a politically relevant way whether partners are honouring their commitments and where cooperation could be improved. Bilaterally, the Federal Foreign Office and other ministries are already working with climate and energy partnerships. The new German government could build on this and commit itself to broader transformation efforts.
The “White Paper on Multilateralism” states that Germany not only intends to oppose attempts to water down the 2030 Agenda, but that it is also committed to its integrated implementation.16 However, this approach is not yet sufficiently prominent in the White Paper itself. As the GSDR points out, an integrated approach would help to realise important synergies, and thus faster progress in achieving several goals simultaneously. Accordingly, a more consistent inter-ministerial cooperation would be an important starting point for a coherent foreign sustainability policy. The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) Germany has taken up the proposal to create a transformation cabinet for international sustainable development, analogous to the climate cabinet (in which the Federal Foreign Office is not represented).17 If it were possible here to establish domestic and foreign policy guard rails in the sense of the three dimensions of sustainable development, this would be a positive development for policy coherence. To this end, for example, it would be important to better link climate policy (currently highly salient, internationally through the Biden administration, at the European level through the Green Deal, at the national level through the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court) with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. This would be of mutual interest, because only together with other key transformations, such as in the transport, construction, or agricultural and food sectors, will it be possible to achieve progress that is sufficiently fast and effective.
The UN and many member states are eager to learn about such coherent policy packages and good practices.18 For example, in May 2021, after years of negotiations to address climate change, the G7 countries agreed to end subsidies for coal-fired power plants.19 This instrument was seen as “low-hanging fruit”, that is, a political measure which is easy to implement and promises quick success. However, social and economic concerns prevented an agreement for a long time. To promote a “just and fair transition”, we need to design subsidies in an environmentally, economically, and socially compatible way.20 Such models or incentives could make it much more attractive for industrialising and developing countries to embark on transformative pathways.
As problems increase and pressure grows, not only innovative technologies but also transformation partnerships and integrated policy approaches “made in Germany” could become a foreign policy bestseller. This will only succeed if the next German government quickly begins to develop suitable foreign sustainability policy messages – in a more committed manner, communicating them also in a credible and convincing way, especially through its own implementation efforts.
Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Six Practical Proposals
Volker Stanzel
Changes in the foreign policy environment require not only substantive but also structural and institutional adjustments. However, their translation into practical diplomacy lags behind the needs of national and international publics, which are shaped by new sensibilities. This increasingly calls into question the state’s ability to steer policy, to the detriment of representative democracies. Six measures therefore seem advisable:
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National dialogue platforms on current foreign policy issues
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European early warning networks
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A National Security Council anchored in the Bundestag
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Firm consultation mechanisms in the framework of the Alliance for Multilateralism
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An international review conference for the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
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Institutionalised European Union (EU) capacity-building on Asia in accordance with the Indo-Pacific guidelines
1. National foreign policy dialogue platforms
Foreign policy is of interest to citizens when it directly affects them. That is not unusual. What is new, however, is how quickly foreign policy issues can have an effect that is difficult to control, when citizens feel that their livelihoods are threatened, and that they are insufficiently informed in their search for solutions to problems – since elections are usually still far off. Dwindling levels of trust can even drastically alter the domestic political landscape in the short term, and thus significantly impair the functioning of democratic mechanisms. Examples include the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the Corona pandemic, all of which spawned populist movements. Brexit, the yellow vest movement in France, the participation of populist parties in government, and the election of Donald Trump as US president show, however, that such crises, which have an impact on foreign policy but also on domestic politics, have so far resonated less loudly in Germany than elsewhere.
If a German government wants to ensure sufficient public consensus for its foreign policy actions in the future, ways must be found to respond more strongly to the desire for participation. Experiments are already underway in the form of various citizen platforms. However, the formats being used are not yet very popular because their effect on government action is not transparent, making it neither more transparent nor more trustworthy. So a further step is needed here. It must, on the one hand, avoid the obvious “fig leaf” suspicion and, on the other, provide reliable accountability for the new approaches to foreign policy. Other forms of participation, such as the Citizens’ Council being considered by the German Bundestag or the Citizens’ Dialogue of French President Emmanuel Macron, can – if consolidated and expanded – serve to institutionalise national dialogue platforms on foreign policy issues. Such platforms will have to create their own legitimacy. It will depend on how successful they are in preserving or reinforcing a democratic understanding of the state.
2. European early warning networks
The Corona pandemic has not only been a warning signal of how quickly citizens can feel insufficiently involved in politics. It has also highlighted the diplomatic dysfunctionality in the face of the fragmentation of international publics, even in partner countries that have close ties with Germany. Examples include the spontaneous closure of borders, even within the Schengen Area, disputes over the distribution of vaccines, and the successes of populist groups and personalities.
Obviously, it is no longer sufficient to observe the public affairs of other states in the traditional way in order to grasp crisis situations in depth and to work on them politically, together with partner governments. This is particularly important in cases where a country’s own measures need to be coordinated with its partners. The above-mentioned crises also provide examples of this. Moreover, measures are more likely to be accepted if the acting governments can credibly demonstrate that they respect each other in their representation of national interests. Within the EU, platforms for intensive cross-border discussions could ensure that politically relevant movements are recognised by the public in a timely manner. An example of suitable structures is, for example, the Global Diplomacy Lab, which is already being promoted by the Federal Foreign Office on a small scale as an experiment. Such platforms could be linked at the European level and, as early-warning networks, could be indicators of politically relevant trends in public moods. They will be just as important as the national dialogue platforms because they will provide insights into the different national trends in public opinion and sentiment, which can help to shape government policy and must be taken into account in foreign policy.
3. National Security Council in the German Bundestag
Not only foreign policy, but also domestic, economic, and socio-political interlinked security issues today affect more than the three traditionally responsible departments of the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defence, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Aspects such as economic or financial sanctions – that is, new instruments of interstate conflict – or problems such as cyberhacking or climate and migration policy reveal how broad the spectrum is of foreign and security policy issues that democratic governance must address today.
That is why it makes sense to deal with these issues in their entirety when it comes to government decisions. In the United States (US), the National Security Council, which is based in the White House, exists for this purpose. In Germany, too, this model has been discussed time and again. It has never been realised because it would mean that responsibilities would be concentrated in the Chancellor’s Office. This would mean, however, that crucial competences would also be taken away from those departments that are led by members of other coalition partners, which would not accept this loss of power, even if it were only relative. The solution would be to establish a German National Security Council without executive powers in the German Bundestag. Particularly in the case of developments that could lead to the participation of the Bundeswehr in foreign missions outside the domain of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or in the case of measures that could seriously damage German economic interests (as is often the case with sanctions), the parliament would at least participate in a consultative capacity, unlike the present Federal Security Council, which is a committee of the federal cabinet. A National Security Council in the German Bundestag would ensure that all relevant ministries are involved and that parliament is consulted in good time. This would bring greater effectiveness, especially in matters that often have to be coordinated between the executive and the legislature under time pressure, such as decisions on military missions. The formal status of the National Security Council would have to correspond to that of parliamentary committees, as this would be important above all in light of the considerable confidentiality and security requirements.
4. Institutional framework of the Alliance for Multilateralism
The Alliance for Multilateralism, launched by the German government in 2019 and currently supported by around 70 states, is a reaction to the realisation that the international order is in danger. Liberal internationalism took institutional shape with the United Nations and the entirety of the rules-based system that has been operating since 1945. Admittedly, the basic idea that all sovereign states solve their problems through negotiation while renouncing the use of force was always a precarious one. Nevertheless, it was widely accepted as the way that states dealt with each other. This reasonably workable system is under threat from two directions in particular.
On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War, more and more spaces have emerged in which states are tempted to break away from the framework of rights and obligations of the international system. In doing so, they are shaking up its cohesion and the preconditions for networked international cooperation. Examples include the behaviour of Russia and Turkey and, under Donald Trump, also of the US.
On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China has entered the international arena as an actor that explicitly advocates a different system of international governance. Thus, Chinese leaders are openly calling for other forms of international relations than the existing ones, or pursuing other forms of international activities, such as with the New Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The greater China’s international influence becomes, the more it is to be feared that the existing international order will be weakened in its effectiveness and, in the end, possibly its very existence will be threatened.
Now, major powers such as the US and China are less dependent on the rules-based liberal international order. Medium-sized powers such as the EU member states, on the other hand, are dependent on a functioning international system if they want to maintain their prosperity and security. In this respect, there was an urgent need to establish a platform such as the Alliance for Multilateralism for such states. So far, however, it has served little more purpose than to offer an exchange of ideas between Alliance foreign ministers on the margins of international conferences. This should be changed. To counter the process of diffusion of the global order, an effective institutional framework is needed, for example in the form of a secretariat for the Alliance for Multilateralism, sensibly located within the EU. Germany initiated the Alliance and is therefore the right actor to now also initiate the improvement of its capacity to act.
5. Review conference for the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
Globalisation and digitalisation – both the economic and technological revolutions – are not just additional forces contributing to the fragmentation of the global order. They are even dissolving traditional basic principles of diplomacy, such as the exchange of factual information as the basis of foreign policy communication and negotiation. The competition with social media infotainment based on “alternative facts” is influencing interstate dealings, as the Russia debate in the EU shows, for example. New diplomatic actors, such as international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and transnational corporations, are part of a political, economic, social, and often violent network. It resembles, so to speak, a meta-universe of the international community that spreads uncontrollably without its finality being apparent. It is obvious, however, that the prior rules of diplomatic inter-state interaction no longer go as far in solving problems as is often assumed. Attempts at structural adjustments of various kinds in different nations do not go far enough, if only because they are each limited to one state, while the problems created by the new actors are a global phenomenon.
In response to the global fragmentation processes, the reform – that is, expansion – of the United Nations Security Council is often discussed. Since the first such proposals were made a quarter of a century ago, however, doubts have been growing that an enlarged body could more easily achieve unity among the participants than the existing one. It might therefore be more promising to thoroughly review the actual toolbox of international interaction and communication. It consists essentially of the rules governing diplomatic or consular relations between states, the functions of state representatives, and the principles for the peaceful settlement of disputes, as set out in the two Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations of 1961 and 1963. A review conference for the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations should be tasked with developing provisions for the rules-based integration of international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and transnational corporations into inter-state relations and adapting the existing rules.
6. Institutionalised EU capacity-building on Asia
The Indo-Pacific guidelines, which the German government adopted in September 2020, are intended to diversify Germany’s relations with the region geographically and thematically. In doing so, they are intended to help advance normative and institutional exchanges in light of economic as well as security concerns. They follow a similar French strategy paper from 2018, but one in which France appears as the “Nation of the Indo-Pacific”. In late 2020, the Netherlands also released its own guidance paper. With their documents, the three states aim to support efforts by the European Commission to develop a coherent EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
The increasing magnetic field-like radiance of China’s new power is leading Europe to neglect its interests in other parts of the region. The result is that Beijing is indirectly further strengthened. This must be balanced out. The abovementioned draft strategies are an expression of the desire to focus more strongly on countries in Asia, which, thanks to their own characters and policies, are and should remain important partners for Germany. According to the guidelines, in order to be successful, not only should the European perspective be broadened, but cooperation with the states in the region should also be meaningfully strengthened. This, in turn, presupposes the comprehensive development of competences on a scale that corresponds to the great and growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region at the level of social, political, economic, and personal contacts. The model could be the earlier European development of competences in transatlantic affairs and relations with Russia. As in these two cases, the development of European knowledge on the Indo-Pacific should be conceived in a multifaceted way. That is, it should take place in dedicated research institutes such as the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics), in universities, and in civil society institutions such as the Atlantic Bridge. This requires the EU to develop a competence initiative on the Indo-Pacific that should be initiated by the new German government.
Hybrid Threats and the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy
Annegret Bendiek and Raphael Bossong
The global security situation is increasingly characterised by so-called hybrid threats, which aim to disrupt the public order of targeted states. Hybrid threats are primarily created by proxy actors that are only indirectly or covertly supported by another state (see Matrix on p. 66).1 These include, for example, hacker or troll groups that are encouraged or merely tolerated by state authorities, and that disrupt critical infrastructures or attempt to manipulate national electoral processes.
A few years ago, hybrid threats were characterised by the concurrence of armed conflict with the use of non-violent, covert instruments to exert influence.2 Today, by contrast, the variety of actors involved is at the forefront, as is the use of multiple interlocking civilian but illegitimate approaches to destabilisation,3 such as the targeted takeover of economic sectors or the systematic manipulation of the media or of diaspora groups.4 The “toolbox” of hybrid threats has become increasingly diverse and comprehensive, even if it has a predominantly non-military character. Particularly with regard to Russia and China, European authorities assume that all available instruments are being brought to bear against them – below the threshold of armed conflict. Classic security policy, understood as border security or territorial defence, systematically falls short here. Hybrid threats endanger the internal cohesion of democratic societies, and thus the core of the European idea.
Resilience and Security Union
Adequate policy responses must mirror the variety of hybrid threats and involve a large number of sectors and actors. Since most attempts to disrupt public order are covert, the first priority is to strengthen the resilience of democratic society at large.5
The European Union (EU) has been committed to the concept of resilience for years and seeks to cover all critical aspects of the contemporary risk society. Among other instruments, numerous legal acts on investment protection, the energy industry, transnational transport networks, communications and infrastructures, and the integrated (digital) single market all contribute towards European resilience. Compared to neighbouring states, the process of European integration in its legal, economic, and social dimensions has increased the member states’ resistance to illegitimate outside interference.
More than at any time since the founding of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, individual member states are too small to be able to hold their own in the competition between China, the United States, and Russia and in the face of multiple hybrid threats. Since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the EU have been addressing such threats in a number of strategic documents, working groups, and through a joint Centre of Excellence.6 The European External Action Service (EEAS), in particular, strives to uncover and counter disinformation campaigns.7 The further development of both the Security Union and the Defence Union8 should help to counter a growing spectrum of hybrid threats – through higher security standards and improved EU coordination mechanisms.9
The weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
The EU’s central weakness remains the lack of focused detection, joint threat assessments, and proactive, forward-looking foreign policy responses to hybrid threats. Attempts have been made – and are still being made, largely unsuccessfully – to achieve more effective decision-making in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by extending qualified majority voting in the Council. Perhaps the most important reason for failure is that the member states’ threat analyses and security policy scenarios diverge greatly; often they do not allow for a common interpretation of the situation, and therefore also no uniform formulation of security policy. Understandably, there are major differences in threat perceptions between Italy and Sweden or between Portugal and Estonia. If each member state understands the threat landscape only against its respective national background, collectively they can only agree on a minimalist CFSP and cannot develop a coordinated approach to major power conflicts. This fundamental problem is not new, but it is exacerbated by hybrid threats.
The German Council Presidency made a renewed attempt in 2020 with the “Strategic Compass” to mitigate the existing differences between EU member states.10 Yet, the Strategic Compass has two major shortcomings. First, it seeks to develop a common European threat assessment only in selected fields and is not systematically connected to policymaking. It represents an ad hoc measure that does not translate the observed structural changes into an institutional reform which would go beyond another White Paper on defence. Its second shortcoming may be even more serious: The entire process is shaped by the defence ministries of EU countries, and thus it tends to be too narrow and technical when applied to diverse hybrid threats.
In order to do justice to the complexity of hybrid threats, European security policy must also protect the integrity of the democratic process (e.g. elections), further train the population in digital skills, consider and implement strategic connectivity or decoupling, analyse the vulnerabilities of supply chains (e.g. for important medicines and raw materials), and much more. It is a policy that needs to be thought through comprehensively, and it needs to be located in a place that is appropriately equipped for this purpose.
The necessary reorganisation of the EEAS as a strategic intelligence unit
The two shortcomings of the Strategic Compass can be corrected. This would require a systematic process of institutionalisation with the aim of attaining regular and comprehensive threat assessments.11 The EEAS, in particular, should be empowered to orchestrate such a continuous and EU-wide process. It should be given the competence to request intelligence from the member states and EU delegations as well as from the Commission services, and to organise Europe’s security expertise to handle the new world of hybrid threats. It is by no means sufficient for the competent authorities of the member states to provide selective information to a Council working group set up to counter hybrid threats.12 In particular, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) and its military counterpart in the EU Military Staff (EUMS INT) need to be upgraded as key suppliers to the EEAS – and to Council decision-making, in turn. Although EU INTCEN and EUMS INT are formally separate structures from the EEAS, they have been cooperating for a long time through the civil-military network of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) of the EEAS.13
In 2016, the Hybrid Fusion Cell (HFC) was launched within EU INTCEN. This unit represents the model for an institutionally and methodologically broad analysis of hybrid threats.14 However, the HFC has not yet been developed into a strategic analysis unit that combines sensitive intelligence of the member states (finished intelligence), the thematic expertise of the Commission and various international centres of excellence, as well as the growing volume of open source intelligence. National authorities need to proactively forward analyses to the SIAC (push principle), rather than respond to EU INTCEN on demand (pull principle). An upgraded HFC should result in the regular submission of an agreed number of intelligence analyses that can serve as a valid basis for decision-making in the CFSP or Common Security and Defence Policy matters. The competence of the EEAS should not be limited to the military dimension of security policy – as currently provided for in the Strategic Compass – but should address all relevant policy fields in line with the aspirations of the Security Union.
Germany’s contribution to the restructuring of the EEAS
Germany should launch a political initiative to strengthen the EEAS with the aim of producing regular joint intelligence-led threat assessments. This is neither about creating a European intelligence service nor about undermining national constitutional principles. It is simply about the basis on which any common position in the Council must be based: a common understanding of the most pressing risks and threats. Only then will it be possible to decide on appropriate countermeasures. Today, it is not only Europe’s (physical) borders that are being challenged, but also its internal constitution. Even countries such as France that are sceptical about the challenges posed by hybrid threats on the EU’s eastern flank are likely to recognise the European added value. Communitarising the process of threat analysis may also provide new insights to large states such as Germany and France about when patterns and risks emerge simultaneously in several EU states. The thematic priorities for reporting should be decided on an ongoing basis, using the matrix outlined above (see p. 66). More generally, a shared intelligence matrix would allow all states to allocate their respective resources across regions and topics in a more complementary way.
The recipients of regular joint intelligence assessments on hybrid threats are not only the leaders of the EU institutions, the Political and Security Committee, and the European Union Military Committee, but also selected committees of the European Parliament as well as the decision-makers at the government and ministry levels in the major capitals. Last but not least, a firmly institutionalised, EU-wide coordination of threat analyses could promote substantial reforms in Germany and improve the respective role of the Federal Security Council.
Authoritarian regimes have become the norm in many parts of the world. Following the third wave of transition to democracy1 (1974–1990), we have been talking about the third wave of authoritarianism since 1995.2 Many countries that were on the road to democracy have become stuck in a “grey zone” between incomplete democratisation and autocratic tendencies, where the road often leads back to the past. The signs of a democratic awakening have been deceiving, not only with regard to the states of the post-socialist sphere; established democracies have also been caught up in the maelstrom of an increasing authoritarian imposition of political styles and methods.
Much of this is taking place behind a legal façade that is mostly controlled by “elected autocrats” who undermine and subvert democratic institutions and procedures as well as the rule of law in the name of a “new democracy”.3 Their actions against liberal democracy follow a pattern: They stir up resentment and deepen social divisions; they gain legitimacy for these policies through elections won by “popular” measures such as resistance to immigration or by touting economic success. Political polarisation and the collapse of party systems are seen as crucial factors in the decline of democracies. Autonomous institutions, free media, and an independent judiciary are becoming the targets of illiberal practices, in Europe as well as in other regions of the world.
In the meantime, it has become clear that this trend cannot be countered with ad hoc policies. Nor can this decline in democratic governance be stopped by purely reactive measures in the form of warnings, complaints, or sanctions. In its foreign policy, Germany, as a democracy-oriented polity, must always consider anew when deciding about these cases as to whether engagement is, or could be, necessary – or even if it is worthwhile. If Germany wants to play a more prominent role in efforts to prevent further “backsliding” on democracy and human rights, it must first address the question of how a corresponding foreign policy can become more effective beyond symbolic actions and in view of the limited effectiveness of traditional travel diplomacy in its attempt to issue warnings to politicians around the world who are inclined to authoritarian rule. In concrete terms, it is necessary to clarify whether our country has a genuine opportunity to exert influence or is prepared to permanently assume the costs of resolving a crisis or overcoming the problems that triggered it.
Is Germany a democracy that is willing to defend itself and its principles also to the outside world?
It is part of the DNA of the Federal Republic of Germany to see itself as a contentious, defensible democracy at home. Articles 1 and 20 of the constitution (Grundgesetz) enshrine this status, in conjunction with Article 79.3. The defence of democracy and human rights has thus become the basis for the actions of all constitutional bodies and part of Germany’s foreign policy identity. Should this democratic policy mandate in foreign policy refer only to international relations or also to the domestic politics of other states? A distinction must be made here: First, the validity of our understanding of democracy extends into foreign policy in cases where the legal order in Germany is endangered or called into question in an international environment, for example due to terrorist attacks or cyberattacks on essential institutions of the democratic infrastructure, such as those for conducting elections. Second, respect for democracy is a good that cannot be limited by the oft-cited precept of inadmissible “interference in internal affairs”.
Looking at variants of authoritarianism and autocracies
The world of authoritarian states is not homogeneous. It will therefore hardly be possible to apply a uniform standard for foreign policy action against them. In addition, for many autocratic leaders, their international presence and the recognition it often brings are convenient instruments for consolidating power, which also gives them domestic political legitimacy. Those shaping German foreign policy are thus faced with a difficult problem: judgement cannot solely be based on an assessment of the “qualities” of the respective regime and its internal dynamics; it must also take the regional and global environment into account.
The spectrum of possible manifestations of authoritarian rule practices is very broad,4 ranging from repressive autocracies (as in North Korea and Syria) to liberal autocracies that still allow the media and civil societies to operate (as in Jordan and Morocco) to modernising autocracies that combine repressive elements with the granting of certain civil liberties (as is evident in the case of Saudi Arabia). A special position is occupied by “authoritarian gravity centres” such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, which not only exemplify and propagate an autocratic role model within a narrower regional framework, but even hone corresponding governing techniques through collective learning processes and disseminate them worldwide via common means of transmission.5 Germany’s close partners, such as Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, deserve special attention because they are expected to enforce democratic rules to a greater extent than can be demanded of regimes that are less close to it. In addition, it must be assessed as to whether the respective authoritarian regimes exhibit revisionist or even expansionist tendencies, that is, whether they are pursuing strategies that could change the international status quo. German foreign policy decision-makers must react in a correspondingly scaled manner to these states’ violations of the fundamental norms and rules of democracy. Democracy promotion – whether in the context of state cooperation or through civil society actors such as German political foundations – is also increasingly encountering resistance in the host countries, which limits, complicates, and even inhibits engagement in the promotion of human rights and political participation.
From external democracy promotion to an international policy of democratic resilience
Democracy promotion has been based on two approaches – one antagonistic and one facilitative: Specific punitive measures, such as those directed at particular individuals (as currently the case with the leaders of Belarus, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) or more comprehensive sanctions regimes (as in the example of Cuba) have sought to promote regime change, not least by supporting opposition members or subsidising their diaspora organisations. This is in contrast to the promotional approach, which focuses on democracy-building measures with the aim of expanding existing spaces for participation and helping a variety of voices to find expression in a pluralistic society. The aim is to provide an impetus in the hopes of encouraging parliaments, parties, the media, and civil society groups in the target countries to develop and expand democratic norms by means of imitation and persuasion, but also by setting conditionalities (such as in the EU accession process).6 The central point here is to create confidence in the institutions and procedures of democracy to prevent democratic competition from creating lines of conflict within society that cannot normally be dealt with by (still) weak institutions. This goal is primarily served by the classic instruments of promoting political parties and expanding spaces for participation by civil society actors. So far, the focus of such engagement has mostly been focused on the political elites, whose interests in maintaining power and social positions are often at odds with this concept of democracy promotion because it fails to engage them in democratic procedures.
Today, a new understanding of democracy promotion must be found, one that focuses not only on initiating and galvanising but also on defending democratic standards. This shifts the focus to the question of which instruments, procedures, and organisations are suitable for strengthening the resilience of democracies. The aim is to formulate a policy of democratic resilience7 that focuses on those institutional relationships which are essential for the functioning of democratic rule and can ward off anti-democratic behaviour, that is, robust institutions such as transparent and fair electoral procedures, the effective separation of powers, and free media. In this context, the transnational dimension of challenges to democracy must also be taken into account, for example the targeted external attacks on democratic procedures (such as elections) by means of hybrid interventions by other states.8
However, even such an ambitious programme to strengthen democratic resilience needs to identify its priorities, not only in terms of the selection of countries, but also in terms of its own possibilities. Given the limited resources for action, a policy of democratic resilience must focus on the early stages of autocratisation processes,9 on when existing freedoms can still be used, and on where resilience – especially of the judiciary – can still be strengthened. Once institutional relations have been massively weakened, such a policy can only react, and merely with a greatly reduced arsenal of options. A policy of democratic resilience is a policy “without red lines” that must act agilely and closely to the ground, even if the partners and institutions concerned are not democratically “flawless”. In doing so, one will still have to live with the criticism of applying “double standards”.
It is therefore advisable to adopt a preventive approach that does not follow static formats but allows for strategic adjustments in order to enhance and expand the performance of democratic procedures. It follows from this that countries such as El Salvador, Indonesia, and the Philippines should be considered with respect to the question about which measures of active de-polarisation or transformative re-polarisation can still be successful.10 This does not mean completely dispensing with the reciprocal strategies of opposition forces vis-à-vis state measures, but working with other themes and formats that neither reinforce nor strengthen existing patterns of polarisation. Such a strategy demands comprehensive local knowledge and the rapid availability of resources from the actors involved. The latter could be provided by a “resilience fund” from the German Federal Foreign Office that may be accessed without too much bureaucracy.
Setting priorities: A policy of democratic resilience must focus primarily on those institutions in states where threats are becoming visible or where a weakening of authoritarian rule practices (as is currently the case in Sudan, despite all the recent turbulent events) can be discerned. Robust institutions must be supported flexibly and promptly in the relevant states with “light” tools, that is, with little bureaucratic effort. Authoritarian gravity centres, for example, thus fall outside such a grid, as they are difficult to influence with proactive measures.
Politicisation of cooperation formats: Pursuing a policy of democratic resilience means showing “clear edges” and publicly addressing undesirable developments as such, in other countries as well. Those who want to combat the dismantling of democracy must formulate clear positions. Possible negative consequences should be mitigated through formats of risk and responsibility-sharing – in the national context through the development of network structures, digital formats, and multi-actor alliances; internationally through joint action by various donors and their implementing organisations. “Foreign agents” laws in countries such as Russia and El Salvador try to single out non-governmental organisations, journalists, and bloggers receiving grants from abroad to control or even inhibit their activities.
Counteracting the formation of international blocs: It is important to avoid driving governments with authoritarian tendencies into a common front in the mistaken assumption that democratic values and principles can be better enforced through the formation of a democratic bloc. With such an approach, the opposite effect could manifest: If the world is once again divided into blocs and new rifts are created, joint action is likely to become more difficult, or even impossible. Economic interdependence and social interaction remain important preconditions for influencing the authoritarian character of a regime.
Thinking Build Back Better on a Global Level: Strengthening Strategies from the Global South
Christina Saulich and Svenja Schöneich
“Build Back Better” (BBB) is a strategy for socio-economic recovery after the Corona pandemic. The aim is to compensate for weaknesses in the global economic system. In its Recovery and Resilience Plan and the European Recovery Plan, the German government has committed itself to aligning post-health crisis recovery with the premises of social justice and sustainability. While the focus so far has been on combating the pandemic and its consequences in Germany and Europe, the upcoming coalition government must think BBB in more global terms. Due to the high level of international interconnectedness in investment, trade, and the production of goods along global supply chains, the recovery and future resilience of the German and European economies also depend on the successful management of economic crises and political stability in countries of the Global South. The German government therefore needs to take the potential negative impacts of the German and European BBB strategies on other (sub-)continents or regions into account. Otherwise, these impacts may run the risk of thwarting Germany’s and Europe’s economic and development policy goals. To avoid this, the newly elected German government should initiate a “Global Dialogue on Recovery Strategies”.
Understanding regional recovery strategies
The economic recovery strategies of regions in the Global South and the Global North differ according to the socio-economic challenges that they consider to be particularly pressing. Where strategies overlap, for example the aim to strengthen regional value chains, the implementation of these strategies varies widely due to the different geographical contexts. For example, when comparing Latin American and African countries to most Asian countries, which have competitive manufacturing industries and high production capacities, consolidating regional value chains is a major challenge due to (with some exceptions) low levels of industrialisation. Both regions often function as suppliers of critical raw materials to the Global North in global supply chains and are therefore the focus of this article. Since the production and trade of goods is organised along global value chains, interventions at one point of the chain automatically affect the entire supply chain. In order to support crisis recovery in Latin America and Africa and to assess the potential impacts of the German and European BBB strategies on both continents, it is important to better understand regional BBB strategies.
European priorities
The European Union’s (EU) recovery plan “NextGenerationEU” and the seven-year budget adopted in 2021 put a strong emphasis on climate protection and digitalisation. The German Recovery and Resilience Plan largely coincides with the EU’s priorities because Germany played a key role in drafting the budget. A third of the investments at the EU level will finance the European “Green Deal”, which aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050. The “Just Transition Fund” is intended to mitigate the socio-economic costs of the green transition. Central elements in the European debate on BBB are the concepts of reshoring and nearshoring. In order to increase the EU’s strategic autonomy and security of supply – particularly with raw materials for the green transition – Brussels aims to relocate selected production facilities to EU member states or neighbouring countries. In June 2021, Germany also joined the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative in the wake of the G7 summit.1 B3W aims to promote large-scale investments in low- and middle-income countries in the areas of climate, health, digitalisation, and gender equality.
Build Back Better in Africa
In order to combat the pandemic, African states have centred on regional cooperation within the framework of the African Union (AU) and the African regional organisations, as well as on support from international actors such as the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation, but also from China. The regional strategy developed by the AU prioritises the building of resources to combat the coronavirus, inter alia by supporting the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. In February 2021, the AU called for the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), which also protects intellectual property rights of products and technologies used to combat the virus, to be suspended for the duration of the pandemic. The claim has so far been unsuccessful due to opposition from the EU, among others.
The mobilisation of financial resources is another important component of the African BBB strategy. However, there were limited effects of stimulus packages from the African Development Bank and international organisations as well as of the suspension of interest payments on public debt and sovereign bonds for low-income countries decided by the G20 finance ministers on the regional liquidity crisis. Finally, the AU is pushing for the rapid and effective implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched in January 2021, to boost economic reconstruction. By removing barriers to intra-regional trade, AfCFTA aims to strengthen intra-African value chains and attract foreign direct investment.2 It has the potential to increase the economic resilience of African states in the long term and can promote economic recovery in the medium term. However, the successful implementation of the free trade area requires extensive economic reforms in the AU member states, investments, and supportive measures to strengthen the private sector – in addition to political will.
Latin American strategies
Latin American countries have shown very different reactions to the pandemic. However, many are now pooling their efforts and formulating common goals for recovery. Regional organisations such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have identified the challenges the region is facing and have developed strategies for reconstruction. In doing so, they are focusing in particular on the problem of social inequality, which in most Latin American states coincides with a high level of mistrust in state institutions by the citizens. In some cases, non-transparent or even contradictory measures that were adopted to deal with the pandemic have reinforced the distance between citizens and their respective states. The recovery strategies of Latin American governments are therefore being directed at strengthening effective governance with a focus on social justice and sustainability. Digitalisation is among the most important instruments to reach this goal.
The extraction and export of raw materials is the main economic pillar of many Latin American countries. However, this sector has suffered massively from the crisis. The Latin American BBB strategy therefore aims to promote resource exports and restructure the entire extractive sector in a fairer and more sustainable way, for example through increased investments in new technologies and the expansion of renewable energies. Some countries have already introduced conditional cash transfer programmes that include incentives for environmental and health protection and sustainable production methods, and they have also adopted fiscal pacts with a focus on sustainable investment.3
The need for compatible regional strategies
The European economy is closely linked to production and processing sites in Latin America and Africa. Economic recovery and resilience in Europe and Germany depend on success against the pandemic as well as economic recovery in the two continents. Regional BBB strategies must therefore be compatible with each other. The future German government should make use of three central fields of action to strengthen the BBB strategies in Latin America and Africa. It should supplement these efforts by initiating a “Global Dialogue on Recovery Strategies”.
Establishing B3W as an attractive cooperation offer: Taking advantage of the German G7 presidency
The G7 countries present their B3W infrastructure project as a value-based and transparent alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). B3W seeks to establish partnerships of equals between G7 countries and countries of the Global South. However, distribution of the Corona vaccines and the decision not to suspend patent protection on vaccines have re-manifested existing global power imbalances and cast doubt on the credibility of the B3W initiative. In contrast, many countries in the Global South have viewed China’s mask and vaccine diplomacy positively. At the same time, some governments in the target regions are critical of Beijing’s actions in the context of the BRI.
B3W offers an opportunity for Germany to position itself, together with the G7, as an attractive partner for middle- and low-income countries. Against the backdrop of the smouldering rivalry between China and the United States, however, the initiative should not be designed as a rival to the BRI but instead create attractive offers for cooperation for its target countries. An important step in this direction would be to align investments with the recovery strategies of the partner regions. The newly elected German government should seize the opportunity of the upcoming G7 presidency to play a key role in shaping the criteria for implementing B3W. Looking at Germany’s Due Diligence Act and the one being planned by Europe, priority should be given to compliance with high sustainability and transparency standards. These standards and the mechanisms for monitoring them should be defined jointly with the partner countries.
Designing nearshoring fairly: Strengthening local supply chains through EU trade policy
Supply shortages during the pandemic have revealed weaknesses in the hitherto organisation of supply chains. The EU as well as countries in the Global South therefore seek to promote regional supply chains by nearshoring or reshoring specific economic sectors. In resource-rich countries in Latin America and Africa with weak processing industries, this cannot be achieved without an additional push towards industrialisation. If the EU was to transfer some industrial processing (closer to) to Europe, this would thwart current efforts to promote the creation and consolidation of robust local value chains in both regions. The future German government should therefore use its strong voice in the EU to advocate for the promotion of economically, socially, and ecologically sustainable and transparent processing industries in countries of the Global South within the framework of European trade policy. It should aim to strengthen the resilience to crises in international supply chains and to increase its own security of supply.
With regard to Africa, the new German government should advocate broadening the support for AfCFTA at the next EU-AU summit. The EU could supplement existing measures by promoting the building of production capacities and the creation of a mechanism that mitigates economic and social inequalities within AfCFTA. At the same time, the EU should not push for economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with individual African regional organisations. EPAs could negatively impact the implementation of AfCFTA and the development of manufacturing industries in the free trade area. In addition, European and international investment programmes, such as the EU External Investment Plan for Africa, the G20’s Compact with Africa, and B3W, should be more closely aligned with AfCFTA. With regard to Latin America, Germany should advocate for taking into account not only trade policy considerations but also the expansion of sustainable, local processing industries during negotiations on bilateral free trade agreements, for example between Chile and the EU.
Thinking globally about the energy transition: Implementing measures for a just transition
The German and European BBB strategies focus on the green transition. Potential negative effects of the EU’s decarbonisation strategy in other regions have been given little consideration so far. However, the current focus on securing the supply of critical minerals, which are indispensable for the development of green technologies, should not neglect the social and ecological impacts in countries where minerals are extracted and processed, nor the goal of promoting local value creation. Planned policy instruments for the implementation of the “Green Deal”, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for imports, pose economic challenges for coal-dependent countries in the Global South. These countries lack access to the technologies and financial leeway needed to drive the energy transition and mitigate its social costs. Reducing the negative social and environmental impacts of the extraction and processing of raw materials in the Global South is an important prerequisite for increasing the sustainability of end products produced in Germany. To achieve this, the new German government should focus on technology and knowledge transfers within the framework of bilateral partnerships. Furthermore, in the course of its upcoming G7 presidency, it should advocate for the creation of a global fund to mitigate the socio-economic costs of the energy transition in countries of the Global South.
The three fields of action highlight that a lack of compatibility between regional BBB strategies can thwart efforts to achieve an equitable and sustainable global recovery. The creation of a “Global Dialogue on Recovery Strategies” would be an appropriate tool to discuss and coordinate regional priorities for building back better and their impacts.
Formative Change
Integrating Climate Ambition and Energy Diplomacy in Foreign Policy
Susanne Dröge and Kirsten Westphal
In the past, Germany’s climate and energy diplomacy had many overlaps and interlinkages. However, they followed separate path dependencies and were largely dealt with individually.1 The energy sector accounts for two-thirds of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and is thus central to the climate agenda. In order to rapidly increase the low-carbon supply of electricity and hydrogen, renewable energy production has to be expanded considerably and energy efficiency must be improved. This should be accompanied by a modernisation and repurposing of long-standing infrastructures in industry as well as existing buildings, and transport networks. With the Green Deal, the European Union (EU) is adding new climate initiatives for industry, transport, and agriculture to its agenda. Climate protection, energy, technology, and industrial policy are thus becoming increasingly integrated. Internationally, however, they are subject to geo-economic rivalries. Accordingly, Germany’s energy and climate foreign policy conduct needs both a step change and a strategic set-up for the next couple of years.
Climate ambitions and a changing energy sector
Following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 24 March 2021,2 the Federal Government has committed itself to achieving climate neutrality by 2045 and a 65 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. This reinforces once more the primacy of climate protection. Yet, the German energy consumption mix is still dominated by fossil fuels: Oil has a share of 33.7 per cent, natural gas 26.6 per cent, coal 15.8 per cent, nuclear 6 per cent, and renewable energies only 16.6 per cent.3
Moreover, the EU has decided to become climate neutral by 2050, too; EU-wide, emissions are to be reduced by 55 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990. As part of the “Fit for 55” package, the European Commission proposed a first set of measures in July 2021, and the European post-pandemic recovery plan, “NextGenerationEU”, includes the promotion of climate-friendly investments.4
There is no alternative but to initiate far-reaching and rapid decarbonisation through closer international cooperation, as it is technically difficult and expensive for Europe to undertake the energy transition on its own, not to mention the potential disruptions at its external borders and in its relations with the neighbourhood. German and European climate diplomacy therefore has to maintain and deepen the climate policy consensus of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Energy diplomacy needs to be intensified for both the “phase-out” of fossil energy sources and the “phase-in” of green and clean electrons and molecules.5
A coal phase-out as the prevailing global climate solution
The global phase-out of coal combustion is a climate policy goal of many members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Global coal consumption is consistently high – despite the pandemic – and is being driven by China, which burns around 56 per cent of the global coal supply.6 Germany had announced a phase-out of its coal-fired power generation by 2038 that was to be accompanied by a socially acceptable transformation (“just transition”), and the new government coalition wants to speed up the end of coal by the target date of 2030. In the long term, however, it will also be necessary to phase out natural gas in order to meet climate targets.
How much and how quickly oil consumption in Germany and the EU will decline depends on how extensively climate-neutral energies are used for transport and mobility. A rapid reduction in oil consumption will have far-reaching geopolitical consequences, as the EU accounts for 12 per cent of global consumption.7 The EU’s shift away from oil will severely affect countries in its wider neighbourhood such as Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, and Azerbaijan. As far as oil production is concerned, the shares of the Arab Gulf states and Russia could continue to rise. The turnaround in the climate policy of the United States (US) under President Joe Biden implies that the US will set a regulatory limit on extended and expanded oil (and gas) production.8
Expansion of renewable energies and the importance of Europe
The use of renewable energies is on the rise globally. However, neither the pace nor the capacity is sufficient to meet the demand, let alone permanently slow global warming. Even if Europe still has the potential for more renewables investment, Germany and the EU will have to import green electricity as well as carbon-neutral hydrogen to meet their needs. For this, pipelines and grids will have to be expanded on a pan-European basis. Moreover, the European energy transition depends on new technological solutions such as offshore wind farms, more efficient batteries, and electrolysers. Metals and rare earths, as well as the complex supply chains for raw materials and technological components, add to the list of new foreign policy challenges. Climate-neutral raw materials and energy sources must be available promptly, reliably, and cost-effectively if European industries are to avoid competitive disadvantages.
External relations in climate and energy: Interfaces, divergences, and partners
Climate and external energy relations need guardrails if they aim at supporting the reduction in fossil fuel imports and the expansion of climate-friendly alternatives. Germany and the EU should, in a first step, develop the necessary norms, standards, and rules within the EU and the European Economic Area, the Energy Community, and the United Kingdom.9 Hydrogen in particular has to be integrated into the EU’s Energy Union. In a second step, these guardrails must also be negotiated and implemented globally. Trade policy rules, coordinated carbon pricing, and climate- and energy-related standards for key sectors and goods must be negotiated and agreed with the US, China, and Japan as well as other G20 members.
In view of limited diplomatic resources, it is necessary to focus on key partner countries in the Afro-Euro-Asian ellipse.10 This refers to countries in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Caspian regions with which climate policy cooperation as well as old and new energy policy issues need to be addressed. They provide the production sites as well as important grids for green electrons and molecules.
Dealings with Russia remain arguably the greatest geopolitical and economic task due to its pre-eminent position as a supplier of oil, gas, and raw materials. The potential for escalation is high; the most prominent example being the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Furthermore, the planned de-coupling of the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Moldova from the post-Soviet electricity grid constitutes another critical issue. The integration of Ukraine into the European energy market is already a political priority. Cooperation with Russia on hydrogen could help to shape a positive agenda and strike a balance between cooperation, confrontation, and competition.
Finally, the Maghreb, Egypt, and Turkey are key energy countries and also bridgeheads to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where interconnectivity dynamics are unfolding. The economic and logistical corridors that are emerging in these regions have to be developed, as part of both the EU-Africa partnership and the Green Deal.
Whether the partner countries will commit themselves more strongly to low-carbon energy sources and production will not least depend on their political approaches to dealing with an increasing number of climate change-driven extreme weather events.
Options for a proactive German diplomacy
German climate and energy diplomacy needs a step change with the aim of transforming the patchwork of German climate and energy partnerships into a more coherent landscape. Such a change should be based on priorities that reflect geographical and substantive policy goals. The new German government should take stock of its energy and climate policy interests with a view to its respective foreign partners and draw up a strategy that reflects these interests.
One of the priorities is dealing with fossil fuel suppliers. So far, Germany’s interests in security of supply on the one hand, and climate action on the other, are not aligned, which is creating tensions. Such tensions can be reduced, yet it is important that government departments prioritise issues based on environmental, development, and foreign trade policy considerations. These priorities should become part of a coordination process between the ministries that minimises contradictory signals in foreign relations much more than in the past. The decarbonisation of the gas value chain will pose a particular challenge in this respect.
From a geographic angle, energy policy has to be developed along concentric circles. Climate policy interests have to be added in order to complement and specify the approach. For a rapid and far-reaching transformation towards climate neutrality, existing as well as new infrastructures matter as much as a common legal and normative framework. These priorities demand a refocusing on the EU and other European partners, including the neighbouring regions of the North, the Baltic, the Black Sea, as well as the Mediterranean. Policymakers have to develop forums for the EU’s “electricity neighbours” and the “hydrogen neighbours” along industrial centres, routes, and networks. Moreover, Germany has to carry forward these new dimensions of foreign policy to the European level of trade policymaking. Existing and future trade agreements help to set standards and lower transaction costs – at best this will also have an impact on progress at the World Trade Organization.
The trade policy debate on climate action has come alive in view of the Commission’s proposal to introduce a border carbon adjustment levy on certain energy-intensive goods entering the EU market from 2026. The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) will be based on the CO2 content of the production processes abroad.11 Some EU neighbours have already reacted by signalling an interest in national CO2 pricing, and OECD partners would also like to cooperate with the EU on this issue. However, China and Russia, among others, are highly sceptical and have thought aloud about retaliation should the CBAM be put into force. The German government should not give in to such rhetoric and instead use the window of opportunity in 2022 to put climate protection on a common footing – namely CO2 price and emissions standards – with the G7 partners, the G20, and other groups.
The energy and climate policy tools and their national implementation will remain important topics also in negotiations at the United Nations (UN) level, the G‑formats, and in existing multilateral institutions. However, for effective regional and global cooperation, multilateral institutions are still lacking. New technologies, energy sources, interconnectivity, standards, and norms need to be addressed in detail. In order to facilitate this, the growing number of parallel forums should be consolidated around these issues as quickly as possible. This would be a task for the German G7 presidency in 2022, with which the new German government could raise its profile.
The prominence that the impacts of climate change and the pressure for more climate protection have gained in politics and the public sphere has made decarbonisation part of the contest for global leadership in Europe and the US. This contest is reflected in UN climate negotiations but also in economic competition over future technologies. Only together with its European partners can Germany achieve the critical mass and develop the foreign policy levers to prevail in this contest. To be more assertive, technological leadership, standard-setting, regulatory space, and market size should be the guiding principles of a new energy and climate foreign policy strategy, and they must be added to the diplomatic toolbox if it is to carry more weight.
German and European Asylum and Migration Policy: Why a More Forward‑looking Approach Is Needed
Steffen Angenendt, Nadine Biehler, Nadine Knapp, Anne Koch, and Amrei Meier
In recent years, German and European asylum and migration policy has been strongly crisis-driven, especially during and after the large-scale migratory movements of 2015/2016, with governments mainly trying to limit the number of incoming refugees and irregular migrants through short-term national measures.
However, the costs of a merely reactive mode of action are high, especially in this policy area. The ad hoc approaches of the past have had problematic consequences – among these legitimising the Libyan coast guard and its practices that violate human rights, strengthening Turkey’s increasingly autocratic government, and perpetuating the degrading conditions for refugees on the Greek islands. In reaction to this, the German government and the European Commission have been criticised by the European Parliament as well as the United Nations (UN) and human rights organisations for violating European and international law, in particular the 1951 Refugee Convention.1 In addition, this mode of policy-making fuels doubts about the ability of those in power to deal with complex challenges related to migration and displacement. The main beneficiaries of this are populist parties and movements that offer supposedly simple solutions. A predominantly reactive policy ultimately misses opportunities to address migration challenges and to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to sustainable development – the main objectives of the Global Compact on Migration, adopted by the majority of UN member states on 10 December 2018 in Marrakesh. Against this background, the European Union (EU) and its member states should adopt a more forward-looking asylum and migration policy. There is a favourable opportunity for this, at least in Germany. First, in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, public attention to issues of displacement and migration has waned, allowing for a more factual approach to these polarising issues in domestic politics. Second, internationally, Germany’s reputation with regard to its asylum and migration policy has risen due to it being one of the main refugee-hosting countries. This goes hand in hand with growing expectations about German engagement in this policy area, and with demands being placed on the Federal Government to address longer-term issues concerning asylum and migration policy. Third, the recent federal election and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to break out of previous path dependencies based on a reactive policy mode. A more strategic, sustainable, and effective asylum and migration policy is based on (1) identifying problems, challenges, and opportunities to be expected in the medium and long term, (2) identifying conflicting goals, determining objectives, and prioritising them, and (3) expanding Germany’s competence to shape policy in a targeted manner.
Problems, challenges, and opportunities
Both forced displacement and irregular migration have increased in recent years. A reversal of this trend is not in sight. At the same time, Germany and Europe are dependent on immigration. This is the only way to cushion the impact of demographic changes and to counter the labour shortages that exist and continue to grow in many sectors of the economy. Dealing with these challenges and opportunities is made more difficult due to the unwillingness of EU member states to pursue policies that address asylum and migration objectives in equal measure. This continues to be a problem because EU member states are affected to different degrees by refugee movements, and each has specific migration policy interests. Over time, however, these differences will diminish.
This applies to migration, for one thing. Most European countries are now in a phase of demographic transition, in which their populations are ageing and shrinking,2 resulting in political, economic, and social consequences that are hard to predict and difficult to manage. The ongoing convergence of interests in favour of labour immigration is accelerated by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. It has shown, on the one hand, that the shortage of seasonal workers in agriculture and of skilled workers in the health sector is structural in nature. On the other hand, it has made it obvious that the previously abundant labour pools in the countries on the periphery of the EU are also limited. As international competition for labour increases, a rules-based and rights-based approach to international labour mobility is becoming an important asset.
There are also growing common interests in refugee and asylum policy that should be highlighted. In general, there are concerns with regard to reducing the root causes of forced displacement and stabilising countries of origin and host countries so that humanitarian emergencies are avoided and the pressure on asylum systems is reduced. Europe’s capacity to act in this area should be strengthened through selective cooperation on key issues, for example in the context of a joint resettlement initiative or in relation to migration in the context of training partnerships.
Conflicting objectives and target-setting
In order to transform German and European asylum and migration policy into a proactive mode, it is not only necessary to identify current and future challenges and opportunities. There is also a need for a corresponding definition of policy goals. In this context, an open and evidence-based debate on conflicting goals and areas of tension is essential.
Conflicting goals exist, among other instances, with regard to reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. This applies, for example, to cooperation with authoritarian regimes, which may seem necessary from a security policy perspective in order to reduce irregular migration in the short term. However, it is fundamentally at odds with the overarching goal of foreign and development policy to strengthen good governance in partner countries.3
Similar trade-offs exist in the recruitment of labour, which is becoming increasingly important for the economic development of many industrialised countries. This applies not only to skilled workers, but also to lower-skilled jobs in home care and domestic services. Such recruitment can conflict with development policy efforts to prevent brain drain. Fundamental conflicts of this kind cannot usually be resolved. Instead, they require a balancing of interests. To this end, it is necessary to set thematic and geographical priorities and to assess long-term and short-term interests. The basis must be the existing obligations under human, international, and European refugee and migration law, in particular the 1951 Refugee Convention. More recent international agreements, such as the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration, are helpful.
Against this backdrop, there is an urgent need for priority action with regard to refugees, especially in the following key areas: responsibility-sharing within the EU as well as globally, the creation of more legal migration pathways to Germany and the EU, an improvement of the reception facilities at the EU’s external borders, and increased support for major refugee-hosting countries outside of the EU. In this, the German government should lead the way with like-minded (EU) states instead of waiting for a common European solution.
Elements of a strategically oriented asylum and migration policy
In order to pursue the strategic goals and expand Germany’s competence in shaping asylum and migration policy, the new Federal Government should become particularly active in the following areas.
For one, a number of institutional and organisational reforms are needed. In addition to strengthening interministerial coherence, thematic analysis and forecasting capacities in particular should be expanded. The concerns and opportunities for action by the private sector, civil society, and municipal actors should be taken into account more systematically than has been the case. In addition, the external dimensions of Germany’s asylum and migration policy should be better coordinated, along the lines of the Swiss whole-of-government approach in migration policy, for example. Such an approach would give sufficient weight to foreign, security, economic, and development policy objectives and enable better cooperation between the relevant ministries and subordinate authorities. Part of this process could be annual asylum and migration summits at which all stakeholders discuss the direction of policy.4 In order for the Federal Government to effectively represent its interests and goals in international processes, two things are required. First, migration-related knowledge must be anchored in the German administration in a sustainable and interministerial manner, which presupposes appropriate staffing. Second, there is a need for the continued and expanded secondment of German personnel to the relevant UN agencies and international organisations (such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, and the International Labour Organization). Finally, flexible, multi-year, and reliable funding is a central element of any strategically oriented policy.
Additionally, long-term sustainable partnerships with countries of origin and transit are an essential component of an effective, legitimate, and sustainable asylum and migration policy. This requires flexible approaches that are tailored to the actors involved and allow for solutions that go beyond the respective legislative period. Moreover, partnerships must be based on mutual trust and include the interests of both sides. Since this has been insufficiently taken into account, especially in the EU’s approaches, the Federal Government should also advocate effective and sustainable migration partnerships that are backed by concrete targets at the European level. The Commission’s proposal for a new migration and asylum package already provides an important basis for this. However, the partnership idea contained in it has not yet been given concrete form. The implementation proposals are one-sidedly oriented towards migration management and cooperation on return and reintegration without adequately taking into account the interests of potential partner countries, for example in legal migration channels and greater international mobility.5
Outlook
The beginning of the new legislative period offers a favourable opportunity to give German asylum and migration policy a more strategic orientation. This opportunity should be seized. Migration pressure is expected to remain high, not least because of the economic disruption resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, but also because of existing or newly escalated violent conflicts worldwide, for example in Afghanistan. Once pandemic-related restrictions on mobility are eased, the number of refugees and migrants arriving in the EU is also likely to rise again. In dealing with these challenges, the mistake of poor communication – as was committed in the past, for example in the context of the Global Compact for Migration – should be avoided. Instead, the new Federal Government should proactively justify and promote potentially controversial decisions in asylum and migration policy.
At the same time, every opportunity must be seized at the European and international levels to ensure that asylum and migration policy is developed in line with human rights and Germany’s long-term interests. For example, the new Federal Government should advocate for an expansion of legal immigration channels beyond the ongoing negotiations in the context of the EU’s asylum and migration package. At the international level, it should support the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, the Global Compact for Migration, and the Sustainable Development Goals. On the one hand, this offers starting points for improving global refugee protection and adapting it to the challenges of climate change. On the other hand, migration that promotes development must be strengthened through better mobility regulations and the fair recruitment of workers.
Between War and Peace: How to Raise Germany’s Profile in Crisis Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa
Melanie Müller and Judith Vorrath
The primacy of crisis prevention is an integral part of foreign policy rhetoric in Germany. The election manifestos of almost all political parties represented in the Bundestag refer to the goal of preventing crises and violent conflicts. The importance of crisis prevention is also emphasised in the Federal Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy Guidelines (Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Promoting Peace) and in the 2021 report on their implementation. Moreover, the approach has repeatedly been a programmatic focus, for example during Germany’s recent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The German government now provides far-reaching resources and is expanding its capacities in early warning. But a gap between aspirations and reality remains because decisions on initiatives and measures during imminent crisis situations are often still taken too late or half-heartedly. The new coalition government should therefore fundamentally raise Germany’s profile in this area, place crisis prevention higher on the political agenda, and create the institutional conditions for taking a position and acting in a coordinated manner before critical junctures are reached.
Despite visible improvements in recent years – from early warning to inter-ministerial coordination and the design of concrete instruments – the challenge to act earlier, more flexibly, and in a more targeted manner persists. Preventive measures are still rarely prioritised, despite discernible warning signals. However, those who wait for the breaking headlines will hardly be able to make a significant contribution towards preventing crises. If this primacy is to be filled with substance, crisis prevention must be given a higher political priority and be firmly embedded in all the relevant ministries. In order to translate increasing pressure for action into tangible initiatives, however, capacities in the administration must also be strengthened. Here the links between strategic foresight and the units in the ministries responsible for policies in specific regions and countries are particularly important. The new German government could focus particularly on contexts in sub-Saharan African states, where decisive turning points between war and peace are looming. This would be in Germany’s interest for various reasons. Moreover, the room for manoeuvre in this part of the African continent is sometimes greater and the international environment less entrenched than in parts of the Southern neighbourhood.1
Early prevention instead of wait and see
It is not surprising news that, in many geopolitical contexts, the line between war and peace is increasingly blurred, conflicts are becoming entrenched, and violence is repeatedly breaking out. Thus, they rarely follow the ideal-type conflict cycles and instead fluctuate between different stages. Under these conditions, it is difficult to find starting points for effective prevention that not only seeks to avoid the outbreak of violent conflict, but also works against its escalation or recurrence after a phase of relative calm. International actors frequently shy away from the complexities of such situations and the possible material – and political – follow-up costs. As a result, effective crisis prevention is often least likely to take place where it is most urgently needed. The German government’s White Paper on Multilateralism of May 2021, for example, primarily emphasises early and structural prevention – alongside efforts by the UN and the European Union (EU). It is generally correct to start with the framework conditions in fragile states. However, longer-term projects, such as the reform of state institutions and multilateral formats, quickly reach their limits when political (and security) developments take a problematic turn. Moreover, the EU does not always have the necessary influence as an actor in these contexts.
The patterns of conflict in several contexts in recent years – including in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon – have shown that, when signs of destabilisation increase, it is not too late to act, but options are significantly narrowed. For example, it becomes more difficult to access areas with an eroding security situation, and thus to reach local actors (for dialogue processes, for example) and gather information. The respective government sometimes tries to play down violence and insecurity so as to conceal or dismiss the underlying causes. Moreover, extremist threats, as in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, tend to be transnational. But cooperation with neighbouring countries is not always possible or desirable, especially when violence is already occurring. Under such conditions, development cooperation projects usually have to be scaled back or switched to “remote control”.
The example of Mozambique has recently highlighted the main problems arising in such a scenario. The lack of clarity in the situation leads some international actors to react with a wait-and-see attitude, which is linked to the hope that the conflict could still develop differently. In the meantime, regional powers or other influential states may enter the scene and push for an “iron-fist” policy. State actors such as Russia or (more or less) private security companies are then on the spot and ready to intervene militarily at an early stage. But it is precisely this kind of repressive approach against violent extremist actors that often proves to be insufficient or even counterproductive. Security measures are certainly needed, at the latest when violence breaks out. However, these must be applied in a targeted and coordinated manner and complemented by other approaches. In addition, political channels should be used and offers of support made before (African) states officially request military assistance.
In the past, the wait-and-see attitude also repeatedly put Germany in situations it actually wanted to avoid: ultimately having to decide on the deployment of its own military forces or being called upon to provide support for armed operations. The debate about the recent EU training mission in Mozambique is another example. Of course, the German government can hardly stop a crisis by itself. But it can provide more targeted support than in the past to influence developments at critical junctures in such a way that they may develop in a more positive direction. Establishing and expanding channels of communication as well as linking structural and operational prevention measures are fundamentally important. To this end, Germany should position itself more firmly at an early stage when there are signs of a critical escalation and address “tricky” cases more decisively. Countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mozambique may not be very high on the foreign policy agenda. However, this was also true for Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan before the outbreaks of violence there – all countries where Germany has since spent considerable resources for stabilisation. Moreover, German interests in the sub-Saharan crisis zones are affected in many ways – whether regarding the causes of flight, terrorism, regional stability, and/or responsibilities towards partners and actors in the countries themselves.
Acting at critical junctures
A key to effective preventive action is a stronger focus on potential critical junctures, where pivotal decisions are made in an uncertain environment that set the course for a longer period. In retrospect, these junctures preceding the outbreak or escalation of armed conflict are relatively easy to identify. They are often associated with incisive events – such as coups, as in Mali in 2012; initial outbreaks of violence, such as the attack on a police station in northern Mozambique in October 2017; or harsh responses by the central state to protests, as in the Anglophone areas of Cameroon in 2016/2017 – each of which was then followed by further violence. Of course, critical junctures can also generate positive momentum, for example when new windows of opportunity open, as in the case of the transition in Sudan.
Such events with long reverberations are difficult to predict, but there are a number of signals along the way. In order not to miss possible entry points for (increased) engagement, discussions about potential critical junctures in the foreseeable future should be systematically included in conflict analysis and scenario planning. In this way, instances of increasing pressure and options for preventive action can be identified more concretely and earlier. This requires breaking away even further from the idea of a common conflict cycle and analysing more specifically – on the basis of the case and the political environment, both nationally and internationally – where there is scope for intervention.
Considering “atypical” courses of conflict
The precondition is a continuous examination of the situation as well as a consistent questioning of traditional assumptions. External actors tend to continue to interpret crisis developments in one direction once they have been clearly perceived. In countries such as Burkina Faso and Mozambique, for example, extremist threats had been taking shape for some time. When they became virulent, support was focused primarily on the military level. This reaction corresponded to the preferences of the governments concerned but was also promoted by some European partners. Instead, it is important to explore starting points for prevention more thoroughly before security erodes and – in the event of actual destabilisation – to continue to identify countervailing tendencies or divergent paths that do not necessarily lead directly to a military solution. It is debatable to what extent, for example, the support of the government of Burkina Faso for (local) negotiations with extremists in different parts of the country really was meant to be a way out of the mired “iron-fist” policy. But such processes could at least open a window of opportunity for other approaches. To assess such situations with regard to possible entry points for action, it is also necessary to sharpen one’s eye for potentially atypical courses of conflict. This, in turn, presupposes the further expansion of capacities for analysis and foresight in the ministries involved.
If the new Federal Government wants to make crisis prevention more effective, it must determine its own positions and the relationship of this goal to other objectives of German foreign policy. Only if there is support for this at a higher political level can prevention efforts be intensified before or during potential critical junctures. There is already awareness within the administration that it is essential to translate the results of early warning into early and substantive action. However, despite improved analysis, the meaning of “early” often remains a matter of discretion for the individual bureaucrats who decide about prioritising preventive measures in response to warning signs – or not.
Formative change needs leadership
Crisis prevention would have to be more firmly embedded in all the relevant ministries in order to be an integral part of the guiding principles of German foreign policy. In certain cases – for example, when Germany has vested interests and coordinated action with corresponding international visibility is called for – a stronger role of the chancellery might be necessary. In addition, crisis prevention needs to be permanently embedded in day-to-day business in the form of a permanent focal point that integrates all the relevant ministries and provides them with the capacities to support those responsible for preventive measures in implementing their mandates. Finally, the Bundestag has an important role to play in critically observing an approach for active crisis prevention.
A more proactive positioning of Germany in crisis prevention could meaningfully complement the work of the UN and the EU in this field. Experience shows that coordination processes can take a long time in these institutional contexts, resulting in critical windows of opportunity being missed. In this way, Germany could also meet the demand for a greater contribution to peace and security without having to resort to military intervention – which is highly controversial within the population – although security policy measures will continue to be part of the toolbox. For initiating political processes, the EU framework can be used in a more targeted manner. Where this path is blocked, Germany could lead the way with like-minded states (also outside Europe). This is particularly appropriate in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where the German government has invested heavily in recent years to improve cooperation in the field of peace and security. Cooperation with the African Union and its sub-regional organisations could be further expanded here to broaden the scope for action.
For this conceptual change to take place, several preconditions must be met: In addition to data-based early warning, the country units in the respective ministries and the aforementioned institutional interfaces – and certainly also the embassies – need to be adequately equipped. In addition, the German government must bring political weight to bear – not only in concrete bilateral and regional cooperation, but also at the international level wherever necessary. Moreover, it is important to explore the broad spectrum of political and financial options – aimed at supporting not only the state level but also civil society actors – for managing critical junctures. In this sense, structural and operational prevention should be closely coordinated.2
The course for such an active shaping of crisis prevention would have to be set at the beginning of the legislative period. Above all, Germany’s foreign policy profile needs to be clearly embedded in the agenda of the new Federal Government and in the inter-ministerial cooperation as well as supported with the appropriate resources.
Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. Germany’s European and Global Responsibility
Germany is committed to the transatlantic alliance and advocates for disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both political principles can be combined by declaration, but in practice they are in latent tension with each other. For this reason, Berlin’s arms control policy appears ambiguous and untrustworthy. In order to live up to its global and European responsibilities, a future German government must make its alliance and disarmament policy more coherent. This can succeed if it encourages the Biden administration in its deliberations on a change of strategy, makes more credible contributions to conventional alliance defence, and promotes a new beginning for conventional arms control in Europe more decidedly than before.
Balancing act between normative non-proliferation policy and nuclear sharing
On the one hand, Germany has committed itself to the status of a non-nuclear weapons state in both the Two Plus Four Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is obliged to renounce the production, acquisition, and control of nuclear weapons. According to the NPT, it must contribute towards their elimination.
On the other hand, Berlin supports the strategic concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which defines itself as a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. Its policy of “extended deterrence” does not exclude the first use of nuclear weapons. To this end, the United States (US) has “strategic” delivery systems with intercontinental range. Within the framework of nuclear sharing, it has also stationed “sub-strategic” (formerly: “tactical”) nuclear free-fall bombs in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. In order to be able to use them in the event of war, these states keep their own nuclear-capable combat aircraft (dual-capable aircraft”, DCA) ready. Conventional air operations by seven other Allies are to support the DCA in penetrating protected airspace.
The prerequisite for allied deployments of nuclear weapons would be their release by the President of the United States. Prior to this, the NATO Council is to take a position. The Nuclear Planning Group discusses political principles of nuclear deterrence and procedures in the event of the release of nuclear weapons. It includes all Allies except France, which has an autonomous nuclear strategy. Release procedures are planned by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, who is also the commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe.
In January 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. It prohibits the support of nuclear weapons postures of other states. Therefore, Germany cannot join the TPNW as long as it supports NATO’s deterrence concept and adheres to nuclear sharing.
In addition, Berlin is of the opinion that the TPNW presents a normative goal, which it shares, but it is not proposing any concrete steps on how nuclear disarmament can be advanced. Rather, it has deepened the political divisions among the NPT parties. Together with nuclear and non-nuclear states, Berlin wants to develop realistic prerequisites for effective disarmament. This would include comprehensive international verification of the life cycles of nuclear weapons, from the start of enrichment to the dismantling of weapons-grade fissile material. This would be the only way to prevent individual actors from secretly retaining nuclear weapons in the final phase of disarmament.
This essentially useful approach, however, does not get to the heart of the problem, for in the view of the nuclear powers and their Allies, nuclear weapons are also intended to deter a conventional attack. This is particularly appealing to Allies of the US, who rely on the latter’s “positive nuclear security guarantees”. They consider the “negative security guarantees” that are given in the NPT context to be insufficient. These are commitments by nuclear powers to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, provided they belong to nuclear-weapon-free zones, abide by NPT obligations in a certifiable manner, do not attack the troops of the guarantor powers, and do not ally with other nuclear powers. Instead, strong military powers would have to credibly guarantee that they would also refrain from conventional attacks. The prerequisite for this, however, would be effective conventional arms control in the conflict regions of Europe, East and South Asia, and the Middle East – or a political settlement of the conflicts.
Since neither of these is likely to occur in the foreseeable future, the nuclear powers claim that the political situation does not allow them to fully comply with the disarmament obligation under Article VI of the NPT. But this obligation applies in principle and unconditionally. Therefore, they and their Allies are coming under increasing pressure to justify their position. Why should nuclear weapons – in contradiction to NPT norms – be indispensable to preserve their national security, while all other states are obliged to renounce them? One can, of course, counter this with arguments based on realpolitik. But these challenge the acceptance of the NPT, since it is obviously about preserving the global supremacy of the five official nuclear powers (P5). In the long run, this is likely to damage the normative approach of the NPT and jeopardise the goal of non-proliferation. The entry into force of the TPNW is a sign of growing impatience.
Thus, the German dual approach of advocating for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons and at the same time actively supporting nuclear security guarantees threatens to fail because of the inherent contradiction between postulated goals and real action.
The credibility dilemma of nuclear first‑use
Doubts about the credibility of the nuclear escalation threat have also gained new relevance since NATO’s return to extended deterrence. For 50 years, the US and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) have accepted parity in “strategic” delivery systems and regularly ensured the continuation of “second-strike capability” through arms control treaties. Since that time, both sides have had the ability to launch devastating counter-attacks if attacked with nuclear weapons on their own territory (“first strike”). The “mutually assured destruction capability” realistically excludes a “strategic” nuclear escalation against the core territories (“sanctuaries”) of both states.
Therefore, there is a danger that escalation could occur at the expense of Allies with “tactical” nuclear weapons (TNWs). For Bonn, the idea that divided Germany could become a “nuclear battlefield” was unacceptable. Therefore, NATO’s “flexible response” strategy left it open as to when, how, and where the alliance would respond with nuclear weapons in the event of war, and it provided for a graduated, initially selective escalation. Although this strategy is no longer used, its purpose remains to threaten the aggressor with incalculable risks that would be out of all reasonable proportion to conceivable gains.
Nuclear sharing is a legacy of the Cold War that has remained untouched to this day. At the time, Bonn permitted the stationing of some 5,000 US TNWs and provided hundreds of German Army and Air Force delivery systems. Alongside the US and the United Kingdom, West Germany thus secured a special say in the formulation of the NATO nuclear concept. But then, as now, only the US President decides on nuclear escalation and the “release” of US nuclear weapons to German units. Priority is given to the national security interests of the US.
However, the political and military situations have changed fundamentally. Germany is united; the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have disintegrated; the enlarged NATO extends 1,000 km east of the Elbe River. It is conventionally superior to Russia. Nonetheless, NATO “frontline states” fear an attack by Russian forces that could concentrate sub-regionally more rapidly than those of its Allies. The alliance has been responding to this since 2014 with military reinforcement measures.
The US and Russia have significantly reduced the number of their strategic nuclear weapons since 1990 and withdrawn and reduced the mass of TNWs from Europe. But neither the nuclear powers (except China) nor NATO have renounced the option of nuclear first-use. Currently, 100 to 150 US B61 nuclear free-fall bombs are stationed in Europe, including about 20 at Büchel for use by German Tornado DCA. In addition, there are about 500 French and British nuclear weapons, mainly on submarines, which are classified as “strategic” but are not subject to arms control rules.
Russia still has about 1,800 TNWs. However, they are not operationally collocated with the delivery systems, but are stored securely on both sides of the Urals, from Europe to the Far East. They are earmarked not only for land systems, but also for maritime missions or air and missile defence. Moscow’s risk calculus must include seven neighbouring nuclear powers. According to its nuclear doctrine, nuclear weapons will be used only in the event of an “existential threat” to Russia.
However, the strategic dilemma of NATO’s extended deterrence persists. If nuclear strikes with TNWs were carried out in the “sanctuary” of a nuclear power, a strategic counterattack against the territory of the attacking nuclear power would have to be expected, regardless of the nationality of the pilot who drops the bomb. This still raises the question of whether a regionally limited nuclear war can be realistically conducted and controlled. The Trump administration took that up in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and reintroduced low-yield warheads. However, the Central European “glacis” of non-Soviet allies of Moscow disappeared after 1990. If the US wants to avoid a strategic counterstrike, it would have to conduct nuclear strikes with TNWs on the territory of Allies or over the sea. Extended deterrence, which must be narrowed down to the use of nuclear weapons at the expense of Allies, however, is as irrational and unacceptable as strategic escalation.
Political stability considerations and conclusions
Germany’s nuclear participation today is more politically than militarily motivated: NATO “frontline states” in particular believe that US nuclear weapons in Germany – as the most important non-nuclear ally and strategic hub of the alliance – are indispensable to bind the US to Europe and deter Russia.
In the traditional calculation of the Western powers, nuclear sharing had yet another significance: Dependence on US “nuclear protection” defined Germany’s security status after 1945. It helped to prevent Germany from going it alone. West Germany was not to acquire nuclear weapons. Mainly for this reason, the US, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union jointly pushed the NPT in the 1960s: The number of nuclear powers was to be permanently limited to themselves plus France and the People’s Republic of China. Thus, the Federal Republic remained dependent on the extended deterrence of the US if it and the Allies wanted to prevent an attack or, if this failed, to stop it through nuclear escalation. With the stationing of US nuclear weapons and nuclear sharing, Germany demonstrated its willingness to “outsource” its security needs, link them closely to the US, and share the burdens and risks of deterrence to a greater extent than other Allies.
The decision on the future of nuclear sharing is thus first and foremost a question of the political emancipation of sovereign Germany after 1990. But the consequences for European stability must be considered, as well as those for the credibility of its disarmament and non-proliferation policy. The latter would be strengthened if Berlin were to withdraw from nuclear sharing and communicate this as being a contribution to global disarmament. As a political signal, such a step would give positive momentum to the NPT process. However, its effect on the nuclear powers’ willingness to disarm should not be overestimated.
On the other hand, a move away from nuclear involvement would change Germany’s position in the post-war structure of Europe and arouse mistrust among some Allies. It would force NATO to change its military deterrence structure. Above all, a unilateral withdrawal would raise doubts about Germany’s loyalty to the alliance – especially in Europe’s current security crisis – and divide it. Deploying nuclear weapons in NATO “frontline” states, as has already been considered there, would mean a breach of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and would trigger Russian countermeasures. While this would not be in the interest of the US, Berlin must consider the consequences for European stability when deciding on the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons and the procurement of a new nuclear-capable combat aircraft.
In order to live up to its European and global responsibilities, Berlin should consider new options for action. These could develop from the strategic stability talks and a New Start follow-up agreement between the US and Russia. Both powers have an interest in expanding the treaty framework to include sub-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. If overall ceilings for all nuclear weapons were agreed and geostrategic asymmetries were taken into account, a withdrawal of deployed US TNWs from Europe would be an option, provided that Russia also reduces its TNWs and subjects them to a transparency regime. There is room for negotiation for this in Moscow as well.
If a new German government wants to change the nuclear sharing status without exposing itself to the risk of isolation, it must refrain from going it alone nationally. Instead, it should encourage Washington to seek a New Start follow-up agreement with an expanded regulatory framework that allows for the withdrawal of TNWs from Europe. At the same time, it should encourage the US administration to consider moving to a sole-purpose strategy. Its purpose would be to deter potential adversaries from nuclear first-use, rather than threatening first-use itself in conventional scenarios. To this end, Berlin must coordinate with like-minded states and clearly position itself within the alliance, which intends to adopt a new strategic concept in 2022.
In order to consolidate its credibility as a reliable alliance partner, Berlin should provide rapidly available, fully equipped, and robust large-scale formations for the defence of the alliance. It must also work more vigorously to renew conventional arms control in Europe in order to contain threat perceptions.
A Club of Democratic Market Economies in Response to China’s Mercantilism?
Heribert Dieter
The shaping of future political and economic relations with the People’s Republic of China preoccupies governments around the world. However, many observers assume that the decision for or against the expansion of economic relations with China is one that the industrialised countries – jointly or unilaterally – could make. In fact, the die has already been cast: China’s state and party leaders want to reduce the country’s dependence on imports and are focusing on self-sufficiency in key production sectors. Beijing is partially turning its back on the previous form of globalisation and abandoning the longstanding consensus on the benefits of the international division of labour.
Certainly, at first glance it appears that China’s leadership is striving for a dominant position in international politics, for example through the measures of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In fact, however, the BRI only serves to export temporary overcapacity. In the long term, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is aiming to reduce the country’s interdependencies with the rest of the world. Wherever possible, China’s strategists plan to replace foreign products with domestically produced ones. The People’s Republic is decoupling itself.1 Beijing is thus at least relying on classical mercantilism, possibly even on autarky.
The strategy of the state and party leadership is not limited to trade policy. Cultural exchanges are also to be reduced. At the country’s universities, the works of foreign scholars are no longer to be part of the teaching programme to the same extent as before. A high-ranking CCP official called in March 2021 for the abolition of English classes in schools and universities: This knowledge would no longer be needed.2
Market economies are being forced by China’s new economic policy to take a stand. Therefore, the establishment of a club of democratic market economies could be a possible reaction to Beijing’s politically motivated autarky and its adherence to state capitalist structures.
Preference for economic autonomy
China’s retreat into the domestic economy appears surprising at first glance. After opening up its economy at the end of the 1970s, the country developed into a centre of industrial production. Since then, the Chinese economy has benefited from the deepening of the international division of labour.
Against this backdrop, it would be reasonable to assume that the Chinese leadership would see the country’s integration into the global economy as beneficial and would open up the country’s economy further. Today, however, the Communist Party and its General Secretary, Xi Jinping, are focusing on the country’s far-reaching self-sufficiency. This new strategy finds its programmatic expression in the current Five-Year Plan, which was adopted at the end of 2020.
Back in November 2018, General Secretary Xi felt the time had come for a renaissance of Mao’s trade policy. Xi lamented that it was increasingly difficult to source high technology from abroad. The growing protectionism of other economies is forcing China to take the path of self-sufficiency, he said.3
In October 2020, Xi concretised his foreign economic policy reform plans. The strategy, called “double circulation”, has two central elements: China is to become less dependent on foreign countries by strengthening domestic production and demand. At the same time, Xi wants to ensure that the People’s Republic remains indispensable for international production networks.4
For many centuries, Chinese economic policy favoured self-sufficiency and remained sceptical of the international division of labour. The opening of the country to European imports enforced by Great Britain in the mid-19th century fed these reservations.
Today’s form of globalisation, however, is based on diametrically opposed assumptions: The vast majority of economists and the governments of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are convinced of the economic benefits of the international division of labour. Free trade allows companies to specialise and has contributed significantly to the increases in prosperity of recent decades.
But why is China pursuing this economically implausible policy? It would be a misconception to suggest that Xi Jinping’s strategy is primarily about maximising economic benefits. The general secretary is working primarily to consolidate the CCP’s power. No other political goal is nearly as important. Xi fears that continuing on the current economic policy course could lead to an undermining of the party’s hitherto unchallenged position. For the CCP, exchanges with foreign countries entail the risk that China could become vulnerable, for example through bans on high-tech exports.
Consequences for Germany and the global economy
In Germany, it is repeatedly emphasised how important trade with China and the investments made there are for the country’s own economy. This attitude is increasingly being viewed with scepticism abroad.5 At the same time, China is not irreplaceable. Germany trades significantly more with the three Eastern European economies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary than with China. At €185.4 billion, the exchange of goods with Poland and Hungary was already more extensive than that with the People’s Republic in 2019.
However, a complete picture also includes the German economy’s investments in China. For the German automotive industry in particular, economies of scale – the fall in construction costs per unit as the number of units grows – are an important factor in the development of vehicles. However, these economies of scale mainly benefit the companies’ shareholders, while those employed domestically only benefit to a limited extent.
In mid-July 2021, Friedrich Merz warned German companies against continuing to rely so heavily on business with China. At the same time, he called for a new China strategy from the German government. Germany should not only cooperate with the US in its policy towards Beijing, but also with the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, he said. Merz described the dependence of the German economy on China as “too great”. He advised companies to forgo business once in a while and not to become too tied to trade with the People’s Republic.6
Change through trade?
Today, the European Union (EU) is debating future external economic relations with China. What answers does the EU have with regard to Beijing’s departure from the international division of labour? Would it not be appropriate to break new ground in international economic relations without the People’s Republic of China?
There is little evidence at present to support the expectation that China will change. Against this background, it seems entirely appropriate and necessary to develop concepts for the reorganisation of multilateral trade relations that will help to break the deadlock in the World Trade Organization (WTO) that has persisted for almost 20 years. Moreover, so far there are no plausible proposals on how to overcome the special treatment in the WTO of economies that classify themselves as developing countries.
If one were to follow the idea of waiting for a change in Chinese economic policy and a move towards acceptance of market economy rules, this would mean continuing with the status quo. This would result in foregoing further development of the WTO, because neither China will change to a market economy, nor will the US stand by Beijing’s continued disregard for the principles of the WTO and still agree to strengthen the organisation. The WTO would not disappear in such a course of action, but it would slide into irrelevance.
New directions in trade policy?
There is no doubt that the People’s Republic of China is not the only country that has only half-heartedly supported or even ignored the letter and spirit of the multilateral trade regime. India, South Africa, and, of course, the US have recently blocked further development of the WTO. The US partially crippled the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism by preventing the backfilling of judges’ posts.7 The significant increase in free trade agreements – the number of which has more than quintupled from 99 to 568 in the 2000 to 2021 period – reflects scepticism about the WTO.8 But according to former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, for example, China remains the most important problem in reforming the WTO. In 2018, he already saw the incompatibility of the globalised market economy with the Chinese state economy as being the main obstacle on the path to a reorganisation of the institution.9
Should the Europeans decide to break new ground in trade policy, there are three options. The first is to rebuild the WTO and eliminate some of its current structural flaws. This would include the exclusion of states whose economies are very much shaped by the state. However, this would split the world into a free-market part and the China-led bloc of non-market economies.
The second option is the creation of a trade policy club of like-minded states in a large free trade area. The 38 member countries of the OECD could establish an OECD free trade area.
Even if the OECD was not founded to organise trade policy cooperation, the circle of member countries of this organisation is very well-suited to be a new platform for international economic cooperation in the geopolitical conflict between the US and China. The OECD free trade area could be open to all states that are willing to observe market economy principles and act in a rules-based manner.
The third and most compelling alternative would be to expand an existing free trade area into a new global group. This could be, for example, the already existing agreement of Pacific Rim countries, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This treaty, originally known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, would offer the possibility of concluding a comparatively ambitious agreement and organising the trade relations of the most important industrialised countries within this framework.
At first glance, the suggestion that the EU could join an agreement in the Indo-Pacific region seems very far-fetched and almost audacious. In fact, however, the EU already has a strong presence as a trading partner in the region and is also negotiating, or has already concluded, a free trade agreement with all CPTPP member countries – except Brunei – for example with Mexico and Canada.
The CPTPP, which may be renamed and in the future be referred to more generally as the Comprehensive Agreement for International Partnership, could become the future club of market economies. The UK already applied to join this free trade area in early 2021 after leaving the EU. Both the EU and the US could follow suit. Certainly, even a large club would only be the second-best solution. The silver bullet in trade policy remains multilateral regulation. But in view of the WTO’s design flaws, which were also diagnosed by the new Director General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, in July 2021, the search for alternative regimes is the order of the day.10
A free trade area involving the EU, the US, Japan, and the UK would be a powerful trade bloc. It would have to be open to all applicant economies, provided they are willing to meet the conditions of membership. At the same time, the EU would have bundled its trade relations in the Indo-Pacific region into a single agreement and concluded a trade agreement with the US. The market-based economies, which are currently waiting tensely for the latest decisions in Beijing, would, with the creation of this club, establish the basis for the future organisation of international economic relations.
Readjusting and Refocusing Germany’s European Policy
Sabine Riedel
High expectations are being placed on Germany’s European policy. This was clearly visible before the German government took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) from 1 July to 31 December 2020. The hopes that were placed on Berlin proved to be extremely varied: While the Netherlands expected Germany to support them in maintaining budgetary discipline, Italy had hoped for more solidarity and understanding for its financial situation. The situation was similar with regard to asylum and migration. Which position should Germany have supported? Denmark’s proposal to process asylum applications before entry in the future, Greece’s decision to make Turkey a safe third country, or Italy’s plan to allow asylum seekers to move on within the Schengen Area? Finally, there was the European Commission’s plan to hand over asylum applications to an EU agency.1
Courage to change shape in European policy despite pressure to adapt
The primary task of German European policy is to coordinate efforts to reconcile the differing positions of the member states, or even to provide unilateral inputs in order to facilitate consensus-building. Thus, the motto of the German presidency of the Council of the EU was “Together for Europe’s recovery”.2 In its review of the six-month presidency, the Federal Government noted that it had succeeded in strengthening solidarity among the member states and improving the EU’s ability to act externally. Nevertheless, it admitted that this was only a “foundation” and that only important “cornerstones” had been set for “the way out of the crisis”.3 The EU is thus still in a critical situation that affects nearly all policy areas. Germany can therefore no longer limit itself to the role of mediator of national interests and should see the current crisis as an opportunity to open up new areas for shaping policy.
This is because Brexit has decisively changed the balance of power within the EU. Following the departure of the United Kingdom (UK), a political force has now gone that was sceptical about projects of differentiated integration,4 such as the Eurozone and the Schengen Area. London’s credo has always been the “Europe of homelands”, that is, close cooperation between states that act as sovereignly as possible. Although France prefers a communitarisation of the tasks of nation-states, it is currently not utilising Brexit to pursue this strategy. On the contrary, a few days after the Brexit withdrawal agreement came into force, the French president announced that France “wants to remain sovereign or determine for itself […] which transfers of sovereignty it agrees to and which binding cooperation projects it enters into”.5 If Germany does not want to become a pawn of other EU member states, it must think more about its own interests in the future and include them in the discourse.
The EU is not Europe – EU enlargement does not happen on its own
A rethinking seems appropriate, first of all with the use of the term “Europe”. Increasingly, it is being used synonymously with the EU, which leads to misconceptions. This gives the impression that the EU is the only integration project and that there is no alternative to its deepening and enlargement strategy. However, some European states, such as the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Norway – are not seeking EU membership. The UK also now belongs to this group of economically powerful countries. In addition, some EU members reject additional integration steps, with the result that a continuation of the deepening agenda could lead to further withdrawals, such as that of Poland. Moreover, there have been violations of the EU treaties, which has led to discussions on expulsion from the Union, as in the case of Hungary. After all, only those countries hoping to solve their economic crises or simply gain more security, such as the Western Balkans, are still seeking to join the EU.
On the other hand, it would be more effective to give more responsibility to European organisations – which, like the EU, contribute to peacekeeping and cooperation in Europe – and to demand that they take their own initiatives. This applies to EFTA, the Nordic Council, the Central European Free Trade Agreement in south-eastern Europe, and even to the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This would be entirely in line with a multilateral approach – something that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, seeks to strengthen in the 21st century.6 As a consequence, the European Commission would have to forego the leadership role it is now striving for in many policy fields worldwide. Indeed, multilateralism is based on the “principle of the sovereign equality” of states enshrined in international law.7 Influential countries, such as the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, are suspected of securing leading positions in multilateral forums in order to cover up violations of international laws or more effectively assert their own interests.8 This criticism applies not only to China and Russia, but equally to the United States and EU member states.
Strengthening intergovernmental cooperation within the EU‑27
The multilateral approach is already evident in the intergovernmental cooperation of the EU‑27, for example in foreign policy, because the competences in this policy field lie with the nation-states. The Union’s foreign and security policy is based on consultations and requires unanimous decisions in the European Council. In addition, beyond the supranational level, there are examples of multilateral cooperations within the EU, some of which even have institutionalised formats: the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly, the Visegrád Group, and the Nordic Council. These forms of cooperation should be appreciated as a contribution towards European integration, even if they do not entail communitarisation. Finally, the concept of “differentiated integration” also follows the multilateral or intergovernmental approach. According to it, EU member states can contractually agree to cooperate, even outside of EU law. Examples of when this has occurred are the negotiations on the Schengen Treaty, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, and the Euro Plus Pact.9
When the European Commission initiates infringement proceedings against member states, as it is currently doing, and tensions build between the supranational and national levels, these multilateral formats are particularly useful. They can open communication channels in situations where confrontation would otherwise prevail. Thus, for Germany, good neighbourly relations with Poland are more important than the Commission’s complaints against Warsaw with regard to gender education.10 At the end of 2020, German-Polish relations actually served as a bridge in the adoption of the EU budget, which Hungary and Poland had opposed. Another example of how bilateral or multilateral relations within the Union can help to solve problems are the so-called Dublin cases, that is, asylum seekers who submit their applications in an EU country other than the one stipulated by the Dublin Regulation. Since institutions in Brussels do not (or cannot) offer a solution here, the member states have taken initiatives.11 One result is the German-Spanish repatriation agreement.
Reshaping EU relations with EFTA and the United Kingdom
Despite approval of the withdrawal agreement with the UK at the end of 2020, relations between the EU and its member states and the UK remain tense. This is due to disagreements over the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol annexed to the treaty. These differences are rooted in the conflicting national interests of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and thus a centuries-old conflict that has so far been mitigated due to EU membership. However, Germany should not take sides – at most, it should intervene as a mediator. It has no interest in pursuing a confrontational course, as it did during the Brexit negotiations; after all, the UK is a very important trading partner. The British-German summit at the beginning of July 2021 was therefore a good start for establishing a new contractual basis for the relationship.
In this context, German European policy should take account of the relations that the UK establishes with other European organisations. After all, following Brexit, the UK left the European Economic Area and instead concluded an EU free trade agreement (2021). It is now in a special position similar to that of the EFTA states, which have also entered into their own free trade agreements with the EU. Since the beginning of 2020, these countries have been offering the UK accession to EFTA. But the government in London has so far only signed a new trade agreement with EFTA (20 July 2021). This is because, in the long term, it is seeking more comprehensive agreements with a wide range of states. Switzerland is also seen as a strategic ally on the financial policy level.
Dealing with the EU neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Eastern Europe)
The EU enlargement policy has raised great expectations among the candidate countries, so much so that the states concerned, such as Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, are now demanding membership. The degree to which this is happening is distracting from the fact that they do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, despite an accession process that has lasted around 20 years: They have neither stable democratic institutions nor functioning market economies.12 Another factor is also working against early accession to the EU: their unwillingness to establish good neighbourly relations in their region. The “Berlin Process”, initiated by the German government in 2014, could not change this either. German European policy should change course here and make it clearer that these states have no place in the EU without making efforts towards peaceful coexistence.
The states associated with the EU without accession prospects (Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova) are still closely intertwined with the post-Soviet area, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Tensions between the EU and Russia therefore affect the stability of these countries. This is evident in the territorial conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Concepts that allow for overlapping areas of integration between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU, Russia, Belarus, and Armenia) would be helpful here. While this was ruled out in the case of Ukraine, it was already feasible in the case of the EU partnership agreement with Armenia.13 Germany’s European policy could motivate Brussels to follow Armenia’s example and make such cooperation possible for other countries as well.
Rethinking and Redirecting: Germany’s Security Policy Needs Mental and Material Empowerment
Eckhard Lübkemeier and Oliver Thränert
For years, there has been a gap in Germany between the importance of security policy and the esteem with which it is held by German policymakers, the media, and the public at large. This discrepancy is reflected in the criticism of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan as being part of an utter failure by the West. However, it was not the Bundeswehr that failed, but rather a political strategy that was marred by a calamitous mismatch between goals and means.
The Afghanistan experience makes it an even more urgent matter to rethink and redirect German security policy. The formidable task before Germany’s next government and parliament is twofold. Firstly, political leaders should vigorously raise the public’s awareness about the continued need for protection provided by military forces and German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, they must act accordingly, namely by better equipping the Bundeswehr, pursuing greater European autonomy, and being prepared to take on robust and risky assignments in collective operations. Such a mental and material enhancement should consist of an 11-point agenda.
Within a time span of 15 years, two German presidents have observed that their fellow countrymen have shown “friendly disinterest” in the Bundeswehr: Horst Köhler in 2005 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Bundeswehr’s establishment, and Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2020 on the 65th anniversary.1 Their diagnoses are a testament to a severe failure: German governments as well as Members of Parliament have neglected to convey to the population that the Bundeswehr is pivotal to Germany’s security, the protection provided through its NATO and EU membership, as well as an effective foreign policy. Tellingly, the assistance provided by the Bundeswehr during the Corona pandemic and in the aftermath of disastrous floods was highly appreciated and received with universal applause. This recognition was well-deserved, but “armed forces” are not created for such civilian missions. The raison d’être of the military is the preventive and reactive management of violence: the prevention of war and aggression through deterrence, that is, the threat of countervailing force, or, if deterrence fails, the use of the military to contain and end violence.
Why German security policy needs to be enhanced
Security policy is more than conflict management by military force. It must be embedded into an overarching strategy that focuses on conflict prevention and resolution with non-violent, that is, political and diplomatic, economic and financial means. In this sense, the widely applied mantra in Germany that “there are no military solutions” is true. Since conflicts have causes other than purely military ones, they cannot be resolved militarily. But this truism should not be misused as a justification for avoiding difficult decisions on the deployment and use of military means.
The same applies to the often-employed “culture of military restraint”. There are several explanations why such an approach is ennobled with the term “culture” in Germany. First, there is history. Germany’s economic resurgence, its democratisation, and its regaining of political sovereignty by embedding the country in NATO under United States (US) leadership and through the process of European unification – these post-war developments would have been impossible without a credible renunciation of Nazi-type militarisation and aggression.
Second, the Bundeswehr was founded for and integrated into NATO from the outset; military operations other than in defence of the country and NATO members were not envisaged. Since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr has been deployed for purposes other than national and alliance defence. However, two things have not changed: Germany remains dependent on the support of its allies for its defence. Secondly, Germany never acts alone – it deploys its armed forces only in joint operations with partners. Consequently, in contrast to states of comparable size, Germany has not (yet) had to develop a strategic culture that is based on strictly national interests and informed by independent military operations.
Finally, there is a third reason for military restraint that is not rooted in specific German characteristics. It has a structural and pragmatic aspect. Inevitably, the mere existence of armed forces signals mistrust, for there would be no need for them if – as in the EU – a non-violent settlement of conflicts were the universally respected norm. Hence, even a military posture that is meant to be defensive – but is not perceived as such by others – can lead to an arms race and war-prone tensions.
The pragmatic aspect relates to the experiences with failed interventions, such as in Iraq and Libya. After nearly 20 years, the Afghanistan mission ended in a botched withdrawal and a return to power of the Taliban. Still, it would be fallacious to see the Afghanistan debacle as evidence that there can be no military solutions. The Taliban defeated NATO troops and the Afghan army. Although their victory does not solve Afghanistan’s problems, the Taliban wore down the US and regained power through force.
Afghanistan offers no reason to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Among the lessons of the intervention is the trivial but crucial insight that, although armed forces can only be successful as part of a multi-dimensional strategy guiding their application, they are indispensable to such a strategy.2
Thus, Germany will continue to require a military anchor to safeguard its core foreign policy interests of peace, security, welfare, and cooperation. Since it can only realise these interests as a member of the EU and NATO, the anchor must be a collective backstop to which Germany must make a proper military contribution. For years, Germany has not fulfilled this requirement. It has consistently underperformed with respect to NATO’s goal of spending 2 per cent of a country’s gross domestic product on defence by 2024 at the latest. The Bundeswehr suffers from massive equipment deficiencies, and the public’s awareness of security risks is lacking.
At the same time, Germany’s security situation has deteriorated: Russia’s domestic weaknesses are fuelling outward aggressiveness under Putin’s leadership; an autocratic China sees itself in the global ascendancy and is behaving as such; the American-Chinese rivalry is heating up; and Germany’s most important non-European partner remains domestically polarised even after the change from Trump to Biden, raising doubts about its reliability and demanding more military self-reliance from its European allies. In addition, there are persistent regional conflicts in the Middle East, bilateral tensions between nuclear powers, as well as terrorist and cyber threats.
For Germany to successfully meet these challenges, the mental gap between the importance of security policy and the esteem with which it is held by policymakers, the media, and the public at large must be closed. Military-backed risk prevention and management must be seen for what they are: vital to Germany’s democratic stability, sustainable prosperity, and political self-determination. This requires that the government and parliamentarians be ready to confront the public’s “friendly disinterest” in matters of the military, equip the armed forces with appropriate matériel, and contribute to NATO, the EU, and other formats to a level commensurate with Germany’s size and interests.
An 11-point agenda to enhance German security policy
1. The key is a change in mindset among policymakers and their willingness to speak plainly to the public: The military and armaments are irreplaceable security policy instruments. As such, they are not an unwelcome necessity but in line with Germany’s values and serve its interest in peace, security, welfare, and cooperation.
2. The raison d’être of the military is managing violence and the threat thereof. Its dual nature should be emphatically stated publicly: the indispensable protection provided by armed forces and the concomitant requirement of threatening or using force when necessary.
3. This also applies to the most horrendous military means of all. Germany has renounced the development and deployment of nuclear weapons under international law. Yet, it remains dependent on others to protect it from blackmail and aggression by nuclear-armed opponents. Preventing and defusing war-prone conflicts is primarily a political task, to be achieved through détente and cooperation, including arms control and disarmament agreements. But there will be a need for nuclear deterrence as long as current or potential hostilities are not replaced by a community of trust in which, as in today’s EU, war has become inconceivable. Therefore, Germany cannot and should not accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
4. Germany needs nuclear-armed protectors, first and foremost the US. Yet, this nuclear dependency points to an even more fundamental truth: Germany can only safeguard its security collectively, that is, in an alliance with partners – the most important of which is NATO, with the US as its nuclear backbone.
5. NATO’s modus operandi is reciprocity through each member contributing to the collective good for mutual protection. Germany is shirking its obligation to spend 2 per cent of its gross domestic product on defence by 2024 at the latest. If the government does not consider such a benchmark meaningful, it should argue for a revision that takes into account criteria other than financial input.
6. Reciprocity of risk- and burden-sharing includes nuclear-sharing in the form of US nuclear weapons, which are stored in European countries (besides Germany, also in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy) and, in the event of war, would be delivered to their targets by aircraft from these countries. A unilateral German withdrawal from this arrangement would be unwise and demonstrate a lack of solidarity with its American and European allies. Therefore, the next German government must develop a new fighter jet to replace the obsolete Tornados.3
7. The Afghanistan debacle does not demonstrate the ineffectuality of military means. Rather, the key lesson is that goals and means must go hand in hand. The goal of stabilising Afghanistan and setting in motion a sustainable transition was missed. Unless the goal was inherently illusory, the means and methods used might have been unsuitable, or Washington and its allies lacked the patience for them to bear fruit. There is no doubt, however, that whatever chance to succeed there might have been, it required overthrowing the Taliban regime, defeating al-Qaeda, and providing military provision for civil reconstruction assistance.
8. The Bundeswehr is afflicted by crippling equipment shortfalls. Providing it with the weapons and matériel that it needs and its members deserve should be a priority of the next government and Bundestag. This should include the procurement of armed drones for soldiers’ protection.
9. Notwithstanding that NATO and the US remain Germany’s security backstop for the foreseeable future, Berlin should vigorously advocate for greater European autonomy. Washington will increasingly leave the handling of conflicts in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood (e.g. the Balkans, North Africa) to its European partners. More fundamentally, unilateral dependencies exact a price, even among friends. The Biden administration’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan without properly consulting its European allies has shown this once again.4
10. Berlin can only achieve greater autonomy together with Paris. After Brexit, France is a fortiori the only partner that can offer Germany nuclear reassurance in the event that the American commitment erodes. Hence, after the French presidential election in spring 2022, and as envisaged in the “Aachen” Franco-German Treaty of 22 January 2019, Berlin should seek a substantial deepening of bilateral cooperation, provided this is possible with the next leadership in Paris. To this end, the long-standing offer of Emmanuel Macron to discuss a prospective European dimension of Force de frappe should finally be taken up.
11. More autonomy, including through a closer alliance with France, will demand a great deal of Germany. For joint armaments projects to succeed, German export guidelines cannot be the sole yardstick. Furthermore, Germany would have to make concessions to partners with different strategic cultures and interests when it comes to deciding where, when, and how to deploy joint forces, and its partners would expect Berlin to incur greater risks in combat operations. However, shirking such engagement is not an option for a country that cannot defend itself alone but has considerable resources to create an environment – in Europe and beyond – that is conducive to promoting peace, security, welfare, and cooperation.
Partner-related Change
The European Security Order in a Geopolitical World
Markus Kaim and Ronja Kempin
Germany’s security and defence policy will remain oriented towards multilateralism after the Bundestag elections. In order to meet Germany’s obligations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Berlin has steadily increased its defence budget in recent years. Within the framework of the European Union (EU), the Federal Republic has been making particular efforts in this area since 2016 to close existing capability gaps. Both are essential because, under President Joseph Biden, the United States (US) expects more autonomous engagement from its partners in security and defence policy, while supporting the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in principle.1 Since early summer 2020, the EU member states have also been working on a “Strategic Compass”. In the document, the 27 capitals want to define which goals they wish to accomplish jointly in security and defence policy and which capabilities they need for this. A similar strategy process is taking place in NATO. Here, as there, Germany must focus the attention of its allies above all on the question of how the growing influence of third countries is currently changing the European security order and how it can be contained. Closely linked to this is the challenge of sustaining and improving the political capacities of the EU and NATO for action.
Dwindling influence in a changed geopolitical environment
The European security order is under pressure to adapt to the changed conditions of the international system. Rivalries between major powers have increased and led to a “geopoliticisation” of foreign policy, which runs counter to the kind of security order that the Charter of Paris was intended to establish in 1990. In this Charter, the signatory states pledged to guarantee democracy and the rule of law, settle disputes peacefully, uphold human rights, respect the borders of other states, and not interfere in their internal affairs. Today, this claim is being challenged by foreign policies that are aimed at dominating or influencing specific geographical areas. A number of European states, most notably Russia and Turkey, have abandoned the normative consensus and are moving – at different speeds – towards authoritarianism. Their foreign policies are losing predictability but are generally aimed at undermining the principles of the Euro-Atlantic security order, recklessly pursuing national interests, and influencing Europe’s periphery. In addition, China is also trying to influence the Euro-Atlantic region, for example through large-scale infrastructure projects and direct influence on the policies of Western institutions.
The number of countries that view themselves, at least to some extent, as “European powers” has thus increased significantly. They challenge political institutions whose ability to ensure peace and security in Europe remains limited. This is particularly evident in the case of the EU. For 20 years following the end of the East-West conflict, it was almost the sole formative power for the Euro-Atlantic area and its eastern and south-eastern periphery – the countless cooperation agreements and programmes offered to the countries of this region are impressive proof of this. In the meantime, however, this area has become subject to fierce regional competition. In the case of Russia, this is not surprising given its geographic location. What is new, however, is that countries such as China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates are seeking to shape the European neighbourhood in their own interests and to present themselves as providers of alternative models of order. This limits the EU’s influence, confronts it with new kinds of security challenges, and calls for a new “geopolitical foreign policy”.
What power politics, with what partners?
In view of an emerging “concert of powers”, that is, a multipolar system as the organising principle in international relations, the German government will soon have to answer two questions in the EU, and prospectively also in NATO:
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Do the member states specifically want to develop the EU or NATO into one of those power centres to which other actors orient themselves and gear their foreign policy? And if so, what steps would have to be taken to meet the demands of a geopolitical foreign policy? Such an orientation, which would give the EU and NATO the necessary influence, would also have a normative dimension: “Space” and “power” instead of “values” and “law” would then be the guiding categories for action. Shaping the European neighbourhood would then primarily mean exerting influence on it in order to contain the policies of other actors.
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With which partners and in which institutional arrangements can the normative remnants of the “Paris Consensus” be preserved under fundamentally changed conditions?
In terms of its internal structure and foreign policy self-perception, the EU is not well-equipped for an era of great power rivalries. It was created precisely as a counter-design to the disastrous European great power politics of the first half of the 20th century; it is a union of states, still decides on its foreign policy with unanimity, and defines itself largely as a civilian power that deliberately dispenses with instruments of “hard power”. There is no shortage of proposals on how the EU could achieve greater effectiveness in its external relations by reforming itself institutionally and changing its treaties. But so far, the forces of inertia and path dependencies in this area have proven to be very strong.
The search for partners with whom the normative remnants of the European security order could be preserved collides with an essential characteristic of an international order distinguished by great power rivalries: Other states appear in it simultaneously as partners, competitors, and rivals. The simple emphasis on important bilateral relations encompassing many issues is therefore of no help. Rather, German and European policymakers are faced with the task of developing reasonably stable relations with the major powers of the international system in the face of conflicting interests and differing levels of willingness to cooperate. Since neither the EU nor NATO can organise the necessary consensus, individual states have a special role to play here. This trend can be illustrated by the recent Franco-German initiative for an EU-Russia summit or the current differences between Berlin and Washington on how to deal with China. However, the tendency to take special account of the policies of major powers makes it all the more difficult for Germany to implement its own claim of a “rules-based international order” encompassing all states – the preservation of which the “Alliance for Multilateralism” or the “White Paper on Multilateralism” formulate as a goal.
Flexibilisation internally, readjustment externally
Nevertheless, Germany has the means to adapt itself and its most important security partnerships to the changes that have been outlined. To do so, however, the new German government must be prepared to invest considerable resources – both financial and political.
At times, Berlin seems rather helpless in the face of changes in the international order. Together with its partners in the EU and the US, Germany is trying to impose limits on authoritarian regimes primarily through sanctions. In recent years, however, it has become clear that the states concerned have learnt to deal with such measures. Russia, for example, was able to consolidate its position in the occupied territories of Ukraine after annexing Crimea in violation of international law and intervening militarily in the east of the country. Domestically, President Vladimir Putin has also intensified the pressure on political opponents. The EU member states also imposed sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. However, Brussels continues to lack consensual support for the Belarusian opposition. With regard to NATO ally Turkey, there is no majority among the EU states in favour of fundamentally changing the state of mutual relations and their framework. Berlin, too, is dependent on Ankara – above all in migration policy.
However, because the states that are moving in the direction of authoritarianism in particular are increasingly trying to exert influence on domestic issues in Germany as well as in other EU countries, the future German government should consider expanding the EU’s conditionality policy to include the issues of disinformation, cyberattacks, and influencing diaspora groups. At the very least, Berlin should consider dovetailing internal and external affairs in such a way that interventions in the internal affairs of EU member states are sanctioned.
The efforts of China and the Middle Eastern states to exert influence – efforts that differ considerably in terms of goals, instruments, and political significance – can only be contained by means of a more active enlargement policy as well as foreign policy on the part of the EU. The EU must counter China’s and Saudi Arabia’s investments in the (analogue and digital) infrastructures of countries in the Western Balkans with projects of its own. This will require a high commitment of financial resources, which seems unavoidable if Germany and the EU want to resist the geopoliticisation of their neighbourhood. On the initiative of President Biden, the G7 countries have already agreed on a multi-billion infrastructure initiative for the emerging countries. It is intended to become an alternative to China’s “New Silk Road”.2
In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for EU member states to reach consensus on foreign and security policy issues. This also applies to overarching questions of the European security order. The well-known differences in the strategic cultures of the member states have an impact here. More serious, however, is the fact that some of them block decisions on individual issues in order to force action even on issues that are closer to their interests.
Two processes should serve to harmonise the strategic cultures of the member states more closely: the European Intervention Initiative, launched by France in 2017 outside of the EU framework, and the drafting of the EU Strategic Compass, which was largely driven by Germany. More important, however, would be to redesign the EU’s institutional framework so that a majority of states can make decisions on behalf of all members without compromising legitimacy and political cohesion. In the past legislative period of the Bundestag, a number of ideas have already been developed to this end that are aimed at speeding up decision-making procedures. The call to introduce qualified majority voting is one of them, as is the proposal to set up a European Security Council.3 Neither of these approaches has yet gained majority support among the EU 27.
The debate therefore needs new momentum. In the EU, it could be generated by making greater use of Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union. According to this article, the European Council may, within the framework of the CSDP, “entrust the execution of a mission to a group of Member States which so desire and have the capabilities required for such a mission”. It would entail comparatively little cost to breathe life into this treaty-immanent flexibilisation of the CSDP. If Article 44 is successfully applied, it could provide important medium-term impetus for force integration, defence-industrial cooperation among EU member states, and decision-making procedures in the CSDP. The fact that the article allows member states to find majorities for their own interests within the EU framework – even without questionable manoeuvring – should reduce blocking behaviour during voting.
It may be uncertain whether this can open up a way for the EU to assume an autonomous foreign, security, and defence policy role between the superpowers of the US and China. But it would at least put the EU and its member states in a position to act more quickly and more effectively on crises and conflicts in their neighbourhood.
For Germany’s NATO policy, this means that the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be presented in 2022, will have to recalibrate transatlantic security relations in light of the changed geopolitical environment in the sense of a “New Transatlantic Security Deal”. Based on the assumption that it is in Germany’s interest for the US to remain a European power, it would be necessary to redefine what the European pillar of NATO is capable of achieving politically and militarily. This strategic realignment could basically take two forms, namely a stronger geographic focus (Europe vs. the Indo-Pacific) or a functional division of labour (collective defence vs crisis management) between America and Europe.
German Policy Towards the United States: More Self-Confidence and More Independence Needed
Johannnes Thimm
Under President Joe Biden, the United States (US) and Germany are seeking to reboot their relationship. After President Donald Trump shook the foundations of the transatlantic alliance and called into question many of the certainties of German foreign policy, the desire to return to normality is strong. As recently as 2017, after a G7 summit with Trump, Chancellor Merkel noted: “The times when we could completely rely on others are somewhat over. [...] We Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands.”1 Biden’s announcement that “America is back” and ready to resume its traditional leadership role in international politics was met with relief in Germany. However, Germany should not end its efforts to determine its own destiny. Biden’s presidency should not be taken as a chance to lean back, but rather as an opportunity to prepare for more difficult times.
No return to the status quo ante
Many of Biden’s global policy goals are in line with German interests. It is therefore tempting to dismiss Trump as a historical anomaly and to resume the status quo ante. Instead, the Trump shock should provide an incentive to question problematic patterns of interaction that have emerged in US-Germany relations since the Second World War and establish a new foundation for the relationship. The current US leadership, which shares many of Berlin’s priorities, offers an opportunity for cooperation without losing sight of the goal of reducing Germany’s and Europe’s dependence on the US.
One source of frustration for both sides is the asymmetry in their relationship. In the US, there has long been a bipartisan consensus that Germany is freeriding on US security guarantees and needs to share more of the burden in defence policy; in Germany, on the other hand, there are complaints about the unequal nature of the partnership and a lack of consultation by the US. Both states have resigned themselves to a state of affairs that Jeremy Shapiro calls a “toxic interplay of American arrogance and European incompetence”.2 A case in point was the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the US administration announced at short notice and hastily executed, leading to enormous challenges for US allies and tragic consequences for the Afghans left behind. As was the case at the outset of the intervention, the US set the course while their European allies were confronted with a fait accompli. The same dynamic shapes the relationship in a number of policy areas. Whether it is a global minimum tax on corporations or the lifting of patent protections for vaccines in the Covid-19 pandemic, the US usually launches new initiatives while Germany merely reacts. A little more courage to shake things up could help the new German government to counter the criticism that Germany lacks initiative.
More initiative and self-confidence in cooperation
It is in Germany’s interest to rethink the current division of labour. Currently, both the relative power of the US and the willingness of its public to bear the costs of an international leadership role and the provision of global public goods are declining. A rising China is challenging US supremacy, competing for global influence, and offering its version of authoritarianism as an alternative model to liberal-market democracy.3 One result of this development is that the US will focus more attention on Asia and seek to reduce its involvement in Europe’s neighbourhood, including the Middle East.
Under the heading of “A foreign policy for the middle class”, the Biden administration is rebalancing its international engagement with the needs of American society. So far, it is more a slogan than a concrete framework for action, and it is not without controversy: It is simultaneously criticised for merely being “old wine in new bottles” – meaning rebranding the traditional foreign policy without much substantial change – and for continuing the protectionist nationalism à la Trump under an innocuous motto. At the very least, the new emphasis is based on the recognition that Trump’s call for “America First!” struck a chord with many voters. For the American public to be willing to support an active global policy, they must be convinced that they benefit from it. That will only be the case if Biden delivers at home. Germany should be supportive of Biden’s efforts to reduce inequality by reforming the welfare state. If, on the other hand, protectionist impulses prevail, new conflicts with the EU are inevitable.
An ongoing concern is the state of US democracy. The political polarisation, and in particular the radicalisation of the Republican Party, continues to reach new extremes. Two-thirds of Republican voters (about one-third of the total electorate) believe the “big lie” that the 2020 election was rigged and that Joe Biden is not the legitimate president.4 There is little open dissent from Republican leadership; those who stand up for the truth lose offices, are forced out of the party, or are challenged by Trump loyalists in the primaries. In states that Republicans control, they have introduced legislation that is challenging the independence of election authorities and aims to suppress the vote. In some places, legislatures are even being enabled to ignore the vote in presidential elections altogether and appoint electors themselves. Substantial parts of the Republican Party appear to have abandoned the most basic democratic norms, vastly increasing the potential for constitutional crises.5
Cooperation where possible, independence where necessary
So what can be done? First, we should acknowledge that Trump was no accident but rather the culmination of trends long present in American politics, and that the election of a similarly disruptive president remains a possibility. Therefore, we should do two things at the same time. First, we should not squander the opportunity to cooperate with the Biden administration and the Democratic majority in Congress. The priority should be policies that make the democracies on both sides of the Atlantic more resistant to illiberal tendencies from within and abroad. On the other hand, the next German government would do well to reduce its dependencies in the event that there is a constitutional crisis in the US or someone hostile to Europe once again enters the White House.
Notwithstanding the fact that the possibility to influence US domestic policy is very limited, German policymakers and civil society should express their concerns about US democracy. When dealing with Republicans, it is important to call out and criticise the anti-democratic tendencies within the party. Possible forums include the Bundestag’s Parliamentary Group on the United States; the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States; and the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue of the US Congress. The topic should also be brought up on visits by the usually bipartisan congressional delegations to Europe. A combination of moral appeals and “shaming” would at least signal that these developments do not go unnoticed abroad and are damaging America’s reputation.
A common challenge is the rise of disinformation: Groups denying the danger of Covid-19 – such as the “Querdenker” in Germany – or followers of conspiracies about the power of the “Deep State”, such as the “QAnon network”, undermine trust in the media and public institutions. Their increasing collaboration with far-right forces strengthens violent groups with nationalist and racist attitudes, as illustrated by the images of rioting mobs in the Capitol in Washington and on the steps of the Reichstag in Berlin. All these actors weaken social cohesion and hinder effective government action, especially in response to crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic. It is essential that Germany and the US coordinate their policies in this regard and learn from each other’s experiences.
Changes in the media landscape, especially the ad-based platforms misleadingly referred to as “social media”, also require policy responses. Different regulatory cultures make it difficult to cooperate to curb their influence, but the conditions are currently better than ever. In the US, awareness of the internet companies’ power and corrosive effects on democratic society has grown since elections and political discourse have been massively affected by disinformation. The new transatlantic Trade & Technology Council offers an opportunity to work together to find solutions to the difficult trade-offs between freedom and regulation as well as consumer and business interests. The EU is already a pioneer in the regulation of internet platforms; standing up to Big Tech, whose business model relies on exploiting user data to manipulate their emotions and consumption habits, remains important. Germany should point to the lessons of its own historical experience to stress the need for a resilient democracy and to counter accusations that its insistence to reign in the power of tech monopolies is anti-American in nature.
Reduce political, military, and economic dependencies
The need for constructive cooperation notwithstanding, Germany would be well advised to reduce the extent of its political, military, and economic dependence on the US. Politically, much depends on whether we succeed in creating more unity in Europe. One prerequisite is Germany’s willingness to set aside its idiosyncrasies in favour of a pan-European position from time to time. In order to be able to maintain a more united position vis-à-vis the US, it is crucial to involve those EU members for which American security guarantees are not only of theoretical significance. Nord Stream 2 is an example of how not to do it: Regardless of the substantial pros and cons, it should be obvious by now how high the price is for the project in relations between allies of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). US sanctions against the companies involved in the pipeline met with approval even among some EU members. When smaller EU states are forced to pick sides between Germany and the US, the weakness of the EU becomes apparent. We should try to avoid such situations, at least as long as someone broadly sympathetic to the EU occupies the Oval Office. Conflicts between the EU and NATO can also be avoided when building up the EU’s military capacities.
Germany’s credibility in security and defence depends on whether it manages to resolve the serious problems in its military procurement and capabilities. Countless reports about deficient helicopters, missing spare parts, and poor equipment damage its reputation as a reliable alliance partner. In this respect, it is more important to bring the Bundeswehr’s capabilities into line with political requirements than to meet NATO’s 2 per cent target. Differences between the expectations of EU and NATO allies and specific German reservations on defence issues, such as on arms exports, armed drones, or the presence of nuclear weapons in Germany [nukleare Teilhabe],6 should be openly articulated, debated, and resolved through the political process, keeping in mind that on these issues Germany is the outlier, and insisting on its particular positions affects alliance relations. In contrast, when it comes to deploying German troops to military missions, alliance solidarity or reputational considerations are not sufficient; we should not participate in missions when there are serious doubts about their rationale or prospects of success. In such situations, taking a clear position and being willing to defend it against criticism is preferable to trying to pretend it is possible to please everyone.
On sanctions, Germany should actively and critically engage with the US. Extraterritorial and secondary sanctions against companies in the EU undermine European sovereignty. When faced with the choice between trade with Iran and access to the US market, the decision for European companies was easy – a similar scenario with regard to China would hardly be acceptable. Here, too, the EU gains credibility if it attempts to address its own shortcomings and does not wait for US action, as it did when the US sanctioned Bulgarian officials for corruption. Notwithstanding this, further work should be done to strengthen the euro as an international trading currency and to further develop instruments such as the INSTEX payment mechanism in order to reduce the level of its own vulnerability.
Let us hope that the close German-American relations that were reaffirmed during the Chancellor’s visit to Washington in July 2021 will outlast not only the Bundestag election, but also the US presidential election in 2024. However, in line with the motto “hope for the best, prepare for the worst”, we should not let up our efforts to – in Angela Merkel’s words – “take control of our own destiny” until the next external shock hits us.
Partners or Rivals? Dealing with Authoritarian Powers
Stefan Mair
One mantra of German foreign policy is: “Never alone again!” In view of Germany’s historical experiences in the 20th century, its central position in Europe, and its limited resources compared to the superpowers, it is hardly surprising that this commitment is a core element of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy identity. A central task of German diplomacy is therefore to find partners and to establish reliable and resilient political partnerships with them. After the end of the East-West conflict, the search for partners initially seemed easy. In view of the expectation that the liberal model of order would become universally accepted, almost any country seemed to qualify for such a role. Strategic partnerships were also entered into with states that, from today’s perspective, would be hardly suitable. Germany did so in the case of China, and the European Union (EU) elevated both China and Russia to the status of strategic partners.
In recent years, however, there has been a growing awareness that the global convergence towards democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy could not only fail to materialise, but that, on the contrary, divergent tendencies might dominate – that in the future we might be dealing more with rivals than with partners. A prominent expression of this trend reversal was the European External Action Service’s China Strategy Paper of March 2019, in which the People’s Republic is still referred to as a partner, but at the same time as a systemic rival.1 German foreign policy is still far from naming antagonistic forces so clearly. The most that can be said is “difficult partner” – a term that tends to obscure rather than illuminate the quality of bilateral relations.2
What makes states partners, what makes them rivals?
It is therefore necessary to establish clarity about what qualifies another country as a partner and what makes it a rival. Bilateral partners should (1) have a certain normative consensus, that is, a common set of values; they should (2) pursue congruent interests in at least a relevant number of policy areas;3 and they should (3) complement and strengthen each other’s capabilities. Vice versa, rivals can be defined as those (1) whose set of values is largely incompatible, (2) who not only pursue conflicting interests but also attempt to assert them against their counterparts, and (3) who are in a position to weaken or challenge them – that is, from the perspective of Western liberal democracies: powerful authoritarian states with an adversarial international agenda. The assignment to one or the other category is not binary, but approximate. This becomes clear when one takes a closer look at two states that, at first glance, seem to fall more and more clearly into the rival category and consequently can hardly be considered as partners: China and Russia.
The normative similarities between Germany and China are conceivably small: on the one hand, a democracy and market economy built on individual human rights and freedoms that accepts the primacy of law and strives internationally to create a liberal, rules-based order; on the other, an authoritarian, if not totalitarian, political system that emphasises the primacy of collective obligations and uses law as an instrument to preserve the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.4 Beijing accepts the existing world order only to the extent that it serves China’s perseverance of power and economic development, but it increasingly reveals revisionist intentions where it works against these goals. Although the findings still appear unambiguous when it comes to normative foundations, they become more difficult when it comes to interests. Open conflicts of interest between the two countries are hardly apparent. So far, they have been most readily discernible on two points: whether German and Chinese companies operate on a level playing field in their respective domestic markets and in third countries, and how far-reaching and binding China’s commitments in the fight against climate change should be. On the other hand, it is precisely climate policy – and, more recently, global health policy5 – that suggests an interest in partnerships with Beijing. So far, China has tended to weaken German positions only indirectly – by creating economic dependencies in the course of the Belt and Road Initiative, initiating public campaigns against German companies, building up diplomatic coercion behind the scenes, or mobilising counter-coalitions in international organisations and bodies.
The picture that emerges of Russia in terms of its quality as a partner or rival is in some respects contrary to that of China. Here, it is the criterion of a common normative basis that is least clearly tilted in one direction or the other. The Russian leadership’s effort to establish an authoritarian system that draws on traditional Christian conservative values and contrasts them with the “libertarian” way of life of Western societies finds only limited resonance among its own population. This course seems to be accepted only as long as it can guarantee security and order as well as great power status internationally. On the other hand, the divergence of interests vis-à-vis Russia is much more evident: in climate policy as well as in the shaping of the security order for Eastern Europe and the European neighbourhood. Moscow’s attempts to weaken Germany’s influence and power are clearly visible: through disinformation campaigns and threats of a hybrid and military nature; through actions against reform-oriented states and forces in Eastern Europe or the Caucasus; through open antagonism towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Whereas in the case of China the systemic, normative conflict stands in the way of a genuine partnership, in the case of Russia it is above all divergences of interests and strategic calculations.
The grey area between partner and rival is large. This can also be illustrated by a country that clearly falls into the partnership category but showed obvious signs of rivalry between 2017 and 2020. Outside of Europe, the United States is Germany’s most important bilateral partner and an indispensable guarantor of its security. And yet, the four years of the Trump administration raised serious doubts about the solidity of the common foundation of values and revealed considerable differences of interest in trade and climate policy. The fact that the American president openly referred to the EU as a “foe” gave rise to concerns that he was pursuing a strategy of weakening Germany and the EU.6 Populist governments in India, Brazil, and Mexico pose similar challenges for German policies. The normative and interest-driven divergences with NATO partner Turkey are also growing.
Nevertheless, the criticism of the excessive use of the term “partner” should not lead to the reverse conclusion that it is now primarily a matter of identifying rivals and developing counter-strategies. Rather, it is important to keep this category small and to limit it to those for whom normative and interest-related differences predominate and who are both willing and able to weaken or even question liberal models of order at the national or international level. At the global level, only China can be considered such a rival, and in Germany’s wider neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia) Russia and, with greater reservations, Iran.
Dealing with rivals
However selectively it must be used, the rival category is nevertheless useful for defining the basic orientation in bilateral relations with certain countries. It is not primarily a matter of trying to strike a balance with a partner, to involve them, to accommodate their interests, and to always strive to work together as partners, but rather of realising that relations are primarily characterised by antagonism. In this context, it must be acknowledged that rivals are also needed in order to tackle global challenges effectively and contain the escalation of conflicts of interest.
Thus, the right strategy vis-à-vis rivals seems to be the compartmentalisation of bilateral relations.7 This unwieldy term can be elegantly broken down into the so-called three C’s: cooperation, competition, confrontation. With regard to China, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken paraphrased this approach in his first programmatic speech at the beginning of March 2021 as follows: “Our relationship with China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.”8 With this, the Biden administration departed from the “decoupling” approach of the previous administration and swung to the line that had already been formulated by the EU in 2019.9
There seems to be a broad consensus on the general approach to China. The real challenge lies in its concrete implementation – in two respects. First, it must be defined in which policy areas which “C” dimension is to be applied; second, negative spill-over effects between the areas must be avoided. The first task seems easier than the second. Cooperation is certainly needed in the case of global challenges such as climate change, comprehensive health risks, the fight against international terrorism, the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, and sustainable development. Competition is possible in the case of economic relations, technological innovation, and international standard-setting. Confrontation, on the other hand, is necessary in the case of human rights, Indo-Pacific security, the independence of Taiwan, diplomatic coercion emanating from China, and hybrid threats. Beijing itself, however, rejects such compartmentalisation and has, among other things, created an instrument for itself in the form of the Anti-Sanctions Law to punish foreign companies if they comply with sanctions imposed by their governments against China. It is to be feared, then, that confrontation on security and human rights issues will at least affect the competitive dimension. However, China’s interest in addressing global challenges is likely to be so great that the negative effects resulting from confrontational issues on cooperation, especially in climate policy, should remain limited.10
One example of semi-successful compartmentalisation is Western policy towards Russia. Sanctions have been imposed to penalise Moscow for human rights violations, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and military intervention in eastern Ukraine. These punitive measures have indeed affected mutual economic relations and Russia’s willingness to cooperate in international disarmament policy. But they have not led to a complete breakdown of exchanges in either area, let alone to Russia’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.11
Such a compartmentalisation approach towards powerful authoritarian states offers promise if four preconditions are met. First, it is important to act from a position of strength. Western democracies therefore also have the task of remedying their own deficits that undermine their input and output legitimacy.12 At the same time, they must develop the necessary capabilities to withstand confrontation, to survive in competition, and to be attractive as cooperation partners. In doing so, the position of the counterpart must be correctly assessed when evaluating their relative strength. There is a tendency to either significantly underestimate or overestimate China’s penetrating power in particular. Second, compartmentalisation must be embedded in a comprehensive country strategy so that interactions between the three dimensions mentioned above can be adequately taken into account. The German government has such a cross-policy area strategy for Africa, Central Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, for example, but not for China and Russia. Third, corresponding strategies vis-à-vis individual states must be set in relation to each other.13 Finally, these strategies and the actions based on them must be closely coordinated with European partners, transatlantic allies, and other like-minded states.14
Don’t Drop the Ball: German Indo‑Pacific Policy
The Indo-Pacific is an economically dynamic region that is of fundamental significance for the future of the international order. For German and European policy, it has thus become an important geo-economic and geo-strategic point of reference. The Federal Government published policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in September 2020, while the European Union (EU) released its corresponding strategy a year later. One of the main aims of these approaches is to diversify, deepen, and thematically broaden relations with partners in the region beyond China. Thereby, Germany and the EU intend to play a key role in shaping developments in this dynamic region.
In geo-economic terms, the Indo-Pacific includes important non-European trading partners such as China, Japan, India, South Korea, and South-East Asian states. Several of these countries have some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and thus are attractive targets for German investment. As a trading nation, Germany is dependent on open trade routes. The geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific lies in the fact that the region is centre stage for the systemic rivalry between the United States (US) and China. Developments there will determine the future shape of the international order. It is therefore also in Germany’s and Europe’s interest to strengthen the existing rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific – for example by advocating the rule of international law, open and fair trade practices, and peaceful conflict resolution.
To ensure Germany’s credibility as an international actor in the region, the next Federal Government must develop a strategy for implementing the guidelines as well as the principles and goals formulated therein. The political will to pursue this Indo-Pacific policy should be demonstrated through a long-term commitment. This includes, firstly, the provision of adequate resources in terms of finance, materials, and personnel on a sustained basis. Secondly, political contacts must be expanded, for example through diplomatic visits and new formats, so that Germany also gains greater visibility in the region.
As Berlin sets out to chart an appropriate course, it faces four central challenges. These relate firstly to European cooperation, secondly to the choice of partners in the Indo-Pacific, thirdly to the issue focus, and fourthly to dealing with conflicting goals and crises.
European coordination and cooperation
Having played a key role in the process of formulating the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany should now follow through by contributing to concrete measures. However, given the limitations in EU foreign policymaking resulting from the consensus principle, Berlin must simultaneously pursue the implementation of its own guidelines. With France and the Netherlands also having presented their own concepts for the region, a juxtaposition of European and national strategies is emerging. Against this background, it is advisable to establish a regular exchange between the main actors responsible for Indo-Pacific policy with the objective of harmonising and coordinating initiatives at the EU level and in the member states.
The United Kingdom also emphasises the Indo-Pacific in its new foreign and security policy strategy of March 2021. Therefore, London should be included in European coordination processes as much as possible. That would allow for devising joint initiatives or positions while increasing the coherence and complementarity of European policies towards the region.
If no consensus can be reached at the EU level, Germany should move ahead with initiatives by relying on flexible coordination with European partners. Examples of such joint moves include the note verbale to the United Nations regarding the South China Sea, issued by Berlin, Paris, and London in September 2020, as well as the reference to Taiwan in the final declaration of the G7 summit in June 2021.
Partners in the Indo-Pacific
So far, Germany’s focus vis-à-vis the region has been on bilateral relations with important countries such as Japan, India, and Indonesia on the one hand, and regional institutions, in particular the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the other. Within the G7, Germany is also involved in the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, which was announced in June 2021. It aims to support developing countries in the Indo-Pacific and other regions with improving their infrastructure.
In addition, however, new minilateral forums and ad hoc coalitions have emerged in the Indo-Pacific in recent years with the objective of achieving efficient cooperation on specific issues. These include the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative between Japan, Australia, and India, and the Blue Dot Network between Japan, Australia, and the US, which develops standards for infrastructure projects. The Quad Group, consisting of the US, India, Japan, and Australia, has also intensified cooperation. Minilaterals of this kind allow the partners to pursue common goals and respond to regional needs in a flexible way.
Germany has no experience to date with minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific, but it should be open to them. To this end, the Federal Government should seek like-minded partners on the basis of shared values or converging interests on certain issues. Germany should initially engage those regional states that are identified as value partners in the guidelines, such as Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea. Going forward, Germany must consider how domestic and foreign policy constellations influence the respective willingness of these countries to cooperate. The conflict over North Korea, for example, limits South Korea’s foreign policy options.
At the same time, however, cooperation with selected regional organisations must not be neglected. In view of its political and economic importance, ASEAN should remain the focus of attention for Germany and Europe. Depending on the geographic and issue focus – and such a focus is important – Germany could also place greater emphasis on other regional formats, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) or the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Minilateral formats and regional cooperation can also be combined; for example, regional organisations can be supported through joint programmes with India and Japan.
In terms of values such as democratic rights and freedoms, Taiwan is an important regional partner, yet it is not mentioned in the German guidelines. The challenge here is to find creative ways to intensify cooperation at the political level or in economic and social spheres without abandoning Germany’s official “one-China” policy.
Issue priorities
Germany’s and Europe’s cooperation with the Indo-Pacific already spanned a wide range of topics before the related policy documents were published, and the agenda has now broadened further. In addition to economic cooperation, Germany and Europe have been particularly active in “soft” areas (including non-traditional security), such as development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the environment and climate, or fighting organised crime and piracy.
This focus also opens up opportunities for cooperation with the Quad states. In Beijing, the Quad is seen as part of the American effort to build a bloc against China, although its members are also pursuing partly inclusive concepts for the Indo-Pacific and for dealing with the People’s Republic. At its first summit in March 2021, the Quad emphasised cooperation on climate change, health, and technology. Even if Berlin and Brussels do not seek direct cooperation with the Quad in order to show their independence and avoid being seen as supporting a confrontational stance vis-à-vis China, the group’s agenda offers common ground for cooperation within the framework of a Quad-plus format. The same applies to the minilateral initiatives mentioned above.
Germany also needs to consider a stronger security profile in the Indo-Pacific, given that the military balance of power in the region has been rapidly shifting in favour of China and inter-state tensions are on the rise. In view of the limited capabilities of the German navy and existing alliance obligations, the deployment of warships will for the foreseeable future remain merely a symbolic act calling for compliance with international law – especially the law of the sea. In such cases, coordination and cooperation must be sought with European states such as France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, which have their own naval units in the region or are deploying them. Joint exercises, also with the littoral states, would make Europe more visible in the Indo-Pacific. This would also be in line with the EU Council Conclusions on the Indo-Pacific of April 2021, which state the goal of ensuring an EU maritime presence in the region on the basis of voluntary contributions by member states. Germany’s security policy profile can also be raised by establishing high-level political formats with selected value partners, such as government consultations or “two plus two” dialogues between foreign and defence ministers. Such a dialogue already took place with Japan in spring 2021.
In security cooperation with the region, Germany and the EU could place a more prominent focus on capacity-building. Germany should actively support the EU’s CRIMARIO II (Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean II) initiative, which aims to improve partners’ maritime awareness capabilities, and thus the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and in South and South-East Asia. Through the European Peace Facility, Germany can also work within the EU framework to help partner countries improve their capabilities in areas such as border control and border defence. Furthermore, the German Enable and Enhance Initiative is suitable for helping to build security-related capacities through selected projects in the Indo-Pacific.
Priority-setting, conflicting goals, tough decisions
There is a need for inter-ministerial coordination and a consistent implementation of the German guidelines on the Indo-Pacific, which were formulated as a “whole of government approach”. However, the multitude of intended cooperation areas across many policy areas expressed in the document do not indicate any clear prioritisation. With limited financial, human, and military resources, it will become necessary to focus on specific issues, partners, and formats. One of the challenges will be to find a balance between cultivating bilateral relations, supporting minilateral formats, and strengthening regional organisations.
Against the backdrop of a growing rivalry between the US and China, Germany’s and the EU’s inclusive Indo-Pacific concept aims to counteract both bipolarity and unipolarity in the region. Germany and Europe must make it clear to China that inclusiveness does not mean that Beijing’s violations of international rules and norms, such as human rights or international maritime law, will be accepted without objection. Nor does China have a veto right when it comes to shaping German or European Indo-Pacific policy.
Germany’s and Europe’s growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region is likely to elicit counter-reactions from China. The price involved may include negative effects on German and European economic interests, but unless this is accepted, political credibility cannot be maintained. China’s (over)reaction to the sanctions imposed by the EU on Beijing in March 2021 due to human rights violations in Xinjiang was a case in point. It can be assumed that China’s actions will affect European states to varying degrees and in different ways. In order to prevent divisions between them, dialogue must be sought with the most important partners at an early stage. Any punitive measures taken by the People’s Republic should be countered with joint responses.1
Finally, with a stronger engagement in the region, including on security issues, it will be necessary to undertake more contingency planning at the European and national levels to discuss crises and conflict scenarios in the Indo-Pacific and possible reactions. Such contingency planning is the only way to ensure a timely and coordinated response.
Appendix
Abbreviations
|
AfCFTA |
African Continental Free Trade Area |
|
ASEAN |
Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
|
AU |
African Union |
|
B3W |
Build Back Better World |
|
BBB |
Build Back Better |
|
BMVg |
Federal Ministry of Defence / Bundesministerium der Verteidigung |
|
BRI |
Belt and Road Initiative |
|
CAR |
Central African Republic |
|
CBAM |
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism |
|
CCP |
Chinese Communist Party |
|
CFSP |
Common Foreign and Security Policy |
|
COVAX |
Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access |
|
CPTPP |
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership |
|
CSDP |
Common Security and Defence Policy |
|
DCA |
Dual-Capable Aircraft |
|
EAEU |
Eurasian Economic Union |
|
ECJ |
European Court of Justice |
|
EEAS |
European External Action Service |
|
EFTA |
European Free Trade Association |
|
EPA |
Economic Partnership Agreement |
|
ESM |
European Stability Mechanism |
|
EU INTCEN |
EU Intelligence Analysis Centre |
|
EU |
European Union |
|
EUMS INT |
EU Military Staff Intelligence |
|
GIDS |
German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (Hamburg) |
|
GSDR |
Global Sustainable Development Report |
|
HFC |
Hybrid Fusion Cell |
|
ICC |
International Criminal Court |
|
IS |
Islamic State |
|
LAC |
Latin America and the Caribbean |
|
NATO |
North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
|
NGEU |
NextGenerationEU |
|
NPT |
Non-Proliferation Treaty |
|
OECD |
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
|
OSCE |
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
|
P5 |
Five Official Nuclear Powers / Permanent Members of the UN Security Council |
|
SDG |
Sustainable Development Goal |
|
SIAC |
Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity |
|
SWP |
German Institute for International and Security Affairs / Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik |
|
TNW |
Tactical Nuclear Weapon |
|
TPNW |
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons |
|
UK |
United Kingdom |
|
UN |
United Nations |
|
US |
United States |
|
WBGU |
German Advisory Council on Global Change / Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen |
|
WHO |
World Health Organization |
|
WTO |
World Trade Organization |
The Authors
Dr Hürcan Aslı Aksoy
Deputy Head of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS)
Dr Steffen Angenendt
Senior Fellow in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Muriel Asseburg
Senior Fellow in the Africa and Middle East Research Division
Dr Peter Becker
Senior Associate in the EU / Europe Research Division
Dr Marianne Beisheim
Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Annegret Bendiek
Deputy Head of the EU / Europe Research Division
Susan Bergner
Associate in the Global Issues Research Division until August 2021
Nadine Biehler
Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Raphael Bossong
Associate in the EU / Europe Research Division
Prof. Dr Heribert Dieter
Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Susanne Dröge
Senior Fellow in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Sabine Fischer
Senior Fellow in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division
Felicitas Fritzsche
Research Assistant in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Hanns Günther Hilpert
Head of the Asia Research Division
Dr habil. Markus Kaim
Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division
Dr Ronja Kempin
Senior Fellow in the EU / Europe Research Division
Nadine Knapp
Research Assistant in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Anne Koch
Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Wolfram Lacher
Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division
Dr Barbara Lippert
Director of Research, Executive Board
Ambassador (ret.) Dr Eckhard Lübkemeier
Visiting Fellow in the EU / Europe Research Division
Prof. Dr Günther Maihold
Deputy Director of SWP
Dr Stefan Mair
Director of SWP
Prof. Dr Hanns Maull
Senior Distinguished Fellow, Visiting Fellow of the Executive Board
Amrei Meier
Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Melanie Müller
Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division
Dr Michael Paul
Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division
neColonel (ret.) Wolfgang Richter
Senior Associate in the International Security Research Division
Prof. Dr habil. Sabine Riedel
Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Alexandra Sakaki
Deputy Head of the Asia Research Division
Dr Christina Saulich
Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division
Florian Schöne
Visiting Fellow in the International Security Research Division
Svenja Schöneich
Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division
Dr Angela Stanzel
Associate in the Asia Research Division
Ambassador (ret.) Dr Volker Stanzel
Senior Distinguished Fellow, Visiting Fellow of the Executive Board
Göran Swistek
Visiting Fellow in the International Security Research Division
Dr Johannes Thimm
Deputy Head of The Americas Research Division
Dr Oliver Thränert
Head of the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at SWP
Dr Denis M. Tull
Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division
Dr Judith Vorrath
Senior Associate in the International Security Research Division
Maike Voss
Associate in the Global Issues Research Division until September 2021
Dr Gudrun Wacker
Senior Fellow in the Asia Research Division
Dr habil. Christian Wagner
Senior Fellow in the Asia Research Division
Dr Kirsten Westphal
Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division
Dr Claudia Zilla
Senior Fellow in The Americas Research Division
Endnotes
- 1
-
German foreign policy is understood here as a collective term that covers the entire breadth of the field of foreign policy action, and thus also includes security policy, development policy, etc.
- 2
-
Barbara Lippert and Volker Perthes, eds., Strategic Rivalry between United States and China. Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe, SWP Research Paper 4/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/strategic-rivalry-between-united-states-and-china (accessed 7 September 2021).
- 3
-
New dependencies and vulnerabilities as well as challenges posed by rising powers and the shaking of the post-war international order were already addressed in 2013 in the paper New Power, New Responsibility. Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/projekt_papiere/German ForeignSecurityPolicy_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf. The transformation of the “liberal international order” was the subject of a project a few years later: Hanns W. Maull, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, November 2018). How to respond to the new situation was examined in the study edited by Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes, European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests, SWP Research Paper 4/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ european-strategic-autonomy (all accessed 7 September 2021).
- 4
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See Bernhard Stahl and Sebastian Harnisch, “Nationale Identitäten und Außenpolitiken: Erkenntnisse, Desiderate und neue Wege in der Diskursforschung”, in Vergleichende Außenpolitikforschung und nationale Identitäten, ed. Bernhard Stahl and Sebastian Harnisch (Baden-Baden, 2009), 31–58 (37).
- 5
-
Federal Foreign Office, “‘China Is a Partner, Competitor and Rival’. Interview by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas with Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland”, 12 July 2020, https:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-rnd/ 2367552 (accessed 7 September 2021).
- 6
-
This volume is not intended to succumb to the temptation to discuss possibilities for a reorientation across virtually all policy fields and regional references. This is therefore not a treatise on German foreign policy in all its facets, which would certainly have overloaded an assessment of the current situation.
- 1
-
Richard N. Haass and Charles A. Kupchan, “The New Concert of Powers”, in Anchoring the World. International Order in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Charles A. Kupchan and Leslie Vinjamuri (Foreign Affairs, 2021), 89–103.
- 2
-
Richard N. Haass and Charles A. Kupchan, “A Concert of Powers for a Global Era”, Project Syndicate (online), 25 March 2021,https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/concert-of-powers-for-global-era-by-richard-haass-and-charles-a-kupchan-2021-03 (accessed 5 July 2021).
- 3
-
See Haass and Kupchan, “The New Concert of Powers” (see note 1), 91, 99.
- 4
-
The analogy to the Congress of Vienna and the time of Metternich is inaccurate in many ways, not least because it did not bring about an era of peace – see the Crimean War, Germany’s wars with Austria and France. Also, the Holy Alliance within the Pentarchy suppressed national and democratic movements, and thus held the five powers together. The realist reading of Haass and Kupchan can be found, for example, in Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 83: “The so-called Concert of Europe implied that nations which were competitive on one level would settle matters affecting overall stability by consensus.” It should also be taken into account that England (from the outside) watched over the precarious balance of power on the continent. There is currently no equivalent to this either.
- 5
-
Joseph R. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs (online), (March/April 2020), https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed 5 July 2021).
- 6
-
Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah, “Forget the G-7, Build the D10”, Foreign Policy (online), 10 June 2020, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracy-trump-europe/ (accessed 5 July 2021).
- 7
-
Joseph R. Biden and Boris Johnson, The New Atlantic Charter (St. Ives, Cornwall, 10 June 2021), https://assets.pub lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/992569/The_New_Atlantic_Charter_ 2021.pdf (accessed 5 July 2021).
- 8
-
Ursula von der Leyen, “Europe address”, European Commission, Speech at Allianz Forum, Berlin, 8 November 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_6248 (accessed 5 July 2021).
- 9
-
Emmanuel Macron, Speech by the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, on the occasion of the German Remembrance Day ceremony, Berlin, German Bundestag, 18 November 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/ pdf/181118_rede_pr_volkstrauertag_cle8c3c49.pdf (accessed 5 July 2021).
- 10
-
Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes, eds., European Strategic Autonomy, SWP Research Paper 04/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/european-strategic-autonomy (accessed 18 August 2021).
- 11
-
“Eine sanfte Utopie ist mir lieber”, interview with Nora Bossong, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 June 2021.
- 1
-
This definition draws on Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), 25.
- 2
-
A notable exception was Willy Brandt, who as Foreign Minister in 1968 published a book in which he asserted: “The Federal Republic cannot, of course, make what is called a ‘dead beetle’. To put it less popularly: It shouldn’t pretend that it has no interests and no will of its own”, Willy Brandt, Friedenspolitik in Europa (Frankfurt: Fischer 1968), 49.
- 3
-
See Eckhard Lübkemeier, Europas Banalität des Guten. Ursachen der europäischen Dauerkrise und Auswege – ein Wegweiser, SWP-Studie 6/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2019), 64–70.
- 4
-
On the concept of co-leadership and Germany’s relevant role, see Eckhard Lübkemeier, Führung ist wie Liebe. Warum Mitführung in Europa notwendig ist und wer sie leisten kann, SWP-Studie 30/2007 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2007).
- 5
-
The German government has neglected this imperative in the case of the Nord Stream 2 project. For years it had insisted that the gas pipeline was a purely commercial project, only to have to admit at last that it also has a political dimension, as neighbours like Poland and Ukraine had always claimed.
- 6
-
Quoted in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 November 2020, 6.
- 7
-
Helmut Schmidt, “‘Politik der Friedenssicherung aus Verantwortung und Überzeugung’. Rede auf dem Jahresempfang der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, 26 Januar 1982”, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 18 (3 March 1982), 138–39.
- 8
-
Ibid., 139.
- 1
-
Geneva Global Health Hub, Non-Paper on Strengthening WHO’s Leading and Coordinating Role in Global Health (Geneva, August 2020), http://g2h2.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 08/Non-paper-1.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).
- 2
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Graduate Institute Geneva, “A Global Pandemic Treaty Should Aim for Deep Prevention”, (Geneva, 27 April 2021), https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/ global-pandemic-treaty-should-aim-deep-prevention (accessed 29 November 2021).
- 3
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Zukunftsforum Public Health, Eckpunkte einer Public-Health-Strategie für Deutschland (March 2021), https://zukunftsforum-public-health.de/public-health-strategie/.
- 4
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Federal Ministry of Health, ed., Strategy of the Federal Government on Global Health (Berlin, October 2020), https://www. bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/fileadmin/Dateien/ 5_Publikationen/Gesundheit/Broschueren/GlobaleGesund heitsstrategie_Web.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).
- 5
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Federal Government, “Coronavirus: WHO Centre Comes to Berlin”, Press Release, 5 May 2021, https://www.bundes regierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/who-bueo-in-berlin-1910932 (accessed 29 November 2021).
- 6
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Wissenschaftsplattform Nachhaltigkeit 2030/SDSN Germany, eds., Impulse für die Überarbeitung der Deutschen Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie vor dem Hintergrund der COVID-19 Pandemie (Potsdam, 2020), https://www.die-gdi.de/fileadmin/user_ upload/pdfs/veranstaltungen/2020/20200826_Beiraete_im_ Gespraech_Ergebnis.pdf (accessed 29 November 2021).
- 7
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Bundesgesundheitsministerium, ed., Strategie der Bundesregierung zur globalen Gesundheit (see note 4).
- 8
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See website: https://globalhealth.de/.
- 9
-
“Coronavirus Pandemic: Five Heads of State Call for Global Alliance”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online), 1 April 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/gesundheit/ coronavirus/coronavirus-pandemie-fuenf-praesidenten-fordern-globale-allianz-16706321.html (accessed 29 November 2021).
- 1
-
This extreme negative scenario would only be conceivable if the EU were to break apart – and in this catastrophic case, the Europeans and Germany would have quite different problems than taking over and repaying the debts of a defunct Union.
- 1
-
“Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of 29 April 2021 on Addressing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 172/79 (Brussels, 17 May 2021), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX: 32021R0784&from=EN.
- 2
-
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters, COM(2018) 225 final (Strasbourg, 17 April 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/? uri=CELEX:52018PC0225.
- 3
-
For example, the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), or the Europol Information System (EIS).
- 4
-
For example, on Passenger Name Record (PNR) data or on cross-border searches of DNA or motor vehicle data.
- 5
-
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Preparations for the Full Implementation of the Interoperability Regulations, COM(2020) 428 final (Brussels, 21 August 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2020:0428:FIN:EN:PDF.
- 6
-
See Article 222 TFEU.
- 7
-
Council of the European Union, “The EU Integrated Political Crisis Response – IPCR – Arrangements in Brief”, 17 April 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ documents-publications/publications/the-eu-integrated-political-crisis-response-ipcr-arrangements/.
- 8
-
Tiago Almeida, “EU Parliament Approves Reform of Civil Protection Mechanism”, euractiv, 29 April 2021, https://www. euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-parlia ment-approves-reform-of-civil-protection-mechanism/.
- 9
-
Raphael Bossong, The Expansion of Frontex. Symbolic Measures and Long-term Changes in EU Border Protection, SWP Comment 47/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.18449/2019C47.
- 10
-
7,000 of the 10,000 EU border guards targeted by 2027 would be seconded from member states.
- 11
-
European Parliament, Report on the Fact-finding Investigation on Frontex Concerning Alleged Fundamental Rights Violations, Working Document, 14 July 2021, https://www.statewatch. org/media/2590/ep-frontex-scrutiny-group-final-report-14-7-21.pdf.
- 12
-
Cameron F. Kerry, “The Oracle at Luxembourg: The EU Court of Justice Judges the World on Surveillance and Privacy” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 11 January 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-oracle-at-luxembourg-the-eu-court-of-justice-judges-the-world-on-surveillance-and-privacy/; Sofie Royer and Sem Careel, “Access Denied – CJEU [European Court of Justice] Reaffirms la Quadrature du Net and Clarifies Requirements for Access to Retained Data”, 23 March 2021, https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/access-denied-cjeu-reaffirms-la-quadrature-du-net-and-clarifies-requirements-for-access-to-retained-data/.
- 13
-
Marion MacGregor, “EU Border Agency to Face Court over Alleged Migrant Rights Violations”, InfoMigrants, 26 May 2021, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/32529/eu-border-agency-to-face-court-over-alleged-migrant-rights-violations.
- 14
-
Fenella M. W. Billing, “Limiting Mutual Trust on Fundamental Rights Grounds under the European Arrest Warrant and Lessons Learned from Transfers under Dublin III”, New Journal of European Criminal Law 11, no. 2 (2020): 184–203.
- 15
-
Nikolaj Nielsen, “EU Condemns ‘Pegasus’ Spyware Use on Journalists”, EUobserver, 20 July 2021, https://euobserver. com/democracy/152487.
- 16
-
See the contribution of Steffen Angenendt et al., p. 33ff.
- 1
-
Bodo Weber, “Die Flüchtlingskrise als Spiegelbild europäischer Außenpolitik – Russische Sabotagepolitik, die Abwesenheit der USA und die Grenzen reaktiver Führung”, in Europa und die neue Weltunordnung. Analysen und Positionen zur europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, ed. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Berlin, 2016), 135–43.
- 2
-
Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future (Berlin, 18 May 2021), https://www. bmvg.de/resource/blob/5092636/f30cf5dd345488be5c5a090c58367fae/eckpunkte-final-en-data.pdf.
- 3
-
Ulf von Krause, Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik (Wiesbaden, 2013), doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-00185-8.
- 4
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United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (6 December 2018), https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/ pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf (accessed 3 August 2021).
- 5
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Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Army MultiDomain Operations (MDO) (Washington, D.C., 22 April 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11409.pdf (accessed 3 August 2021).
- 6
-
BMVg, Key Elements (see note 2).
- 7
-
Ibid.
- 8
-
Federal Ministry of Defense, Position Paper: Reflections on the Bundeswehr of the Future (Bonn, 9 February 2021), https://www. bmvg.de/resource/blob/5029396/a83129815c00e3638302ba3630478987/20210211-dl-positionspapier-en-data.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 9
-
BMVg, Key Elements (see note 2).
- 1
-
The authors owe the inspiration for this apt metaphor to Philip Stephens, “The Right Answer to Xi Jinping Is a One-China Policy”, Financial Times, 21 January 2021.
- 2
-
See Hanns W. Maull, “Eine China-Strategie braucht auch Abschreckungspotenzial”, Die Zeit (online), 22 May 2021.
- 3
-
See in particular Feration of German Industries (BDI), Partner and Systemic Competitor – How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy?, Policy Paper China (Berlin, January 2019).
- 4
-
See the contribution of Alexandra Sakaki, Gudrun Wacker, and Christian Wagner, p. 123ff.
- 1
-
European Commission, EU Trade Statistics, https://ec. europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/statistics/ (accessed 14 July 2021).
- 2
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Carlos de León, “Transporte terrestre chino en América Latina” [Chinese land transport in Latin America], Observatorio Económico Latinoamericano, 31 May 2021, http://www. obela.org/analisis/transporte-terrestre-chino-en-america-latina (accessed 14 July 2021).
- 3
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Wilson Center, Aid from China and the U.S. to Latin America amid the COVID-19 Crisis (Washington, D.C., 8 February 2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/aid-china-and-us-latin-america-amid-covid-19-crisis (accessed 14 July 2021).
- 4
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African Union Commission/OECD Development Centre, Africa’s Development Dynamics 2021. Digital Transformation for Quality Jobs (Paris, 2021), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ development/external-financial-inflows_e1670c9e-en (accessed 14 July 2021).
- 5
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Federal Foreign Office, Eine vertiefte Partnerschaft mit Afrika. Fortschreibung und Weiterentwicklung der Afrikapolitischen Leitlinien der Bundesregierung (Berlin, 27 March 2019), 18.
- 6
-
Idrissa Rahmane, Dialogue in Divergence. The Impact of EU Migration Policy on West African Integration: The Cases of Nigeria, Mali, and Niger (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 2019).
- 7
-
European Council, European Council Meeting – Conclusions (28 June 2016) –, EUCO 26/16 (Brussels, 28 June 2016), para. 2.
- 8
-
“‘Spanien wirft Marokko ‘Erpressung’ vor”, Deutsche Welle, 20 May 2021, https://www.dw.com/de/spanien-wirft-marokko-erpressung-vor/a-57600252 (accessed 19 July 2021).
- 9
-
Data on Covid-19 infections and deaths as well as vaccination coverage in this section are based on analyses from WHO, WHO Cornonavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, https:// covid19.who.int/ (accessed 13 July 2021).
- 10
-
Rashmee Roshan Lall, “Por qué Haití no ha vacunado aún a ni una sola persona” [Why Haiti has not vaccinated a single person yet], openDemocracy, 5 July 2021, https://www. opendemocracy.net/es/haiti-no-ha-vacunado-a-nadie/ (accessed 13 July 2021).
- 11
-
Vaccines from Russia (Sputnik V) and China (VeroCell) are in the EU approval process after application in March and May 2021, respectively.
- 1
-
The Federal Foreign Office, ed., A Multilateralism for the People. Federal Government White Paper (Berlin, May 2021), 23.
- 2
-
In the German government’s current White Paper on multilateralism, there is remarkably no reference to either the – obviously obsolete – modernisation partnership with Russia or the – formally continuing – bilateral “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China.
- 3
-
The expenditures for external relations include the departmental appropriations of the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defence, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- 1
-
Federal Government, German Sustainable Development Strategy – Update 2021 (Berlin, 2021).
- 2
-
Independent Group of Scientists, Global Sustainable Development Report 2019: The Future Is Now – Science for Achieving Sustainable Development (New York, NY: United Nations, 2019).
- 3
-
This article is based, among other things, on a series of talks on “Hebel ‘Internationale Verantwortung und Zusammenarbeit’ als Instrument deutscher und europäischer Nachhaltigkeitspolitik” (Lever ‘International Responsibility and Cooperation’ As an Instrument of German and European Sustainability Policy), held in cooperation with the German Development Institute and the SDSN Germany network on 4 and 5 May 2021. See also note 17.
- 4
-
Auswärtiges Amt, Diplomatie für Nachhaltigkeit. Bericht des Auswärtigen Amtes zur Umsetzung der Deutschen Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie und der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) (Berlin, November 2020).
- 5
-
Federal Government, German Sustainable Development Strategy (see note 1), 128 (emphasis added).
- 6
-
Auswärtiges Amt, Diplomatie für Nachhaltigkeit (see note 4, own translation), 5.
- 7
-
Citizen Assembly, Germany’s Role in the World. The Recommendations of the Digital Citizens’ Assembly (Berlin, March 2021).
- 8
-
Ibid., 56.
- 9
-
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Leitsätze zum Beschluss des Ersten Senats (Klimaschutz) (Karlsruhe, 24 March 2021), 97.
- 10
-
Bundesregierung, Transformation erreichen – Perspektiven für die Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitspolitik (Berlin, 14 June 2021), 3 (own translation).
- 11
-
Ibid.
- 12
-
UN Secretary General, Our Common Agenda (New York, NY: United Nations, 2021). https://www.un.org/en/un75/ common-agenda (accessed 7 October 2021).
- 13
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Sara Batmanglich et al., Driving Transformative Change: Foreign Affairs and the 2030 Agenda (Berlin: Adelphi, 2019), https://www.adelphi.de/de/publikation/driving-transformative-change-foreign-affairs-and-2030-agenda (accessed 12 July 2021).
- 14
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Federal Government, A Multilateralism for the People. Federal Government White Paper (Berlin, 2021), 16.
- 15
-
Maike Voss, Globale Impfstoffverteilung: Zu kleiner Kuchen, ungleiche Stücke, SWP Kurz gesagt (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 8 December 2020).
- 16
-
Federal Government, A Multilateralism for the People (see note 14), 88.
- 17
-
Sustainable Development Solutions Network Germany, Zu Hebeln gewendet? Auswärtige Politiken für die Ziele nachhaltiger Entwicklung (Bonn and Berlin, 5 May 2021), https://www.die-gdi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/veranstaltungen/2021/ 20210504_KurzberichtGespraechsreiheAuswaertigePolitiken_ SDSNGermany.pdf (accessed 12 July 2021).
- 18
-
United Nations, Voluntary Common Reporting Guidelines for Voluntary National Reviews at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) (New York, NY, 2021).
- 19
-
G7 Climate and Environment: Ministers’ Communiqué (London, 21 May 2021).
- 20
-
International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Germany and Chile Share Concrete Examples of Just Transition” (Winnipeg, 25 July 2019), https://sdg.iisd.org/news/ germany-and-chile-share-concrete-examples-of-just-transition/ (accessed 19 July 2021).
- 1
-
The term “hybrid threat” is often used in a fuzzy way or is highly contested despite years of use; see Murat Caliskan and Michel Liégeois, “The Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Undermines NATO’s Strategic Thinking: Insights from Interviews with NATO Officials”, Small Wars and Insurgencies 32, no. 2 (2021): 295–319.
- 2
-
Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War”, Survival 57, no. 6 (2015): 51–58.
- 3
-
P. Cullen, C. Juola, G. Karagiannis, K. Kivisoo, M. Normark, A. Rácz, J. Schmid, and J. Schroefl, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats. A Conceptual Model, JRC123305 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021), doi: 10.2760/44985.
- 4
-
See European Commission, Fifth Progress Report on the Implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats, SWD(2021) 729 final (Brussels, 23 June 2021); Lutz Güllner, “Im digitalen Fadenkreuz”, International Politics 76, no. 4 (2021): 78–81.
- 5
-
Mikael Wigell, “Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference”, The Washington Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2021): 49–67.
- 6
-
Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “Addressing Hybrid Threats: Priorities for the EU in 2020 and Beyond”, European View 19, no. 1 (2020): 62–70.
- 7
-
With the so-called Stratcom departments (Strategic Communications), see European External Action Service, “Strategic Communications”, https://eeas.europa.eu/head quarters/headquarters-homepage_en/100/Strategic%20 Communications.
- 8
-
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the Context of the EU Global Strategy, 10048/19 (Luxembourg, 17 June 2019), https://data.consilium.europa. eu/doc/document/ST-10048-2019-INIT/en/pdf; European Commission, EU Security Union Strategy, COM(2020) 605 final (Brussels, 24 July 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0605&from=EN.
- 9
-
Other initiatives of the European Commission focus on related soft factors, such as the quality of democracy and the integration of immigrants.
- 10
-
German Presidency of the Council of the European Union, “Strategic Compass: Developing Strategic Principles”, 25 August 2020, https://www.eu2020.de/eu2020-en/news/ article/eu-defense-strategic-compass-foreign-policy/2377030; Federal Ministry of Defence, “The Strategic Compass: Developing Strategic Principles”, 3 May 2020, https://www.bmvg. de/en/news/the-strategic-compass-5058518.
- 11
-
See From Self-Doubt to Self-Assurance. The European External Action Service as the Indispensable Support for a Geopolitical EU, report by the task force “EEAS 2.0”, Chairman: Pierre Vimont, Rapporteurs: Christophe Hillion and Steven Blockmans (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, January 2021).
- 12
-
Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats (HWP ERCHT).
- 13
-
See Raphael Bossong, Intelligence Support for EU Security Policy. Options for Enhancing the Flow of Information and Political Oversight, SWP Comment 51/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/intelligence-support-for-eu-security-policy; Golo M. Bartsch, “Das Wissen vor dem Handeln. Die Nachrichtendienste in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, Europäische Sicherheit und Technik, no. 5 (2019): 20–22.
- 14
-
Already in 2016, the EU INTCEN built a generic “Hybrid Tool Box”, see Gerhard Conrad, “Situational Awareness for EU Decision-Making: The Next Decade”, European Foreign Affairs Revue 26, no. 1 (2021): 55–70.
- 1
-
See Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21 (9).
- 2
-
Thus Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New about It?” Democratization 26, no. 7 (2019): 1095–113.
- 3
-
See Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York, NY: Penguin, 2018), 7.
- 4
-
See Svante E. Cornell, “How Should America Deal with Authoritarian States?” The American Interest 15, no. 5 (2020).
- 5
-
See Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber, “Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers. Sources and Addressees, Mechanisms and Motives of Authoritarian Pressure and Attraction”, in Authoritarian Gravity Centers. A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion, ed. Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber (New York, NY: Routledge, 2021), 26–52.
- 6
-
For an overview of the extensive literature, see Timm Beichelt, “Externe Domokratieförderung”, Neue Politische Literatur 55, no. 3 (2010): 447–67.
- 7
-
See, e.g., Wolfgang Merkel and Anna Lührmann, “Resilience of Democracies: Responses to Illiberal and Authoritarian Challenges”, Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 869–84.
- 8
-
See the contribution of Annegret Bendiek and Raphael Bossong, p. 33ff.
- 9
-
Boese et al. speak here of “onset resilience”; see Vanessa A. Boese et al., “How Democracies Prevail: Democratic Resilience as a Two-stage Process”, Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 885–907.
- 10
-
For more on this, see Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (2019): 234–71.
- 1
-
The White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership (Washington, D.C., 12 June 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/ (accessed 24 August 2021).
- 2
-
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Covid-19 in Africa: Regional Socio-economic Implications and Policy Priorities (Paris, 7 May 2020).
- 3
-
United Nations Environment Programme, Opportunities to Respond and Build Back Better while Leaving No One Behind in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nairobi, 2020).
- 1
-
See also the contribution by Marianne Beisheim and Felicitas Fritzsche, p. 60ff.
- 2
-
See Federal Constitutional Court, “Constitutional Complaints against the Federal Climate Change Act Partially Successful”, Press Release 31/2021, 29 April 2021, https://www. bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/bvg21-031.html (accessed 16 August 2021).
- 3
-
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen, Struktur des Primärenergieverbrauchs in Deutschland 2020, September 2021, https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/21-0-Infografik.html (accessed 27 August 2021).
- 4
-
See European Commission, “European Green Deal. Striving to Be the First Climate-neutral Continent”, https:// ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en; “Recovery Plan for Europe”, https://ec.europa. eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en (each accessed 23 August 2021).
- 5
-
Net Zero by 2050. A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (Paris: International Energy Agency [IEA], July 2021), 24f., https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/beceb956-0dcf-4d73-89fe-1310e3046d68/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobal EnergySector_CORR.pdf.
- 6
-
See Carlos Fernández Alvarez, “Global Coal Demand Surpassed pre-Covid Levels in Late 2020, Underlining the World’s Emissions Challenge” (Paris: IEA, 23 March 2021), https://www.iea.org/commentaries/global-coal-demand-surpassed-pre-covid-levels-in-late-2020-underlining-the-world-s-emissions-challenge (accessed 12 August 2021).
- 7
-
BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, 70th edition (London, July 2021), 23, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/ bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/ statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.
- 8
-
See The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies”, 22 April 2021, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/ 2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/ (accessed 12 August 2021).
- 9
-
Maria Pastukhova, Jacopo Maria Pepe, and Kirsten Westphal, Beyond the Green Deal: Upgrading the EU’s Energy Diplomacy for a New Era, SWP Comment 31/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2020).
- 10
-
Ibid.
- 11
-
Susanne Dröge, Ein CO2-Grenzausgleich für den Green Deal der EU. Funktionen, Fakten und Fallstricke, SWP-Studie 9/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2021).
- 1
-
See, e.g., Kim Son Hoang, “Klage und scharfe UN-Kritik wegen EU-Migrationspolitik im Mittelmeer”, Der Standard, 26 May 2021, https://www.derstandard.de/story/20001269 27457/klage-und-scharfe-un-kritik-wegen-eu-migrations politik-im-mittelmeer (accessed 11 August 2021); “Moria: Empörung und Abgrenzung im EU-Parlament”, Deutsche Welle, 17 September 2020, https://www.dw.com/de/moria-emp%C3%B6rung-und-abgrenzung-im-eu-parlament/a-54 960264 (accessed 11 August 2021).
- 2
-
See Wido Geis-Thöne, In Deutschland und der EU leben immer weniger Kinder. Eine Betrachtung der Entwicklungen der letzten 25 Jahre, IW-Report 62/2020 (Cologne: Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft/German Economic Institute [IW], December 2020), https://www.iwkoeln.de/ studien/wido-geis-thoene-in-deutschland-und-der-eu-leben-immer-weniger-kinder.html (accessed 11 August 2021).
- 3
-
See Anne Koch, Annette Weber, and Isabelle Werenfels, eds., Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management, SWP Research Paper 4/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018), https:// www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/profiteers-of-migration (accessed 11 August 2021); Nadine Biehler, Anne Koch, and Amrei Meier, Risiken und Nebenwirkungen deutscher und europäischer Rückkehrpolitik. Ein außen-, sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischer Beipackzettel, SWP-Studie 12/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2021), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/risiken-und-nebenwirkungen-deutscher-und-europaeischer-rueckkehrpolitik (accessed 8 September 2021).
- 4
-
See Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement, Preventing Crises, Creating Prospects, Protecting People, Report (April 2021), 146, https://www.fachkommission-flucht ursachen.de/en (accessed 4 October 2021).
- 5
-
See Steffen Angenendt, Nadine Biehler, Raphael Bossong, David Kipp, and Anne Koch, The New EU Migration and Asylum Package: Breakthrough or Admission of Defeat? SWP Comment 46/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-new-eu-migration-and-asylum-package-breakthrough-or-admission-of-defeat (accessed 4 October 2021).
- 1
-
See the contribution of Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, Muriel Asseburg and Wolfram Lacher, p. 33ff.
- 2
-
Systemic prevention is equally relevant. However, it is primarily directed at the global risk factors of conflicts and can therefore rarely be applied to individual cases.
- 1
-
Moritz Koch, “Chinas Selbstentkoppelung”, Handelsblatt, 12 July 2021, 16.
- 2
-
Liu Caiyu, “Chinese Lawmaker Proposes Removing English as Core Subject”, Global Times, 5 March 2021, https:// www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217396.shtml (accessed 5 August 2021).
- 3
-
Gabriel Wildau, “Xi Invokes Mao with Call for ‘Self-reliance’”, Financial Times, 13 November 2018, 4.
- 4
-
Tetsushi Takahashi, “A Future in Which China No Longer Needs the World, but the World Cannot Spin without It”, Financial Times, 16 December 2020.
- 5
-
“Germany’s China Policy: Out of Date”, The Economist, 18 July 2020, 24.
- 6
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Daniel Goffart, “Notfalls aufs Geschäft verzichten”, Wirtschaftswoche, 16 July 2021, 30.
- 7
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“Welthandelsorganisation WTO droht die Blockade”, Die Zeit (online), 10 December 2019, https://www.zeit.de/news/ 2019-12/10/welthandelsorganisation-wto-droht-die-blockade (accessed 5 August 2021).
- 8
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WTO, “RTAs Currently in Force (by Year of Entry into Force), 1948–2021”, Regional Trade Agreements Database, https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (accessed 5 August 2021). It should be noted that the actual number of free trade agreements is even higher, as not all agreements have to be reported to the WTO.
- 9
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Thomas Hanke, “‘Wir müssen Druck auf China ausüben”, Handelsblatt, 9 August 2018, 9.
- 10
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Okonjo-Iweala acknowledged in early July that the WTO suffers from a “design problem” because WTO rules allow economies such as China to classify themselves as developing countries; see Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, “Development Status at WTO a ‘Design Problem’”, Inside U.S. Trade (online), 13 July 2021.
- 1
-
For more detail, see Sabine Riedel, Grenzschutz, Migration und Asyl. Wege der Europäischen Union aus der Politikverflechtungsfalle, SWP-Studie 23/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ publications/products/studien/2020S23_asyl_migration.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 2
-
Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Together for Europe’s Recovery. Review of Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 1 July to 31 December 2020 (Berlin, 2021), https://www.eu2020.de/ blob/2430740/82492e5a38fd3d8312991a7ee8e930c1/bilanz-en-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 3
-
Ibid., 5f.
- 4
-
Ursula Lehmkuhl, “Großbritannien in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften”, in Dossier. Der Brexit und die britische Sonderrolle in der EU, ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn, 10 June 2016), https://www.bpb.de/internationales/ europa/brexit/229084/von-efta-bis-eu?p=all (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 5
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Élysée, “Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy”, Paris, 7 February 2020, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/ speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 6
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European Commission, A Renewed Multilateralism Fit for the 21st Century: The EU’s Agenda, Press corner (Brussels, 17 February 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/ip_21_622 (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 7
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See Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, CA, 26 June 1945), article 2, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/ uncharter.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 8
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Laura Philipps and Daniela Braun, The Future of Multilateralism. The Liberal Order under Pressure, International Reports 3/2020 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 5 October 2020), https://www.kas.de/documents/259121/10240919/The+Future+of+Multilateralism.pdf/6ad20720-e21f-7986-b784-ec6729 adc53f?version=1.0&t=1601545054776 (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 9
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Deutscher Bundestag, Unterabteilung Europa, Fachbereich Europa, Differenzierte Integration in Europa, Berlin, 27 October 2020 (Ausarbeitung PE 6-3000-090/20), p. 12 https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/810866/e2015ec67fe07f73390cba33eb2fa229/PE-6-090-20-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 10
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See “Polen-Quartett. Vier Personen, ein Thema. Über Polen” (online) (Darmstadt: Deutsches Polen-Institut, 2021), https://www.deutsches-polen-institut.de/politik/polen-quartett/ (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 11
-
For background, see Axel Kreienbrink et al., Rückkehr aus Deutschland. Forschungsstudie 2006 im Rahmen des Europäischen Migrationsnetzwerks, Forschungsbericht 4 (Nürnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2007), https://www. bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb04-rueckkehr-emn.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11 (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 12
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See European Parliament, The Western Balkans, Fact Sheets on the European Union (Brussels and Strasbourg, June 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_ 5.5.2.pdf (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 13
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European Union, The Comprehensive & Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union & Armenia (CEPA) (Brussels, 26 February 2021), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/36140/comprehensive-enhanced-partnership-agreement-between-european-union-armenia-cepa_en (accessed 1 October 2021).
- 1
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Horst Köhler, speech on 10 October 2005, https://www. bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Horst-Koehler/ Reden/2005/10/20051010_Rede.html; Frank-Walter Steinmeier, speech on 12 November 2020, https://www. bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/11/201112-Geloebnis-Bundeswehr. html (accessed 18 August 2021). While Köhler’s statement was merely indicative, Steinmeier conceded that there was a problem of “friendly disinterest”.
- 2
-
For lessons and fallacies of the Afghanistan intervention, see Eckhard Lübkemeier, “Nicht alles ist schlecht”, Die Welt, 17 June 2020, 2.
- 3
-
See Oliver Thränert, “Sicherheit im Atomzeitalter: Atempause oder Zeitenwende?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 June 2021, 7.
- 4
-
See Eckhard Lübkemeier, Europa schaffen mit eigenen Waffen? SWP-Studie 17/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2020). For the English version, see Eckhard Lübkemeier, Standing on Our Own Feet? Opportunities and Risks of European Self-Defence, SWP Research Paper 1/2021 (Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2021).
- 1
-
See Max Bergmann, James Lamond and Siena Cicarelli, The Case for EU Defense. A New Way Forward for Trans-Atlantic Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, June 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/ issues/security/reports/2021/06/01/500099/case-eu-defense/ (accessed 13 August 2021).
- 2
-
Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan E. Hillman, The G7’s New Global Infrastructure Initiative, CSIS Critical Questions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], June 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/g7s-new-global-infrastructure-initiative (accessed 13 August 2021).
- 3
-
See Markus Kaim and Ronja Kempin, A European Security Council. Added Value for EU Foreign and Security Policy? SWP Comment 2/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/
a-european-security-council (accessed 8 October 2021). - 1
-
Adam Soboczynski, “Die Zeiten, in denen wir uns auf andere völlig verlassen konnten, die sind ein Stück vorbei”, Die Zeit (online), 3 June 2017, https://www.zeit.de/2017/23/ angela-merkel-rhetorik-deutschland-usa (accessed 20 July 2021).
- 2
-
“The essential problem is neither American arrogance nor European fecklessness. Rather, it is the toxic interaction between the two”, Jeremy Shapiro, “Biden Talks a Big Game on Europe. But His Actions Tell a Different Story”, Politico (online), 4 June 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/ magazine/2021/06/04/biden-administration-europe-focus-491857 (accessed 8 June 2021).
- 3
-
See the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p. 46ff.
- 4
-
Public Religion Research Institute, “The ‘Big Lie’: Most Republicans Believe the 2020 Election Was Stolen” (Washington, D.C., 12 May 2021), https://www.prri.org/ spotlight/the-big-lie-most-republicans-believe-the-2020-election-was-stolen/ (accessed 15 July 2021).
- 5
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Brennan Center for Justice, “Voting Laws Roundup: May 2021” (Washington, D.C., 28 May 2021), https://www. brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2021 (accessed 16 July 2021); States United Democracy Center et al., “Democracy Crisis Report Update: New Data and Trends Show the Warning Signs Have Intensified in the Last Two Months”, 10 June 2021, https:// statesuniteddemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ Democracy-Crisis-Part-II_June-10_Final_v7.pdf (accessed 16 July 2021).
- 6
-
See the contribution of Wolfgang Richter, p. 91ff.
- 1
-
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: EU-China – A Strategic Outlook (Strasbourg, 12 March 2019), 1, https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0005&from=EN (accessed 19 October 2021).
- 2
-
Jörg Lau, “‘Schwieriger Partner’”, Internationale Politik, no. 2 (2021): 13.
- 3
-
See also Library of the European Parliament, EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries, Library Briefing (26 September 2012), 2, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/biblio theque/briefing/2012/120354/LDM_BRI%282012%29120354_REV1_EN.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).
- 4
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See Moritz Rudolf, Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law. New Substance in the Conflict of Systems with China, SWP Comment 28/2021 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2021), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/xi-jinping-thought-on-the-rule-of-law (accessed 19 October 2021).
- 5
-
See the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p. 46ff.
- 6
-
“‘I think the European Union is a foe,’ Trump says ahead of Putin meeting in Helsinki”, CBS News, 15 July 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-interview-cbs-news-european-union-is-a-foe-ahead-of-putin-meeting-in-helsinki-jeff-glor/ (accessed 10 August 2021).
- 7
-
For another view, see the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p. 46ff.
- 8
-
US Department of State, “A Foreign Policy for the American People”, Speech by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, 3 March 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/ (accessed 10 August 2021).
- 9
-
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council (see note 1), 1.
- 10
-
See the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p. 46ff.
- 11
-
See the contribution of Sabine Fischer, p. 43ff.
- 12
-
See the contribution of Günther Maihold, p. 69ff.
- 13
-
See the contribution of Sabine Fischer, p. 43ff.
- 14
-
See also Wolfgang Ischinger and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy – Report of the Distinguished Reflection Group on Transatlantic China Policy (Munich, Berlin, Washington, D.C.: Munich Security Conference, Mercator Institute for China Studies, Aspen Strategy Group, July 2021), https://doi.org/10.47342/GXWK1490 (accessed 6 August 2021); Hans Binnendijk and Sarah Kirchberger, The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, March 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/ 03/The-China-Plan-A-Transatlantic-Blueprint.pdf (accessed 10 August 2021).
- 1
-
See the contribution of Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel, p. 46ff.
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